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Let every man be his own methodologist; let every man be his own theorist; 
let theory and method again become part of the practice of a craft. 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                        C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (1959) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the recent politics of wildlife and forest conservation with reference 
to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state in India. It analyses two processes initiated in 2002, 
and their effects on conservation and livelihoods: a) the international ban on the trade of 
shahtoosh (wool derived from the Tibetan antelope), resulting in the loss of the 
traditional occupation of a large number of shawl workers in the Kashmir valley; and b) 
the implementation of joint forest management projects under the ‘National 
Afforestation Programme’ in Jammu region, resulting in new spaces for cooperation and 
conflict between forest bureaucracy and local communities. The thesis explains how 
global environmental policies permeate different layers of politics from macro- to 
microlevels in the process of implementation. The following four questions are addressed 
in the thesis: first, how does power determine access to and control over natural 
resources? Second, how are global conservation interventions understood, accepted and 
reshaped by various actors? Third, what has been the impact of these recent 
interventions on different categories of resource users? Fourth, in what ways do these 
conservation processes converge with the attempts of historically powerful actors (state 
and local elites) to dominate the poor and marginalised populations, specifically shawl 
workers and forest dependent communities?  
 
On the basis of a detailed examination of the two processes, I argue that nature 
conservation policies do not go unchallenged but are contested and coloured by the 
power, agendas and interests of different stakeholders. I demonstrate that in the pursuit 
of conservation measures, powerful actors are able to secure their respective interests 
while directing the cost of nature conservation to the poor who are traditionally 
dependent on wildlife and forest resources for sustenance. This is not to deny the 
seriousness of environmental concerns, but to point out the repercussions of a blanket 
ban on the livelihoods of the shahtoosh workers, and of limiting the access to forest 
resources for local communities, who are trying to survive in an already fragile economy 
amidst militant separatist movement in J&K. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction: research problem and questions 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine and analyse the politics of recent wildlife and 
forest conservation interventions in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter 
J&K). With a long history of militant separatist movement and violence, J&K has drawn 
the attention of scholars interested in the issues of strategic affairs, autonomy, secession, 
terrorism, ethnicity, identity based conflicts, displacement and forced migration. Over 
the last few decades, these problems relating to political instability in the region have 
eclipsed other issues of significant research interest, despite the fact that amidst conflict, 
interactions between social, political, economic and environmental forces have 
simultaneously been taking place in J&K (as in other states of India). The problems 
pertaining to natural resources and livelihoods have also been unfolding in J&K as in the 
rest of India, but have not received due consideration by the scholars of the region. 
Owing to the fact that the vast majority of the population of the state is dependent on 
natural resources for livelihoods and sustenance, and that power relations largely 
determine access to and use of resources, the field of environmental politics provides a 
significant area of research on J&K. It is with this interest and motivation that I have 
undertaken my study on the politics of nature conservation, aiming to fill the gap in the 
available literature on the region.  
 
In 2002, two significant nature conservation interventions took place in the state of J&K. 
First, an international ban on the production of shahtoosh (wool derived from the 
Tibetan antelope, Pantholops hodgsonii) was imposed on the state following pressure 
from the international conservation community and the Indian government. The banning 
of shahtoosh resulted in the loss of traditional occupations for a large number of shawl 
workers in Kashmir. Second, the central Ministry of the Environment and Forests 
sponsored National Afforestation Programme (NAP) was initiated in J&K for promoting 
forest regeneration and protection with the help of local communities. In line with the 
dominant global forest management discourse of the time, the NAP aimed to facilitate 
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the functioning of ‘joint forest management’ through devolution of project funds to the 
village forest committees, resulting in new avenues for cooperation and conflict between 
the forest users and managers. Apart from making significant impact on the livelihoods 
and sustenance of populations dependent on natural resources (shahtoosh wool and 
forest produce) in J&K, these two processes have also generated various forms of politics 
within local communities on the one hand, and between conservationist groups, central 
government, provincial government, local state and resource users on the other, in 
relation to control over and access to resources. The thesis discusses the agendas, 
interests and power of different actors involved in the two processes, and analyses how 
environmental policies permeate different layers of politics from macro- to microlevel in 
the process of implementation.
1
  
 
The research sets out to understand the recent politics of nature conservation in J&K by 
addressing the following four analytical questions. First, how does power determine 
access to and control over natural resources? Second, how are global conservation 
interventions understood, accepted and reshaped by various actors? Third, what has 
been the impact of these recent interventions on different categories of resource users? 
Fourth, in what ways do these conservation processes converge with the attempts of 
historically powerful actors (state and local elites) to dominate the poor and marginalised 
populations, specifically shawl workers and forest dependent communities? While 
answering these questions, my purpose is not to challenge the arguments put forward by 
conservationists in relation to the urgent need for conserving natural resources, both 
forests and wildlife, but to question the dominance of conservation interests at the cost 
of livelihoods and subsistence needs of the local communities. In this thesis, I 
demonstrate that in the absence of alternative livelihoods or rehabilitation support to 
the affected populations, the conservation policies are unlikely to meet desired goals. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis, the terms macro and micro are used to refer to the sites of study as well as relative scales.  
While the term micro is used to define the local or the specific site where the policy is enforced, macro 
refers to sites outside the local, including international, national, state and divisional levels, and also the 
linkages between them. 
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1. Introduction to case-studies 
 
Case I: The ban on shahtoosh trade 
As mentioned above, the international ban on trade involving shahtoosh was extended to 
J&K in 2002 to protect the ‘endangered’ species of the Tibetan antelope, commonly 
known as chiru.
2
 This antelope is killed for its wool, known as shahtoosh, which is 
smuggled into Kashmir from Tibet and woven into shawls and scarves.
3
 While the source 
of shahtoosh is Tibet, the manufacturing of shawls takes place exclusively in the Kashmir 
valley. The shawls are very expensive and have remained in great demand as a luxury 
product in high-end fashion markets worldwide.
4
 Over the years, the increasing demand 
for shahtoosh shawls resulted in the large scale poaching of the antelope in Tibet by local 
herdsmen.
5
  
 
There are 21 different categories of shahtoosh workers involved in the various stages of 
production and marketing of shahtoosh shawls.
6
 Bhotias, the pastoral nomads of western 
Himalayan region, bring the unprocessed wool from Tibet to Kashmir to be sold to local 
                                                 
2
 Since 2002, chiru is listed as ‘endangered’ in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature ‘Red 
List of Threatened Animals’ (IUCN, 2010). The species was categorised as ‘vulnerable’ from 1996 until 2002 
in the same list. 
3
 The origin of shawl weaving in Kashmir is obscure. The local people of the Kashmir valley associate its 
origin with Shah Hamdani, a Sufi saint who introduced this skill from Persia to Kashmir centuries ago. I deal 
with the myths and legends associated with its origin at length in chapter three of this thesis. 
4
 Before the ban, the price of a plain shahtoosh shawl would range from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 40,000 depending 
upon the quality of the wool used. The price of an intricately embroidered shahtoosh shawl could even go 
up to eight to ten lakhs of rupees. After the ban, the price of shahtoosh shawls has increased manifold. I 
explain the continued production of shahtoosh shawls and its illegal trade in chapters four and five of this 
thesis.   
5
 For centuries, people in Kashmir had clung to the age old belief that shahtoosh wool is shed by an animal 
seasonally and collected from rocks and bushes by the herdsmen. The truth about the connection between 
the massacre of the Tibetan antelope, and shahtoosh shawls was revealed to the scientific and 
conservation communities only in 1988 by George Schaller, an American biologist who saw herdsmen in 
the village of Gerze plucking the shahtoosh wool from the hides of the antelope to sell it to wool traders 
(see Schaller, 1993). 
6
 A detailed description of all the different categories of workers and the production process is presented in 
chapter three. In this thesis, I have used the term ‘shahtoosh workers’ to refer generally to all the different 
categories of workers engaged in shahtoosh shawl production. At some places, this term specifically refers 
to the poorer artisans from within the broader community of people involved in the shawl production, 
especially when comparing the interests of the poorer workers with those of powerful actors such as 
manufacturers, hawkers, agents and traders.  
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wool dealers and shawl manufacturers (locally known as vastas).
7
 The agents of 
manufacturers (poiywans) distribute the raw wool to separators (charun wajens) and 
spinners (katun wajens) for spinning, and then to weavers (vovers).
8
 The woven shawls 
are then taken to clippers (puruzgars), darners (raffugars), and washers (dhobis) for 
finishing, and finally to the designers (naqqashs), printers (chappawals) and 
embroiderers (ragbars) for designing and embroidery. These shawls are then sold by 
hawkers (pheriwalas) and exporters in domestic and international markets. It is 
noteworthy that the wool dealers, manufacturers, agents and exporters have reaped the 
maximum benefits from the shahtoosh trade while the skilled workers involved in the 
production have suffered exploitation at the hands of these powerful actors. 
  
The antelope has been included in Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) since its inception in July 1975, 
making any trade in chiru body parts and its derivatives illegal (CITES, 1999). In India, the 
species was listed under Schedule I of the Wildlife Protection Act (1977), making any 
harm to the animal, or trade in its products, an illegal act. The state of J&K is the only 
state in India which has a separate Wildlife Protection Act. Here, chiru appeared in 
Schedule II of the Wildlife Protection Act (1978), which permitted trade, however, 
‘controlled’ by the state. Owing to the declining number of chirus, evidenced by an 
American wildlife biologist, George Schaller, the Wildlife Protection Society of India 
(WPSI), a New Delhi based animal rights organisation, filed a ‘Public Interest Litigation’ 
(PIL) in the J&K High Court in 1998, calling for a complete ban on the manufacture and 
sale of shahtoosh shawls.
9
 After a four year long legal battle between animal rights 
organisations and the J&K government, the J&K High Court in 2002, ordered the J&K 
state to comply with the regulations of CITES to which India is a signatory. Following this, 
                                                 
7
 It is to be noted that manufacturers, unlike traders or merchants, are themselves involved in the actual     
production process of shawls such as embroidering or weaving, alongside controlling the entire production 
process, employing subordinate workers and owning the finished products.  
8
 In a gendered division of labour, spinning is done exclusively by women and weaving by men. 
9
 The WPSI is a non-profit organisation of India founded by a wildlife photographer Belinda Wright in 1994 with 
the aim of providing support and information to combat wildlife poaching and illegal trade of wildlife parts. 
The WPSI is involved in all of India's major wildlife conservation issues and have been in the forefront of media 
campaigns to highlight the importance of wildlife protection. It is funded by a wide range of international and 
national donors including the British High Commission, New Delhi, Ford Foundation, HSBC Ltd. and American 
Museum of Natural History. The Society’s members include leading conservationists and business people. 
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and also due to the pressures of the central government and international 
conservationist groups, the J&K legislative assembly amended its Wildlife Protection Act 
and moved the Tibetan antelope from Schedule II to Schedule I, giving it complete 
protection but resulting in the loss of traditional occupations of a large number of shawl 
workers in the Kashmir valley.  
 
This case-study aims to understand the process of banning shahtoosh in J&K and the 
surrounding politics between environmentalist groups, central and state governments, 
and shahtoosh workers. It analyses how the international ban on shahtoosh trade was 
received, resisted and negotiated at different levels from global to local. The ban on 
shahtoosh trade is examined in the light of the following questions: a) What are the 
agendas and interests of the diverse set of actors (international, national, state and local) 
associated with the ban on shahtoosh trade? b) What is the status of shahtoosh trade in 
J&K state since its ban in 2002? c) How can the state be understood in its dual role, acting 
as an agency to impose the ban and also contesting the ban in view of the demands of 
the people or even allowing illegal production and the trade of shahtoosh to continue? d) 
How has the ban affected the livelihoods of different categories of shahtoosh workers? e) 
How did the shahtoosh workers respond to the ban and to what extent were their 
interests served by the state and non-state agencies? f) How do local power relations 
within the shahtoosh worker community determine the control over shawl production 
and trade after the imposition of the ban? These questions can help us to analyse how 
power determines control over natural resources; can explain how global wildlife 
conservation interventions unfold from national to local levels; and highlight how such 
interventions can seep into existing relations of domination and subordination at the 
microlevel. An integrated analysis of macro- and microforms of politics and the 
differential impact of the ban on shahtoosh within the local communities can enhance 
our understanding of multiple ways through which the global meets with the local. 
 
Case II: National Afforestation Programme  
The forest use, control and access in India has been characterised by issues of 
cooperation as well as conflict between multiple actors including local users, timber 
contractors, state forest departments, the central Ministry of the Environment and 
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Forests, and international development and conservation communities. From the 
colonial period until the late 1980s, forest management and conservation in J&K has 
largely remained under the exclusive control of forest bureaucracy, as in other parts of 
India.
10
 Yet, some attempts to incorporate the participation of local forest users in the 
projects sponsored by the Forest Department (FD) and international donors have been 
made in discrete locations within J&K from the 1970s onwards. The ‘farm forestry’ 
programme was initiated in 1972 to ‘afforest’ rural areas and supplement the incomes of 
farmers, and a World Bank funded ‘social forestry’ project was started in 1982 with the 
main objective of tree plantation on common lands so as to combat the global problem 
of ‘deforestation’. Under these projects, village forest committees were formed in some 
villages of the state for the purpose of implementation but they lacked any effective 
powers and remained dormant after project completion. With the change in 
international development thinking in favour of ‘decentralised natural resource 
management’ by the late 1980s and the rising demands for local control of local forest 
resources by environmental activists in India, the Ministry of the Environment and 
Forests (MoEF), Government of India in 1990 initiated an ambitious programme, the 
‘Joint Forest Management’ (JFM), to involve village communities in the protection and 
development of degraded forest areas surrounding villages. The JFM programme was 
implemented in J&K in 1992, and required formation of ‘joint forest management 
committees’ (JFMCs) with an understanding that the local communities would get better 
access to forest resources in return for their shared responsibility in forest protection and 
regeneration. However, the JFMCs lacked financial powers, which still remained within 
the FD.  
 
Reviewing the functioning of the JFM in the first decade of its implementation, the MoEF, 
in 2002, initiated the National Afforestation Programme (NAP) to facilitate the 
functioning of the JFM, and to provide a firm and sustainable mechanism for the 
devolution of funds to the JFMCs for effective project implementation. The new scheme 
of the NAP was to be implemented through a two-tier decentralised structure including 
Forest Development Agencies or FDAs (at the forest division level) and JFMCs (at the 
                                                 
10
 I provide a detailed historical account of forest management and use during this period in chapter six of 
this thesis. 
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village level).
11
 Under the NAP, in contrast to previous JFM projects, the funds were to be 
transferred directly by the MoEF to the FDAs headed by the territorial Conservator of 
Forests (bypassing the state FD headquarters) which were then to be released by the 
FDAs to individual JFMCs. 
 
The study of ‘joint forest management’ under the NAP in J&K provides an opportunity to 
analyse the politics of forest conservation and management involving various actors, 
including the MoEF, J&K Forest Department, forest field-staff, JFMCs and village 
communities. The study engages with the following analytical questions: a) How can we 
understand the changing systems of forest management and control in J&K and their 
implications for the relationship between forest resources and dependent populations? 
b) What potential does the NAP have for sustainable management of forest resources 
through decentralisation, partnership and local participation? c) To what extent has the 
programme been able to address the problems of access to timber, fuelwood and fodder 
for village residents? d) How can the ‘local state’ be understood in its divided role of 
implementing the programme and also, at times, contravening the forest laws and 
regulations? e) How do the differential power and abilities of various actors influence 
their transgression of forest regulations and indulgence in illegal timber harvesting? This 
study can enhance our understanding of the various layers of politics from macro- to 
microlevels, through which forest conservation and management policies are shaped and 
reshaped in the process of their implementation. It can demonstrate the centrality of 
power relations in defining the outcomes of forest conservation interventions. The study 
can also unravel the various mechanisms by which the conservation interests can 
converge with the attempts of historically powerful actors to maintain control over forest 
resources while also creating new possibilities of cooperation, alliances and conflicts at 
different levels, from national to village. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 A detailed discussion on the objectives of the NAP, the flow of funds, and the structure and composition 
of the FDAs and JFMCs is presented in chapter seven of this thesis. 
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2. Rationale for case selection 
 
In order to understand the wider politics of nature conservation, and to capture the 
political, cultural and regional diversities within the J&K state that could influence the 
outcome of conservation interventions, it was logical to select more than one case-study 
for the purpose of this thesis. The selected case-studies reflect on two recent nature 
conservation interventions in J&K, one in the field of wildlife and another in the arena of 
forest conservation. The banning of shahtoosh, while affecting its trade worldwide, is of 
the utmost significance to the people of Kashmir valley, as the entire production of 
shawls is concentrated in this region. The impact of the ban on shahtoosh in the Jammu 
region is inconsequential apart from the general decline in trade. The political dynamics 
of Kashmir valley are very different from that of the Jammu region, making it difficult to 
draw any generalisations on the politics of nature conservation based on a single study.
12
 
Therefore, I selected one case-study (ban on shahtoosh) from Kashmir, and another (on 
forest conservation) from the Jammu region. Also, since shahtoosh shawl production is 
an urban based activity, mainly concentrated in Srinagar city, the summer capital of the 
state, while the JFM programme is implemented in rural areas, the choice of two case-
studies was made, keeping in view the various ways that local communities, both rural 
and urban, amidst the fragile economy of the state, can respond to nature conservation 
policies affecting their livelihoods and access to natural resources. 
 
The selection of two recent processes of nature conservation in J&K was also influenced 
by the fact that while there is a direct conflict between the interests of the affected 
community, the state and those of the conservationist groups in the case of shahtoosh, 
there is no overt conflict between the interests of forest dependent populations and 
conservation goals in the case of the NAP. It was, therefore, worth examining how the 
nature conservation policies unfold under situations of both converging and diverging 
interests of the different players involved, for getting a holistic picture of nature 
conservation in J&K. A common denominator in both cases was the requirement to 
evaluate the power, agendas and roles of different actors at multiple levels – 
                                                 
12
 I discuss the political dynamics of J&K and introduce my field sites in the next chapter. 
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international, national, state and local. Furthermore, the two case-studies address the 
question of livelihoods and subsistence needs of the local communities in relation to the 
conservation policies. Although it was not the focus of my research to investigate the 
illegal trading of shahtoosh as well as timber resources in J&K, I saw commonalities in 
both cases in terms of the dual role of the state and its nexus with powerful actors (e.g. 
shawl manufacturers, timber contractors and local elites) which largely influence the 
outcome of nature conservation interventions.  
 
3. Analytical framework 
 
The two processes of wildlife and forest conservation in J&K are analysed using a political 
ecology approach as power in resource use and access is the central component of this 
thesis. Scholars have emphasised the significance of ‘political ecology’ in understanding 
various forms of struggles involved in controlling natural resources (for a review, see 
Robbins, 2004; Forsyth, 2003; Jayal, 2001; Watts, 2000; Greenberg and Park, 1994 and 
Blaikie, 1985) and also in gaining insights into the responses of local actors to the 
challenges and opportunities posed by global discourses of conservation, 
environmentalism, sustainability and development (see for example, Dressler et al., 
2010; Shackleton, 2010; Singh, 2008; Springate and Blaikie, 2007; Sundar et al., 2001 and 
Stott and Sullivan, 2000).  
 
Political ecology has been described in various ways: Watts (2000: 257) argues that 
political ecology understands the complex relationship of nature with society through a 
careful study of ‘forms of access and control over resources and their implications for 
environmental health and sustainable livelihoods’. Bryant and Bailey (1997: 28) argue 
that political ecologists accept the idea that ‘costs and benefits associated with 
environmental change are for the most part distributed among actors unequally’. 
Robbins (2004: 12) insists that political ecology is able to critically explain ‘what is wrong 
with dominant accounts of environmental change, while at the same time, explore 
alternatives [...] in the face of mismanagement and exploitation’. Others have defined 
political ecology as a framework that links macrolevel political economic processes with 
microlevel aspects of human ecology (Dodds, 1998); or ‘a synthesis […] to link the 
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distribution of power with productive activity and ecological analysis’ (Greenberg and 
Park, 1994: 1); and also as an approach to identify ‘political circumstances that forced 
people into activities which caused environmental degradation in the absence of 
alternative possibilities’ (Stott and Sullivan, 2000: 4).  
 
In the context of developing countries, Moore (1993: 381) alleges that political ecology 
approaches have given little attention to the ‘rich micropolitics that condition 
environmental conflicts’ (see also Campbell et al., 2001; Moore, 1996). It is argued that 
political ecology analyses should focus on the relationship of class, ethnic, and gender 
structures to conflicts over access to resources, the interrelations among local resource 
users and groups of society who affect resource use, and diversity in the decisions of 
local resource managers (see Rocheleau et al., 1996; Stonich, 1993). Some scholars have 
also cautioned against the understanding of local communities as fairly autonomous and 
homogeneous (e.g. Painter, 1995; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999) and to ignore the internal 
complexities of the state while analysing natural resource management problems (see 
Baviskar, 2007; Vasan, 2006; Vira, 1999; Gupta, 1995; Moore, 1993).  
 
While recognising the importance of microlevel politics, Bryant and Bailey (1997) suggest 
that the third world political ecology research actually suffers from an ‘exaggerated 
emphasis on local activities at the cost of regional and global analyses’, and that there is 
an ‘anthropological style preoccupation with local problems even when those issues are 
linked to structural forces’ (ibid.: 6). A more appropriate course for political ecology 
analyses, Bryant and Bailey (1997: 196) suggest would be a ‘political engagement on 
several fronts, at different scales and with various actors’. Along the same lines, Robbins 
(2004: 10) sees political ecology as evaluating the ‘influence of variables acting on a 
number of scales, each nested within another, with local decisions influenced by regional 
and global policies’. Moreover, some other scholars have acknowledged the role of 
historical analysis in understanding the complex relationship between social, political and 
ecological processes (see Agrawal, 2005; Mosse, 2003; Peluso, 1993; Guha, 1990; Blaikie 
and Brookfield, 1987; Blaikie, 1985). It is also suggested that the management of natural 
resources, inherently political in nature, requires inter- and transdisciplinary research 
rather than being ‘disciplinarily divided’ (Mollinga, 2008: 8/2010).  
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Keeping in view the significance of interdisciplinarity as well as the need to have a wider 
canvas for multi-scale analysis, the political ecological framework adopted in this thesis 
draws from historical, political and anthropological approaches, and incorporates the 
study of role, agendas and interests of multiple actors at different levels – from global to 
local – to understand the two recent nature conservation interventions in J&K. I use 
interdisciplinary approach in order to examine how various historical, political, social, 
economic and ecological factors combine to shape nature conservation policies and their 
effects. The integrative multi-level and multi-actor framework of the thesis also takes 
into account the differentiated concerns of various social groups within the affected 
communities as well as the internal complexities within the state while examining the 
banning of shahtoosh and the implementation of NAP.  
 
4. Theoretical positioning 
 
The issues of sustainability, livelihoods, participation and decentralised natural resource 
management are central in the policy and practice of the mainstream institutions in the 
arena of nature conservation. One of the earliest documents of the mainstream, World 
Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980, para. 20.6) reads: ‘Conservation is entirely 
compatible with the growing demand for “people-centred” development that achieves a 
wider distribution of benefits to whole populations’. Adams (2001: 270) argues that 
initially, the conservationist groups believed that conservation could sustain 
development and also that development could be reconfigured to achieve conservation 
goals. The mainstream conservation community advanced ‘sustainable development’ 
(SD) as a solution to the tensions between environment and poverty issues.
13
 By the late 
1980s, with the popularity of the concept of SD, conservationists began to claim that 
these objectives could be achieved at all levels: globally, nationally and locally (Adams, 
2001). Conservation is portrayed as something that, if properly organised, could be made 
to meet the needs of the local people, and sustainable development and conservation 
                                                 
13
 The most common definition of SD reads: ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). In other words, SD 
suggests undertaking ‘environmental planning and management in a way that does minimum damage to 
ecological processes without putting a brake on human aspirations for economic and social improvement’ 
(Redclift, 1987: 39). 
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are always easier to achieve when they bring positive economic benefits to communities 
affected by these endeavours (Tisdell, 1999; see also Dryzek 2005). There is a strong 
belief that poverty is the root of environmental degradation. Scholars such as Chambers 
(1987: 1) challenge this viewpoint by arguing that ‘the poor are not the problem, they are 
the solution for sustainable development’. Following this, the ‘sustainable livelihoods’ 
(SL) approach was advanced as a solution to bridge the gap between conservation goals 
and the interests of local populations, and to better understand the relationship between 
poverty and the environment.
14
  
 
Wildlife conservation and forestry, however, provide significant challenges to realising 
the goals of sustainable management of natural resources along with the sustainable 
livelihoods of dependent populations. Despite the celebration of the SD and SL 
approaches, the concept of ‘sustainability’ is ambiguous and does not clearly suggest 
what is to be sustained and for whom. Most discussion on sustainability is at the ‘high 
concept level’ rather than ‘practical problem-solving level’ (Hempel, 1999). Yearley 
(1996) states that the goal of SD fails to provide an uncontested, universal discourse 
because the very concept is difficult to define (see also Carswell et al., 1997). Sachs 
(1993) argues that SD fails to address the difficult questions of what kinds of needs 
should be satisfied and how available resources should be distributed. The SL approach 
synthesises many issues into a single framework, but like SD remains ambiguous and 
conveys a somewhat ‘cleansed’, ‘neutral’ approach to power issues (Ashley and Carney, 
1999; see also Barraclough, 1997). The central importance of ‘political factors’ and the 
harsh realities of power relations in determining people’s access to local resources are 
largely neglected in both SD and SL literatures (Baumann and Sinha, 2000). Lele (1991) 
                                                 
14
 The ‘Sustainable Livelihoods’ approach assumes that people can pursue a range of livelihood outcomes 
i.e. more income, increased well being, reduced vulnerability and a sustainable resource base. This 
framework identifies five capital assets available to the poor: natural capital (the natural resource stocks- 
soil, water, air, genetic resources etc.), physical capital (ecological cycles from which resources flow and 
services useful for livelihoods are derived), economic or financial capital (the capital base- cash, 
credit/debt, savings, and other economic assets, including basic infrastructure and production equipment 
and technologies), human capital (the skills, knowledge, ability to work, good health and physical 
capability), social capital (the social networks of trust, social relations, affiliations and associations) 
(Chambers, 1988: 7). For a review on the SL framework, see Ellis (2000), Bebbington (1999), Scoones 
(1998), Carney (1998) and Chambers and Conway (1992).  
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argues that lacking faith in local participation, the SD approaches have led to 
inadequacies and contradictions in policy-making, resulting in their failure to address the 
problems of poverty and environmental degradation. These approaches also ignore 
illegal activities and the issues of corruption in natural resource management (see for 
example, Collins, 2008; Nordstrom, 2004; Robbins, 2000 and Peluso, 1993). I found the 
issues of power relations as well as corruption and illegality as central in both wildlife and 
forest conservation processes in J&K, an issue inadequately addressed in SD approaches. 
While noting the contributions of the SD and SL approaches, I have examined, in this 
thesis, to what extent the conservation goals are compatible with the subsistence needs 
of resource users and dependent populations. 
 
The mainstream conservation and development communities have responded to the 
critiques in relation to the exclusion of local communities in conservation programmes by 
incorporating ideals of ‘participation’ and ‘decentralisation’ (especially since the late 
1980s) for realising the goals of sustainable natural resource management. It is 
emphasised that active and willing participation of the local communities is necessary for 
any nature regeneration programme to succeed (Sunderland and Campbell, 2008; Hulme 
and Murphree, 2001; Gadgil, 1998). It is also argued that the decentralised management 
over natural resources would ensure the long term sustainability of resources as well as 
the livelihoods of resource dependent populations (see D’Silva and Nagnath, 2002; Saigal, 
2000 and Lynch and Talbot, 1995). Adams (1996: 9) suggests that ‘large scale creative 
conservation can involve both the restoration of nature and the reinvigoration of local 
communities’. Similar arguments for conservation through local cooperation have been 
made by Shepherd (1998) and Chambers et al. (1989). Some critics have cautioned that 
participation may not always alter the unequal power relations between resource users 
and the state as well as within local communities (e.g. Mabee and Hoberg, 2006; Ballabh 
et al., 2002; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Others have expressed scepticism on the 
potential of decentralised resource management for securing better outcomes for the 
poor as well as preserving environmental health (see Sarap and Sanrangi, 2009; Sundar, 
2004; Ribot, 1998). I shall provide a more detailed discussion on the claims of both 
optimists and sceptics in relation to participation, partnership and decentralisation while 
presenting the empirical findings from my two case-studies later in this thesis.  
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Contrary to the ‘win-win’ impulse of the SD and SL approaches based on cooperation 
between different stakeholders, the alternative stream of thinking sees global 
environmental concerns as a potential ground for conflict between the differently placed 
actors at various levels from global to local. One set of scholars highlight these conflicts 
at the global level between the North and the South. For example, Gupta (1998) views 
global environmental treaties as a ‘new form of governmentality’ while Peluso (1993) 
sees the global conservation agenda as inherently ‘coercive’ in nature. Others have 
defined global conservation interventions through concepts such as ‘ecological 
imperialism’ (Calvert and Calvert, 1999), ‘fortress conservation’ (Hulme and Murphree, 
1999), ‘green neo-liberalism’ or ‘eco-governmentality’ (Goldman, 1996), 
‘ecototalitarianism’ (Dietz, 1996) and ‘conservation imperialism’ (Guha and Martinez-
Alier, 1997). Calvert and Calvert (1999) argue that the aggressive support for forest 
conservation in tropical countries is linked to the interests of developed countries in the 
North. Likewise, Buttel (1992) observes that concerns about ‘our common future’ are, in 
practice, more parochially focused on the future of the wealthy industrial countries.  
 
While I find the arguments presented above convincing to a certain extent, I also see a 
lack of attention paid by these scholars to understand the various forms of politics 
generated in response to conservation policies imposed from ‘above’. Also, I 
problematise the assumption in the arguments of these scholars that the rationality 
disseminated by international treaties potentially alters the behaviour of people at the 
local level and changes their relationship with nature. In this thesis, I have argued that 
the conservation interventions do not go unchallenged but are contested, negotiated and 
reshaped by the interests of diverse actors at different levels from national to local. I 
shall deal with this point while analysing wildlife and forest conservation policies in J&K 
later in the thesis. 
 
Another set of scholars highlight the increasing use of conservation ideology to justify 
coercive interventions at national and sub-national levels. For example, Peluso (1993) 
argues that in the guise of resource control, the state uses ‘legitimate violence’ to control 
people, especially recalcitrant regional groups or minority groups who challenge the 
authority of the state in exclusive control of resources. Bryant and Bailey (1997) maintain 
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that environmental conservation is rarely seen by states as a goal in itself, but rather as a 
means to various political and economic ends (see also Blaikie, 2006). Some other 
scholars have also explained the use of conservation ideology in systematic state 
intervention for controlling natural resource use by local communities (see for example, 
Lohmann, 1996; Kothari et al., 1995; Ghimire, 1994; Utting, 1993; Neumann, 1992; Scott, 
1985).  
 
Critics have also discussed the various ways and methods through which the state is able 
to exercise its control over local natural resources. For example, Agrawal (2005) analyses 
how forest conservation efforts are realised by the state and suggests that it is done 
through the mechanism of ‘intimate government’ (by forming forest councils and 
dispersing its rule) and creation of ‘environmental subjects’ (local forest users imbibing 
conservation ideals). Li maintains that by portraying deficiencies in communities in 
relation to effective resource management, state forest agencies ‘retain their customary 
role as the party that produces policies, plans and regulations, prescribing and enforcing 
the proper relations between people and forests’ (2007: 280). She goes on to argue that 
often the state adopts the language of community forest management but treats it as ‘a 
contract between villagers and the forest department in which the department dictates 
the terms’ (ibid.: 280). Dean (1999: 209) argues that rights to resource use are made 
conditional on the performance of local communities, adding a coercive element to 
governmental strategies (see also Sundar, 2001; Poffenberger and Singh, 1996). Apart 
from these mechanisms, some scholars suggest that the state (and conservationists) also 
uses ‘scientific rationality’ as a means of establishing its privileged position of legitimate 
controller of local natural resources (see Forsyth and Walker, 2008; Saberwal and 
Rangarajan, 2003). I keep these viewpoints in mind while examining the role of state and 
conservationist groups in redefining the relationship between local communities and 
natural resources in J&K. 
 
Positioning thesis arguments 
My research complements the emerging literature on the politics of contingency and 
contestation in the context of natural resources (e.g. Gupta, 2009; Li, 2007; Sundar et al. 
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2001).
15
 This study, while acknowledging the centrality of politics in resource control and 
access, also recognises the dispersed and fluid nature of power and its exercise at 
multiple levels by conservationist groups, the heterogeneous state and local elites for 
retaining their hegemony and domination. Such an understanding of power motivates us 
to problematise the notion of the state as a unified or monolithic entity, and also to 
appreciate the diverse interests and abilities of differently positioned social groups within 
the local communities. Below, I note the arguments of some other scholars who have 
influenced my understanding of how global conservation interventions shape local 
realities and get reshaped in the process of implementation.  
 
Rose (1999: 51) argues that governance is not a process in which rule extends itself 
unproblematically across a territory but ‘a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and 
fissiparous affiliations’. Along the same lines, Moore (2000: 43) suggests that 
international development needs to be understood ‘not as a machine that secures fixed 
and determined outcomes but rather as a site of contestation’. Gupta notes that 
development, a powerful tool of domination in the postcolonial era, has also been 
appropriated and reshaped by subaltern groups, particularly in the context of Third 
World agrarian populism (Gupta, 1998: 320). Martinez-Alier (2003) explains how local 
settler communities in Guatemala have learnt to defend their interests and manoeuvre 
through the language of indigenous territorial rights and sustainable development. Rossi 
(2004: 26) argues that relative distance from the sources of development rationality 
increases the room for manoeuvre available to the recipients of policies and 
interventions. A common denominator in the arguments of these various scholars is that 
they contest the idea that policies from ‘above’ have the sole power to transform the 
                                                 
15
 The approach in this research is comparable to some recent studies in the field of natural resource 
management. For example, Gupta (2009) analyses the interests, agendas and power of various actors 
involved in ‘watershed development’ interventions in India, ranging from international development and 
donor agencies to the state, as well as different types of grassroots organisations, and presents complex 
processes of cooperation, conflict and negotiation between the various agents and recipients of watershed 
development programmes. Li (2007), in the context of the community forestry programme in Indonesia, 
examines the role of a range of parties beyond the state that attempt to govern forest resources including 
NGOs and donor agencies with their teams of expert consultants, social reformers, scientists and research 
institutions. She argues that community forest management is the assemblage that has emerged in the 
space of struggle between villagers and forest bureaucracies on the forest edge. Sundar et al. (2001), in 
their study of the JFM in five states of India, provide a detailed ethnographic work at the village level with a 
survey of NGOs and forest departments at state and national levels, and argue that in the process of 
implementing participatory forestry, communities and their needs are being reconfigured.  
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local realities. In this thesis, I have demonstrated this point in the context of both the 
banning of shahtoosh and forest conservation intervention in J&K.  
 
5. Significance 
 
The principal originality of the thesis lies in its empirical focus on understanding the 
politics surrounding the banning of shahtoosh trade, and the functioning of joint forest 
management in J&K. The available literature on shahtoosh in particular and the shawl 
industry in general, mainly consists of historical accounts by travellers (such as 
Younghusband, 1909; Schonsberg, 1853; Moorcroft, 1820) and the works of art historians 
(e.g. Rehman and Jafri, 2006; Ahad, 1987; Ames, 1986; Irwin, 1973). These accounts do 
not suggest any connections between shahtoosh and the Tibetan antelope; the origin of 
wool remains unclear although shahtoosh has been described as the finest quality wool 
in comparison to other varieties such as pashmina.
16
 Apart from these historical accounts 
of the shawl industry, there is no academic work specifically on shahtoosh shawl 
production before or after the ban. The project reports produced by wildlife conservation 
organisations from the late 1990s onwards are the only secondary materials available on 
this subject. In the case of forest conservation, there is no comprehensive account of 
forest management in the state during the colonial period apart from the annual 
assessment reports and working plans produced by the J&K Forest Department. There is 
also no academic work on the performance of the JFM or NAP in the state. This study is, 
therefore, the first systematic account of the recent politics of wildlife and forest 
conservation in J&K. 
 
The literature on J&K is preoccupied with issues relating to political conflict, militancy and 
forced migration in the post-independence period. The field of ecology and environment 
has largely remained unexplored in the literature on this region, with the available 
studies mainly focusing on the natural science aspects of the environment, such as 
wetlands conservation, flora and fauna diversity, environmental pollution, deforestation 
etc. (see for example, Bhatt, 2004; Chadha, 1991). There is a lack of attention to social 
                                                 
16
 Pashmina, popularly known as cashmere (outside India) is another fine quality wool, derived from a 
reared goat found in Ladakh. 
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and political aspects of the environment and natural resources. This study is an attempt 
in the field of political ecology in J&K which can also contribute to the emerging literature 
on environmental politics in conflict situations (see Le Billon, 2005; Korf, 2004; Peluso 
and Watts, 2001; Homer-Dixon, 1999).  
 
My research also makes a significant contribution to understanding the illegality and 
corruption in natural resource use and management. While illegal wildlife and the timber 
trade were not the primary objectives of my research, I was able to gather information 
on these issues while collecting data on the impact of the ban on shahtoosh workers and 
interacting with village residents and forest field-staff. Despite widespread evidence of 
bribery and illegal exchange in natural resource management, corruption is largely 
unexplored and undertheorised in the literature (Robbins, 2000; Omara-Ojungu, 1992). 
By explaining some new mechanisms adopted by various actors in the illegal production 
and trade of shahtoosh as well as illegal timber harvesting, my findings add to the 
existing literature on illegality and corruption in the context of resource use (see for 
example, Bloomer, 2009; Wardell and Lund, 2006; Wiggins et al., 2004; Leon, 1994; 
Peluso 1993). 
 
This study also enhances our knowledge of how conservation interventions are 
understood, contested and reshaped at various levels. The dispersed and fluid notion of 
power advanced in this thesis can be particularly useful in understanding the politics of 
contingency and contestation in the arena of natural resource governance. This research 
also contributes to the debates on the role of local power relations in determining access 
to forest resources; the differential impacts of conservation policies on resource 
dependent populations; the dual role of implementing agencies; and the relationship 
between law, science and politics in nature conservation interventions.   
 
Besides contributing to academic literature and debates on nature conservation, this 
thesis could provide inputs on policy-making. It suggests that issues of local access to 
forest resources and the rehabilitation of affected communities need to be adequately 
addressed in the policies to make conservation work. This becomes even more significant 
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in conflict regions and fragile economies, as in the case of J&K, where issues of violence, 
exclusion and poverty are intertwined.  
                          
6. Thesis outline 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Following this introductory chapter, I present 
research setting and methodology in chapter two. The next six chapters provide in-depth 
analyses of the two case-studies. The empirical findings and discussion on the ban on the 
shahtoosh trade are presented in chapters three, four and five while those of forest 
conservation are presented in chapters six, seven and eight of the thesis. Chapter nine 
presents the main conclusions on the basis of the two processes studied. Below, I provide 
the summary of contents in each chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of Jammu and Kashmir state with specific reference to the 
political dynamics since the year of independence. I also introduce my field locations in 
J&K and describe my research methods and design for data collection. Towards the end 
of the chapter, I present the specific challenges faced while collecting data for my 
research and note the limitations of my study. 
 
Chapter 3 begins by providing background information on chiru and its habitat, and 
traces the diverse myths and legends relating to the origin of shahtoosh. I describe the 
production process of the shahtoosh shawl, and the tasks performed by different 
categories of shawl workers. I explain the growth and development of the shawl industry 
since the medieval era until the 1980s, and highlight the poor conditions of shawl 
workers in the Valley who have experienced exploitation at the hands of both rulers and 
manufacturers under different regimes. I also examine the changing and overlapping 
roles of various categories of workers in the shawl industry.  
 
Chapter 4 explains the chronology of events that led to the imposition of the ban on 
shahtoosh and analyses the legal battle between the conservationist groups and J&K 
state. I also present the arguments of various actors with regard to prospects of chiru 
breeding. While examining the response of the shahtoosh workers to the ban, I highlight 
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the limited space of protest available to them. I also problematise the role of the state 
both in enforcing the ban and allowing the now illegal trade to continue (a process I have 
termed ‘split role’ of the state). The chapter ends by sketching shadow networks of 
shahtoosh and presenting diverse viewpoints on the connection between militancy and 
the shahtoosh trade in Kashmir.  
 
Chapter 5 highlights various forms of micropolitics surrounding the ban on shahtoosh. I 
discuss the perpetuation of myths regarding the origin of wool and the rationale behind 
the banning of trade, the differential impact of the ban on various categories of 
shahtoosh workers, their changing socio-cultural relations and new mechanisms of 
exploitation adopted by manufacturers and other powerful actors. I illustrate the ongoing 
illegal production of shahtoosh shawls in the Valley and explore a phenomenon wherein 
powerful actors delegate illegal tasks to their subordinate workers (a process I have 
termed ‘delegated illegality’). The chapter ends by examining the initiatives of state and 
non-state organisations to support the ban affected shawl workers.  
 
In Chapter 6, I turn to the study of forest conservation and management. I begin by a 
brief description of forest management in the early colonial period and provide a detailed 
analysis of the politics of ‘scientific forestry’ in J&K from the late 19
th
 century to the 
1970s. Following this, I highlight the shift in forest management practices from ‘custodial’ 
(in the colonial and post-colonial period) to ‘social’ (by the 1980s) and also the changing 
relationship between forest managers and forest users over the years.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the rationale and objectives of the NAP, and the prospects for 
achieving sustainable management of forests through local participation and devolution 
of power, funds and responsibilities. I highlight the interplay between the MoEF, the FD 
and the State Forest Corporation to suggest repeated re-centralisation in the guise of 
decentralisation of forest management and control. Following the discussion on the 
politics of policy-making and implementation, I provide background information on the 
twin villages chosen for the study. The focus then turns to analysing the micropolitics of 
resource use, involving the forest field-staff, villagers and timber contractors.   
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Chapter 8 extends the discussion on micropolitics further by examining the interplay 
between the JFMC, forest field-staff and panchayat. I highlight the areas of tension as 
well as new areas of cooperation between these actors and analyse the differential 
impact of forest conservation intervention on differently positioned rural social groups 
with regard to their access to forest resources. The chapter also demonstrates the dual 
role of the forest field-staff in enforcing forest regulations and allowing illegal timber 
harvesting by various players including the para-military forces deployed in the state, 
affecting the outcome of forest conservation policies.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes by reflecting on the broader findings of the thesis and relocating its 
contribution to the existing literature on the politics of natural resource conservation as 
well as on the state of Jammu and Kashmir. I also outline the broad implications of my 
findings for policy-making in the arena of natural resource management. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The State of Jammu and Kashmir: research setting 
and methodology 
 
This chapter provides background information on the state of J&K and a brief 
introduction to the field sites and research methodology. Section one provides an 
overview of the geographical features and demographic composition as well as unique 
political challenges witnessed by the state since independence, owing to its special status 
in the Indian Constitution. Section two describes research methods, research design, 
techniques of data collection and various stages of fieldwork. I discuss the specific 
challenges faced during fieldwork, and present the limitations of my study towards the 
end of the chapter. The historical and social milieus specifically relating to the two case-
studies will be discussed in detail later in the thesis – the origin, growth and development 
of the shawl industry in Kashmir in chapter three, and history of forest management and 
control (from the early colonial period to the late 1980s) in chapter six.  
 
Section One 
 
1.1 Jammu and Kashmir: an introduction 
 
J&K, strategically the most important state of India, occupies a special status in the Indian 
Union. It is the only state of India with a separate constitution. Geographically, the state 
is divided into three regions viz. Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, covering an area of 
2,22,236 square kilometres (GoJ&K, 2001a). Srinagar is the summer capital while Jammu 
is the winter capital of the state. A large part of the state territory is under Pakistani 
occupation (since 1947) and also under Chinese occupation (since the Indo-Chinese war 
in 1962), resulting in a long lasting dispute between the three countries (see Map 1 
below). Effectively, the Indian administered area of the state is estimated to be 1,01,387 
square kilometres (ibid.). The Jammu region is separated from the rest of the state by the 
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Pir Panjal range of the Himalayas. The Kashmir valley, situated between Jammu and 
Ladakh, is surrounded by the inner Himalayas from the northeast to the northwest, the 
Pir Panjal range from the southeast to the southwest and Pakistan in the west. The 
Ladakh region is surrounded by the Karakoram range in the north, Tibet in the east, 
Himachal Pradesh in the south and Kashmir in the west.  
 
In 2001, the population of the state was 10.06 million of which 74.9% resided in rural 
areas and 27.7% in urban areas (Census of India, 2001). Of the total population of the 
state, Muslims constitute nearly 67% (largely concentrated in Kashmir valley), Hindus 
approximately 30% (mainly residing in the Jammu region), Sikhs 2% (concentrated in the 
Jammu region) and Buddhists 1% (mostly in Ladakh) (ibid.). Nearly 90% of the population 
is dependent on agriculture, forests, tourism and the handicraft industry for sustenance 
(Ramasubramanian, 2004). The dependence of the local population on forest resources, 
particularly timber and fuelwood, is very high due to harsh winter conditions in the 
region. Other forest produce such as medicinal plants, herbs and fruits also provide 
additional incomes to the village residents, especially the women. The state has not seen 
large-scale industrialisation due to poor infrastructural facilities (mainly transportation) 
and political factors (such as militancy and terrorism), limiting the range of livelihood 
options available to the citizens. Owing to a rich handicraft tradition, the art and craft 
industry occupies a significant place in the social and economic life of the people in J&K. 
This industrial activity is mainly unorganised and limited to small-scale. Carpets, shawls, 
wood carving, papier mache and silver work are some of the prominent handicraft 
articles produced in J&K. Since the late 1980s, the rise in militancy has severely affected 
the tourism industry and, in turn, the arts and crafts industry in the state. Below, I note 
some significant political developments in the state since the year of independence. 
 
In 1947, with the end of British rule, when the princely states were given an option to 
join India or Pakistan, the then Maharaja of J&K (a Hindu Dogra ruler) kept delaying the 
decision to accede to either of the dominions. Challenged by the popular movement for 
democratic change within the state that had been going on since the early 1930s, he 
tried to find ways to retain his autocratic power (Bose, 1997). However, a Pakistan 
sponsored attack of tribal bands in the same year left him with no option than to ask the 
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Indian government for help (Jan 2005: 68). The Indian government laid the condition that 
the instrument of accession should be duly signed by him and the state should first 
accede to Indian Union. The Maharaja agreed to sign the instrument of accession but 
asked for the special status of the state in recognition of the unique conditions of 
accession. By the time the J&K state signed the instrument of accession in October 1947, 
large parts of the former princely state were already under Pakistan’s occupation. The 
Indian government took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations, whose resolution 
asked Pakistan to vacate the occupied areas and asked India to organise a plebiscite for 
determining the will of the people on the question of accession. However, the issue of 
plebiscite has been lingering and Pakistan has refused to vacate the occupied areas 
resulting in continued hostility between the two countries. The separatist sentiments 
within Kashmir have been prevalent since its accession and the Indian government has 
tried to curb them through various mechanisms such as democratic suspension, 
liquidation of special status and heavy deployment of armed and para-military forces.
17
 
 
The J&K state originally ceded to the Indian Union in matters of defence, foreign affairs 
and communications, retaining autonomy in all other matters. However, the autonomy 
has significantly declined in the decades after independence mainly on the pretext of 
national threat (posed by Pakistan) and disintegration. While large parts of its territory 
continue to remain under Pakistani and Chinese occupation, the state has witnessed 
fluctuating fortunes with regard to the democratic process as well as democratic 
functioning of institutions in the post-independence period (Punjabi, 1990). There are, 
however, a few important markers in the history of democracy in J&K such as 
introduction of land reforms, panchayati raj institutions, and rights for shawl workers 
and artisans which illustrate the pre-dominance of pro-poor policies in the initial years 
after independence (Gupta, forthcoming, 2011). 
 
The roots of participatory management of political institutions in J&K can be dated as far 
back as 1944 when the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference Party under the 
                                                 
17
 For details on the issues of autonomy, separatism and political dynamics in J&K, see Jha (2003), Sharma 
(2002), Widmalm (2002), Ganjoo (1998) and Puri (1993/1999). 
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leadership of Sheikh Abdullah
18
 formulated its agenda for radical (social, economic and 
political) transformation in a document titled Naya Kashmir. The transformatory policy 
spelt out in this manifesto reads: ‘All the regions of the state shall have equal right(s) to 
participate in the political power and the same will be decentralised up to district, block 
and panchayat levels’ (Shafi, 1990: 32). Guided by this manifesto, some important 
policies were framed in the early 1950s (when Sheikh Abdullah assumed power in the 
state) to bring about political and socio-economic reforms, which are pertinent to note. 
 
Firstly, land reforms or the ‘land to the tiller’ policy implemented soon after 
independence changed the social fabric of J&K. In 1947, following the collapse of princely 
rule, the first state government under Sheikh Abdullah based its development agenda 
along the lines of building a social and participatory democracy (Gupta, forthcoming, 
2011). The ‘backwardness’ of the state was largely attributed to landlordism and it was 
held that to safeguard the interests of the class of tenants, there was a need for the 
redistribution of land ownership rights (Prakash, 2000).
19
 Hailed as one of the most 
radical and successful land reform programmes in India, the Big Landed Estates Abolition 
Act, 1950 of the J&K government made possible the transfer of land to the tiller without 
any compensation to former landlords (Sharma and Bakshi, 1995: 136).  
 
Secondly, the seeds of democratic decentralisation (establishment of panchayats) in the 
state were sown way back in 1935 with the promulgation of the J&K Village Panchayat 
Regulation. The striking feature of this regulation was the provision regarding the right of 
franchise by the people in the villages and the right to be elected as a panch or head of 
the village (Sharma, 2002: 434). The regulation amended in 1941 was an improvement on 
the earlier one in that now the panchayats were also assigned to perform the 
                                                 
18
 Sheikh Abdullah (1905-1982) was the leader of the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference’ (later 
renamed the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference’) formed in 1932 to redress the grievances of 
Muslims and other marginalised sections under Hindu Dogra rule in the princely state of J&K (Jan 2005: 61). 
He also started ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’ in 1946 to directly challenge the autocratic rule of Maharaja Hari 
Singh of J&K. Soon after the accession of the state to India in 1947, he served as the Prime Minister of the 
state but was dismissed in August, 1953 at the behest of the Indian government. He was immediately 
arrested and later jailed for 11 years on charges of conspiracy against the state. He again came to power in 
1975 and served as Chief Minister until his death in 1982. 
19
 For the purpose of this thesis, I have briefly outlined the initiative of land reform in J&K state to illustrate 
the extension of the principle of social democracy. For details on the programme, see Dhar (2004), Misri 
and Bhatt (1994) and Bamzai (1962). 
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development functions in the countryside (ibid.: 436). Following the guidelines of Naya 
Kashmir, more powers were devolved to panchayats in J&K in the early 1950s. These two 
reform policies (land reforms and panchayats) illustrate the state’s commitment to 
promote pro-poor reforms and benefit the marginalised sections in the early 1950s.  Yet, 
the panchayats in the state continued to remain dormant in the 1960s through to the 
1980s, the period of decreasing autonomy of the J&K state.
20
  
 
Thirdly, in order to systematically curtail the influence of shawl merchants, the manifesto 
also outlined some specific measures to be taken. It provided for the nationalisation of all 
key industries through the establishment of the National Industrial Council in order to 
abolish the monopoly of big private entrepreneurs (Jan, 2005). The manifesto 
emphasised on improvement in the conditions of artisans and shawl workers by 
providing minimum wages to them, freedom to form and join trade unions, reduction of 
the working day to eight hours and universal social insurance (KIN, 2006). Ironically, the 
zeal for pro-poor reforms started to wane in the following decades, mainly due to the 
sabotage of democracy in the state by the central government. 
 
While regular elections were held in most parts of the country from 1952 onwards, the 
first State Assembly election in J&K was held only in 1962 and the first parliamentary 
election did not take place until 1967. However, most elections held in J&K before the 
mid 1970s are generally considered to have been fraudulent or rigged by New Delhi 
(Widmalm, 2002: 56). This period saw political instability, authoritarianism, pervasive 
corruption and popular discontent against the state governments (Bose, 1997: 32). Also, 
due to the constitutional order of 1954 by the President of India, there have been drastic 
curbs on fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech, assembly and association in 
the state (ibid.: 33). The separatist sentiments in Kashmir have been alive and in the 
absence of a strong democratic outlet along with liquidation of the special constitutional 
status in the years after independence, the discontent of the people in Kashmir took a 
violent turn. The Hindu minority in Kashmir valley came to be associated with the Indian 
state, against which the resentment of the separatists kept growing. In the mid 1980s, 
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 For details on the functioning of Panchayati Raj institutions in J&K, see Sharma (2002) and Puri (1999). 
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widespread anti-Hindu riots struck the southern districts of Kashmir province (Sunita, 
2006: 107). This violence spread to other parts of the state and was the first expression 
of organised armed resistance against the Indian state, very often fuelled by terrorist 
groups based in Pakistan. In the following years, J&K saw massive turmoil due to 
militancy and terrorism, counterpoised by heavy deployment of armed forces and anti-
terrorist measures taken by the Indian state. Bose (1997) notes the extent and nature of 
violence in J&K in the 1980s and 1990s as involving recurrent massacres of civilians, 
widespread torture, random killings of bystanders and pedestrians, and defenceless 
people inside their homes. There were extended periods of blanket curfew in major 
towns and cities, a persistent pattern of search-operations and road-block checks 
frequently involving beatings, intimidation and verbal abuse (Bose, 1997: 55-56). Every 
conceivable occasion that could set off strikes and protests rallies was suppressed with 
lethal force (Puri, 1993: 56-57). Even peaceful demonstrations against a steep increase in 
the electricity tariff in 1988 resulted in numerous deaths from police firing (Bose, 1997: 
47; Puri, 1993). All institutional channels of protest and dissent were effectively blocked 
(Bose, 1997: 49) and all protest activities came to be seen as ‘anti-national’. This violent 
process also resulted in the migration of hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits from 
the Valley to Jammu, Delhi and other places in India, thus, ending the centuries old co-
existence of the Hindu minority and the Muslim majority in the Kashmir valley (ibid.: 71). 
 
In 1990, the State Assembly was dissolved and the President’s rule was imposed in the 
state to retain peace and stability. In 1996, elections took place and since then, formal 
democracy has been re-established in the state with three rounds of assembly elections 
by the year 2008. It can be, thus, argued that although the J&K state started with a strong 
base and commitment to bring about social and participatory democracy in the form of 
agrarian reforms and local bodies, it had to struggle even to maintain regular electoral 
processes for formal or representative democracy. I now turn to introduce the field sites 
(highlighted in the Map 1 below) where I conducted my research on the shahtoosh trade 
and the NAP in J&K. 
43 
 
 
                              
                              Map 1: Field locations in Jammu and Kashmir 
 
1.2 Field locations 
 
For the first case-study (ban on the shahtoosh trade), I conducted most of my fieldwork 
in Srinagar. The city inhabits a population of approximately 8,00,000 with Muslims 
constituting more than 95% of the population. Srinagar city is the centre of the 
shahtoosh shawl industry and accounts for 97% of all shahtoosh workers in the Valley. 
Within Srinagar, 85% of the shahtoosh workers are concentrated in the downtown or 
older areas of the city (IFAW and WTI, 2003). These localities include Rathpora, 
Tawheedabad, Syedpora, Merjapora, Khanyar, Mondibal, Hamchi, Nowhatta, Khaiwan, 
Malpura, Nawa Kadal, Waniyar, Eidgah, Nowshera, Narwara, Khaiwan, Zoonimar, Nawab 
Bazar, Fateh Kadal, Malabagh, Saffa Kadal and Noor Bagh. Some of these localities are 
numerically dominated by the shawl workers engaged in a particular skill, for example, 
the majority of the weavers are concentrated in Nowshera, Khaiwan, Eidgah, Rathpora 
and Zoonimar, while the embroiderers mainly reside in Syedpora, Hamchi and Malabagh. 
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Apart from Srinagar city, some shahtoosh workers also reside in nearby villages namely 
Tulamula, Ganderbal and Khanmulla. I interviewed the shahtoosh workers in Srinagar city 
as well as in these three villages. For my second case-study, I chose the twin villages of 
Laati and Chapparh of Udhampur district in the Jammu region. The choice of the villages 
was made on the recommendation of senior forest officials, who considered the NAP to 
be most successful in Udhampur and Nowshera forest divisions. I selected Udhampur 
division because of the problem of militancy in Nowshera. The choice of Udhampur 
district was also made considering the fact that the forest density in the district is one of 
the highest in the Jammu region.
21
  
 
Section Two 
 
2.1 Research method and design 
 
Due to the nature of my topic, my field research was likely to be less quantitative, as it 
was more qualitative data that I needed to collect in my effort to analyse how nature 
conservation interventions are understood, accepted and negotiated at various levels, 
from macro to micro. Since the objective of my study was to understand processes in 
which actors are multiply situated, I designed a research plan based on multi-sited 
ethnography coupled with an examination of secondary materials including archival 
records, governmental documents and NGO reports. Multi-sited ethnographies can be 
useful when the aim is to understand complex processes, or to look for evidence in 
relation to the questions relating to how rather than what (see Bryant, 2005; Mosse, 
2005). Multi-sited ethnographies, as Marcus (1995: 110) suggests, help to understand 
something broadly about the system as much as to understand local subjects. Moreover, 
they enable us to rethink the ‘relationship between places, projects, and sources of 
knowledge’ (Des Chene, 1997: 81) and open up spaces that may otherwise be invisible 
from the single site (Hovland, 2005). By employing ethnographic approaches to the 
processes and relations operating within and between multiple sites, recent work on 
                                                 
21
 The geographical area of Udhampur district is 4,550 square kilometres (sq. km.) with a forest area of 
2,343 sq. km. i.e. 51.49% of the total area making it the most densely forested district after Poonch 
(56.81%). Due to the high incidence of militancy in Poonch, I selected Udhampur district for personal safety 
considerations. 
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natural resources has succeeded in transforming the global-local divide (Mehta et al., 
1999; see also Mosse, 2005). Ethnographies are also useful as they provide scope for 
opportunistic and non-systematic style of data collection, a method Tsing (2005) refers to 
as ‘patchwork ethnography’. However, Luders (2004) cautions that, in such approaches, 
the researcher has to cope with the complexity of data collection and field situations, 
which cannot be controlled in advance, thus, rendering pointless any attempts of using 
standard techniques of data collection (see also Walton, 2009). 
 
While conducting my study at multiple locations, I relied on various techniques of data 
collection including use of schedules with open ended questions, semi-structured 
interviews, group discussions, informal conversations and observation. The use of 
interview schedules employing open ended questions minimises intervention from the 
researchers and allows the respondents the opportunity to tell their own stories 
(MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000). Selection of the interviewees in both the 
case-studies was made on the basis of ‘purposive’, ‘snowball’ and ‘quota’ sampling. 
‘Purposive’ sampling was most helpful in identifying key informants in the initial stages 
for both the cases and selecting respondents from the various government departments 
and NGOs. The information gained through these initial interviews helped in spotting the 
‘plausibility probes’ (Esser, 2008) and in framing the questions accordingly. Through 
these interviews, I was also able to gauge the possibility of conducting interviews with 
the selected respondents and the problems I could face. The ‘purposive’ sampling 
approach employed in the initial interviews was useful in figuring out the critical areas, 
but Ritchie et al. (2003) cautions that the approach can also limit generalisation. Since 
the manufacturing of shahtoosh shawls requires 21 different categories of workers, 
therefore, to have a representative sample for my research, I chose respondents from 
each of these categories following ‘quota’ sampling. Once contacts were made in the 
different categories of shahtoosh workers, I ‘snowballed’ out through introductions from 
one informant to another. A snowball survey, in which trust is established by interviewing 
‘friends of initial contacts’ (Tripp, 1997: 27) is also the best method for research on 
activities ‘outside the law’ (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000: 24), such as the 
illegal shahtoosh and timber trades for this study. The ‘quota’ and ‘snowball’ sampling 
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were also used in the study of the NAP while choosing village respondents from different 
social groups based on caste, gender and wealth.  
 
In the case of the shahtoosh trade, I interviewed a total of 117 respondents. The first set 
of interviewees included 92 shahtoosh workers, selected from each of the 21 categories 
according to their population size and a variety of issues to be investigated.
22
 The census 
survey of shahtoosh workers conducted by the International Fund for Animal Welfare 
(IFAW) and Wildlife Trust of India (WTI) in 2002-03 (see Table 1 below) served as a 
sample frame in order to select respondents for the study.
23
 The largest number of my 
respondents were weavers (24%), followed by embroiderers (17%), spinners (17%), 
separators (7%), agents of manufacturers (7%), manufacturers and traders (3%), hawkers 
(3%), wool dealers (2%), thread-processors (2%), warp-dressers (2%), warp-threaders 
(2%), clippers (2%), darners (2%), dyers (2%), designers (2%), printers (2%), washers (2%), 
carpenters (1%) and shuttle-makers (1%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Of the 92 shahtoosh workers, 20% were female, mainly spinners, separators and warp-threaders. 92% of 
the respondents were from Srinagar while the remaining 8% were from the villages of Tulamula, Khanmulla 
and Ganderbal in the Srinagar district. 
23
 Note that the census survey does not include finishers and warp-dressers as separate categories but 
finishers are clubbed with washers and warp-dressers with weavers, possibly because of their overlapping 
tasks. However, in my study, I have treated them as separate categories. Also, I could not interview any 
sazgurs (cotton loop-makers) and fringe-makers in the field due to their non-availability.  
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Name of Category Srinagar Budgam Pulwama Baramulla Total     % 
Spinners 9803 86 13  9902 69.28 
Weavers 1808 5   1813 12.68 
Thread-
processors 
952    952 6.66 
Embroiderers 562 81  31 674 4.72 
Separators 359    359 2.51 
Agents 112 2   114 0.80 
Manufacturers 108    108 0.76 
Hawkers 74    74 0.52 
Warp-threaders 57    57 0.40 
Washers/Finishers 56    56 0.39 
Clippers 44    44 0.31 
Dyers 42    42 0.29 
Traders 33    33 0.23 
Designers 29    29 0.20 
Dealers 14    14 0.10 
Darners 13    13 0.09 
Sazgurs 3    3 0.02 
Fringe-makers 3    3 0.02 
Carpenters 2    2 0.01 
Shuttle-makers 1    1 0.01 
Total 14075 174 13 31 14293 100.00 
 
   Table 1: Occupational distribution of shahtoosh workers (adapted from IFAW and WTI, 2003) 
 
The second set included respondents (16 in total) from the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests and Ministry of Textiles (Delhi), Handloom Department, Handicrafts Department 
and Police Department (Srinagar), Wildlife Department (Srinagar and Jammu), and 
Weaver’s Service Centre, Craft Development Institute, School of Designs and a private 
firm called Cashmere Marketing Agency (Srinagar). The third set included seven 
respondents from conservationist groups – WTI (Srinagar) and WTI, WWF and Traffic 
India (Delhi). I interviewed two leading politicians in Srinagar, one from the ruling party 
and the other from the opposition to understand their position and perspectives in 
relation to the ban on the shahtoosh trade. 
 
In the case of the NAP, I interviewed a total of 104 respondents. The first set of 
respondents (80 in total) included 73 villagers, five members of the JFMC and two ex-
sarpanch of Laati and Chapparh.
24
 I interviewed members belonging to all caste and 
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 In 2006, at the time of my study, Laati had a population of around 2990 with approximately 450 
households. In Laati, 43% of the population is upper caste Hindus (such as Thakurs and Brahmins), 40% 
Muslims, 15% Scheduled Castes (such as Mahshe, Meg, Chamar) and 2% Scheduled Tribes (Gaddis). 
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religious groups in the villages – Brahmins (21%), Thakurs (18%), Scheduled Tribes (22%), 
Scheduled Castes (19%) and Muslims (20%).
25
 The second set of interviewees (9 in total) 
included five members of forest field-staff (one forester, three forest guards and one 
watchman), three local timber contractors and one NGO worker. The third set of 
respondents (15 in total) included government officials from the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests (Delhi), Forest Department (Jammu and Udhampur), Department of Soil 
Conservation (Jammu), an official from the State Forest Corporation (Jammu) and two 
timber contractors from the State Forest Corporation (Udhampur).  
 
2.2 Description of fieldwork period 
 
Ban on the shahtoosh trade 
Stage I: Building up contacts, personal set up and interviews with shahtoosh workers 
Since J&K is a conflict-ridden state, my first concern was to find a safe place to stay. After 
deciding to stay with a Muslim family known to me in Srinagar, the next step was to 
arrange a research assistant who could help me to build contacts in the city and also 
serve as an interpreter of the Kashmiri language.
26
 With the assistance of a senior 
member of the WTI in Delhi, I got in touch with a student of sociology in Srinagar who 
also belonged to the shawl worker community. He was fluent in Kashmiri and Urdu as 
well as English which met all my requirements for a research assistant. He participated 
actively in the interviews with local shahtoosh workers, making clarifications and at times 
checking the accuracy of translations.  
 
My fieldwork in India (September, 2006 to June, 2007) started in Delhi with a brief two 
week stay to collect preliminary information on the shahtoosh trade in the form of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Chapparh had a population of 2870 with around 320 households. In Chapparh, 55% of the population is 
Gaddis, 25% upper caste Hindus (Brahmins, Thakurs and Mahajan), 11% Muslims and 9% Scheduled Castes. 
Approximately 12% of the residents of Laati (mainly Scheduled Castes) and 15% of Chapparh (mainly 
Scheduled Tribes) were officially categorised as Below Poverty Line (BPL). This information was provided to 
me by patwari, the local revenue official. 
25
 Of the total respondents, 40% were female and 60% were male. 52% of respondents were residents of 
Laati village while the rest 48% belonged to Chapparh. 17% of the respondents I interviewed were ‘BPL’. 
26
 Although being native to the state, I was never able to travel to the Valley in the past due to heightened 
militancy from the late 1980s through the 1990s. I am fluent in Dogri (spoken in Jammu region) and Urdu 
(the official language of J&K state) but not in the Kashmiri dialect and, therefore, required an interpreter.   
49 
 
reports and related documents of wildlife conservation organisations. From Delhi, I 
moved to Srinagar where I stayed for a period of two months (October and November, 
2006). In the first two weeks of my stay there, I held several meetings with the research 
assistant to map out the different categories of shahtoosh workers and their localities, 
location of the libraries, archives and various government departments, and began 
identifying the state and NGO officials to be interviewed. I conducted 12 preliminary 
interviews with key informants within the shahtoosh worker community to familiarise 
myself with the main issues of the shawl industry. I selected the senior and most 
communicative members of the community with the help of my research assistant. These 
interviews also revealed that the shahtoosh workers were hesitant to discuss the 
shahtoosh production and trade openly. Therefore, while preparing my schedules for the 
next round of interviews, I avoided placing sole emphasis on the shahtoosh and framed 
more general questions in order to allow the respondents to speak on both the 
shahtoosh and other high quality wools like pashmina.  
 
The interviews with shahtoosh workers provided me with inside information about the 
conditions of the shawl workers and the increased exploitation of the poor artisans at the 
hands of manufacturers, traders and poiywans after the ban. Some of these respondents 
were also leaders or members of workers associations such as the Kashmir Valley 
Weavers and Manufacturers Association, Garib Mazdoor Pashmina and Shahtoosh 
Handloom Workers Union and Kashmir Handicraft Traders and Weavers Association. 
Their interviews were particularly helpful in understanding the nature of protest, legal 
suits, dialogues with the government, demonstrations and the response of the state 
authorities to their agitations. The presence of the illegal trade of shahtoosh came out 
from some interviews with women when I saw them spinning shahtoosh for their 
manufacturers. Besides choosing respondents from Srinagar, I made three one-day visits 
to the Tulamula, Ganderbal and Khanmulla villages in Srinagar district to interview some 
spinners, weavers and embroiderers working in rural areas. The interviews with the rural 
workers provided insights into the strategies adopted by the manufacturers and their 
agents to exploit the poor workers by paying them lower wages in comparison to those in 
the cities.  
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Stage II: Interviews with state actors and local NGOs 
During my stay in Srinagar, I also interviewed the state officials and NGO actors. This 
helped me to understand the role of the local state in enforcing the ban and, at the same 
time, allowing the illegal shahtoosh shawl production and trade to continue. In my 
interviews with them, I also investigated issues such as the status of illegal trade in the 
state, trade routes and people involved. I also interviewed the workers of the WTI in 
Srinagar who played a significant role in the legal battle for banning the shahtoosh trade 
and had recently started a programme on alternative livelihoods of shahtoosh workers. 
These interviews also provided me with insights into the tensions between the state and 
NGOs on the issues of both implementation of the ban and efforts made by them for 
rehabilitation of the affected community. 
 
Stage III: Interviews with central actors and national NGOs 
After collecting the primary data in the Valley, I headed to Delhi (December, 2006 - 
January, 2007) to interview the central government officials (Ministry of Environment 
and Forests, and Ministry of Textiles) and members of the wildlife conservation agencies 
(WTI, WWF and Traffic India) in order to gain further insights into the legal battle 
between the centre, the state and conservationist groups, efforts made to rehabilitate 
the shahtoosh workers, feasibility of chiru farming as an alternative, and the status of the 
illegal shahtoosh trade after the ban. 
 
National Afforestation Programme 
Stage I: Collecting preliminary information on the NAP 
Upon completing my data collection on the shahtoosh trade in Delhi by January, 2007, I 
started fieldwork on the NAP by gathering preliminary information from the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF) and Winrock International, an NGO working in the field 
of the JFM. At this stage, I did not see the need to conduct interviews because the state 
as well as NGO policies and agendas are well documented in their publications, guidelines 
and reports. However, after my interviews with the state forest officials in Jammu and 
Udhampur, I returned to Delhi in June to conduct interviews with the officials of the 
MoEF in order to understand the key issues of concern for the central Ministry 
concerning the performance of the Forest Department in J&K. 
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Stage II: Site selection and interviews with forest officials 
I began my data collection in Jammu in February, 2007 and stayed there for two months. 
Being native to this region, I had a foothold in the area and, therefore, it was easier to 
establish a ‘network of contacts’ than in the first case. I conducted interviews with the 
senior officials of the J&K Forest Department in Jammu and Udhampur, the State Forest 
Corporation and the Department of Soil Conservation. I also gathered relevant 
information from documentary evidence including forest working plans, statistical 
reports, notifications as well as archival records to understand the shifts in forest 
management policies from the colonial period to the present day. My interviews with the 
officials helped me to select the villages for my study. I gathered their views on issues of 
participatory forest management, the performance of the NAP in J&K, the challenges and 
problems of forest protection, and the illegal timber trade in the region.  
 
Stage III: Interviews with Joint Forest Management Committee and local villagers 
Following data collection in Jammu and Udhampur, I moved to Laati and Chapparh 
villages in April, 2007 where I stayed for two months, although this period was 
intermittent due to brief visits to Jammu and Udhampur in order to gain supplementary 
information concerning project funds, activities sanctioned, procedure of timber 
concessions etc.
27
 Initially, I selected some key informants for the study with the help of 
the ex-sarpanch to identify the main issues concerning the relationship between the 
Forest Department and village residents. Following this, I interviewed members of the 
JFMC on several occasions, individually and in groups in order to gather information on 
its formation, their roles and responsibilities, availability of funds, devolution of actual 
powers, and their interactions with the Forest Department and fellow village residents. I 
interviewed the selected villagers to understand if the NAP has been able to provide 
effective solutions for the growing shortage of biomass, problems of their access to 
forest produce and to examine their level of awareness regarding the NAP, the 
relationship with the JFMC and forest field-staff, and the perceived benefits from the 
project. I had repeated informal conversations with the forest field-staff and local timber 
contractors. The interactions with the field-staff were particularly useful in understanding 
                                                 
27
 I stayed at the house of the ex-sarpanch of Chapparh whose reference was given to me by the Divisional 
Forest Officer, Udhampur.  
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the dilemmas faced by them in policing the forests and catering to the genuine needs of 
the villagers for timber and fuelwood. After this period of stay in Laati and Chapparh, I 
returned to Delhi in June to conduct the last stint of fieldwork. Additionally, after writing 
the preliminary draft of chapters based on fieldwork, I made a second trip in November, 
2008 for a period of one month to fill in the gaps in my data on the NAP and explore 
further the issues of the illegal timber trade, encroachments of forest lands and the 
conflict between the JFMC and panchayat in the villages.  
 
2.3 Research challenges 
 
Research in the context of violent conflict 
Working in the context of violent conflict involved several challenges in doing fieldwork. 
The insurgency in Srinagar caused problems with travel and communication, which made 
it difficult to plan interviews with respondents.
28
 My Hindu identity in a situation of a 
generally hostile attitude towards Hindus and non-Kashmiris in Srinagar brought 
considerable risk in conducting interviews. Since I stayed with a Muslim family in 
Srinagar, it minimised the personal risks involved in such conflict situations. I avoided 
wearing anything that could symbolise my Hindu identity, but decided to be honest with 
my respondents if any religious identity related questions were posed to me.
29
  
 
                                                 
28
 For example, during my stay in Srinagar, bomb blasts took place on two different occasions in the 
localities where most of the shahtoosh workers reside. Although no curfews were imposed after the blasts, 
I avoided going to those areas for the next couple of days for safety reasons. 
29
 In the case of my respondents in Srinagar, I observed that my Hindu style of greeting by way of folding 
hands invited some unwelcoming gestures in the beginning but after a few minutes of interacting with 
them, I felt that the issue of different religious identities did not matter much in our conversations. Yet, on 
other occasions, I experienced both the risk of being a Hindu working in Srinagar and the situation of 
embarrassment it brought for some people I interacted with. For example, one day, after conducting 
interviews at Hazratbal, Srinagar, I took an auto-rickshaw to return home. The auto-rickshaw driver could 
identify me as being a non-Kashmiri when I spoke to him in a mix of Hindi and Urdu languages. However, 
assuming that I am also a Muslim, he did not refrain himself from speaking against the Hindus of the state 
and narrating stories about his transformation from being an active member of a militant group engaged in 
bomb blasts in Srinagar in the 1990s to auto-rickshaw driving since the year 2000. On the way, he also 
narrated stories about members of his family killed in police encounters and pointed to the places in 
Srinagar where these encounters took place. When I was about to reach home after an hour long journey, 
he asked me: ‘By the way, sister, are you a Muslim or Hindu?’ My reply of being ‘Hindu’ shocked him, he 
looked at me, stared and apologised as I handed him the fare for the ride. 
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Walton (2009) suggests that in conflict situations, interviewees are more cautious about 
sharing sensitive information and more suspicious about the motivations of a researcher. 
In response to the considerable methodological issues associated with conducting 
research in conflict affected regions, Barakat et al. (2002) have argued for a ‘composite 
research approach’ which draws on a variety of methods depending on the availability of 
information and access. A process of methodological triangulation can help to 
compensate for the restrictions imposed by conflict. While also relying on other 
techniques for data collection such as conducting interviews, group discussions and 
direct observation, the triangulation method was particularly helpful in understanding 
the perceived connections between the militancy and the shahtoosh trade, the illegal 
production of shahtoosh shawls in Kashmir valley and the illegal timber trade in the 
Jammu region.  
 
Debunking presumed identities 
Investigating global processes such as wildlife or forest conservation is a complex task 
that addresses ‘a great number of interactions between actors of different statuses, with 
varying resources and dissimilar goals’ (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 1). Thus, research at 
multiple sites involves working in a context where ‘unequal power relations loom large’ 
(Markowitz 2001: 41). I faced difficulties in explaining my identity as a ‘research student’ 
and the purpose of my research to a diverse set of actors ranging from senior 
government officials, NGO workers, timber contractors to forest field-staff, shahtoosh 
workers and village residents. While some shahtoosh workers associated me with the 
WTI, the Delhi-based organisation involved in banning the trade and refused to speak to 
me, others took me as an official from the State Handicrafts Department, eager to 
enquire about the benefit they could gain from the interaction. Furthermore, some 
villagers in Laati and Chapparh were initially reluctant to engage in any conversations for 
they considered me to be associated with the Forest Department, which polices the 
neighbouring forest areas. In an attempt to lessen misconceptions about my work and 
gain access to the interviewees, I made clear the purpose of interviews right at the 
beginning. Research on sensitive issues may damage the position of officials in respective 
departments and organisations, and can even cause harm to the local residents. 
Therefore, some officials and interviewees wished not to disclose their identity while 
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sharing the information with me. Their anonymity has, thus, been protected in the text 
either by stating this or providing pseudonyms for the individuals.  
 
Dual identity 
Being native to J&K, I was cautious about the possibility of ‘biases’ in my understanding 
of the issues at hand. The problem of maintaining ‘objectivity’ was, to some degree, 
mitigated (in the case of shahtoosh) owing to the fact that I belong to the Jammu region, 
the cultural milieu of which is very different from that of Kashmir, where I felt myself to 
be an ‘outsider’. In the study of the NAP, however, the fact that I was aware of the need 
for conscious explication owing to my ‘native’ status, helped me in being as objective as I 
could, as a researcher. On the other hand, my ‘insider’ status conferred an intimate 
knowledge of the field situation, crucial for detecting problems in conflict affected areas, 
seeking out research sites and setting up contacts (see MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-
Ganga, 2000). Being an ‘insider’, I experienced advantages in gaining insights, especially 
in accessing information on illegal activities by using previous contacts or establishing 
informal relations with the interviewees. Also, my relative familiarity with the culture 
made it possible for me to observe the level of comfort of my interviewees while 
engaging with sensitive issues, helping me to modify the questions accordingly. It also 
helped me to identify the situations when the respondents would deliberately try to hide 
information concerning illegal shahtoosh production or illegal timber felling.
30
 Whilst I 
could benefit from my prior knowledge of the field and contacts, my dual identity of 
being ‘native’ to the state and ‘research student’ needed particular caution. I clarified my 
role and research aims while approaching the respondents in order to minimise their 
apprehensions. 
 
Researching activities outside of the law 
The investigator’s primary problem in research on illegal activities is to find ways to win 
informants’ trust. Generally, people are wary of discussing activities that can land them in 
trouble with the police (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000: 25). Hence, there were 
                                                 
30
 For example, in the case of a few shahtoosh workers, I observed that during my interactions, the 
respondents directed their female family members, in Kashmiri language or through hand gestures not to 
display shahtoosh wool or products.  
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significant challenges involved in getting information on the issues of ‘shadow networks’ 
in the illegal shahtoosh as well as timber trades, and connections between militancy and 
shahtoosh. On the issue of connections between the trade of shahtoosh and the 
militancy, I decided to deliberately stay away from any direct investigation with my 
respondents. However, I realised later that I had acquired some data on it by coincidence 
based on informal discussions with my respondents, local gossip and rumours among the 
interviewees. For more information, I informally discussed the issues with the 
respondents suggested by my research assistant or a few others with whom I had built a 
good rapport in the field, having made frequent visits to their houses. Some additional 
information on the connections between the illegal trade, militancy and shahtoosh were 
also provided to me by the local officials of the WTI in Srinagar which helped in 
triangulating the information on these issues obtained from different sources. 
 
2.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Before I examine the two case-studies in the rest of this thesis, it is pertinent to point out 
two main limitations I see in this research. In the first case-study (ban on the shahtoosh 
trade), while I present primary information to suggest the loss of livelihoods of the 
shahtoosh workers due to the ban and their indulgence in the now illegal production of 
shawls, I could not gather primary data on the Tibetan herders who are involved in 
poaching chirus and supplying wool to the traders in India. This was due to both time 
constraints in this research as well as the sheer practical challenges involved in accessing 
high altitude areas of a disputed territory like Tibet. Therefore, for this information, I 
have relied on secondary sources to argue for the loss of livelihoods of the Tibetan 
herders. Nevertheless, the impact of the ban on Tibetan herders and the existing shadow 
networks of the wool trade originating from Tibet can form a significant agenda for 
future research.  
 
In the case of the NAP, I wanted to do in-depth research on community forest 
management by selecting a village site where the forest officials considered the 
programme to be most successful. Having identified the process of implementation of 
the NAP and key issues of the conflict as well as cooperation between different actors 
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involved in the selected location, further research could be benefitted by making 
comparisons and contrasts with some other villages in the state where the programme is 
viewed to be less successful by the Forest Department. I could not assess the functioning 
of the JFMC formed in November, 2007 since no concrete activities were undertaken by 
the new JFMC until November, 2008 when I conducted the second round of my 
fieldwork. My discussion on this case, therefore, needs to be seen in the light of the 
functioning of the JFMC from 2003 to 2007. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Tibetan Antelope and Shahtoosh Shawl: a brief history 
 
Shahtoosh shawl production in Kashmir has a long history. Various historical, political and 
social factors have influenced the present state of the shawl industry, now on the verge 
of decline due to the international ban on shahtoosh, imposed in 2002. While scientific 
knowledge traces the source of shahtoosh as the Tibetan antelope, the skilled 
craftspeople in Kashmir hold diverse myths and legends regarding the source of 
shahtoosh as well as the origin of shawl industry. It is also important to examine how 
successive regimes have shaped the production and trade in shahtoosh and the working 
conditions of shawl workers. Such a historical overview of the shawl industry in the pre-
ban period can provide useful insights for analysing the politics surrounding the recent 
controversy over the banning of shahtoosh. This background chapter presents the myths 
and realities of the origin of shahtoosh, and also provides a brief history of the evolution 
and growth of the shawl industry in Kashmir. 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the general 
characteristics of chiru, the animal from which the wool is obtained. I explain how the 
diverse myths relating to the source of wool have persisted for centuries until the 
connection between the massacre of chirus and the expensive shahtoosh shawls was 
uncovered by the scientific community in 1988. In section two, I introduce the various 
stages of the production process and explain how the wool and the product pass from 
one hand to another. I also provide the population estimates of shawl workers in 
Kashmir. In section three, I present a brief description of the growth and development of 
the shawl industry since the medieval era, highlighting the suffering of poor shawl 
workers in the Valley who experienced exploitation at the hands of both rulers and shawl 
merchants. Following this, I examine the conditions of the shawl workers after 
independence, the initiatives taken by the new state, and the strategies adopted by the 
manufacturers to increase their profits and maintain their privileged position in the shawl 
industry.  
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In this chapter, I refer to the works of wildlife biologists to describe the characteristic 
features of chiru and its habitat. I also use the accounts of travellers and historians in 
order to understand the myths relating to the shahtoosh wool, the origin of the shawl 
production, the growth of the shawl industry and the conditions of the shawl workers. 
Due to the absence of any authentic historical accounts specifically on shahtoosh, I have 
described the picture of the shawl industry and the artisans in general with incidental 
references to shahtoosh.  
 
Section One 
 
1.1 Chiru and its habitat 
 
The Tibetan antelope or chiru (see Figure 1), as it is commonly known, is endemic to the 
high plains of the Tibetan plateau which extends from Lhasa in Tibet to Ladakh in India 
(Kumar and Wright, 1997: 5).
31
 In the summer, the male chirus appear reddish fawn in 
colour, with light grey and brown tones grading to white on their stomach while in the 
winter, the body colour is predominantly light grey and tan with a white undercoat 
running from the chin to the belly (Schaller, 1998: 43). Females and young chirus are 
fawn coloured, almost pinkish with a rust brown nape that fades into white on the 
underside (ibid.). Chirus grow thick coats as insulation to conserve body heat. This coat 
has two types of hair: first, long, rough guard hair and second, underwool, which is 
composed of fine woolly hair. This densely packed underwool grows close to the skin and 
remains covered by the guard hair. These antelopes shed their thick guard hair when the 
temperature rises with the onset of the summer (Chundawat and Talwar, 1995). 
However, it is the underwool of chirus (obtained by killing the animal) which is known for 
its fine quality and is used for making highly expensive woollen shawls and scarves. 
 
                                                 
31
 The male chiru is 80-85 cm high at the shoulder, weighs 35-40 kgs. and has slender, slightly curving black 
horns, 50-60 cm in length. The female chiru is 75 cm tall, weighs 25-30 kgs. and is hornless (Schaller, 1998: 
42). 
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Figure 1: Male and female chiru (Schaller, 1997) 
 
Chirus primarily inhabit the Tibet Autonomous Region (mainly Chang Tang Reserve), 
Qinghai Province and the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (mainly Arjin Shan Reserve) of the 
People’s Republic of China (Schaller, 1993; see Appendix I). Chirus prefer flat to rolling 
terrain, usually above 4000 metres, although their habitat ranges from 3250 metres 
altitude to as high as 5500 metres (Schaller, 1998: 44). In the summer months from May 
to August, a small population of 200-220 chirus migrate to Ladakh in India (Kumar and 
Wright, 1997: 6).
32
 
There are contradictory views in relation to the population size and population trend of 
the chirus. In 1905, C. J. Rawling described herds of chirus migrating across the Tibetan 
plateau in the following words: ‘Almost from my feet away to the north and east, as far 
as the eye could reach, were thousands upon thousands of doe antelope with their 
young [...] there could not have been less than 15,000 or 20,000 visible at one time’ 
(cited in Schaller, 1998: 41). In 1990, the total chiru population for the entire Tibetan 
plateau was estimated to be between 65,000 and 72,500 which declined to about 45,000 
in 1998 (ibid.: 59). While the IUCN (2010) reports that the chiru population is declining, a 
                                                 
32
 The range encompasses the upper Chang Chenmo valley and its neighbouring Lingti Tsiang plains, which 
are opposite the Daulat Baig Oldi in the extreme north eastern part of Ladakh (Kumar and Wright, 1997). 
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Chinese news agency states that the population of the endangered Tibetan antelopes has 
expanded to about 2,00,000 by 2011 with an average annual growth rate of 7% in the last 
one decade (Xinhua, 2011). From the above estimates, we can see that while the 
population of chirus has fallen considerably in the past few decades, it is difficult to 
ascertain the exact population size as well as the population trend due to the lack of any 
systematic census surveys. 
1.2 The shahtoosh wool: myths and realities 
 
The name ‘shahtoosh’ is derived from two Persian words: the word shah meaning 
emperor and toosh meaning nature. Therefore, shahtoosh wool means the ‘king of 
wools’ or the ‘wool that is fit for the emperors’ (Traffic India, n.d.). The wool is also 
referred to as asli-tus in Kashmir, meaning genuine or real wool. This wool is used to 
manufacture the high quality shahtoosh shawls that are so fine that they can pass 
through the ring of a finger and are thus known as ‘ring shawls’. In the following 
discussion, I present the various myths and realities surrounding the origin of shahtoosh 
wool, the poaching of chirus to obtain wool, the trade routes of shahtoosh and the 
various international, national and state legislations to protect chirus. 
 
Animal rights organisations claim that for centuries, the shawl industry has hidden the 
unsavoury origin of the shahtoosh wool by perpetuating the myth that wool is derived 
from the wild goats, Ibex, or even ‘Siberian geese’ in the Himalayas (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 
19). William Moorcroft (1820), a British traveller and an employee of the East India 
Company, on the origin of shahtoosh notes that it is derived from Ibex, which is a most 
inaccessible goat but yields much finer wool. Ahad (1987: 18) writes, ‘Kyl-phamb or asli-
tus is grown by Tibetan Ibex [...] this animal is called Ra-ba in Ladakhi’. In the historical 
accounts, while there is uncertainty regarding the species from which the wool is 
obtained, the source of wool has been mainly described as Tibet (see for example, 
Bamzai, 1980; Irwin, 1973). There are also diverse myths regarding the collection of 
shahtoosh wool. For example, Ganhar (1979: 34) notes the process of the shedding of 
wool in the following words: ‘The poor animal is pestered by a fly, the bot fly, which 
buries deep into the skin and lays eggs there. When the eggs hatch, the wriggling of the 
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puppas makes the animal mad with discomfort. The pestered animal runs here and there 
and rolls over in sand to scratch his body and relieve his pain, thus, shedding some of the 
hair of his winter coat down in the sand’. Wilson (1841: 347) writes, ‘the fleece is cut 
once a year and wool, coarsely picked, is sold by the importers to the merchants who sell 
it to Kashmir’.  
 
The origin and collection of shahtoosh has remained obscured for centuries, due to the 
fact that the entire wool trade was controlled by only a few influential Kashmiri 
merchants who possibly did not want to share its true origin with the local people for 
fear of losing their exclusive control over trade. The merchants, with their tightly knit kin 
groups, had been purchasing the raw material in large quantities from Chang Tang, 
Ladakh, Yarkand and a few other Chinese territories for centuries (see Rizvi, 1999). The 
control of Kashmiri merchants over the raw wool trade facilitated the Treaty of 
Tingmosgang (1683 A.D.), under which the Tibetans and the Mughals agreed that the fine 
wool of goats of western Tibet would be sold only to the Kashmiri merchants (Ahad, 
1987: 19). Wilson (1841: 347) states that the export of wool from Ladakh and western 
Tibet was exclusively confined to Kashmir and all attempts to convey it to other countries 
were punished by confiscation (see also Rizvi, 1999).  
 
During my fieldwork, I found that the shahtoosh workers in Kashmir still hold many myths 
regarding the origin of the wool. The majority of the shawl workers claimed that the 
nomadic shepherds collect the shed wool of the animal from the bushes and rocks it 
brushes up against while grazing. They maintained that this process takes place in the 
summer as the animal sheds its winter coat with the rise in temperature. Others believed 
that the wool is derived from the moulted breast feathers of a bird that eats red sand. 
Besides these myths, kasturi or musk deer, snake-eating Ibex, rabbit and sheep are also 
believed to be the sources of shahtoosh wool.
33
 It can be argued that the Kashmiri 
merchants and Tibetan traders might have hidden the realities and perpetuated false 
stories which then became accepted as fact by the local people in Kashmir. The fact that 
the name of the product (shahtoosh shawls) is different from the name of the animal 
                                                 
33
 More discussion on the persistence of myths regarding the source of wool follows in chapter five of this 
thesis. 
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source (chiru) may represent a deliberate strategy on behalf of the traders to disguise the 
link between the shahtoosh shawls and the Tibetan antelope. Several animal rights 
organisations maintain that the protected status of the chiru and the scarcity of 
shahtoosh may also have motivated the manufacturers and exporters to even 
commercially rename a sub-species of Capra Ibex as the ‘shahtoosh goat’ (see IFAW and 
WTI, 2001). They argue that by using the pictures of an Ibex in shahtoosh promotional 
brochures, it is also possible for manufacturers to divert suspicion away from its original 
source (ibid.).  
 
The truth about the connection between the massacre of the Tibetan antelope, and the 
highly prized shahtoosh shawls of Kashmir became known to the conservationist groups 
only in 1988 when wildlife biologist George Schaller spent several months working in the 
habitat of the Tibetan antelope. The reason for the rapid decline of chirus was revealed 
to Schaller during his visit to a small town called Gerze in 1988. He saw herdsmen 
plucking the shahtoosh wool from the hides of the antelope to sell it to local dealers 
(Schaller, 1993). Schaller notes, ‘in the courtyard of such a dealer were sacks of wool 
ready for smuggling into western Nepal and from there to Kashmir, where the wool is 
woven into scarves and shawls’ (ibid.: 81).  In 1992, Schaller visited a camp of hunters in 
Chang Tang and stated that hides of chirus were ‘[...] stacked in their tent, the frozen 
bodies outside; they had also saved the heads of males because the horns are widely 
used in traditional medicine’ (ibid.: 82). This truth about the massacre of chirus alarmed 
wildlife conservationists and governments, leading to a number of surveys to investigate 
the poaching of chirus.  
 
The surveys conducted by wildlife conservation groups such as IFAW, WTI, WWF 
provided evidence to challenge the existing myths on shahtoosh. First, it was revealed 
that the Tibetan antelope does moult its wool slowly over a period of time in spring, but 
on the icy wind-swept plains of Tibet, there are no rocks and bushes to which wool could 
possibly cling and subsequently be collected (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 20). Second, it was 
argued that the small quantity of shed wool would not be sufficient to meet the 3000 
kilograms of raw shahtoosh wool processed per annum in Kashmir (Kumar and Wright, 
1997: 35). Therefore, it was maintained that the supply of wool in Kashmir necessarily 
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involves the poaching of this wild species and the extraction of underwool from its hide. 
Since 150 grams of shahtoosh wool is produced by one animal, it has been calculated 
that approximately 20,000 Tibetan antelopes were required to meet the market demand 
around the late 1990s (ibid.).
34
 It was claimed that the poaching of the antelope has 
resulted in their decline from one million in the 1950s and 1960s to less than 75,000 in 
the year 2000 (IFAW and WTI, 2001). Third, the hair samples taken from shahtoosh 
shawls were tested under the microscope, and confirmed to have patterns that are 
unique to the Tibetan antelope (ibid.). In 1998, the China Exploration and Research 
Society discovered the first known cases of the poaching of calving females in Xinjiang 
(Chundawat and Talwar, 1995). However, no evidence has been found of the killing of 
Tibetan antelope within the Indian territories.  
 
Historically, the Tibetan herdsmen have hunted chirus primarily for subsistence needs. 
Huber (2003) suggests that the chirus have been harvested in a sustainable manner for 
more than a millennium by indigenous hunters living adjacent to major antelope 
populations in Tibet. It is claimed that while the trade in shahtoosh has been going for 
centuries, owing to the growing fame of shahtoosh shawls in the West and the Middle 
East by the 1970s, the killing of chirus acquired a commercial dimension (ibid.). The 
commercial hunting, Schaller (1993) notes has often provoked the poachers to use 
various barbaric methods. Hunters began to shoot into herds of chirus from moving 
vehicles, killing as many as 500 animals in a hunt (Kumar and Wright, 1997: 8). After 
poaching, the wool is bought by the traders and smuggled through various border 
crossings into Kashmir in exchange for other wildlife products.
35
 The wool is also sold by 
the poachers in exchange for money, who make significant profits out of this trade (ibid.). 
Referring to the highly lucrative trade of wool, Bamzai (1980) quotes a famous Kashmiri 
saying: 
 
Yus gav Las suh zah na av 
Av ai tas nah zah wav 
                                                 
34
 It is estimated that three chirus are needed to make one shawl for women where as five chirus are killed 
to produce one shawl for men. 
35
 These mainly include tiger and leopard bones and skins, musk pods and bear gall bladders (Kumar and 
Wright, 1997: 15). 
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He who went to Lhasa (Tibet), never returned 
If he came back, he was a rich man forever. 
 
The shahtoosh wool is transported from Tibet through a number of border crossings into 
Nepal and India. The city of Lhasa and the town of Burang are the major centres for 
wildlife trade in Tibet (see Map 2 below). The shahtoosh wool and other goods are said to 
be brought by khampas, the Tibetan herdsmen, to the Indo-Nepal border. Kathmandu 
serves as another important hub for shahtoosh wool trade. Near the Indo-Nepal border, 
on the Chinese side, the khampas hand over the wool to bhotias, the pastoral nomads of 
the Himalayan region who have largely taken up farming in Tibet and the border regions 
of Nepal and India. The bhotias then bring the shahtoosh south to Dharchula and 
Pithoragarh in Uttaranchal where it is sold to Kashmiri traders and then carried to 
Srinagar to be made into expensive shawls (Kumar and Wright, 1997: 15).
36
 In some 
cases, the raw wool is brought to Delhi via Kathmandu and to Srinagar via Ladakh. I 
further discuss the illegal trade of shahtoosh wool in the next chapter. 
                                                 
36
 In the 1980s, the price of raw shahtoosh wool was approximately Rs. 6000 per kg. This rose to nearly Rs. 
16,000 in the early 1990s and to Rs. 30,000 by 1998. This sudden rise in the price of wool can be attributed 
to the growing global concern for the protection of chirus, which limited the supply of the wool in the 
market. Moreover, the growing controversy over the ban on the shahtoosh trade in Kashmir also evoked 
public curiosity and increased the desire to possess it. 
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        Map 2: Shahtoosh wool trade routes (IFAW and WTI, 2001) 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, the trade in shahtoosh wool and its products is prohibited 
by a number of international and national treaties and legislations. The Tibetan antelope 
is listed in Appendix I of the ‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora’, making all international trade in chiru body parts and its 
derivatives illegal (CITES, 1999). Since China, Nepal and India are signatories to this 
convention, any cross-border movement of raw shahtoosh wool into India through its 
northern border with Tibet or Nepal is illegal. The species is also listed as ‘endangered’ in 
the 2010 International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources’ ‘Red 
List of Threatened Animals’ (IUCN, 2010). The chiru is a ‘protected’ species in the United 
States of America and the European Union. The wildlife protection laws of China, Nepal 
and India also prohibit any harm to the Tibetan antelope and trade in its body parts 
including wool. The chiru is listed as an ‘endangered’ species under schedule I of Nepal’s 
National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1973 (Kumar and Wright, 1997: 29). 
Although enforcement has been greatly enhanced in the areas administered by the 
Nepalese Department of National Parks, enforcement outside the park is the 
responsibility of the Forest Department and police, who have taken little interest in 
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controlling the illegal wildlife trade (ibid.: 31). The weak implementation of laws has 
made Nepal one of the largest illegal trade centres, with a well-connected network 
linking Nepal with China and India.  
 
In India, national law protects the species through its Wildlife Protection Act of 1972.  
Five years after its enactment, the chiru was placed in Schedule I of the Act, providing 
‘regulated’ protection, which permitted trade under ‘licence’ from the government.  An 
amendment of the same Act in 1986 completely banned hunting of and trading in 
derivatives of Schedule I species, thus giving chiru complete protection in the country. 
Therefore, the trade in shahtoosh has been ‘illegal’ in India since 1986. J&K is the only 
state in India which has its own Wildlife Protection Act. Under the J&K Wildlife Protection 
Act of 1978, chiru was listed in Part I of Schedule II under the ‘Special Game’ category. 
This legislation permitted hunting and regulated trade in its derivatives under the 
‘licence’ of the state. However, the state wildlife officials report that they have never 
issued any licences for shahtoosh wool trade (ibid.: 38). As such, the production and 
trade of shawls continued in the state until 2002 (when the ban was imposed) without 
any interference from the enforcement agencies within J&K. 
 
Section Two 
 
2.1 From raw wool to finished shawl: the production process 
 
Before I provide an overview of the growth and development of the shawl industry since 
medieval times, and the conditions of shawl workers, it is pertinent to understand the 
complex processes involved in the shawl production and the roles of the various 
categories of shawl workers.
37
 By explaining the complex division of labour and the tasks 
performed by each category, I demonstrate that the shawl workers who perform the 
most strenuous jobs have experienced marginalisation within the shahtoosh worker 
                                                 
37
 The information presented in this section is based on my interviews with various categories of shahtoosh 
workers and observation during the fieldwork in Srinagar. Apart from this, my understanding of the 
Kashmiri shawl manufacturing process has also benefitted from Rehman and Jafri (2006), Ahuja (2006) and 
Ahad (1987).  
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community. In this section, I have explained the production process prevalent at the time 
of my fieldwork.  
 
The entire production process involves five broad functions: raw wool supplying, 
spinning, weaving, finishing and trading. Out of 21 categories of shawl workers involved 
in the process, 13 are directly involved in the shawl production, six in its trading and the 
remaining two (carpenters and shuttle-makers) in the production of hardware products 
required in the manufacturing process.
38
 The diagram below (Figure 2) shows how the 
raw material and product pass from one worker to another, and highlight the relatively 
powerful actors in the shahtoosh shawl production and trade. The production process 
begins with bhotias procuring raw shahtoosh wool from Tibet. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 The carpenter makes spinning wheels and handlooms from deodar wood. The shuttle-makers make 
shuttles or muks for weaving and clips used for brushing the unwanted threads of the fabric. With the 
increasing use of machines for spinning and weaving, the demand for their products is declining rapidly. 
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  Figure 2: Production process of the shahtoosh shawl 
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Bhotias and local dealers 
As mentioned above, bhotias, the pastoral nomads of the western Himalayan region, 
bring the unprocessed wool from Tibet and Nepal to Uttaranchal and Delhi in order to 
sell it to the Kashmiri dealers. Due to strict enforcement of the ban on shahtoosh outside 
J&K state from the mid 1990s onwards, the bhotias started bringing the wool directly to 
Srinagar via Ladakh. Some of them have members of their families residing in Srinagar 
who act as local dealers. The bhotias also sell the wool to the manufacturers or their 
agents in Kashmir. 
 
Manufacturers or vastas 
Shawl manufacturers are the most powerful actors in the shawl industry not only 
because they accrue profits and control the production process but also because they 
determine the relationship of the industry with the outside world. They are involved in 
every stage of production from purchasing the wool to the sale of finished shawls. Some 
of the big manufacturers buy the wool directly from the Tibetan and Nepalese traders 
and bypass the local Kashmiri dealers. They buy large quantities of wool for the whole 
year and control the production process. The manufacturers are the owners of the shawl 
and pay the subordinate workers for their labour. Previously, the manufacturers provided 
these shawls to the hawkers for selling, but since the 1980s, many manufacturers have 
also taken up the trading functions. Besides supplying the shawls to the hawkers on 
credit, they now also sell the shawls directly to the exporters or traders outside the 
state.
39
   
 
Agents or poiywans 
The poiywans act as middlemen or agents of the manufacturers. They either get the wool 
from the manufacturers or purchase the wool directly from the bhotias or local dealers in 
Srinagar. These agents distribute the wool to the separators and spinners for cleaning 
and spinning, and the yarn to the weavers for weaving. They also distribute the fabric to 
the skilled workers for finishing and embroidering. Being the middlemen between the 
                                                 
39
 The manufacturers also have direct contact outside the state with the customers who give them special 
orders for producing desired shawl patterns and designs.  
 
 
70 
 
manufacturer and spinners/weavers, these agents make their earnings by purchasing the 
yarn at lower prices from the spinners and the weavers, and selling it at slightly higher 
prices to the manufacturers. I shall discuss this point in detail in chapter five of the thesis. 
 
Separators or charun wajens  
The separators are exclusively women and their job is to separate the inner soft fleece 
from the outer rough guard hair. This process of separation by hand is known as charun. 
They return the separated fleece to the manufacturers or their agents who weigh both 
the waste and the inner fleece to ensure that the quantity of raw wool provided has 
remained the same.  
 
Spinners or katun wajens 
The next job is that of the spinners, mainly female. They generally learn this skill from 
their mothers, and begin to spin as early as the age of ten. Spinning is one of the most 
skilled tasks in the production process.
40
 The spinning starts with the spinner running the 
spinning wheel with her right hand and simultaneously lifting the fleece with her left 
hand (see Figure 3 below). The movement of the wheel must be in perfect harmony with 
the lifting up and down of the fleece in order to produce yarn. The yarn is then made 
thick by combining two threads on a wooden cone known as the pritz. The pritz is put on 
the spinning wheel to twist the two threads into one. This process of twisting two 
threads is known as absaween. Finally, knots or gund are made with the help of a 
wooden instrument known as a thinjour, which has a wooden base with two sticks. The 
yarn is wrapped around these sticks and a knot is tied after every nine threads. On 
average, out of ten grams of wool, the spinners make 120-130 knots every three days.  
 
The agents of manufactuers then distribute the spun threads to the weavers for weaving 
the shawls. Weaving involves various sub-stages such as strengthening the thread, 
preparing warp, weft-making and combing the threads. These pre-weaving tasks are 
                                                 
40
 The spinners first clean the wool by mixing it with wet rice flour or kharott. This mixture lubricates the 
wool, absorbs its impurities, and also acts as a bleaching agent. After being treated for about an hour, the 
wool is cleared from the flour and is then combed on an instrument called a kangyn. The soft combed hairs 
are piled up into soft tufts known as temb, which are kept in an earthen pot to keep the wool away from 
dust and impurities.  
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generally carried out by workers employed by the weavers. In some cases, the weaver 
himself engages in these pre-weaving processes for an additional income. The family 
members of the weaver, including his wife and children, usually help him in this tedious 
process. 
 
 
Figure 3: Spinning yarn with a traditional hand-driven wheel 
 
Thread-processors or perkumgors 
The first pre-weaving stage is strengthening the spun thread. The threads are first 
cleaned by washing with herbal soap or reetha. These threads are then rolled on pritz. 
Upon drying, the threads are untied and dipped in a starch or maya made of rice flour. 
These wet threads are again rolled and untied many times so that the starch does not 
form lumps and get fixed to the yarn (see Appendix II: Picture 3). This processing of 
thread is called phirayee and the workers performing this task are called thread-
processors or perkumgors, who are generally male. The threads are then returned to the 
weaver who pays them for their labour. If the threads are to be dyed, they are sent to the 
dyers, otherwise they are woven in their natural shades. The weaver then sorts the 
threads on the basis of their thickness and strength. The better quality stronger threads 
are used to make warp and those which are somewhat thicker are kept for the weft.  
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Warp-dressers or penkumgors 
The second stage is warp-making or yen yaren which is either done by the weavers 
themselves or the warp-dressers employed by them. The number of threads to be used 
depends on the desired width of a shawl. The strong threads are stretched by means of 
four to six iron rods dug into the ground at regular intervals. Usually two people, 
normally male, walk along the length of these rods by carrying a pritz, on one hand and a 
yarunwej, a long stick with a hook, on the other. While walking, they transfer the thread 
from the pritz by using the yarunwej and tie it around the iron rods, crossing at each end 
(see Appendix II: Picture 4). The iron rods are then replaced at the crossings by the 
wooden sticks. The threads are then lifted up and spread evenly, after which the wooden 
sticks are again replaced by thick threads to keep the crossing at its place and avoid any 
tangling. The warp is then wrapped on a wooden roller or navrada.  
 
The third pre-weaving stage is weft-making or watchekein wallen, which is done by the 
weavers themselves. The threads are rolled on a spindle, after which they are taken out 
and fitted into a special metallic reel to create the weft.  
 
Warp-threaders or barangors 
The fourth pre-weaving stage is to pass the warp wrapped on a navrada through a 
wooden comb. This is done by warp-threaders or barangors who are generally women. 
They perform this job in two steps; first they pass each thread of warp through thicker 
cotton threads fixed on an instrument known as a saaz and second, these threads are 
passed through a wooden comb known as a kangi. Each warp consists of 1000-1500 
threads (see Appendix II: Picture 5). 
 
Weavers or vovers 
The weavers now fix the warps on the looms for weaving and the wefts are gently 
inserted into them with the help of a shuttle or muk (see Figure 4 below). Weaving is 
done exclusively by men who start learning this skill at around the age of ten. A weaver 
gets approximately 190 grams of yarn for a single shawl. It may require a minimum of 
seven days to weave a shahtoosh shawl, which is then returned either to the agent of the 
manufacturer or directly to the manufacturer. The weavers are paid by the 
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manufacturers and, in turn, the weavers pay the wages to the thread-processors, warp-
dressers and warp-threaders for their labour.   
                                                         
 
Figure 4: A weaver weaving a pashmina shawl in a karkhana in Srinagar 
 
Washers or dhobis 
The manufacturers, after assessing the quality of the woven fabric, send the shawls to 
washers or dhobis for their first wash to remove the mixtures such as soap and starch 
used in the making of threads and fabric. The dhobis wash them with herbal soap or 
reetha at the banks of the Jhelum river by using its water which is well known for its 
softening properties (see Appendix II: Picture 7). The shawls are then taken by the agents 
to the clippers. 
 
Clippers or puruzgars 
The clippers scrub the surface of the shawl on a frame which is made of two wooden 
beams set at a distance of one metre apart. The fabric is placed on this frame where the 
uneven threads, knots and any other flaws are removed by a long clip known as a wouch. 
The fabric is also rubbed with a husked corn cob known as a kashir to make the surface 
smooth and even. 
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Darners or raffugars 
The darners have a unique skill of mending the holes in the fabric and their services may 
be required at any stage between the weaving and finishing of the shawls. The holes may 
appear when the weavers lose any thread while weaving or when the clipper brushes the 
fabric. To repair these holes, the darners draw out the threads from within the fabric and 
interlock new threads with the old by using a needle (see Appendix II: Picture 8).  
 
Dyers or rangrez 
Before the second wash, the fabrics are taken to the dyers or rangrez. The dyers are 
proficient in dyeing them with brilliant colours and permanent tints (see Appendix II: 
Pictures 9 and 10). However, the natural vegetable dyes such as kirmizy or badamy have 
been replaced these days by chemical dyes. The dyed shawls are then taken by the 
agents again to the manufacturer to assess the quality of finishing, after which the 
manufacturer sends the shawls for designing and embroidery. 
  
Designers or naqqashs 
To embroider the shawls, the designers create patterns or designs. They draw patterns 
on the paper to be printed repeatedly on the fabric. Although the designers are very few 
in number, their job is indispensable for producing new patterns to satisfy the diverse 
tastes of the customers. 
 
Printers or chappawals 
The chappawals print the designs on the fabric by using wooden printing blocks (see 
Appendix II: Picture 11). These blocks are made of walnut wood because it is soft and 
takes the shape of the designs easily. The chappawals have a large collection of different 
sized blocks carved with various designs. They heat a mixture of black and white carbon 
powder with rice starch to use as a paste to print the design on the shawls. 
 
Embroiderers or ragbars 
The shawls are then embroidered by using silk threads or resham dyed in different 
colours (see Appendix II: Pictures 12 and 13). Depending upon the pattern or design, 
embroiderers can work on a shawl from several months to years to finish embroidering 
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it. The process can cost anything from a few hundreds to thousands of rupees. After the 
embroidering, the shawls are sent to the washers for a final wash, and finishers for steam 
ironing and then returned to the manufacturers. 
 
Hawkers or pheriwalas 
The manufacturers supply the shawls on credit to the trusted hawkers for sale outside 
the state. The hawkers travel to the big cities such as Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai and stay 
there for five to six months in a year. They contact the exporters or traders for the sale of 
their products and also their old customers. The profits are shared between the 
manufacturers and hawkers.   
 
Traders and exporters 
The traders make significant profits by selling the shahtoosh shawls in the big cities of 
India. They also export the shawls in large numbers to fashion outlets worldwide 
including France, the UK, Belgium, Switzerland, the USA, Hong Kong, and those of the 
Middle and Far East.  
 
In the above discussion, we can observe that categories of workers such as the spinners, 
weavers and embroiderers contribute the most to the production of shawls, by 
performing the most arduous jobs and adding value to the finished products. Yet, 
economically these have remained the most exploited and marginalised categories, a 
point with which I engage in detail in the next section. Manufacturers, traders and 
poiywans who contribute the least in the actual production process are economically the 
most powerful actors who are able to make profits and control the entire manufacturing 
and trading of shawls. This topic is further detailed in the analysis of the differential 
impact of the ban on the livelihoods and wages of different categories of shahtoosh 
workers in chapter five. 
 
2.2 Shahtoosh workers: population and distribution 
 
The Government of J&K has no records on the population or distribution of the 
shahtoosh workers in the state. However, on the basis of the following historical 
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accounts on shawl workers in Kashmir, some approximate figures can be estimated. 
Ames (1986: 20) states that during the Mughal period (1586-1753), 40,000 looms were in 
operation in Kashmir, with each loom employing three people. Notably, the Mughal 
period was the one of relative peace and stability in the region in comparison to the 
successive Afghan and Sikh regimes. In times of Afghan rule (1753-1819), there was a 
decline in the trade with the number of looms reducing to 16,000 (Ahad, 1987: 49). 
However, at the turn of the 18
th
 century, 24,000 looms operated in the Valley, giving 
employment to 72,000 weavers (ibid.: 49). During the Dogra rule (1846-1877), there were 
27,000 weavers working at 11,000 looms (Ames, 1986: 32, see also Younghusband, 1909: 
212). The Census report of 1891 puts the number at 5,148 (Ahad, 1987: 50). However, 
these accounts do not specifically indicate the total number of shahtoosh workers in the 
Valley but provide a general estimate of shawl workers.   
 
The state’s last published census information on Kashmir in 1981 does not differentiate 
shahtoosh workers from the other textile workers. The first census to determine the total 
number of shahtoosh workers and their families was conducted in 2002-03 by the IFAW 
and WTI. The total size of the population surveyed was 45,405 covering the Srinagar, 
Budgam, Baramula and Pulwama districts. Out of this figure, 14,293 individuals were 
directly or indirectly involved in the production of shahtoosh shawls. Of the remainder, 
26,044 worked in other professions, and 5,068 individuals were classified as dependents 
(IFAW and WTI, 2003: 7). There is also a clear division of work by gender and females 
outnumber males in this industry. On average, each manufacturer keeps 75 separators 
and around 300 spinners on its payroll (ibid.: 7). These two categories form the largest 
workforce involved in the manufacturing of shahtoosh products. It is estimated that 
females constitute 74% of the population of shahtoosh workers in the Valley (ibid.: 7). 
The Wildlife Protection Society of India (WPSI) claims that this industry is largely in the 
hands of about 20 powerful families who, in turn, employ thousands of shawl workers in 
small household units (see Kumar and Wright, 1997: 22). The IFAW and WTI estimate the 
number of manufacturers to have been 120 in the 1990s, when the industry was at its 
peak (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 56).  
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Section Three 
 
3.1 Origin and development of the shawl industry 
 
The word ‘shawl’ is commonly accepted to be derived from a Persian word shal which 
originally denotes a class of woven fabric rather than a particular article of dress (Irwin, 
1973: 1).  It has also been argued that the word shawl owes its origin to the word sha of 
the Dardic group of languages to which Kashmiri belongs (Ahad, 1987: 5). The shahtoosh 
shawls are well known for their lightness, warmth and softness, and are typically 
embroidered with beautiful floral, faunal and geometrical designs.  
 
The origin of shawl weaving in Kashmir is obscure. The local people associate the origin of 
this art with Shah Hamdani (1314-1384), a Persian Sufi saint and a popular figure of 
medieval times in Kashmir. They believe that besides preaching Islam, he brought the 
weavers from Persia to teach the skill of shawl weaving to the people of Kashmir for their 
economic prosperity. He introduced the indoor economic activities to help them secure 
their livelihoods in winter conditions. Another popular belief regarding the origin of the 
shawl industry among Kashmiris is that Shah Hamdani was given a pair of socks made of 
pashmina wool by the local people of Ladakh on his way to Turkistan (historically, the 
region of Central Asia). Observing its warmth, he presented some pashmina wool to the 
Sultan Qutub-ud-din (1374-89 A.D.) in Kashmir, who had it manufactured into a shawl 
and, thus, the shawl became a popular item of manufacture among the Kashmiri 
craftsmen (Hassnain, 1992: 169).  
 
Scholars of Kashmir history such as Riazuddin (1988), Ames (1986), Strauss (1986) and 
Irwin (1973) hold the view that the shawls of Kashmir originated during Sultan Zain-ul-
Abidin’s reign (1420-1470). Zain-ul-Abidin brought the weavers from Turkistan to the 
Valley in order to train the people of Kashmir. This consensus has been challenged by 
writers such as Ahad (1987) and Jayakar (1959) who argue that the art of shawl weaving 
was known to the Kashmiri craftsmen since ancient times. Historians such as Rehman and 
Jafri (2006) and Ahad (1987) have maintained that the art of shawl weaving was merely a 
subsidiary occupation pursued by agriculturalists in Kashmir before the conquest of the 
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Sultans in the 14
th
 century. The shawl was woven on a rough loom with the help of family 
labour, primitive know-how and little of the division of labour that characterises current 
production (Ahad, 1987: 9). However, under the reign of the Turkish Sultans, shawl 
weaving began its slow transition from a subsistence base to a factory system based on 
the complex division of labour. The industry flourished in Mughal times and was a 
significant source of revenue to the subsequent Afghan, Sikh and Dogra regimes. Below, I 
discuss the development of the shawl industry in Kashmir during different periods. 
 
Kashmir Sultans (1320-1569): introduction of Persian designs to craftsmen in Kashmir 
The Sultans of Kashmir showed great enthusiasm for developing Kashmiri handicrafts. As 
mentioned above, the art of shawl weaving developed during the reign of Sultan Zain-ul-
Abidin (1423-1474), who took several systematic measures to organise the shawl 
industry. Besides improving the traditional looms, it is claimed that he invited experts 
from Turkistan and provided them with facilities in order to train the people of Kashmir 
in weaving the kinds of designs prevailing in Persia at the time (ibid.: 10). The art of 
weaving in Kashmir, thus, came to be largely influenced by the Central Asian experts 
during this time. Furthermore, due to the geographical proximity of Kashmir to Central 
Asia and its linkage with the old ‘silk route’, Kashmir became an important transit point in 
the Indo-Central Asian trade during this period (Warikoo, 1989: 55).  
 
Mughal period (1586-1753): shahtoosh shawls as symbolic capital 
Although Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin is credited as the first monarch to have developed the 
shawl weaving art in Kashmir, the Mughal emperor, Akbar (1542-1605) is venerated for 
making a quantum leap in its manufacturing. Abul Fazl, the court’s chronicler, describes 
in Ain-i-Akbari how the emperor Akbar was famously known to hold the shahtoosh shawl 
in high regard (Rehman and Jafri, 2006: 35). He referred to these shawls as paramnaram, 
meaning the softest fabric (Ahad, 1987: 12). Abul Fazl describes the king as having had 
such a great passion for the shahtoosh shawls that his empire legislated against the use 
of shahtoosh shawls outside the court (Rehman and Jafri, 2006: 36). References to the 
Kashmiri shawls are also found in Tuzk-i-Jehangiri, in which Jehangir (1569-1627), the son 
of Akbar, describes the shawl as one of his favourite items of dress. His love for 
naturalistic forms inspired the shawl designs with flowering patterns (ibid.: 57). Until 
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Shah Jahan’s (1592-1666) reign, the toos shawls were reserved for the exclusive use of 
the royal household (ibid.: 45). They were also given as tribute to the foreign kings of 
Rome, Persia, Egypt, Golcanda and Bijapur (Ahad, 1987: 11). The other shawls available 
for the courtiers and noblemen were pashmina. This illustrates that the shahtoosh shawls 
were not considered just as commodities, but goods imbued with symbolic capital to be 
possessed only by the ruling class. 
 
The state owned factories (known as karkhanas), developed rapidly under the Mughal 
rule, becoming a vital source of prosperity for Kashmir (ibid.: 45). Ahad (1987: 45) 
describes karkhanas as ‘large halls seen in many places for the artisans who are busily 
employed and superintended by a master’. The officers called Khans or Maliks exercised 
control through the master craftsmen over subordinate workers (ibid.). They were in 
charge of the workshops, collecting the materials and distributing the wages. The master 
craftsmen, known as vostas, were employed to supervise the work done by the artisans 
in the production of shawls. The state, however, discouraged private entrepreneurs from 
gaining a foothold in the shawl production and sale. A few entrepreneurs who were 
permitted by the state to employ weavers and embroiderers established looms in 
ordinary dwelling rooms of their small houses (Schonsberg, 1853: 131-133). They were 
subordinate to and dependent upon the government, which exercised absolute authority 
over their small workshops through Dag-i-shawl, an early department of excise (Ahad, 
1987: 46).  
 
Afghan period (1753-1819): expansion of markets and emergence of independent 
karkhanas 
The state factory system became a major source of revenue during the period of Afghan 
rule. There was a time in Kashmir in the early 19
th
 century, when the revenue given by 
the shawl industry was more than the land revenue (Dhar, 2001: 31). The most notable 
development of this period was the extensive trade of shawls in Europe. The Kashmiri 
shawl was largely adopted as a fashion article at weddings, especially during the reign of 
Queen Victoria (Ahad, 1987: 12). The merchants from Europe came to Kashmir to 
purchase the shawls to export them to various European countries including England, 
Russia, France and Italy. This resulted in the expansion of shawl markets, which led some 
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artisans to start their own karkhanas. However, the number of weavers employed by 
private individuals was very small and state officials controlled the karkhanas, both state 
owned and private (Schonsberg, 1853: 106). Ames (1986: 26) suggests, ‘a fine piece of 
shawl was sold at the rate of forty rupees by the merchant during this period’, although 
the weavers were paid only in kind. Moorcroft (1820) argues that the main profit makers 
of this industry were not the loom owners but the shawl brokers or mohkuns, who were 
intermediaries between the producers and foreign merchants. By this time, Kashmir had 
not only evolved a system of factory and complex division of labour but also a fully-
functioning brokerage and marketing system.  
 
Sikh period (1819-1846): emigration of shawl workers to Punjab 
During the Sikh rule, the manufacture of shawls increased manifold. Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh (1780-1839) made it a convention to present these shawls to Europeans who 
visited the court (Ahad, 1987: 13). These shawls were often used to bribe the officials of 
the British East India Company by the princes to seek personal favours (Irwin, 1973: 10). 
The industry continued to be a significant source of revenue to the government. The 
working conditions of the shawl workers, however, were very poor during this period 
(Rehman and Jafri, 2006: 88). The karkhanadars (factory owners) completely controlled 
the weavers, who were bound to work only for the employer who trained them. The 
practice of luring away a weaver by others was punishable by law (Ames, 1986: 32). The 
workmen were kept under perpetual bondage by their karkhanadars and their wages 
were extremely low. The last Sikh governor of Kashmir, Sheikh Imam-ud-din gave the 
shawl weavers some relief in 1846, by setting them free from the bondage of 
karkhanadars (ibid.: 32).  
 
During this period, Kashmir’s trade links with Central Asia and Europe were firmly 
established. Merchants from Persia, Turkey, British India and Europe regularly came to 
Kashmir to purchase its fabrics (Ahad, 1987: 13). The British also tried to bring the shawl 
workers to Punjab, apparently to feed the supply to England (Ames, 1986: 40). The 
oppression of the rulers and karkhanadars, and the great famine in 1834 in Kashmir 
resulted in the emigration of a large number of workers to Amritsar and other towns in 
Punjab. Ames notes that ‘since about 1810, Loudhiana has been the site of a new 
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industry employing over a thousand specialised workers and 400 looms’ (ibid.). This was 
also the time when the industry was experiencing an economic tug-of-war between 
England and France, who both wanted to establish their own separate shawl industries, 
independent from Srinagar (ibid.).  
 
Dogra period (1846-1877): the rising and falling demand of shahtoosh shawls 
A new situation developed when the colonial interests of the Sikhs in Kashmir clashed 
with the British commercial interests. The British defeated the Sikhs led by Maharaja 
Ranjit Singh and took control over all of their territories. However, in order to meet their 
commercial interests and reduce administration costs, the British government sold the 
kingdom of Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh (1792–1857), the Dogra ruler of Jammu, 
after signing the treaty of Lahore in 1846. This treaty gave shape to the princely state of 
J&K including Ladakh. The treaty contained an article which said, ‘Maharaja Gulab Singh 
acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government and will, in token of the 
supremacy, present annually to the British Government, one horse, twelve perfect shawl 
goats of approved breed (six male and six female) and three pairs of Kashmir shawls’ 
(Dhar, 2001: 41). The treaty demonstrates the importance of the Kashmiri shawl industry 
and by extension the trade in pashm and shahtoosh wool (Rizvi, 1999: 50). It also appears 
that the British were contemplating rearing the shawl goats from the mountains of 
western Tibet. However, the experiments of rearing these goats in England failed as the 
new habitat did not suit the species (see Dhar, 2001; Schonsberg, 1853). 
 
In the Dogra period, European taste, especially English and French, completely 
dominated the Kashmiri shawl design. The early accounts show that weavers themselves 
resented this foreign interference. In the initial years, much difficulty was experienced in 
persuading the native designers to alter or amend their patterns, but eventually they 
started adopting hints (Irwin, 1973: 17). The French and English traders attempted an 
imitation of the art of shahtoosh weaving and embroidering. Norwich is regarded as the 
pioneering imitation shawl centre in Europe, started as early as 1784, followed by 
Edinburgh and some other Scottish towns (ibid.: 20). Competition to the Kashmir shawl 
manufacturing was also posed by the flourishing industry in Lyons in 1800. It is notable 
that when the British brought Kashmir under their control, they stopped Kashmiri 
82 
 
craftsmen from having direct contact with the French agents to establish their monopoly. 
The British also blocked the Kashmir shawl trade with Russia by controlling the frontiers 
at Yarkand and Kashgar (Dhar, 2001). It is reported that the popularity of these shawls 
declined in Europe with the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and a sudden change in 
European fashion (Ames, 1986: 48; see also Younghusband, 1909). In short, the 
commercial rivalry of the colonial powers and the popularity of shawls in European 
markets contributed among other things to the rise and fall of the shawl industry of 
Kashmir. 
 
3.2 Marginalisation and exploitation of the shawl workers: pre-independence 
 
The available literature provides very limited information on the conditions of shahtoosh 
workers in the Kashmir valley. However, we find some references to it in the accounts of 
travellers such as Moorcroft and Trebeck (1841), Schonsberg (1853) and Younghusband 
(1909). In the discussion below, I highlight the poor living and working conditions of the 
shawl workers and the harsh system of taxation under different regimes. 
 
Describing the living conditions of the artisans in the mid 19
th
 century, Ahad writes: ‘the 
artisans lived in old dilapidated houses situated in the places of inconceivable filth’ 
(Ahad, 1987: 68). The dress of artisans too reflected their acute poverty. The majority of 
them did not possess sufficient clothes to protect themselves from the cold and moved 
around almost bare-foot (ibid.: 67). Moorcroft (1820) states that the weavers were the 
most oppressed section of the industry, the majority of them ill-clothed, under-nourished 
and permanently indebted to the state tax-collectors and karkhanadars. Without the 
supplementary earnings of his wife and children, it was impossible for an average weaver 
to support his family (ibid.). The artisans worked under strict regimentation as bond-
slaves or day labourers from morning to evening (Moorcroft and Trebeck, 1841). 
Wakefield (1879) observes that the shawl workers spent their childhood, youth and old 
age with unending poverty, disease and suffering.  
 
The poor conditions of artisans described in historical accounts reflect that their wages in 
the Mughal period must have been meagre (see Verma, 1994; Ahad, 1987; Lawrence, 
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1895). In the time of the Afghans, the system of remuneration was both in kind and cash. 
The food grains were sold to the shawl weavers in exchange for their labour at the rate of 
50% above their market price (Ahad, 1987: 54). When paid in cash, the wages were very 
low for shawl workers but the merchants and shawl brokers earned profits and lived a 
prosperous life (ibid.). During the Sikh period, the economic exploitation of the artisan 
class and mass of peasantry had reached new heights. The weavers earned seven to eight 
rupees per month, but were forced to pay five rupees per month as tax (Dhar, 2001: 31). 
They had to undergo heavy loans, which ultimately left their families starving. For 
spinners, the wages did not exceed three and a half rupees per month. Out of this 
amount, they had to spend two rupees on the purchase of wool (Ahad, 1987: 55). 
Treating them as bonded slaves, the government coerced the workers not only to pay the 
tax but also to work very hard. The dreadful cruelties of the rulers can be observed when, 
for the smallest offence, the government punished the poor artisans with the loss of their 
noses and ears (Ames, 1986: 30). The weavers are said to have cut off their thumbs to 
escape the tyrannies of the rulers and karkhanadars or proprietors (ibid.: 32). The Sikh 
government levied heavy taxes on the wool trade. The import of raw wool was subjected 
to innumerable duties at various places between Ladakh and Tibet. On each horse-load, 
95 rupees was to be paid to the government as duty. On its arrival in Kashmir, the wool 
was sold by the government at 20% profit to the merchants. During the Sikh period, there 
was 25% ad valorem duty on each shawl and 25% more as private exaction of the corrupt 
officers, who made the artisans starve even for their basic necessities (Ahad, 1987: 105).  
 
After Kashmir was handed over by the British to Maharaja Gulab Singh, conditions for the 
weavers deteriorated even further. The Maharaja levied a poll-tax of 47 to 48 rupees per 
annum on each shawl weaver, which caused their living conditions to deteriorate 
considerably (Irwin, 1973: 9). Heavy duties were imposed on the import of wool, and the 
production and export of the fabric greatly hindered the flow of the trade, discouraging 
the purchaser (Ahad, 1987). This accelerated the downfall of the industry. During this 
period, the shawl workers were forced to pursue their craft in order to create profits for 
their masters even though many were half-blind or incapacitated (ibid.). If any shawl 
worker gave up his employment or succeeded in escaping to Punjab, the darogah of Dag-
i-shawl would send a sepoy to the house of the fugitive to drag his wife, mother or father 
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to the court, where they were fined a heavy sum or imprisoned for a few days (ibid.: 
104). However, the shawl merchants gained huge profits from the sale of shawls to 
European markets during this period. For example, Zutshi (2004: 85) notes that in 1850s, 
shawls were sold at a 500% profit on its original cost of production in Kashmir. 
 
We can observe that the formation of each new state attempted to control the shawl 
industry and the shawl workers by way of different strategies. For example, during the 
Mughal period, the shahtoosh shawls were reserved for the exclusive use of the royal 
household or presented as a tribute to the foreign kings, thus making shawls a symbolic 
capital. In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century, with the expansion of the shawl industry and the 
extension of trade links with foreign markets, we saw the emergence of private 
karkhanas and a fully-functioning brokerage system. Yet, there were several restrictions 
imposed by the Mughal and Afghan rulers on private entrepreneurs in order to control 
them and protect state revenues. Apart from this, the state forced the workers to work 
for long hours in return for very low wages and, at times, controlled labour by paying 
them only in the form of food grains. During the Sikh period, there were checks placed on 
the mobility or freedom of shahtoosh workers to work with other karkhanadars and if 
the shawl workers fled the Valley, they were punished brutally. We can observe that the 
harsh taxation system under the different regimes imposed on the shawl workers 
contributed to the increase in the state revenue but, at the same time, it also led to the 
deteriorating living conditions of the artisans. We also witnessed the attempts by British 
colonialists to re-territorialise the shawl trade by closing off older trans-regional 
networks with Russia, France and Central Asia for their own commercial interests by way 
of monopolising the trade. 
 
3.3 Shahtoosh workers and the new state: post-independence 
 
In 1948, soon after independence, the shawl industry received a severe blow in the wake 
of partition of the country when many artisans migrated to Pakistan, where they tried to 
earn a living by adopting other professions (Shah, 1992). The control over the production 
and trade of shawls now passed from the feudal rulers and merchants to the 
manufacturers of that time. The shahtoosh workers now experienced exploitation in the 
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industry at the hands of manufacturers and their agents, and continued working in an 
unorganised sector without any fixed contracts and wages (ibid.). Ahad (1987), however, 
describes that after independence, the working conditions of shawl workers improved 
slightly after the creation of cooperative production centres and the formation of trade 
unions. Although few in number, government production centres and embroidery units 
run on cooperative basis had well-ventilated halls, with proper heating and cooling 
arrangements (ibid.: 56). Since the shawl industry could be one of the important sources 
of revenue for the state government, the government started making efforts to foster its 
growth by providing subsidies to exporters, credit facilities to manufacturers and starting 
training schools for artisans (see Shah, 1992).  
 
According to the shawl workers, the period of Sheikh Abdullah’s government represents 
a glorious period in the history of artisans in the Valley. In the early 1950s, Abdullah took 
some measures to curtail the influence of shawl manufacturers and traders, and to 
improve the conditions of artisans by providing them the minimum wages. He also 
encouraged the shawl workers to form trade unions in order to check the exploitative 
practices of their employers. As mentioned in chapter two, in 1950, Abdullah introduced 
land reforms in the state and distributed the land to the tiller. The tenants were now 
entitled to three-quarters of the produce of the land. These changes resulted in the 
improvement of the economic conditions of artisans who partly depended on agriculture 
for meeting their survival needs. During this period, the government sponsored Kashmir 
Industrial Arts Emporium set up outlets in Amritsar, Delhi, Mumbai and Shimla with a 
view to find a market for the Kashmiri handicrafts and to eliminate the middlemen 
altogether. Cooperative societies started organising exhibitions for Kashmir arts and 
crafts to strengthen the industry. According to the shawl workers, Sheikh Abdullah also 
prohibited the trade of any unfinished products in order to protect the incomes and 
livelihoods of local people against machine-made products outside the state. In 1975, 
when Abdullah came to power again, Debt Conciliation Boards were formed in order to 
help the artisans who depended on the manufacturers for advances and loans. These 
boards helped generate amicable settlements between debtors and creditors and 
dismissed all claims in which one and a half times the principal had been paid (Sharma, 
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2004: 83). Yet, the manufacturers found ways to maximise their profits and retain control 
over the production process, a point that I explain below. 
 
Until the 1970s, each job in the production process was mutually exclusive, with 
poiywans (agents of manufacturers) purchasing the wool from the bhotias or local 
dealers and supplying it to the manufacturers. The manufacturers, in turn, employed the 
skilled artisans for processing, and supplied the finished shawls to hawkers to be sold 
within and outside the state. Since the 1980s, in order to derive profits from the raw 
wool trade, the manufacturers started bypassing the poiywans and the local Kashmiri 
dealers in procuring the raw wool.
41
 They started buying the wool directly from the 
bhotias or from the Nepalese traders by making cash payments. The bhotias preferred to 
sell the wool to the manufacturers directly than to the poiywans as the latter were only 
able to pay the amount in instalments unlike the manufacturers who had ready cash 
available. The manufacturers now started employing the poiywans to distribute the raw 
material to the separators, spinners and weavers, and also to supervise the whole 
process of shawl production. Furthermore, owing to the rising demand for shahtoosh 
shawls in foreign countries, the big manufacturers, bypassing the hawkers, started 
directly engaging in the marketing of shawls outside the state. As such, the conventional 
jobs of the manufacturers, poiywans and hawkers, most often, now came to be 
performed by the same person. 
 
Another important shift occurred in the manufacturing process itself. We saw a decline of 
big karkhanas in the post-independence period, possibly, due to new labour regulations 
regarding minimum wages and working conditions. The production process got de-
concentrated into small karkhanas where typically weavers would employ subordinate 
workers on their residential premises. Spinners, separators and embroiderers also 
started working from their own houses, and poiywans acted as supervisors of the entire 
production process on behalf of manufacturers. Although the karkhanas owned by 
manufacturers declined in number in the post-independence period, the manufacturers, 
                                                 
41
 The discussion presented is made on the basis of my interviews with senior shahtoosh workers, mainly 
embroiderers and weavers during my fieldwork in Srinagar. 
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through their agents, were still able to control the entire production process. The de-
concentration of the manufacturing site could be understood as a strategy on the part of 
manufacturers to discourage unionisation of workers and reduce production costs. Since 
there was a significant difference in the costs incurred in the production of the shahtoosh 
shawls and their selling price, some weavers also felt motivated to engage in small-scale 
manufacturing. Their initiatives, however, were discouraged by the established 
manufacturers and they devised different tactics to keep these weavers at a 
disadvantage. For example, when the weavers approached the manufacturers to 
purchase shahtoosh wool, the manufacturers charged them very high rates for the wool. 
The weavers had to purchase the wool from the manufacturers on credit as, most of the 
time, they did not have the cash readily available. This indebtedness further led to the 
vulnerability of the weavers. As the weavers did not have easy access to the market, they 
were forced to sell their products to the manufacturers at a low cost in order to pay for 
the raw material they had borrowed. Owing to this, very few weavers were able to 
succeed in becoming manufacturers in their own right and others simply returned to the 
status of subordinate workers of big manufacturers. Some weavers also took over the 
roles of hawkers to sell their products in the market outside the state. But the 
manufacturers again adopted various ways to convince the customers and exporters 
outside J&K that the products brought by these weavers were adulterated and did not 
represent the pure hand-made shahtoosh shawls. Thus, due to the lack of capital, the 
high cost of wool, and the absence of a market for their products, the weavers were 
forced to accept the domination and exploitation by the established manufacturers, who 
managed to remain the most powerful actors in the shawl production process. I shall 
return to this point in chapter five of the thesis. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have highlighted the myths and realities concerning the source of 
shahtoosh wool. The origin of shahtoosh has remained obscured in the historical 
accounts and there is also no consensus on the actual population size of the antelope. 
Historically, the Kashmiri shawl merchants have enjoyed monopoly over the wool, both 
shahtoosh and pashmina, originating from western Tibet and Ladakh. The fact that the 
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local shawl workers still hold the traditional beliefs and legends concerning the source of 
shahtoosh possibly point to the deliberate strategy adopted by the merchants and 
traders over the centuries to secure their interests and maintain control over the trade. 
Despite the fact that the wool is obtained after the killing of chirus and the meagre 
quantity of shed wool is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the shawl industry, 
the manufacturers and exporters have tried to conceal the true origin of shahtoosh by 
perpetuating myths relating to the collection of wool as well as using the pictures of the 
mountain goat Ibex in the shahtoosh promotional brochures. The frontier location and 
the special status of J&K made it possible for the trade in shahtoosh to continue even 
after the trade involving the antelope and its body parts was made illegal by the Indian 
government in the mid 1980s.  
 
We have observed that shahtoosh shawl production involves a complex division of 
labour. The powerful actors such as bhotias, local dealers, manufacturers, agents, 
hawkers and exporters, who contribute very little to the actual production process, 
accrue profits by exploiting the skilled workers engaged in the most laborious tasks 
involved in the production of shahtoosh shawls. The lack of capital and access to markets 
has traditionally kept these artisans in a subordinate position. We also witnessed that the 
shawl industry had undergone important changes during its growth under different 
regimes. The production of the shahtoosh shawl for exclusive use by the ruling classes 
gave way to the production for mass consumption with the decline of the Mughal 
Empire. While the state owned karkhanas remained dominant, some privately owned 
karkhanas also emerged by the 18
th
 century, although under the control of the state 
officials. We see an increase in the volume of long distance trade in shawls especially 
with European countries around this time. The British succeeded in gaining a monopoly 
over the shawl trade by restricting the access of French and Russian agents. Historically, 
the shawl trade has remained an important source of revenue for the various regimes in 
Kashmir. While the merchants and shawl brokers amassed wealth as the industry 
flourished, the conditions of the artisans, as I explained, did not improve much. On the 
contrary, harsh taxes imposed on the shawl workers and their poor working conditions 
have forced them to live in misery in the period before independence. 
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In the post-independence period, I argued that the manufacturers and agents replaced 
feudal rulers and shawl merchants in controlling the shawl industry and production 
process. Although the new state took some initiatives to help the poor artisans by 
granting loans, cancelling debts and abolishing the taxes imposed on them, it could not 
eliminate the exploitation of the artisans at the hands of manufacturers and their agents. 
I explained that the manufacturers started taking up wool and shawl marketing jobs, 
bypassing poiywans and hawkers, in order to gain exclusive control over the production 
process as well as marketing. Rather than being associated with their previous job of 
supplying wool to the manufacturers, poiywans now came to be employed by the 
manufacturers to distribute wool and supervise the production process. The established 
manufacturers, as noted, also discouraged the shawl weavers from becoming small-scale 
manufacturers by charging a higher price for the raw wool and purchasing their fabric at 
lower rates. The weavers, due to the lack of capital and easy access to the market, often 
ended up working under the big manufacturers. Furthermore, the manufacturers have 
been able to reduce the production costs and prevent the unionisation of artisans by 
fragmenting the site of production but, at the same time, maintaining control over their 
subordinate workers through their agents, poiywans. I further elaborate on the complex 
relations of domination and subordination in the post-ban period as well as examine the 
roles and agendas of the different stakeholders in the banning of shahtoosh trade in the 
next two chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The Ban on Shahtoosh: sustainability for whom? 
 
There’s restlessness in every heart  
                                                                                                                          But no one dare speak out — 
Afraid that with their free expression  
Freedom may be annoyed. 
 
— Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor
42
  
 
The debates on nature conservation and livelihoods are far from conclusion. They have 
tended to follow two entrenched and opposed lines of argument. The mainstream 
environmental conservation policies aimed at achieving goals of environmental 
sustainability have, thus far, largely ignored the politics and power relations crucial in the 
access, control and distribution of resources. The alternative viewpoints have mainly 
considered nature conservation interventions as coercive and detrimental to the 
interests of the local communities dependent upon natural resources for sustenance. 
Before taking sides, it is important to examine how nature conservation policies 
permeate different layers of politics and are further shaped and reshaped according to 
the interests of the various stakeholders involved in the process of implementation.  
 
This chapter examines the politics that surround the process of banning the shahtoosh 
trade in J&K and analyses how power determines access to and control over local 
resources which are now seen as global commons. The following questions are 
addressed in this chapter: a) What were the agendas and interests of a diverse set of 
actors (international, national, state and local) associated with the ban on the shahtoosh 
trade? b) How can the state be understood in its dual role, acting as an agency for 
imposing the ban and at the same time, allowing illegal production and trade of 
                                                 
42
 A selection from the poem “Aazaadee” by Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor, a Kashmiri poet. The English 
translation of the poem can be found in ‘An Anthology of Modern Kashmiri Verse (1930-1960)’ by 
Trilokinath Raina (1972). 
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shahtoosh to continue? c) How did shahtoosh workers respond to the ban and how were 
the interests of both powerful actors and poor artisans served? d) What were the 
linkages, if any, between militancy in the state and the now illegal trading of shahtoosh? 
Overall, I explain how the ban on the shahtoosh trade was understood, accepted, 
negotiated and resisted at different levels from global to local. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section one explains the chronology of events 
that led to the imposition of the ban on shahtoosh in 2002 and presents the arguments 
of various actors with regard to the prospect of chiru breeding. I identify three forms of 
politics associated with law, science and the constitutional status of the state and argue 
that the ban on the shahtoosh trade was addressed largely along conservation lines 
without adequate attention paid to the livelihoods of the poor shahtoosh workers. 
Section two examines the response of the state and shahtoosh workers to the ban and 
unravels embedded local political complexities. I analyse the ‘split role’ of the 
enforcement officials and limited avenues of protest for the poor shahtoosh workers. I 
argue that the powerful actors within the shahtoosh worker community are able to 
secure their interests while the relatively powerless and poorer workers are 
marginalised. Following this, in section three, I examine shadow networks of shahtoosh 
and argue that the trade still continues, albeit illegally. Towards the end of this section, I 
also discuss the various arguments presented by the shahtoosh workers about the 
connection between militancy and the shahtoosh trade. My principal argument is that 
the imposition of a blanket ban often proves to be detrimental for poorer groups that are 
dependent upon natural resources for sustenance. At the same time, it can potentially 
open up new opportunities for rent seeking (for enforcement agencies), profit making 
(for traders and manufacturers), and the legitimisation of a conservation agenda along 
the lines of science and sustainability (to the benefit of international conservation 
community).  
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Section One 
 
1.1 The ban on shahtoosh: a chronology of events 
 
I have discussed the legal status of the chiru in detail in chapter three. Here, I explain the 
chronology of events that led to the change of the chiru’s status from a protected to a 
banned species.  
 
In 1988, with the revelation of the truth about the connection between the massacre of 
the Tibetan antelope and the highly prized shahtoosh shawls of Kashmir, the 
conservation of the chirus became a global concern. CITES began to create awareness of 
the issue among policy makers through international workshops and directing the various 
governments to coordinate, collaborate and enforce CITES resolution to protect the 
chirus from extinction. Supporting this agenda, wildlife conservation NGOs launched 
various campaigns worldwide to educate the masses about the unsavoury origin of the 
shahtoosh shawl. In India, NGOs such as Traffic India, WTI, IFAW and WWF played a 
major role in generating awareness of the issue. The IFAW and WTI organised various 
programmes, supported by the fashion fraternity, such as ‘Say No to Shahtoosh’, ‘Save 
Chiru’ and ‘Wrap Up the Trade’ to educate the people about the origin of shahtoosh 
wool. Similarly, the Traffic India launched another campaign ‘Don’t Buy Trouble’ with the 
aim to get the message across to consumers and discourage the demand for shahtoosh 
shawls in the market. It is important to note that these awareness building programmes 
were confined to metropolitan cities and elite consumers. Apart from a small-scale 
campaign organised by the WWF in Srinagar, there were no programmes organised to 
generate awareness among the local people in Kashmir. 
 
In 1995, CITES accused the Indian MoEF of failing to stop the shahtoosh production and 
sale and ordered the government to take strict measures in this regard. In response, the 
MoEF appointed an expert committee
43
 to undertake a survey in Ladakh to determine 
                                                 
43
 The survey team was comprised of the Chief Wildlife Warden of J&K, the Regional Wildlife Warden of 
Leh, a scientist from the Wildlife Institute of India, a representative of Traffic India and a few traders from 
Kashmir.  
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the conservation status of the chiru in India and the trade in its wool. The first objective 
of the survey was to identify the areas in India where the Tibetan antelope is found, and 
to give a rough estimate of its population. The second task was to verify the area from 
where the shed shahtoosh wool (if any) is collected as claimed by local herders and 
traders. The third aim, since the traders also claimed the existence of a breeding farm for 
the species in Ladakh, was to verify it or a farm breeding any other species, which the 
traders might have mistaken for the Tibetan antelope. The fourth objective was to 
identify the border areas through which the barter trade of shahtoosh wool is carried 
through Ladakh (Chundawat and Talwar, 1995).  
 
The survey confirmed the presence of Tibetan antelope in the upper Changchenmo valley 
and Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. The chiru habitat that lies within the Indian territory was 
estimated to be around 2,500 square kilometres. The traders were unable to provide any 
evidence of shed wool of the chirus or any breeding farms. The team also reported that 
no evidence of killing of the Tibetan antelope was found within Indian territory (ibid.). 
According to the survey team, the figure for the consumption of shahtoosh was initially 
stated by the traders as about 3,000 kilograms per year. Subsequently, on being asked to 
confirm this, the traders stated that accurate figures of consumption were not available. 
Considering this initial figure, the expert group estimated that since 150 grams of 
shahtoosh wool is produced by one antelope, approximately 20,000 Tibetan antelopes 
are required to meet the current market demand (ibid.). The experts argued that since a 
very small population of 200 to 220 chirus enter into the Indian territory, commercial 
collection of wool was not possible to sustain the shahtoosh trade in J&K. While not 
rejecting the possibility of captive breeding of the chirus in Ladakh in India, the experts 
stated that it is economically not viable considering the high costs involved in the 
project.
44
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 The then Wildlife Warden of Leh and a member of the survey team, Naseer Kichloo informed me that 
captive breeding of the chirus is possible although it requires high investments and co-ordination with the 
Indian army as antelopes need to be airlifted in helicopters from Changchenmo valley to the closure in Leh, 
which is the only suitable place (owing to its altitude, transportation facilities, availability of food etc.) in 
Ladakh for establishing closures. Also in 1995, there were no tranquilising experts in the state and very 
little funds were available with the Wildlife Department in J&K to materialise this project. Militancy was at 
its peak and the entire government machinery and funds were directed to tackle it. Therefore, the plan to 
explore chiru breeding was dropped (Interview in Jammu, 22 March, 2007).  
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WPSI vs. J&K state: petition and the response  
A complex situation emerged in the mid 1990s when the trade of shahtoosh shawls was 
banned in most parts of the world, yet due to the J&K’s special constitutional status, the 
production and sale of shahtoosh shawls continued in the state. A careful study of 
constitutional provisions and legal precedents was then undertaken by the Supreme 
Court of India. The court indicated that there were two ways of ensuring that the J&K 
government banned the trade. First, at the time of accession of the state to the Indian 
government, it was agreed that all international treaties that are ratified by the central 
government would apply to J&K and that when a state law differed from a central law, 
the latter would prevail. Since the chiru is a protected animal under the provision of 
CITES, the import and export of its parts from China and Nepal signalled its illegality and 
violation of an international law. The second argument was that since no regulation of 
the shahtoosh trade has taken place in the state under ‘licence’, the shahtoosh trade was 
already in violation of the Wildlife Protection Law of 1978 (IFAW and WTI, 2001).  
 
In 1997, the WPSI issued a notice to the Government of J&K to include all endangered 
species in the State Wildlife Protection Act along the lines of the Central Wildlife 
Protection Law (Kumar and Wright, 1997: 39). It stated that the trade in shahtoosh was 
being carried out without permission from the relevant authorities and without the 
issuance of licences. It directed the state to control the illegal trade of raw wool. 
However, due to the inaction of the state, in 1998 the WPSI filed public interest litigation 
in the J&K High Court on the grounds that there had been several seizures of shahtoosh 
wool and shawls from 1992 to 1998 and that India accounts for most of the seizures 
(IFAW and WTI, 2001; see Appendix IV). It stated that there is a paradoxical contrast 
between the Central Wildlife Act and State Wildlife Act with regard to the status of the 
chiru, and, therefore, it appealed to order the state government to ban the hunting and 
trade of all species listed in Schedules I to IV (ibid.).   
 
It can be observed that the law set the first stage for politics among various actors
45
 
                                                 
45
 Here, various actors include the WPSI, the Union of India represented by the MoEF, the Government of 
India, the CITES Secretariat, the Supreme Court of India, the J&K High Court, the State of J&K represented 
by the Secretary, Department of Forests, the Chief Wildlife Warden, J&K, the Presidents of Handicraft 
95 
 
involved in the controversy over the ban on shahtoosh. I understand this relationship 
between law and politics in two ways: First, as soon as the two propositions were made 
by the Supreme Court (mentioned above), it expanded the power and arena of actions of 
various players associated with the shahtoosh controversy. Second, I observe that laws, if 
unclear, can create uncertainties and disputes and hence can be used by the various 
parties to their advantage. Such a controversy found its way through the ambiguities in 
the meanings of ‘wool’ and ‘hair’ of the chiru in the Wildlife Protection Act of J&K. In the 
following discussion, I illustrate these two points by presenting the arguments made by 
the WPSI and the central MoEF in relation to the urgency of the ban and the competing 
claims made by the J&K state and the other interest groups such as the Handicraft 
Traders Association and the Shahtoosh Weavers Association. 
 
In the public interest litigation, the WPSI stated that the chiru falls under the definition of 
‘animal article’ and ‘trophy’ in the State Wildlife Act of 1978.
46
 The definition of ‘animal 
article’ reads: ‘an article made from any captive animal or wild animal, other than 
vermin, and includes an article or object in which the whole or any part of such animal 
has been used’.
47
 Further, the definition of ‘trophy’ states: ‘trophy means the whole or 
part of any captive animal other than vermin, which has been kept or preserved by any 
means whether artificial or natural and includes a) rugs, skins and specimens of such 
animal mounted in whole or in part through a process of taxidermy and b) antler horn, 
rhinoceros horn, hair, feather, nail, tooth, musk, eggs and nests’.
48
 Thus, the WPSI held 
that since the chiru is included under ‘animal article’ and its hair falls in the category of 
‘trophy’, the trade in its wool or products was illegal.  
 
The MoEF supported the arguments of the WPSI and added that the state of J&K cannot 
maintain its own laws if they conflict with those of the central government. Therefore, it 
asked the State government to bring the State Wildlife Act in line with the Central 
Wildlife Act. The Ministry claimed to have taken steps to train and sensitise the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Traders Association and the Shahtoosh Weavers Association. 
46
 High Court of Jammu and Kashmir (2000). Public Interest Litigation PIL (CWP) No. 293/98. This PIL was 
filed in 1998 and the decision came out in May, 2000. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
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enforcement agencies such as the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, the Border Security Force, 
postal guards, customs officers and police to prevent any illegal import or export of the 
shahtoosh and other animal articles. However, the Ministry maintained that enforcement 
in the state is a subject that falls within the domain of state government and therefore it 
was the state government’s responsibility to take corrective measures.
49
 
 
In 1998, the state government rejected the WPSI directive, stating that J&K has a 
separate constitutional status and is not obliged to comply with central wildlife 
regulations.  Moreover, the state government argued that there has been no evidence of 
the poaching of chirus in the state and maintained that shawls are made from the wool 
shed by the animal and collected by the local herdsmen, which are then sold in the 
market against which there is no prohibition. It was further added that the chiru figures 
in Schedule II of the State Wildlife Act and that hunting is not allowed without permission 
from the Chief Wildlife Warden of the State. Therefore, even if the animal is not moved 
to Schedule I, hunting of the animal is not possible without the knowledge of the wildlife 
authorities. It is, therefore, immaterial whether the chiru figures in Schedule I or 
Schedule II of the State Wildlife Act.
50
 
 
On account of the provisions based on the special status of the state, the J&K Handicraft 
Traders Association also held that the state can maintain its own laws and take 
appropriate measures to protect the species rather than banning the trade. The 
association resisted the WPSI petition on two grounds: first, it argued that the shahtoosh 
shawl is made of wool (and not hair), which is not covered under ‘animal article’ or 
‘trophy’ as defined in the State Wildlife Act, and which therefore requires no licence. 
Second, it held the belief that since this wool is shed by the animal which the local 
herdsmen collect and sell in the market, no killing is therefore involved.
51
 Supporting this 
position, the Shahtoosh Weavers Association added that ‘the prohibition of shahtoosh 
trade in the state will help those who are competing with the shawl industry of Kashmir. 
Foreign countries, especially those in the Middle East, are overtaking the Indian markets 
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in such local products’.
52
 The association emphasised that the state, which is suffering 
from ongoing militancy and which is primarily dependent on the handicrafts and tourism 
industry, would be hit hard. The total ban would cause irreparable damage to the art, 
artisans and culture of the state and, therefore, the trade should be regulated and not 
prohibited. 
 
As we observe in the narratives above, the ambiguity over the question of ‘hair’ and 
‘wool’ became a controversial subject for the players involved. Below, I present the 
arguments made by different parties involved in the petition hearing in the J&K High 
Court from 1998 to 2000. 
 
The counsel for the WPSI stressed that ‘“animal article” as defined in the State Wildlife 
Act includes shawls made from the hair of Tibetan antelope, and that the definition of 
“trophy” also includes the hair of the animal and that wool is nothing but hair’.
53
 He 
added that under the State Wildlife Act, wild animals, including ‘animal articles’, shall be 
the property of the government and the person who obtains them by any means must 
report it to the enforcement agencies or police officials. Therefore, according to him, no 
person can be a manufacturer or dealer of any of the animal products. He further argued 
that since the chiru is a protected animal under the provisions of CITES, import and 
export of the animal article is not permissible except in accordance with the law. 
Moreover, since no licences have ever been issued by the state authorities, the 
manufacture, trade and possession of the shahtoosh shawl is illegal. 
 
In response to the above arguments, the counsel for the J&K state argued that the state 
is acting strictly in accordance with the provisions of the State Wildlife Act. Since the 
Central Wildlife Act is not applicable to the state, he argued that the chiru is not a 
protected animal and there is no need to regulate the trade.
54
 The counsel for the 
Handicraft Traders Association added that the petition should not be maintained because 
it involves no public interest. He reiterated the argument that it is not the hair of the 
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chiru but the underwool shed by the animal from which the shahtoosh shawls are 
manufactured.
55
 Further, the counsel for the private respondents argued that unless 
poaching of the animal is proved to be for the purpose of trade, the manufacture of 
shahtoosh shawls cannot be prohibited. He stressed that if killing is necessary for wool to 
be collected, the trade would not have survived for centuries. He also maintained that it 
is the underwool shed by the animal that is collected by the local people of Tibet. 
 
In response, the counsel for the WPSI stated that the justification provided by the 
Handicraft Traders Association that shahtoosh is not ‘hair’ but ‘wool’ can be questioned 
on the grounds that wool is defined as ‘fine wavy hair from the fleece of sheep, goats 
etc.’ and ‘any of the fine thread like strands growing from the skin of mammals’.
56
 He 
further added that the claim of shahtoosh not being obtained from killing chirus is 
misleading. He stated that ‘the yield from a dead animal is only between 125 to 150 
grams of the shahtoosh and when it is shed, the quantity may be much less, and hence it 
cannot meet the market demand’.
57
 He added that the expert committee appointed by 
the MoEF in 1995 also found no evidence for the collection of shed wool of any kind and 
argued that the Union government as well as the State government are under legal 
obligation to enforce the provision of CITES. The WPSI maintained that since the J&K 
state has acceded to the central government in foreign affairs, the union government 
alone is competent to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries and has the 
obligation to enforce it throughout India, including in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
 
The above discussion suggests that the law set the ground for the interplay among 
various actors by enhancing their power to address concerns and opening up new 
possibilities of negotiations because of the ambiguities in the policy or in the law itself. 
We also observed that ambiguities around the origin of the shahtoosh wool (discussed in 
chapter three) became useful in the controversy for various parties.  
 
The J&K High Court asked the shahtoosh traders for evidence to prove that the shahtoosh 
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wool is shed by antelope, which they failed to provide. On the other hand, the plaintiff 
(WPSI) provided irrefutable evidence of the slaughter of the Tibetan antelope and the 
smuggling of raw wool from Tibet to India (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 28). Moreover, the hair 
samples taken from shahtoosh shawls were tested and confirmed to have patterns that 
are unique to Tibetan antelope (ibid.: 20). As a result, the J&K High Court upheld the view 
that the claim made by the shahtoosh traders about the origin of shahtoosh wool is 
unacceptable due to lack of evidence.  
In May 2000, the J&K High Court directed the state government to strict regulation of the 
shahtoosh trade according to its Wildlife Protection Act, 1978.
58
 The J&K state, however, 
did not take any effective measures to control or regulate the shahtoosh trade for fear of 
losing the revenue and to protect the age old shawl industry. It maintained that the 
special status of J&K (under Article 370 of Indian Constitution) provides autonomy to act 
in its own interests. The then Chief Minister of J&K, Farooq Abdullah stated: 
As long as I am the Chief Minister, shahtoosh will be sold in Kashmir. The 
campaign to ban the trade maligns the people of the state […] There was no 
evidence of Tibetan antelope being reduced in number or their being shot to 
acquire wool for shahtoosh.
59
 
Here, we see that the controversy on the ban on shahtoosh became more complex due 
to the special status of J&K state. The conflict around the status of the chiru in the State 
Wildlife and Central Wildlife Acts provided a podium for both the parties to justify their 
claims. The political instability encouraged the representatives of the state to plead for 
the ban not to be imposed and to argue that complete prohibition would further damage 
the already fragile economy of J&K.  
In the same year, the WPSI filed an appeal to the Division Bench of the J&K High Court 
against the previous judgement, calling for a ban or complete prohibition of the trade in 
products made from the Tibetan antelope and parts thereof. The central government 
was concerned about its ‘international image’ and persuaded the J&K government to 
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provide complete protection to the chirus and to bring its status within the J&K Wildlife 
Act in line with the Central Wildlife Protection Act, 1972.
60
 It reminded the state 
government that all international treaties to which India is a signatory, including CITES, 
are also enforceable in J&K. Following this, in September, 2002, the J&K legislature ended 
the long drawn legal battle by passing the J&K Wildlife Protection (Amendment) Act and 
moved the Tibetan antelope from Schedule II to Schedule I, thus giving it complete 
protection in the state. As a consequence of the amendment, any trade in shahtoosh was 
declared illegal and all persons with stocks of shahtoosh wool and shawls were required 
under law to declare the stocks and obtain ownership certificates from the Chief Wildlife 
Warden.  
 
Interestingly, in 2003 the Division Bench of the J&K High Court disposed of the writ 
petition filed by the WPSI in 2000 pleading complete prohibition. The court noted that in 
light of the amendments to the J&K Wildlife Act in 2002, which changed the status of the 
chiru, no further direction was required to be given to the J&K state in this matter.
61
 It is 
the responsibility of the state to abide by the international treaties (such as CITES) and 
cooperate with the central government to enforce the ban. However, the court observed 
that ‘those who have been deprived of their livelihoods, both the artisans as well as 
nomadic tribes, be adequately compensated’.
62
 It is notable that apart from this 
observation, the court did not put the onus of responsibility for compensation and 
welfare of affected artisans on either the state/central governments or the conservation 
community. The conservationists, thus, eventually succeeded in making the trade in 
shahtoosh ‘illegal’. While the trade still continues illegally (as explained later in the 
chapter), this legislative change, nevertheless had significant implications for the 
livelihoods of shawl workers.
63
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On the basis of the above discussion, I argue that the global environmental concerns can 
act as potential grounds for conflict between nature conservation interests and the 
livelihoods of the local communities. Despite the initial resistance to the ban by the J&K 
state on the pretext of its special status, and the observation made by the High Court 
regarding compensation to artisans, we can see that the issue of shahtoosh was 
addressed largely along conservation lines. To a certain extent, this supports the claims 
of scholars who are of the view that the global conservation agenda is, inherently, 
oppressive in nature. I will examine the arguments of some of these scholars below, and 
validate their claims of the disciplinary and coercive nature of conservation policies. I will 
also indicate (and demonstrate later in sections two and three) that the enforcement of 
such policies is influenced by competing interest groups and governed by local political 
realities.  
 
Scholars such as Peluso (1993) argue that the conservation agenda, which is described as 
being in the common interests of the entire global community, is an excuse for external 
intervention in what had previously been the sole affairs of states. Similarly, Gupta (1998) 
suggests that increasing environmental concerns are resulting in a new form of 
‘governmentality’ to discipline third world societies. Neumann (2001) argues that the 
conservation agenda has a disciplinary effect by limiting the access of local people to 
their natural resources. This has also been characterised by a neglect of human needs 
and interests to the extent that Dietz labels it ‘ecototalitarian’ (Dietz, 1996: 13) and 
Goldman terms this new hegemonic regime as ‘eco-governmentality’ (Goldman, 1996: 
33). There has also been considerable debate within urban contexts on the role of PIL in 
advancing the interests of middle classes on environmental issues (often described as 
bourgeois environmentalism) at the cost of interests of the poor urban residents (see 
Mawdsley, 2004; Baviskar, 2002; Chaplin, 1999). Randeria notes that the new 
conservation regime, aided by international NGOs, has brought more and more 
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territories and communities on the peripheries under the control of the postcolonial 
state in the name of ‘ecological development’ (Randeria, 2007: 13). These claims can be 
supported by my findings which suggest the primacy of conservation over local interests. 
We observed that although the J&K state resisted the imposition of ban for a long time, 
due to pressures by the international conservation community and the Indian 
government, it was forced to comply with their demands of supporting the conservation 
interests even against the will of its population, who remained almost voiceless in the 
legal battle.  
 
In the discussion on legal proceedings, I have illustrated that science and the faith in its 
objective nature can be used to serve and legitimise conservation interests. This point 
draws us closer to the arguments of scholars (such as Saberwal and Rangarajan, 2003; 
Greenough and Tsing, 2003; Yearley, 1999; Feyerabend, 1993; Pickering, 1992) who have 
demonstrated how the authoritarian nature of science and its ability to claim expert 
knowledge can undermine indigenous or local understandings. It has also been argued 
that for conservation management, the local is a site for instruction, implementation and 
control with specific scientific objectives in mind (Blaikie, 2006: 1951). Some other 
scholars have even questioned the objective nature of science and hence its 
appropriateness in resolving conservation related problems. For example, Agrawal (1995: 
11) states that the problem with science arises only when it claims to be necessarily 
better by basing itself on notions of objectivity and neutrality, and hence supporting the 
scientific community to claim primacy in decision-making (see also Saberwal, 2003). In 
the discussion below, I further examine the ways in which science and scientists are 
enrolled within the argument for a total ban, and against captive breeding. 
 
1.2 The prospects of chiru farming: observations of the ‘expert group’ 
 
In 2004, the Prime Minister of India visited the J&K state. During his visit, some politicians 
of the ruling party (People’s Democratic Party), the President of the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the shahtoosh workers appealed for the ban to be lifted. Soon after, an 
expert committee was formed by the central government to investigate the prospects of 
chiru farming so as to protect the shawl industry in J&K. The expert committee comprised 
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of representatives of the Union Ministry of Textiles, the MoEF, the President of the 
Chamber of Commerce, J&K, the Director of Animal Husbandry and senior members of 
wildlife organisations such as the WTI and the WPSI. From the outset, the committee 
split into two groups on the basis of different perspectives held on the prospects of chiru 
breeding. The first group, comprising the MoEF and conservationist NGOs, believed that 
chiru farming was not a viable alternative. The other group, comprising the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Animal Husbandry Department of J&K, contended that the breeding 
is possible as it has been done in the case of other protected or endangered species such 
as the mink in Estonia, eider-duck in Iceland, and vicuna and alpaca in South America. 
Below, I present some of their arguments in relation to possibilities of chiru farming in 
Ladakh. 
 
The various representatives of the J&K state maintained that chiru is not killed in the 
Indian territory and that it is the shed wool which is collected by the herdsmen. They 
argued that serious efforts to farm chirus should be made to sustain the art and 
livelihoods of the people involved in the production of shahtoosh shawls. The Director of 
Animal Husbandry suggested that while poaching may be a major factor in the decline of 
the chiru population, other factors such as disturbances in the chiru habitat due to the 
construction of roads and railways, mining and tourism are equally noteworthy.
64
 He 
contended that the vicuna in Latin American countries was also on the verge of extinction 
but that initiatives by the government authorities to involve local communities in its 
farming resulted in positive outcomes.
65
 Not only have these measures resulted in an 
increase in the vicuna population but the local people have also been able to generate 
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(McNeill et al., 2009). 
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income by selling vicuna fibre. The Director of Animal Husbandry, therefore, suggested 
that if a turnaround in the vicuna population was possible, it could also be done in the 
case of chirus. He stressed that the issue of conservation would not be successful unless 
local populations living in and around the chiru habitat were involved for the protection 
of wildlife with a vested interest in such a way that the nomadic tribes would find it more 
beneficial to protect the chirus rather than simply being involved in their killing. He 
proposed that this would require the involvement of the Chinese authorities, since 90-
95% of the chiru habitat falls in the Tibetan territory (Ministry of Textiles, 2005a).  
 
Supporting the above argument, the President of the J&K Chamber of Commerce added 
that financial incentives provided to the local herdsmen to conserve and farm chirus 
could help to increase its population (ibid.). He presented the example of eider-ducks
66
 in 
Iceland which were also on the verge of extinction due to the relentless hunting of them. 
To avert this, eider-ducks were made the property of farmers on whose land they bred. 
As a result, the farmers felt motivated to protect these ducks from natural predators and 
poachers. This provided a new business opportunity for local communities. The President 
of the J&K Chamber of Commerce argued that if such initiatives were put in place in the 
case of chirus, the art and the livelihoods of the people could be preserved. The Wildlife 
Department of J&K maintained that captive breeding of chirus is possible. However, it 
requires heavy investment costs and coordination with the Indian Army and para-military 
forces, not just for transportation purposes but also in checking the solid waste pollution 
created by the army which is posing a major threat to the local ecology and chiru 
population in the Indian territory.
67
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The proposal of chiru breeding, however, was not supported by conservationist groups 
such as the WTI and WPSI on the basis that it seemed impractical.
68
 These groups argued 
that it would require high investment to set up a breeding farm in a vast and inaccessible 
area of Tibetan highland. Furthermore, they emphasised that no parallel can be drawn 
between the rearing of vicuna in Latin America and chiru in the Changthang region for 
the reason that vicuna is amenable to be shorn and chiru is not. It was stated that no in-
depth study regarding the physiology or the growth of shahtoosh fibre has been 
conducted to date which adds uncertainty to the prospects of chiru farming. Belinda 
Wright, a representative of the WPSI reiterated that it is not possible to breed chirus in 
captivity. She argued that breeding prospects were possible for vicuna in South America 
because the species could be herded and kept in a semi-captive state unlike the chiru.
69
 
She stated that the only example of a captive chiru was recorded in Natural History of the 
Mammalia of India and Ceylon (Sterndale, 1884) wherein it is observed that ‘the captive 
chiru was reduced to a living specimen’.  
 
George Schaller, an expert on Tibetan wildlife, was contacted by the WTI to give his 
opinion on the prospects of chiru breeding. In response, Schaller stated that captive 
breeding of chirus in India is a poor idea.
70
 India has only a very small population which 
migrates from Tibet during the summer. Historically, chirus have never been kept in 
captivity and the problems of maintaining them are still unknown. Besides this, he 
reported that nothing is known about the nutritional requirements, veterinary care or 
social interactions in confinement of these sensitive and nervous animals. Capturing and 
transporting them is likely to cause deaths, stress and injury to the animal. He added that 
to maintain such a farm requires a facility that needs high initial costs, besides recurrent 
costs including staff salaries, food for animals, vehicle maintenance etc. To initiate a 
captive breeding program under present conditions is, therefore, morally and 
economically indefensible. He suggested that any available funds would be better spent 
on protecting the chirus and providing alternative jobs to people in the shahtoosh 
business.  
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After discussing the various issues and possibilities of chiru breeding, the Expert Group 
felt that the matter should be discussed with the Chinese authorities. In this regard, the 
WPSI contacted the CITES Management Authority of China. In response to CITES 
Management Authority of India, it was stated that the decline in population of the chirus 
in Tibet was due to demand for their wool in J&K.
71
 Further, it was held that the animal 
has not been successfully bred in captivity until now and hence, the proposal to breed 
chirus did not seem to be a feasible solution. However, the Chinese authorities stated 
that they were willing to cooperate with the Indian government to crack down on any 
illicit trade in endangered species in the future (ibid.). The WTI, in 2005, arranged a 
meeting between the representatives of the Chinese government and the Ministry of 
Textiles to discuss the possibilities of chiru farming. In 2005, the Ministry proposed that if 
the Chinese government agreed to provide 1000 chirus, India would take the initiative to 
farm them.
72
 However, this proposal from the Ministry of Textiles was rejected by the 
Chinese government. The reasons were: first, technically, it would not be possible to 
domesticate or breed the animal in captivity as the animal lives in open steppes at an 
altitude of above 5000 metres and cannot survive at lower altitudes. Second and more 
importantly, it was stressed that the Tibetan antelope is listed in Appendix I of CITES to 
which 167 countries are signatories including India and China. Captive breeding for 
commercial trade of Appendix I species can only be permitted if a resolution to that 
effect is adopted by vote at the CITES Conference of Parties (COP). Before such a 
resolution can be brought to the COP, it must be placed before the Animals Committee of 
CITES for technical appraisal. Therefore, the representatives of the Chinese government 
argued that the power or authority to lend the species for farming does not depend upon 
the mere fact that the chiru habitat lies within their territorial boundaries. Further, it is a 
matter which does not simply involve India and China but requires international 
deliberations.  
 
It is important to note here how the international conservation community can re-
territorialise the region in a very different way than was explained in chapter three. 
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There I noted the efforts made by British colonialists to de-territorialise the shawl trade 
by discouraging the association of agents in Kashmir with non-British merchants for their 
own commercial interests. Here the argument put forward by the Chinese government 
with regard to prior approval by the international community or signatories to CITES can 
be understood as an obligation for sovereign nation-states to maintain the primacy of 
conservation interests. It signals the considerable power and authority of a new form of 
conservation regime, which can re-territorialise a region according to its priorities and 
interests. Owing to the transnational nature of the problem, CITES and other 
international conservation agencies could have played a vital role in chiru breeding (by 
collaborating efforts of Indian and Chinese governments) in order to secure the 
livelihoods of nomadic tribes along with curbing illegal poaching.  
 
Despite the claims made by the international conservation community about the 
increasing reconciliation between conservation goals and local interests, the discussion 
above suggests the opposite. The approach pursued by the conservation community in 
the name of ‘environmental sustainability’ can be questioned on two grounds: first, it has 
been observed that marginal significance was attached to the local livelihoods (both 
herders and artisans) in the entire controversy. The proposals for community based 
management through participation of Tibetan herders were put forward by various 
representatives of the J&K state. Different forms of incentives to these herders were 
proposed to both protect the species and save the shawl industry in Kashmir. Yet, apart 
from meetings and discussions of the Expert Group, no practical efforts were made by 
the international agencies to experiment with chiru breeding. I argue that undertaking 
conservation in poverty ridden areas is not tenable if it disregards the needs of local 
people and further contributes to impoverishment (see Campese et al., 2007; Cernea and 
Schmidt-Soltau, 2006; Arjunan et al., 2006). I shall return to this point while discussing 
the socio-economic conditions of Tibetan herdsmen later in this chapter. 
 
Second, little efforts were made to conduct experiments of chiru breeding owing to the 
possible complexities involved such as huge investment costs, lack of studies in chiru 
physiology and wintering conditions. Scholars such as Chhatre and Saberwal (2006), Guha 
(2003), Norgaard (1994) and Lele (1993) have referred to the limitations of the scientific 
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and conservation community in failing to operationalise ‘sustainability’ due to a lack of 
self-reflection, cultural sensitivity and poor understandings of social structures. I suggest 
that before dismissing the possibility of farming chirus by involving local herders, there is 
an urgent need to use science in the service of local communities, and practically assess 
the possibility of chiru breeding before outright denial. This argument can be supported 
by other experiments as we see in the case of endangered species such as vicuna, eider-
duck and mink, which succeeded in spite of specific challenges involved in each of these 
projects. 
 
On the basis of the above two arguments, I maintain that the ban on shahtoosh 
production and trade in J&K state was not based on the principle of ‘sustainability’. 
Various political ecologists have expressed scepticism about the ‘sustainable 
development’ approach as a basis for radical change (see Hulme and Murphee, 2001; 
Escobar, 1996; Middleton et al., 1993; Sachs, 1993). It is suggested that the mainstream 
‘reformist’ approach has hit an impasse both intellectually and practically in its efforts to 
address intensifying environmental problems (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). As well as failing 
to address the problems of poverty and environmental degradation, this approach lacks 
faith in local participation which has, in turn, led to inadequacies and contradictions in 
policy-making (Lele, 1991). Therefore, and as Yearley (1996) argues, the SD approach or 
its offshoot ‘biodiversity conservation’ must recognise the necessity of a flexible 
approach that involves listening to a variety of voices if the conservation goals are to be 
realised at the local level.  
 
To conclude, in this section, I have explained how law, science and the special 
constitutional status of the J&K state set the stages for politics in the controversy 
regarding imposition and resistance to the ban. I have also discussed diverse viewpoints 
regarding the prospects of chiru breeding. I have noted that the issue of shahtoosh was 
largely dealt with along conservation lines and that the agenda of the international 
conservation community ultimately prevailed in making the trade ‘illegal’. Based on these 
broad findings, I have highlighted the limitations of the mainstream nature conservation 
policies, and have extended my support to scholars who emphasise the coercive and 
violent nature of the global conservation regime, which is inimical to the interests of the 
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people dependent on natural resources for sustenance. In doing this, however, I maintain 
that the ‘coercive conservation’ viewpoint too is inadequate in explaining and 
understanding the ways in which global conservation policies are understood and 
experienced at the local level. In the rest of the chapter, I aim to unravel the many 
embedded local political complexities that shape conservation policies during the process 
of implementation. Below, I analyse the ‘split role’ of the state and local forms of protest 
and politics to examine the response of the state and the shahtoosh workers against the 
ban. 
 
Section Two 
 
2.1 Weak enforcement and split role of the state 
 
As discussed earlier, the J&K state tried to resist the ban and delay its imposition but 
finally succumbed to the pressures of the international agencies and central government. 
Here, I focus on the role played by the J&K state as an agency for enforcing the ban and, 
at the same time, acting as an important actor in allowing the ‘illegal’ trade to continue. I 
refer to this dual function as the split role of the state. Before proceeding to examine the 
split role, I present the conflicting positions of the two chief political parties in J&K 
regarding the ban, in order to understand the new form of party politics that generated 
in the state. 
 
The National Conference (NC) Party that was in power in 2002 followed the verdict of the 
court regarding the obligation of the J&K state to assist the central government in 
enforcing CITES regulations concerning the Tibetan antelope. Mustafa Kamal, the then 
Minister of Industries, informed me that the government at that time had no choice but 
to comply with the decision of the court and the will of the central government.
73
 
Subscribing to the myths sustained by shahtoosh workers in the Valley, he argued that 
the ban on the shahtoosh trade was not based on any valid reason since the wool is shed 
by chirus and collected by the herdsmen.
74
 According to him, pressurising the state to 
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 Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Srinagar (30 November, 2006).  
74
 Interestingly, the Director of the Handlooms Department in my interview (20 November, 2006), while 
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ban the production of shahtoosh certainly involves subjugation of the interests of J&K 
state by the central government.
75
 He blamed the Indian government for not taking a 
firm stand against international conservation groups and argued that international 
agencies have always worked for their own interests without considering the costs 
incurred by the poorer countries and affected communities.
76
 As a solution to the 
problem, he proposed that chiru farming should be promoted in the same way as that of 
the musk deer in China. He added that the central government would have taken a 
different stand had this issue involved any other state than J&K, and that the central 
government has never trusted the people or popular governments of J&K.  
 
The main opposition party at the time of the imposition of the ban was the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP). Drawing support from the shahtoosh traders’ and weavers’ 
associations, the party started campaigning for removing the ban to preserve the shawl 
industry of Kashmir and pointed to the resulting massive unemployment in the state, loss 
of cultural heritage and state revenue. It proposed that the vast Changthang pasture, 
where the antelope is found, be used to farm them in such numbers so that the issue of 
livelihoods could be taken care of along with chiru conservation. 
 
In 2003, the PDP came to power. Mehbooba Mufti, the President of the party, argued 
that the ban on the shahtoosh trade could not be justified.
77
 She blamed the NC 
government for surrendering the interests of the state to those of international agencies 
and the Indian government. She alleged that China had recently started manufacturing 
cheap shawls and carpets for the international market, imitating Kashmiri designs and 
                                                                                                                                                        
describing the origin of shahtoosh wool expressed a similar opinion: ‘chiru is not slaughtered but it sheds 
wool which gets stuck to the bushes. The raw wool is stained with blood, at times, because the hands of 
the herdsmen get scratched by the thorns of the bushes while collecting wool [...] Sometimes, even the 
animal bleeds while rushing through the bushes’. He further added that it has long been believed that if the 
wool is from a dead chiru, the fibre cuts frequently and cannot be spun. According to him, the reason that 
it is possible to spin this wool validates the fact that it is shed by the living chiru.  
75
 Kamal blamed Maneka Gandhi, the then Indian Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment 
and a well known advocate of animal rights, to put pressure on the J&K government for the imposition of 
the ban. 
76
 The NC lost elections in 2003 and was the main opposition party in 2006 at the time of my fieldwork. 
Mustafa Kamal informed me that if his party came to power again, it would increase the wages of the 
shawl workers, and sanction loans to the poor to set up new businesses to compensate their losses. The 
party came to power again in 2008 and it is yet to be seen what actions have been taken to redress the 
grievances of the poorer shahtoosh workers. 
77
 Interview with Mehbooba Mufti, Srinagar (25 November, 2006). 
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weaving patterns, and was thus also involved in banning shahtoosh so as to deal a blow 
to the Kashmir shawl industry which remains its biggest competitor. She stated that the 
PDP government was trying to discuss the possibility of lifting the ban with the central 
government and was also trying to explore the prospects of farming chirus in Ladakh and 
Siachin. However, she held that once the law was passed, it would be difficult to overturn 
it. It is pertinent to note here that the PDP government did not take any rehabilitative 
measures for the poor shahtoosh workers in the form of providing any compensation or 
alternative job opportunities. Rather than providing compensation to poorer workers, 
the state allowed the weak enforcement of the ban, creating room for manoeuvre for the 
powerful shawl manufacturers and exporters. 
 
During my fieldwork, I found that although the production of shahtoosh shawls has been 
banned in the state, the trade has not stopped entirely. Due to the high rate of 
corruption in J&K, informal networks of shahtoosh trade within, as well as outside the 
state, remained. While the manufacturers were reluctant to share information on the 
now illegal shahtoosh trade, the poor skilled workers were open to such questions. Out 
of 92 shahtoosh workers interviewed, 24 were still engaged in shahtoosh processing. A 
few of them, especially women spinners, were not aware of the ban and others were 
working on it simply because the raw wool and products were not owned by them but 
manufacturers. It is important to mention that the majority of interviewees could not 
specify the year in which the ban was initiated. Their responses varied from as early as 
1996 to 2002. This suggests severe shortcomings on the part of conservationist groups 
and the state enforcement agencies to disseminate information about the ban to the 
affected communities.  
 
The poor hawkers described several cases where the local police officials harassed and 
grabbed money from them by confiscating their pashmina shawls, claiming that the 
shawls were made of mixed shahtoosh and pashmina wool and hence ‘illegal’.
78
 A few 
poiywans (agents) described how enforcement officials sometimes even confiscated raw 
pashmina wool and refused to admit that it was not shahtoosh.
79
 However, shawl 
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 Interviews with various hawkers, Srinagar (October-November, 2006). 
79
 Interviews with various poiywans, Srinagar (October-November, 2006). 
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workers remarked that the officials did this to obtain bribes and that after making illicit 
payments to the officials, the wool and shawls would be released.  
 
The poor shawl workers explained that although there have been several restrictions 
placed on them, the products stored and sold by rich manufacturers and traders have 
never been seized. They argued that the manufacturers in Srinagar have strong links with 
the politicians, wildlife and police officials and that it is this support from the 
enforcement agencies that facilitates the illegal production and trade of shahtoosh 
shawls in the state. A poor hawker, wishing anonymity, remarked: 
 
Why target us? Why not raid the houses of ministers, bureaucrats and rich 
people? We've supplied shahtoosh shawls to most of them.
80
 
 
This information is further supported by my observation during the fieldwork that 
although the shops in Srinagar did not openly display shahtoosh shawls for sale, the 
shawls were available on the demands of the customers and could be easily purchased. It 
points to the strong links between traders and enforcement officials who share the 
profits of this illegal trade.
81
 This illustrates that in spite of legal restrictions, the trade 
still persists in the Valley, although in a ‘shadow’ form. The ban on shahtoosh thus 
remains de jure but not de facto. 
 
It is also interesting to note that although shahtoosh shawls are produced exclusively in 
Kashmir, there have been no seizures in the Valley to date. Contrary to the information 
provided by hawkers and weavers, a senior police official informed me that the staff lack 
any training in identifying shahtoosh and are unable to distinguish it from other varieties 
of wool.
82
 He stated that another reason for the lack of seizures in the state is due to the 
fact that the police machinery is primarily preoccupied with the problem of terrorism and 
insurgency. Nonetheless, some embroiderers stated that state officials themselves 
indulge in the illegal trade of shahtoosh. For example, a senior embroiderer, on the 
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 Interview in Srinagar (6 November, 2006). 
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 During my fieldwork, a trader in Srinagar intimated that he could sell a fine quality shahtoosh shawl. Also, 
a senior hawker and well-to-do embroiderer who was on good terms with the manufacturer of his locality, 
stated that he could provide me with a pure shahtoosh shawl at the lowest rate possible.  
82
 Interview with the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), Srinagar (23 November, 2006). 
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condition of anonymity, stated that a wildlife official was found carrying one quintal of 
shahtoosh wool in the official conveyance on his way back from Ladakh in 2004. No 
police action was taken against him. He added that there are some manufacturers and 
traders in Srinagar who have more than 20 quintals of undeclared shahtoosh in stock, 
and that no police action has been taken against them because they are affluent and 
well-connected.
83
 
 
The above discussion signals the split role of the state. Neither has the ban been 
implemented effectively nor is there a complete disregard to the law and the regulations 
surrounding it. I argue that a set of perverse incentives have sprouted from the ban and 
have created rent seeking opportunities for local officials. This resonates with the 
findings of Wardell and Lund (2006: 1900), in the context of Ghana that ‘a tacit 
understanding between public servants and local elites prevails such that the access to 
resources is not prevented but kept illegal in order for various rents to be extracted’. The 
local elites in a community are able to build a nexus with the local state and bureaucrats, 
becoming willing participants in corruption networks; what Veron et al. (2006), in Indian 
context, refer to as ‘decentralised corruption’. Likewise, Bloomer (2009: 49) adopts the 
term ‘extra-legal’ to refer to criminalised networks in Lesotho between formal political 
actors and those engaged directly in the illegal trade. In the case of the shahtoosh trade, 
we see the emergence of such complex networks between rich traders, manufacturers, 
enforcement officials and politicians, which have helped to serve the interests of these 
powerful players, but have shrunk the space of protest available to poorer workers. 
 
2.2 Shawl workers response to the ban: protest and politics 
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to mention that symptoms of resentment 
among the shawl workers against harsh taxation and exploitation can be observed under 
different regimes. During the Afghan period, the people of Kashmir had rallied against 
Sayyid nobles to protest against the harsh taxation system (Panikar, 1953: 139). Shawl 
workers had also risen in revolt in 1833 against the exploitation of the Sikh rulers (Dhar, 
                                                 
83
 Interview in Srinagar (29 October, 2006). 
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2001). In 1847, the weavers demanded that the Dogra ruler give them permission to 
emigrate to Punjab or change working conditions in Srinagar but these demands did not 
bring any substantial change in their actual conditions. In 1865, the shawl workers 
rebelled against the Dag-i-shawl department but this rebellion was crushed mercilessly 
(Zutshi, 2004: 85). Although the weavers showed resistance to the growing exploitation 
of the rulers, this marginalised class was not able to lead an organised political 
movement. The sporadic incidents mentioned above were largely unsuccessful in altering 
the economic conditions of the poor weavers, embroiderers and spinners. Also, as 
explained in chapter two, after independence, all popular struggles (with the exception 
of the separatist movement) have suffered tremendously at the hands of insurgency and 
counter-insurgency in J&K, limiting the space for protest. Below, I explain this point in the 
context of the banning of shahtoosh. 
 
My interviews with shawl workers suggest that before the initiation of legal battle 
around banning the shahtoosh trade in the mid 1990s, some shawl workers’ associations 
such as the Kashmir Shawl Manufacturers and Weavers Association, the Garib Mazdoor 
Association, the Kashmir Shawl Workers Association, and the New Farosh Pashmina 
Shawl Association already existed in the state. Their primary demand in the pre-ban 
period had been the increase in the wages of shawl workers. In the 1990s, these 
associations also demanded a ban on the use of machines for dehairing and spinning 
which was proving to be detrimental to their livelihoods and incomes. Neither the 
government nor the manufacturers responded to their demands at that time.
84
 It is 
notable that when the ban on the shahtoosh trade was being enforced on the state, 
manufacturers and their agents began to join these associations. They soon took control 
and tried to increase the membership by motivating a large number of weavers to join 
them and participate in the protest demonstrations against imposition of the ban. In 
return, they assured the artisans that they would campaign to stop the use of machine-
spun pashmina wool and increase their wages.  
                                                 
84
 As informed by the shahtoosh weavers and spinners during interviews conducted in Srinagar (October-
November, 2006). Several of my respondents suggested that the banning of shahtoosh has damaged the 
shawl industry and that the use of machine-spun pashmina wool by manufacturers and poiywans is further 
undermining the age old craft of hand-made shawls in Kashmir and rendering thousands of workers 
unemployed. 
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The manufacturers appointed senior workers in each locality to disseminate information 
about meetings, demonstrations and any other protest activities against the ban. These 
workers then passed the information to all their subordinate employees and motivated 
them to assemble for such meetings. Poor weavers’ main motivation for participating in 
the meetings was to ensure that their wages would be increased once the issue of the 
ban was settled. The manufacturers financed the meetings as well as protest activities 
but largely refrained from attending demonstrations and instead sent their agents. In 
hindsight, the weavers could see that the manufacturers were merely using the poverty 
of shawl workers as a tool to protest against the shahtoosh ban, and were not motivated 
by an interest in their welfare.
85
 
 
The shahtoosh workers started demonstrations with pamphlets, posters and banners 
against the ban. In 1997, when the WPSI first sent a notice to the J&K government 
regarding the ‘illegality’ of the shahtoosh trade (as per CITES regulations), thousands of 
weavers and spinners assembled at Sher-e-Kashmir Park in Srinagar and raised slogans 
against the prospective ban on shahtoosh. These protests were suppressed by the police 
through the use of violence; as a result of which many shawl workers were injured.
86
 
With a history of militant separatism, the state condemned these public protests as an 
‘anti-national’ activity maintaining bahari siyasat ki badboo aati hai (these protests are 
being supported by a ‘foreign power’).
87
 In 1998, around 15,000 shawl workers gathered 
at the shrine of Shah Hamdani (a Sufi saint who is believed to have introduced the skill of 
shawl weaving in Kashmir) demanding protection of the shahtoosh trade. Interestingly, 
the manufacturers had also presented spinning wheels to female spinners as a gesture of 
solidarity with the ‘shahtoosh community’ during the demonstration.  
 
In June 2000 (in response to the decision of the J&K High Court that the regulations of 
CITES were applicable throughout India including J&K), the shawl workers launched the 
‘Ban Hatao Andolan’ (or ‘Remove the Ban Movement’). The poor workers were 
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 I draw this information on the basis of my interviews with shawl workers in Srinagar (October-November, 
2006).  
86
 Note that democracy was suspended in J&K at that time and the state did not refrain from using brutal 
force to tackle all popular protests. 
87
 Interview with Ghulam Ahmed, a shawl weaver who participated in that demonstration, and was injured 
during the police retaliation (12 November, 2006).  
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interviewed by the media who discussed their grievances but nothing changed as a 
result. On the contrary, several workers were injured in police action in these agitations. 
The manufacturers soon realised that it would be impossible to avert the ban and began 
dialogues with the politicians and government officials to delay the implementation of 
the ban in order to allow them to sell shahtoosh shawls, which were being processed at 
that time.
88
 
 
Eventually the poor skilled workers understood that the manufacturers and poiywans 
were neither taking the issue of wage increase seriously, nor were they stopping the use 
of machines for dehairing and spinning. Moreover, disputes emerged within the 
associations between the weavers and the manufacturers. For example, previously shawl 
workers in the Kashmir Pashmina Tarr Farosh Association had demanded that there 
should be a ban on the use of dehairing machines in the state and the government had 
agreed to it in principle. Some of its members, on the condition of anonymity, informed 
me that after the ban on shahtoosh was imposed, the manufacturers and well-to-do 
poiywans had changed their agenda by supporting the use of machines.
89
 This resulted in 
a dispute within the association which finally split into two camps: one dominated by 
manufacturers and well-to-do poiywans, and the other led by poorer shawl workers. 
However, at the time of my fieldwork, I observed that this and other associations had 
become inactive after the imposition of the ban. 
 
Although the weavers and spinners demonstrated against the growing unemployment 
and loss of their incomes, we can conclude on the basis of the discussion so far that this 
marginalised category was not able to initiate an organised protest movement. This can 
be attributed to two factors: First, the shawl industry has remained a disorganised sector 
lacking in leadership and effective mobilisation from within the exploited classes to fight 
for their rights. Apart from the common agenda of protesting against the ban, the 
poiywans, the manufacturers and the traders have always acted against the interests of 
the poor shawl workers.  The weavers, spinners and embroiderers found themselves 
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 This information is based on my interviews with several shahtoosh workers in Srinagar (October-
November, 2006). 
89
 Some of my respondents even claimed that the manufacturers bribed the Minister of Industries to allow 
the use of machines to continue. 
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powerless to fight the legal battle initiated by international and national wildlife 
conservation agencies. What is more, they were completely at the mercy of 
manufacturers and traders who had exploited them for centuries. 
 
Second, and as suggested by my respondents, there is limited space for protest in 
Kashmir. Any group that comes out for demonstration in the Valley is immediately 
labelled as ‘anti-national’ by the state authorities. This restrains them from actively 
engaging in such protests. For example, a hawker (on the condition of anonymity) 
explained to me: 
 
We are harassed by the police. We pay several thousand rupees at different 
check posts until we reach Delhi. Many a time, they keep the money as well as 
our shawls. The Delhi police calls us notorious militants and anti-India people 
[…] You can imagine what will happen to us after protests and agitations.
90
 
 
In the brief analysis of the protest by shawl workers presented above, I have shown that 
the J&K state used its violent power to crush demonstrations by the local people against 
the imposition of the ban on shahtoosh. This corroborates the argument presented by 
Peluso (1993: 47) that on the pretext of resource control, the state uses ‘legitimate 
violence’ to control people, especially ‘recalcitrant and marginal groups’ who challenge 
the state’s authority. It also supports the argument made by other scholars that the state 
uses its violent capacities to suppress the local resistance in the name of conservation 
(see Baviskar, 2001; Neumann 2001; Ghimire, 1994). Thus, conservation initiatives, as 
Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue, can provide a means for states to assert their authority 
over peoples and environments thereby strengthening the position of the state actors. 
We observed that even within the affected communities, the interests of poor shahtoosh 
workers were subdued by powerful manufacturers and traders. Ramirez (1999: 107) 
suggests that weak, disenfranchised stakeholders stand to lose much from negotiations 
where power differences are too acute to enable collaboration.
91
 In the case of 
shahtoosh, we noted that the initial collaboration between weavers and manufacturers 
could not be sustained after the implementation of the ban became inevitable. When 
affected communities fail to dismiss interventions, recognising their own position within 
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 Interview in Srinagar (2 November, 2006). 
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 Similar arguments have been made by Njogu (2005) and Edmunds and Wollenberg (2003). 
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power hierarchies, Rossi (2004: 24) argues that the various actors bargain to retain those 
components that matter most to them. Taking stock of the situation, the manufacturers 
and rich traders, after failing to resist the ban, began to build networks with the 
politicians, police and wildlife officials to secure their interests. On the other hand, the 
poor shawl workers, after understanding the motive of manufacturers and traders, 
stopped participating in the movement and started weaving pashmina to sustain 
themselves. 
 
To conclude, this section has outlined local features of protest and politics to examine 
how various actors resisted the ban on shahtoosh in order to serve their respective 
interests. We observed that a powerful stream of actors such as rich manufacturers and 
traders largely determined the role and response of the poor shahtoosh workers in the 
protest activities, and also succeeded in delaying the imposition of the ban. Moreover, 
the banning of the trade, I argued, has provided opportunities for extortion by the state 
officials. I demonstrated the split role of the state in terms of the enforcement of the ban 
and argued that either there is no enforcement or if there is some, it is directed more 
against those who are easiest to control rather than those who commit the most serious 
violations.  
 
Section Three 
 
In the previous section, I briefly analysed the ongoing illegal production of shahtoosh 
shawls in Kashmir, and I shall explain this further while presenting the narratives of local 
shahtoosh workers in the next chapter. In this section, I focus on the illegal poaching of 
the chirus and the smuggling of shahtoosh wool into Srinagar. I also discuss the 
connections between the ban on the shahtoosh trade and the insurgency in J&K.  
 
3.1 The trade continues: illegality and shadow networks of shahtoosh  
 
Despite the regulations enforced by the international conservation agencies to stop the 
poaching of the chirus, its illegal killing still continues. It has been reported that the 
biggest seizure of chiru hides, estimated to be 1,600 in number, was from Kekexili Nature 
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Reserve in China in 1994 (IFAW and WTI, 2001). There have been many other 
confiscations of hides, wool and its products in the following years (see Appendix IV). The 
poaching of chirus can be attributed to a number of factors. It has been noted that the 
expansion of livestock herding into remote and previously unused areas has resulted in 
human-wildlife conflicts (Fox and Bardsen, 2005). Besides this, the building of roads in 
Tibet has facilitated illegal hunting, since the contractors engaged in road construction 
have become attracted to the lucrative shahtoosh wool trade (IUCN, 2010). The fencing 
of pastures on the Tibetan plateau, and the construction of the Beijing-Lhasa railway 
have posed another threat to the chirus by dividing its habitat (ibid.). Further, gold 
mining in the Kekexili region of Qinghai province has motivated thousands of miners to 
enter into the network of the illegal poaching and wool trade (Schwabach and Qinghua, 
2007; IFAW and WTI, 2001). While the potentially large profits made from the illegal 
trade have been a major motivation for the complacency of enforcement agencies in 
China, the poor economic conditions of Tibetan herdsmen and lack of alternative 
livelihoods available to them are also important reasons behind the continued killing of 
the chirus. For example, it has been estimated that in the Chang Tang region, the annual 
income of a nomadic herding household is approximately £250 per year (WWF, 2006). 
When these hunters are able to sell Tibetan antelope skins to shahtoosh traders for £75-
100 per animal, there is a high economic incentive to hunt the antelope (ibid.). Thus, 
desperately poor herders may resort to hunting antelope not to become rich, but merely 
to subsist. While the blame of poaching tends to be placed on the Tibetan herdsmen, it 
has been reported that the Chinese hunters are also involved in poaching.
92
  
 
According to IFAW investigations in 2001, there remain tremendous inadequacies in the 
existing regulatory structure of China. Different nature reserves fall under the 
management of different central government departments, creating departmental 
frictions and making protection measures very difficult (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 35). Some 
nature reserves did not have sufficient policing power to enforce the Wildlife Protection 
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 The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA, 2007), in a report titled ‘Wildlife poaching still rampant in Tibet’ 
claims that in upper Gertse, the Chinese run most of the shops and restaurants and Tibetans are 
economically marginalised. These Chinese, while running their shops and restaurants, also carry out 
poaching and indulge in the animal skin trade. It is reported that in their attempt to make themselves look 
Tibetan, the hunters have the Tibetan holy mantra Om Mani Padme Hum written on their vehicles. 
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Law and staff shortages can be seen as an important factor responsible for the weak 
enforcement in the region (ibid.). For example, the total number of staff in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region is reported to be 163, the lowest among all provinces in China.
93
 
Moreover, the anti-poaching forces are short of equipment and have serious funding 
problems (Tibet Information, 2006). In the 1990s, several high profile poaching cases 
involved the armed police and government officials in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(IFAW and WTI, 2001: 34; WWF, 2006). This supports my previous argument relating to 
the split role of state officials, leading to the weak enforcement of the ban on the 
shahtoosh trade. 
 
As shown in chapter three, the porous borders of Nepal, Tibet and India have various 
potential centers for illegal transactions. Lhasa, Burang and Shigatse in Tibet, Kathmandu 
in Nepal, and Delhi, Pittoragarh and Dharchula in India are the main hubs for the illegal 
shahtoosh trade.
94
 The shahtoosh wool has been reported to travel with pashmina or 
sheep wool stuffed inside Chinese light foam mattresses, pillows, bedrolls, blankets and 
jackets via the Zangmu-Kodari border (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 21). It has also been found 
concealed in trucks transporting sheep wool that move southward from the Qinghai-
Tibet plateau. The wool is sent through individual couriers by bus, truck or by air into 
India where the main centre is Delhi (ibid.). Some traders also carry the wool by foot 
across the border to Pithoragarh and then by bus to Delhi (ibid.).  
 
The IFAW and WTI (2001) report that up to the mid 1990s, big manufacturers and 
poiywans collected the consignments of raw wool from Delhi and carried them to 
Srinagar. However, after 1998, as enforcement outside J&K started getting stricter, they 
stopped going to Delhi and instead started buying raw wool from suppliers who had 
formed new routes bypassing Delhi (ibid.). Some local shahtoosh workers stated that 
Tibetan, Ladakhi and Nepali traders have now started using the old border routes 
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 Ibid. 
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 The wool has been reported to be collected from several points on the stretch between Gar and Amdo 
and brought to Shigatse. Shahtoosh also comes from Qinghai and Xinjiang via the highway connecting to 
Qinghai (IFAW and WTI, 2001: 21). Porters carry the wool to Simikot from where it is transported to 
Kathmandu or Nepalgunj in Nepal. The wool is also transported from Dongba to Mustang and Manang in 
Nepal which is then taken to Delhi. The porters also move the wool from Taglakot in Tibet to Dharchula in 
India. From Dharchula, it moves via Pittoragarh to Tanakpur and onwards to Delhi. From here a different 
set of suppliers and couriers take over, taking it further to Srinagar (ibid.: 21-22).  
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(unpaved) again, to Srinagar via Ladakh where they pass raw wool to their kin and agents 
settled in Kashmir.
95
  
 
The finished shahtoosh shawls are smuggled out of Kashmir in a number of ways. Since 
they are light and compact, they are sent by post or by courier mail. They have also been 
found hidden in shipments of other shawls. They are exported by traders through their 
trusted agents to markets in France, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America, Canada, Mexico, Spain, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, 
Japan and the United Arab Emirates (Kumar and Wright, 1997: 23). Shawls are also sold 
illegally by the hawkers or well-to-do vendors who come from Kashmir to Delhi to sell 
them by making visits to houses or contacting their old customers by telephone (ibid.).  
 
It can be argued that the geographical location of the state is such that it forms an 
important route for cross-border illegal transactions. Although most of the respondents 
were reluctant to share any information regarding illegal shahtoosh networks, it can be 
observed that regional networks and trade (explained in chapter three) still operate, 
although now only in ‘shadow form’ (Nordstrom, 2004) because of the ‘illegality’ 
involved. Nordstrom (2004: 184) examines such ‘shadow economies’ in Angola, 
Mozambique, Sri Lanka and South Africa, and argues that shadow economies ‘are not 
simply monetary matters, but socio-political power houses’. I have illustrated the 
involvement of powerful actors such as enforcement officials in the illegal trade in this 
chapter. I shall further discuss strong networks of power and control involving bhotias 
(raw wool suppliers) and manufacturers in the next chapter.  
 
It is suggested that the states confronting civil violence and economic crises are more 
prone to illegal economies and unrecorded activities, what MacGaffey (1991) refer to as 
the ‘second economy’. Owing to the fact that the J&K state has been affected by 
militancy for the last three decades, I now turn to explore the links between civil violence 
and illegal trading.
96
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 Interviews with various shawl workers in Srinagar (October-November, 2006). 
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 I may mention that to explore the illegal shahtoosh trade and its links with militancy in the state was not 
the intended objective of my research. The information presented on this issue is based on the informal 
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3.2 Militancy and shahtoosh: exploring the connections  
 
It is alleged that militants have set up various commercial bases in Kathmandu where 
they raise funds for insurgent activities partly through shahtoosh and other wildlife-
related trades (Kumar and Wright, 1997). In 1994, three shahtoosh traders, who were 
reported to be also working as informers for Indian intelligence units, were arrested in 
Ladakh. They confessed to bartering tiger bones and skins for raw shahtoosh and using 
the profits to buy arms for Kashmiri militants (ibid.). This incident highlights the need to 
explore the links between the militancy and a scarce natural resource such as shahtoosh. 
Some scholars have suggested that unrest and violence can be the manifestations of 
deeper environmental conflict over the scarcity of natural resources. For example, Peluso 
and Watts (2001) argue that environmental violence reflects or masks other forms of 
social struggles. Homer-Dixon (1999) maintains that environmental scarcity can lead to 
civil violence through ‘resource capture’ (generally by elites) and ecological 
marginalisation of vulnerable or disenfranchised people (see also Le Billon, 2005). 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) points out that due to the loss of access to 
resources, the affected poor may turn to unofficial activities, and society and economy, in 
turn, may become more violent and chaotic. Although it is difficult to draw a direct causal 
relationship between environmental scarcity and insurgent activities in Kashmir, we do 
find connections between the two. Below, I present four sets of arguments shared by my 
respondents in Kashmir, which shed light on the possible linkages between the 
insurgency in Kashmir and the ban on shahtoosh.  
 
The first argument was that there is no relationship between the militancy and the 
shahtoosh trade in Kashmir. A weaver in Srinagar remarked:  
 
It is difficult for a worker to feed his own family, and so there can be no 
question of shahtoosh workers feeding militancy in the state [...] I tell you 
these are Kashmiri Pandits who want to take revenge from the Muslims of 
Kashmir by spreading this rumor in order to ban the shahtoosh trade and ruin 
Kashmir economy.
97 
                                                                                                                                                        
conversations and interviews with the state officials and shahtoosh workers where tangential references to 
illegality and possible connections with militancy were made. The discussion presented here, therefore, 
remains synoptic. Due to safety considerations of my respondents, I have withheld their names. 
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 Interview in Srinagar (11 November, 2006). 
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The second argument was that since the ban on shahtoosh has resulted in the 
unemployment of a large number of people in Kashmir, the unemployed youth are 
joining the militant groups. For example, a hawker pointed out: 
 
I believe that the growing unemployment in the state due to the ban on the 
shahtoosh trade will only feed the militancy in the times to come. I am aware 
of a few instances in which the youth in Srinagar town, after a steep decline in 
their incomes, have taken up insurgent activities and have been involved in the 
recent few blasts in Kashmir for a small amount of money to feed their 
families.
98
 
 
Third, it was also argued that foreign money generated out of the shahtoosh trade 
helped to promote the separatist movement. A senior embroiderer explained:  
 
There are some well-connected hawkers in Srinagar who go to sell shahtoosh 
shawls in the UAE and the Middle East, and who are provided with huge 
amounts of money by the militant groups there to promote and sponsor 
insurgent activities in Kashmir until recently […] This black money is shared by 
the manufacturers, hawkers and the insurgent groups in Kashmir.
99
   
 
 
A fourth argument was suggested by the President of the J&K Chamber of Commerce 
who argued that militancy, in fact, has contributed to the boom in the shahtoosh trade in 
Kashmir. He stated: 
The shawl industry had its glorious period at the time of militancy starting from 
the late 1980s. Since shawl production is an indoor activity, at the time of 
militancy, when shops were kept closed, people had plenty of time to weave 
shawls inside their houses, resulting in more production of shawls than what 
was seen earlier. In the 1990s, when terrorism was at its peak, big 
manufacturers started moving out of Srinagar to Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta, 
and established their businesses there. Using their links, they were able to 
increase export of shahtoosh shawls to France, Italy, Germany, UK, UAE and 
Saudi Arabia. This, in turn, multiplied the demand of shahtoosh shawls and 
their production in Srinagar.
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The above point corroborates the argument made by Korf (2004: 275) that ‘civilians in 
conflict situations are not all victims, and conflict can be a threat and an opportunity, 
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 Interview in Srinagar (26 November, 2006). 
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 Interview in Srinagar (10 November, 2006). 
100
 Interview with the President of the Chamber of Commerce and owner of the Cashmere Marketing 
Agency in Srinagar (22 October, 2006). 
 
124 
 
often at the same time’. As I have shown, although militancy created new opportunities 
for big manufacturers, traders, exporters and hawkers, it also limited the avenues of 
protest for poor shawl workers and posed a direct threat to their livelihoods. Following 
the diverse viewpoints on the question of shahtoosh and militancy, I emphasise that 
although there is no direct or linear relationship between environmental struggles and 
insurgency, conservation interventions in conflict regions can certainly aggravate the 
miseries of already marginalised communities. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
From this chapter, I draw three main conclusions. First, we observe that CITES and 
international activist NGOs played a central role in imposing the ban on the shahtoosh 
trade. The Government of J&K delayed its imposition owing to its special status within 
the Indian Union, but ultimately surrendered to the international pressures for chiru 
conservation against the will of its population. This demonstrates that the transnational 
actors are increasingly influential and possess coercive powers to re-territorialise a region 
and control local natural resources or global commons in the name of environmental 
sustainability. Through my description of the process of the implementation of the ban 
on shahtoosh in J&K, I have, however, demonstrated that this power does not go 
unchallenged but permeates various layers of politics when global conservation policies  
meets local realities. 
 
I explained three kinds of politics generated by law, science and the special status of J&K. 
Law set the initial stage by expanding the arena of power and actions of the different 
players involved. This was further seen in the negotiations based on the uncertainties in 
the meaning and application of the term ‘hair’ and ‘wool’, as also in the ambiguities 
concerning the origin of shahtoosh. Similarly, I have shown how science and scientists 
were enrolled in making a case for the banning of shahtoosh trade and foreclosing the 
possibilities of chiru farming. Further, I discussed how the discrepancy in the status of 
chiru in the State and Central Wildlife Protection Acts provided a new basis for the 
contending parties to justify their respective claims. Although the ban could not be 
averted, these processes led to significant delays in its imposition. 
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Second, the ‘illegal’ production of shahtoosh shawls and the high rate of corruption in 
bureaucratic and political circles reveal the split role of the state. On the one hand, the 
state imposed new regulations to ban the trade, and on the other, it has hardly taken any 
measures to put a check on the now illegal activities of powerful players (manufacturers 
and traders) involved in the shahtoosh trade. The ban was mainly enforced against 
relatively powerless and poor shahtoosh workers and has, at the same time, opened up 
new opportunities for rent seeking and corruption by state officials. We also observe that 
that the wider separatist movement in J&K has enabled the state to limit the space even 
for non-violent protest movements. The state, in fact, used its violent force to control 
protests against the ban on the shahtoosh trade. I described the diverse linkages 
between the insurgency against the state and the shahtoosh trade, and argued that 
although there is no definite and causal link between resource scarcity and violence, 
conservation interventions in conflict areas can further marginalise the poor as observed 
in the case of shahtoosh workers in J&K.  
 
Third, and most importantly, we observed that power relations within the community of 
shahtoosh workers determined the conforming and resisting behaviours of poorer 
workers. The manufacturers and traders played a decisive role in setting the agenda and 
form of protest. They tried to co-opt the poor workers in protest activities, and used the 
issue of a loss of livelihoods and the resulting unemployment in their negotiations with 
politicians and state officials. However, the original demands of poor workers for a rise in 
wages and a ban on machines for dehairing and spinning were abandoned once the ban 
on shahtoosh became inevitable. While the manufacturers and rich traders were able to 
secure their own interests by forging a nexus with the officials and politicians, the 
interests and concerns of the poorer workers were left unaddressed. 
 
Based on the multifaceted understanding of the politics seen in the process of imposition 
and enforcement of the ban on shahtoosh, I challenge the simplistic viewpoints of 
scholars who argue that conservation interventions are based on the principle of 
sustainability, as well as the arguments of those who maintain that a new form of eco-
governance secures fixed and determined outcomes by using its coercive powers to 
discipline the populations according to its own agenda and interests. What can be 
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inferred from the discussion so far is that the power of international community, 
although very influential in defining the relationship between local communities and 
natural resources, does not go uncontested, but is resisted and negotiated by various 
actors depending upon their power and interests. I have shown that the process of 
banning and its enforcement is shaped and governed by various forms of politics from 
macro- to microlevel. This results in differential impact of the ban on various different 
actors within the affected community. I examine this issue in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Micropolitics of the Ban on Shahtoosh: costs 
and reparations 
 
It may be true that  
one has to choose between ethics and aesthetics,  
but it is no less true that  
whichever one chooses,  
one will always find the other at the end of the road. 
 
— Jean-Lue Godard 
 
Critical analyses of nature conservation policies have largely focused on the legitimacy of 
global power to control local resources as well as local resistance to global interventions. 
Yet, there is inadequate attention to understanding the various forms of micropolitics 
and local practices that condition and shape the global interventions such as wildlife 
conservation. In other words, contemporary analyses eclipse the micropolitics through 
which global discourses are ‘refracted, reworked and sometimes subverted in particular 
localities’ (Moore, 2000: 655). It is important to understand how global interventions are 
manipulated and shaped at local level, and to take notice of various modes and strategies 
that local powerful actors devise to compensate their losses whilst directing the costs of 
conservation to the poorer members of the community. The analyses of nature 
conservation policies, thus, need to go beyond the ‘idealised contrast between global 
hegemony and local resistance’ (Singh, 2008: 19), and examine different forms of 
contestations, compromises and costs hidden within local complexities. 
 
I have addressed the local forms of politics embedded both in the protest movement and 
split role of the state in the previous chapter. This chapter extends the discussion further 
to other forms of micropolitics that have emerged with the imposition of the ban on 
shahtoosh. The following questions are addressed in this chapter: a) In what different 
ways did the ban on shahtoosh affect the various categories of shawl workers and their 
livelihoods? b) How have local power relations within the shahtoosh worker community 
determined the control over shawl production and trade after the imposition of the ban? 
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c) How did the various categories of shawl workers deal with the new scenario? d) What 
initiatives have been taken by the state and non-state agencies to rehabilitate or 
compensate the losses of affected shawl workers? In this chapter, I assess the differential 
impact of the ban and differential abilities of various categories of shawl workers to 
secure their respective interests after the imposition of ban. 
 
The chapter is divided into two sections. In section one, I focus on the various forms of 
micropolitics embedded in the perpetuation of myths regarding the origin of wool, 
unpopularity of the ban, declining wages and changing socio-cultural relations, the 
increasing use of machines and the exploitation of poor shawl workers. I analyse the 
differential impact of the ban on the various categories of shahtoosh workers, and 
suggest that the poor shawl workers are left with no other alternative but engage with 
pashmina shawl production, a shift which has resulted in a substantial decline in their 
wages. I argue that although the shawl manufacturers and traders are able to 
compensate their declining incomes by indulging in illegal shahtoosh trade and increasing 
the price of raw wool by creating wool shortages in the market, these tactics have proved 
detrimental to the livelihoods and incomes of poor skilled workers. Following this, in 
section two, I examine the initiatives of state and non-state organisations to support the 
ban affected shawl workers. I argue that the initiatives in this regard have proven to be 
very limited and failed to take into consideration the primary concerns of the shahtoosh 
workers. The central argument in this chapter is that the global conservation 
interventions such as the ban on shahtoosh trade are not simply met with local resistance 
but seep into existing relations of domination and subordination at the local level 
resulting in differential impact on various categories of resource users.  
 
Section One  
 
As explained in chapter three, the categories of workers such as the spinners, weavers 
and embroiderers perform the most skilled and laborious tasks. Yet, economically these 
are the most exploited and marginalised categories of workers. Manufacturers, traders, 
poiywans and hawkers, who contribute the least in terms of actual production of shawls, 
are economically the most powerful actors as they control the entire manufacturing and 
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trading processes. The hierarchical power relations are further reflected in the 
differential impact of the ban on the various categories of shahtoosh workers, not just in 
economic terms (redundancy, decline in wages and exploitation) but also in political 
(corruption and nexus building for illegal trade) and social contexts (gender relations, loss 
of prestige and decline in social status). In this section, I highlight the micropolitics of the 
ban on shahtoosh by considering five factors: a) the perpetuation of myths regarding the 
origin of wool and the unpopularity of the ban; b) the declining wages for different 
categories of workers; c) the changing social and cultural relations; d) the redundancies 
caused due to the increasing use of machines and e) the exploitation by powerful 
manufacturers and traders. 
 
1.1 The origin of wool and the unpopularity of the ban 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the legal proceedings in the J&K High Court and 
presented the arguments of the representatives of J&K state regarding the origin of 
shahtoosh wool. Contrary to the scientific evidence, the state officials, politicians and 
trade associations held the belief that the antelope is not killed to obtain shahtoosh. The 
majority of my respondents amongst shawl workers were unaware of the reasons behind 
the banning of shahtoosh and considered the ban as unjustifiable. I found that only a few 
respondents, mainly manufacturers and traders, acknowledged the connection between 
the ban and the massacre of chirus. Others argued that the wool is shed by a goat found 
in Ladakh and is collected from the bushes and rocks by the herdsmen. I mentioned in 
chapter three that some shawl workers even associated the origin of wool with musk 
deer, ibex, rabbit and sheep. Below I present some more narratives to indicate the 
unpopularity of the ban and diverse myths regarding the origin of shahtoosh in Kashmir. 
 
Shamina Begum (age 40) of Rathpora, Srinagar is a spinner. It is her family occupation 
and she learned the skill of spinning from her mother when she was 13. Since then, she 
has been spinning and contributing to her household expenses. On the question of the 
source of wool, she explained:  
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The origin of shahtoosh wool is a bird found in Ladakh who eats red sand. This 
bird sheds its feathers while flying which get stuck to the bushes. The 
herdsmen collect it and sell it to the shopkeepers in Srinagar. 
 
Another point was made by Mohammed Rajab Naqqash (age 48), a chappawal of 
Nowshera, Srinagar who narrated: 
 
The ban on shahtoosh is not justifiable as it based on the wrong reason that 
wool is obtained after killing an animal found in Tibet. Actually, the wool is 
collected by shearing goats that live on the Nepalese side and eat white mud. 
Had the reason behind the ban been true, I would have been the first one to 
support it. 
 
Fayaz Ahmed Sheikh (age 45) of Tawheedabad, Srinagar is a weaver and has been 
associated with this occupation for the last 30 years. He suggested:  
 
            No animal is being killed for shahtoosh wool. Had it been the case, the animals 
would have become extinct centuries ago. The mere fact that the supply of 
wool in Kashmir has increased over the last three decades confirms the fact 
that the animal is safe. I have heard that the animal looks like peacock. 
 
The above narratives point to the conviction of local shahtoosh workers who not only 
subscribe to the widely popular myths but also consider the justification of the ban put 
forward by the wildlife conservationist groups as based on false premises. On the 
contrary, they also see a positive relationship between the increased supply of shahtoosh 
and the population trend of the species. This suggests that when nature conservation 
interventions collide with layered formations of landscape and livelihood, ‘a space opens 
up for people to challenge the truths in the name of which they are governed’ (Li, 2003: 
5120). The fact that the arguments of shawl workers are in stark opposition to the 
knowledge of the scientific and conservation community also indicates the inadequate 
efforts made by these groups to generate awareness about the rationale behind the ban 
before its imposition in Kashmir. As argued in chapter three, it might be the case that the 
myths regarding the origin of shahtoosh are being perpetuated by the powerful actors 
who tend to gain the most from the shahtoosh trade. However, it also shows that the 
‘rationality’ of the global conservation community may fail to change the ‘local 
knowledge’ or already existing beliefs of the affected communities, and hence can result 
in their non-conforming behaviour towards conservation policies. This corroborates the 
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viewpoint of Singh (2008: 13) that international treaties can create an appearance of 
agreement about environmental management, but ‘they do not necessarily shift belief 
systems or replace existing decision-making frameworks’. In the following discussion, I 
demonstrate that it is the powerful stream of manufacturers and traders who actually 
determine the conforming and transgressing behaviours of poorer workers by involving 
them in the now illegal production of shahtoosh shawls. 
 
1.2 Different categories, differential impact 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the ban on shahtoosh resulted in the 
unemployment of a large number of shawl workers in Kashmir. Those who were dealing 
exclusively with shahtoosh have been made redundant and those who had been working 
with both shahtoosh and pashmina have seen a sharp decline in their wages. The IFAW 
and WTI (2003) in their survey of shahtoosh workers after the ban claimed that 55% of 
the workers reported a complete shift from shahtoosh to pashmina, 16% from working 
exclusively with shahtoosh to working with both kinds of wool, 11% were left 
unemployed, while 10% shifted from working with both shahtoosh and pashmina to 
pashmina only.
101
 Apart from this, no census survey of shahtoosh workers has been done 
by any governmental agencies after the imposition of the ban.  
 
Although the wildlife conservation agencies consider the pashmina shawl industry in J&K 
as the most viable alternative for shahtoosh workers, the shawl workers argue that it is 
economically much less attractive for three reasons. First, shahtoosh production 
provided subsistence livelihoods to separators, spinners and weavers because unlike the 
case of pashmina, machines cannot be used for dehairing, spinning and weaving 
shahtoosh. Second, in the case of shahtoosh, the wool was provided by the 
manufacturers to the spinners (owing to the high cost of shahtoosh), but in the case of 
pashmina, the spinners are required to buy the raw wool from the manufacturers or 
poiywans, and get paid only for their labour, resulting in the loss of their net incomes. 
Third and most importantly, pashmina shawl production provides much lower wages 
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 It is to be noted that this survey was conducted by pro-ban NGOs. As such, their conclusions and claims 
need to be taken with caution. 
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which are less than half of those earned from shahtoosh. Moreover, pashmina wool 
processing is an already saturated sector with very limited opportunities for new 
entrants. This has brought a large decline in the average incomes of all the categories of 
shahtoosh workers, although to different degrees. Since there is no alternative available, 
the shawl workers have shifted from working exclusively with shahtoosh to pashmina, 
although some of them still process shahtoosh supplied by the manufacturers or 
poiywans. In the following discussion, I explain the economic impact of the ban by 
presenting narratives of various categories of shahtoosh workers. I argue that different 
categories of shahtoosh workers have experienced differential vulnerabilities and costs. 
 
Before the ban, the job of dehairing shahtoosh was performed by separators. In the last 
few years, the manufacturers have started increasing the use of machines to dehair 
pashmina and reduce the production cost of shawls to compensate their losses due to 
the ban. This has rendered the category of separator jobless with no alternative 
employment available. As Taja Begum (age 55), a separator of Nawa Kadal, Srinagar 
explained:  
 
I used to clean 200 grams of shahtoosh per day and earned Rs. 250 for it. 
Although I did not receive this amount of wool everyday, my monthly income with 
shahtoosh was Rs. 1000 per month [before the ban]. With this income, I 
supported my family by contributing to the household expenses. After the ban, I 
get no wool to clean and the job of dehairing pashmina has also now been taken 
over by machines.
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The spinners now get machine-carded pashmina and, at times, raw wool for spinning 
from the local poiywans. These spinners, on average, spin 10 grams of raw pashmina a 
day and make 110-120 knots for which they earn Rs. 130 at the rate of one rupee per 
knot. The poiywans deduct Rs. 60 as cost of raw pashmina and pays Rs. 70 for their 
labour. Their earnings with pashmina do not exceed Rs. 500-600 per month. The income 
was three times more with shahtoosh. Some of the spinners informed me that, 
occasionally, they still spin raw shahtoosh wool for their employers. Besides separators 
and spinners, the ban has also hit weavers by reducing their incomes to a third of what 
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 For a comparison, note that the minimum wages for casual labour in J&K in 2001 were approximately 
Rs. 75 per day or approximately Rs. 2000 per month.  
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they earned previously. The average monthly income of a weaver was Rs. 6000 with 
shahtoosh which has now declined to Rs. 2500 working with pashmina. For example, 
Shoukat Ahmed Sheikh (age 35) of Tawheedabad, Srinagar is a weaver. Shahtoosh shawl 
weaving was his family occupation and he was associated with it for the last 20 years. 
Explaining his poor economic condition after the ban, he recalled:  
 
In 2002, when the state government imposed the ban on the production of 
shahtoosh shawls, I became redundant. I approached two vastas 
[manufacturers] but I was not offered any work. The vastas now provide 
shahtoosh only to a few trusted weavers who have been known to them for 
years. After six months of no work at all, I finally got an assignment from the 
third manufacturer I approached, to produce four pashmina shawls. I shifted 
to pashmina weaving but there has been a considerable fall in my income. I 
earned Rs. 5000-6000 per month with shahtoosh but now my income does not 
exceed Rs. 2500 per month.  With this low income, it is not possible to feed my 
five kids, a wife and a mother. I feel completely depressed whenever I think of 
my present situation [...] You see, I made such a big house with the income 
from shahtoosh and now if I have to think of its maintenance, I cannot afford 
it. 
 
As with other categories of workers, the ban has also negatively affected the wages of 
warp-threaders (barangors). Tahmeena Gulzar (age 37), a barangor of Syedpora, Srinagar 
who has been associated with shahtoosh for the last 23 years narrated: 
 
My husband is a rangrez [dyer] and with the combined incomes, we used to 
bear the expenses of the family.  After the ban, the competition among the 
barangors to get the pashmina warps has increased in the locality. Though it 
has benefited the vastas and poiywans in terms of bargaining power, this has 
resulted in our lower wages. Earlier, for passing 200 shahtoosh threads 
through a comb, I earned Rs. 15 but now for passing 200 pashmina threads, I 
get only Rs. 7 even though it takes the same time. This has reduced my 
monthly income from Rs. 2000 with shahtoosh to Rs. 800 with pashmina. I still 
get one or two shahtoosh warps in a month but it does not compensate my 
loss. 
 
Mohammed Altaf (age 40) of Merjapora, Srinagar has been associated with shahtoosh 
shawl clipping for the last 18 years. He explained that although clipping shawls is not his 
family occupation, because of high demand of clipping shahtoosh shawls in the 1980s, he 
chose this occupation. While he earned Rs. 80-100 for clipping a shahtoosh shawl, 
pashmina fetches only Rs. 40-50 per shawl. Therefore, this change has resulted in the 
decline of his income from Rs. 9000 to Rs. 4500 per month. He informed me that 
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although he gets some shahtoosh shawls to clip occasionally, the vasta pays him less on 
the excuse of ‘illegality’. 
 
Syed Mohammed Yusuf (age 75) of Khanyar, Srinagar is a senior darner (raffugar) who 
has been working in this occupation for the last 50 years. Although proud of his skill and 
the shawl industry, he bemoaned the ban on shahtoosh and resultant fall of his monthly 
income from 6000 (with shahtoosh and pashmina) to 3000 with pashmina. He exclaimed 
that while the prices of all commodities in the market are going up, the wages of poor 
artisans in Kashmir are going down.  
 
Mohammed Rajab Naqqash (age 48) of Nowshera, Srinagar works as designer as well as a 
printer. He was a carpet designer until 1986, but since shawl designing was more 
profitable, he shifted to it 20 years ago. After the ban, he started printing pashmina and 
ruffle shawls primarily, although he admitted that he gets shahtoosh shawls occasionally. 
Explaining his inability to venture into another occupation, he commented: 
 
We have been associated with this skill throughout our lives. To learn a new 
skill, we need another life. After the ban, we received no support from the 
government [...] Currently, I earn Rs. 20 for printing a pashmina shawl but with 
shahtoosh, I used to earn Rs. 50. This has resulted in the decline of my income 
from approximately Rs. 15,000 to 5000 after the ban.  
 
The incomes of embroiderers show no uniform pattern, they get wages according to the 
labour needed for embroidering each shawl. The income also varies according to the 
expertise, seniority and skill of the embroiderer. Although it takes the same time to do 
embroidery on a pashmina or shahtoosh shawl, the wages they get for embroidering 
pashmina are one-third of those for shahtoosh. The average incomes of embroiderers 
with pashmina range from 3000 to 4000 per month as compared to 8000 to 10,000 with 
shahtoosh. Although after the ban, they have primarily started embroidering pashmina 
shawls, some of the respondents informed me that they do occasionally get shahtoosh 
shawls from the manufacturers and poiywans. However, they argued that it is the 
manufacturers who benefit from this illegal production and trade because the 
embroiderers, most of the time, are paid less on the pretext of illegality. 
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Abdul Ahed (age 50) is a washer (dhobi) and the only earning member in his family. Since 
the ban, he has been making his living from washing pashmina and ruffle shawls. He 
earns Rs. 50 for washing a pashmina shawl but in the case of shahtoosh, the same job 
fetched him Rs. 100-150. He informed me that his income has fallen from 20,000 per 
month with shahtoosh to Rs. 12,000 with pashmina and ruffle shawls. Similarly, 
Mohammed Ashraf (age 23), a dyer (rangrez) of Nowshera, Srinagar observed a fall of his 
income from 9000 to 2000 after the ban.  
 
According to the shawl workers, the agents (poiywans) have compensated their loss of 
incomes by adopting various strategies including the illegal distribution of shahtoosh. The 
agents, however, claim that they have witnessed a steep fall in their incomes after the 
ban. Jan Mohammed (age 45), an agent of Nowhatta, Srinagar explains the ways by 
which he is trying to reduce the production costs and cope with his declining income.  
 
I collect the machine-carded wool from the vasta and go to the villages to 
distribute it to the katun wajens [spinners]. I prefer going to villages because I 
can bargain and get the wool spun at lower rates. This way, I am preferred by 
the vasta in comparison to other poiywans in the locality. While working with 
shahtoosh, I used to buy threads from the katun wajens at 10% profit margin 
and sell those to the vasta with a margin of 15% but with pashmina, I am able 
to get only 10% as commission. As a result, my income has declined from Rs. 
25,000 to 7000 approximately. 
 
The decline in the incomes of hawkers shows no uniform pattern. Bashir Ahmed Sofi (age 
45) of Waniyar is a small-scale manufacturer as well as a hawker. Every year, he goes to 
Delhi for six months to sell shawls and does weaving along with his subordinate workers 
in his karkhana for the rest of the year. He explained: 
 
I have been associated with this job for the last 25 years. I work with my uncle 
who is a senior hawker in the locality. I go with him to Delhi to sell shawls. 
Besides the shawls we produce in our karkhana, we also borrow shawls from 
the big vastas in Srinagar to sell [...] Before the ban, our annual sale was more 
than ten lakhs every year and we made good profits out of shahtoosh business 
outside the state. We are not able to make such profits with pashmina and 
ruffle shawls now. Our standard of living has been constantly going down since 
the ban. 
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As explained earlier, the manufacturers are the most powerful actors, controlling the 
whole production process and making most of the profit. Most of them, however, were 
reluctant to provide any estimates about their incomes. Although the narratives of 
various shawl workers suggest that shahtoosh wool is still provided by the manufacturers 
and their agents for spinning, weaving and embroidering, most of the manufacturers 
reported that the production has stopped entirely in the state since the ban. I present 
below the narrative of Habibullah Sofi (age 56) of Mondibal, Srinagar who is a 
manufacturer and also works as an embroiderer and trader.  
 
My family has been involved in shahtoosh shawl production and trade for the 
last four generations. I employ poiywans from different localities in Srinagar to 
supervise the production process [...] Before the ban, I used to manufacture 
shahtoosh shawls and sell the best quality ones to the exporters in Delhi as 
well as to the families of big businessmen and politicians [...] Some of my 
customers own nine to ten shahtoosh shawls. Such is their fascination for 
these elegant shawls. After the ban, the demand for shahtoosh has fallen and 
we have stopped its production. The profit margins with pashmina are much 
less and my monthly income has declined to 40,000, which is even less than 
one-third of what I used to earn with shahtoosh. 
 
 
During my stay in Srinagar, I also interviewed a bhotia who is a local raw wool trader as 
well as the owner of a dehairing mill (see Appendix II: Picture 2).
103
 According to him, due 
to the increasing demand of machine-carded wool, he bought a dehairing machine in 
1999 and started supplying wool to the manufacturers in Srinagar. The well-to-do 
poiywans also approach him directly to purchase large quantities of wool. Alongside 
controlling the raw wool trade, he is also involved in shawl manufacturing. Although he 
argued that the ban has negatively affected his income, shawl workers including weavers 
and embroiderers in the locality informed me that not only does he immensely benefit 
from the sale of illegal shahtoosh in the market, but he even creates artificial shortages 
of wool supply and increases the price of pashmina to generate profits. They informed 
me that he has strong links with the politicians and police agencies in Srinagar and is also 
well-connected to wool suppliers in Tibet, Nepal and Ladakh.  
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 He was reluctant to provide any information on his income. In conversation with one of his subordinate 
machine-operators, I was informed that six kilograms of pashmina is being dehaired in the mill everyday 
which suggests that he must be earning more than one lakh rupees per month. However, it was not 
possible to get any estimate about his income from the illegal trade of raw shahtoosh. 
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In the above discussion, I have highlighted that the shahtoosh worker community is 
highly heterogeneous and comprises various actors with diverse interests and power. 
Problematising the notion of ‘community’, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) suggest a stronger 
focus on the divergent interests of multiple actors within communities and the 
interactions or politics through which these interests emerge. I have examined how the 
ban had differential impact on the various categories of shawl workers and also how 
different categories of workers have responded to the ban in order to secure their 
respective interests. While the ban has rendered the category of separators jobless with 
no alternative available, it has resulted in the sharp decline of wages of poor workers 
such as spinners, weavers, embroiderers, warp-threaders, darners, clippers and dyers 
whose unique skills have contributed the most to shahtoosh shawl manufacturing. The 
other categories such as bhotias, manufacturers and poiywans primarily engaged in 
trading wool and shawls have also witnessed a decline in their incomes but have 
simultaneously adopted various strategies to compensate for their losses. Reflecting on 
the different capacities of various social actors to voice and stake their claims, Leach et 
al. (1999) maintain that if powerful groups do not achieve their desired ends through 
open negotiation, they are likely to do so through other means. I have shown that the 
manufacturers and poiywans are taking up multiple jobs of weaving, supervising, trading, 
and have started distributing the wool to rural artisans for getting the yarn spun and 
woven at the lowest possible cost. Moreover, after losing the legal battle, powerful 
actors such as bhotias and manufacturers have opened up new avenues for making 
profits by the illegal shahtoosh trade, creating wool shortages, increasing use of 
machines, and exploiting poor shawl workers. I discuss in detail these various strategies 
in the rest of this section. 
 
    1.3 Machines and adulteration  
 
The use of machines for dehairing and spinning is one of the biggest challenges to the 
livelihoods of poor shawl workers in Srinagar.
104
 The shawl workers believe that the 
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 Similar processes of machines taking over some of the artisanal jobs have occurred world over and have 
been documented by several scholars. For example, Mohamad (1996) notes that spinning as a process died 
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increasing demand of Kashmiri shawls in the 1980s has led to the mechanisation of 
spinning process to save time and labour costs, and to the deterioration in the quality of 
wool (by adulteration) to lower the production costs. The dehairing of raw wool initially 
started taking place with the help of machines in Amritsar, Punjab in the early 1990s. In 
1998, the Government of India provided dehairing machines to the Ladakh Hill 
Development Council to be sold to bhotias at subsidised rates. This set the trend for the 
use of machine-cleaned wool in Kashmir. By 2000, most of the local wool dealers and big 
manufacturers in Srinagar had started purchasing their own machines for dehairing and 
spinning wool, and after the ban on shahtoosh, manufacturers have increased this use of 
machines to compensate their losses by lowering production costs. Although the 
machines have posed a direct threat to the livelihoods of the separators, spinners and 
weavers, they have benefited the manufacturers and raw wool traders.  
 
A separator in Srinagar informed me that until the late 1990s, the local wool dealers and 
manufacturers had to send the raw wool to Amritsar for carding and cleaning but now 
they not only save the transportation costs, they have even started adulterating pure 
pashmina with poor quality wool at the time of its dehairing and processing to make 
swift profits.
105
 The separators and spinners argue that manual dehairing is better than 
machine-carding because the machines produce short fibre, which cuts frequently and is 
very difficult to spin. As a result, poor spinners are able to produce less number of 
threads and hence earn lower wages. The spinners argue that the short length of the 
thread also gives the poiywans an excuse for deducting their wages. Moreover, they 
argue that machine-carding also leads to loss of the durability, softness and appearance 
of yarn.  
 
The machine weaving and embroidery of shawls in Amritsar has also posed a threat to 
the incomes of weavers and embroiderers as the traders get the shawl woven and 
designed at much cheaper rates in Amritsar than getting them hand-woven and 
embroidered in Kashmir. These machine-made shawls from Amritsar are sold as Kashmiri 
                                                                                                                                                        
out by the 1920s among yarn preparers in Malaysia who lost their livelihoods and were displaced because 
of the availability of machine-spun yarn in the market. 
105
 Interview with Haleema Begum (age 58) of Syedpora , Srinagar (12 November, 2006). 
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hand-made shawls, which has resulted in the loss of the distinctive Kashmiri shawl 
identity. The customers are initially unable to see the difference because of the fine 
finishing quality of the machine-made shawls. However, the shawl workers argue that the 
overall inferior quality of machine-made shawls emerges after a few months of use. The 
growing dissatisfaction of the customers with the quality of the product is resulting in a 
declining demand for Kashmiri shawls in the markets outside of the state. Taking this 
point further, Azad Ahmed Khan (age 46), a weaver of Nowshera, Srinagar commented: 
 
Misfortunes do not come alone. The ban on shahtoosh was implemented along 
with the rising use of machines for manufacturing pashmina shawls which have 
made several shawl workers redundant in Kashmir. In 2004, I decided to 
purchase cheap machine-made shawls and blankets from Amritsar and sell 
those in Calcutta in the name of Kashmiri hand-made products [...] I found 
many people outside the state doing this. In the winter, I go to Calcutta and for 
rest of the year, I do pashmina weaving if I am lucky to get some work from a 
vasta. 
 
 
According to my respondent shawl workers, since it is not possible to spin and weave 
pure shahtoosh on machines, many experiments of mixing shahtoosh with pashmina 
were initiated by the wool traders in order to make the shahtoosh wool suitable for 
machine processing. When the demand for shahtoosh shawls was at its peak in the 1980s 
and the early 1990s, some manufacturers started selling shawls made of a mix of 
shahtoosh and pashmina wool in the name of pure shahtoosh shawls.
106
 The use of 
adulterated wool by manufacturers has created various problems for artisans.
107
 For 
example, according to a clipper, there is always a risk of adulterated patches getting torn 
while brushing off the shawl to remove its unwanted knots, which gives manufacturers 
and poiywans an excuse to deduct their wages. Similarly, a dyer informed me that it is 
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 Here, we can compare the case of woollen shawls in Kashmir to silk fabric in Malaysia where rising 
demand of silk products led to deterioration in their quality. Mohamad (1996: 169) notes that the 
qualitative deterioration in production was brought about when the use of natural fibre yarn was reduced 
in silk weaving. At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the international trading pattern in silk had taken a 
turn when supplies could not cope with rising demands for silk all over the world. For local weavers the 
price of silk went up beyond consideration, and they resorted to substitutes of cheaper, lower quality silk 
yarn to sustain production. It is noteworthy that unlike silk weavers, in the case of shahtoosh and 
pashmina, it is manufacturers (and not weavers) who started adulteration practices to meet the market 
demands and make quick profits.  
107
 The information presented was shared on the condition of anonymity by several shawl workers 
including spinners, clippers, dyers and embroiderers during interviews in Srinagar (October-November, 
2006). 
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difficult to get a uniform colour while dying the adulterated shawls. He argued that the 
manufacturers order him to dye the more adulterated shawls black to retain the 
uniformity of its colour. Besides these problems, embroiderers informed me that often, 
they get shawls that have shahtoosh patches in the middle with pashmina borders. These 
borders are to be embroidered to hide the adulterated portions of the shawl.  
 
Following the trend of adulteration initiated by raw wool traders and manufacturers, the 
poor spinners started retaining the threads made from pure wool while returning those 
made from adulterated wool (purchased from the market) to their poiywans, and selling 
the pure quality threads to some other poiywans in order to make extra money. Unlike 
the manufacturers and raw wool traders, these poor spinners could not succeed in their 
strategies as the manufacturers and poiywans started checking the uniformity of each 
thread carefully and assessed if the thread was spun from the same wool which was 
provided to them. It is to be noted that the adulteration tactics of the manufacturers and 
traders succeeded as most customers cannot detect the difference between pure and 
adulterated wool, but the tactics adopted by the spinners failed because poiywans and 
manufacturers could easily identify and scrutinise the quality of the yarn. This indicates 
that even while indulging in adulteration activities and immoral practices, it is the already 
powerful actors who thrive at the cost of poorer workers. 
 
In the previous chapter, I mentioned that although the manufacturers and traders had 
succeeded in delaying the ban for selling their products being processed at that time, the 
interests of the poor with regard to rise in wages and the ban on machines remained 
unaddressed. The workers’ demands were abandoned by the manufacturers and 
politicians once the ban on shahtoosh became inevitable.
108
 On the contrary, the shawl 
workers witnessed loss of jobs and a further decline in their wages. We also noticed that 
the government provided machines for dehairing at subsidised rates to the wool traders 
in Ladakh in the name of ‘development’. This suggests that wildlife conservation policies 
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 Venkatesan (2009: 139) notes that the weaving industry in Tamil Nadu, India is characterised by uneasy 
balances and short term alliances because of the simultaneous existence of both cooperation (between 
workers and traders) and competition (with other workers/traders). Likewise, in the case of shahtoosh, we 
witnessed the co-option of workers by the manufacturers and traders during the protest against the ban 
amidst conflicting interests of manufacturers and artisans. 
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as well as development schemes can be ‘strategically manipulated by different actors 
with different ends in mind’ (Rossi, 2004: 23) and most of the time, actors in weaker 
bargaining positions fail to make their demands and interests prevail. The use of 
machines and saturation in the pashmina industry, lack of direct access to markets and 
increasing wool prices have all proven to be detrimental to the poor artisans who have 
been struggling for their sustenance in the wake of ban. In the following discussion, I 
present the various strategies of control and exploitation of poor shawl workers, adopted 
by the poiywans, manufacturers and raw wool dealers respectively. 
 
1.4 Decreasing wages, increasing prices: strategies of labour exploitation and control 
 
In rural areas, spinning, weaving and embroidering are subsidiary occupations as the 
primary source of income is agriculture and horticulture. The poiywans now prefer to 
provide raw wool to the rural shawl workers than to the local spinners and weavers in 
Srinagar for its processing. They bargain with rural artisans to get the wool spun and 
woven at the lowest rates possible. This shift of jobs to rural artisans has further 
marginalised the ban affected categories of spinners and weavers in Srinagar.
109
 
Shedding more light on it, Mumtaza Begum (age 55), a spinner of Nowshera, Srinagar 
added: 
Because we started demanding a rise in wages and started forming workers’ 
associations, the poiywans have started employing spinners, weavers and 
embroiderers residing in rural areas. These rural artisans are well-off 
[relatively] and agree to work on lower wages as they have other sources of 
livelihood. Rather than helping us in these difficult times after the ban, they 
[poiywans] have devised new ways of increasing their own profits. They even 
provide raw shahtoosh to the rural artisans for processing. 
 
Another interview with Mushtaq Ahmed (age 45), an embroiderer of Khanmulla village, 
indicates some other exploitative practices adopted by these middlemen. He narrated: 
 
The poiywan deducts 15% of my wages as his commission for providing me 
work. He provides threads for embroidering the shawl for which he charges me 
three times more than they are sold in the market. I am aware of this but if I 
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 Hareven (2002) presents similar experiences of the silk weavers of Kyoto who are losing their jobs since 
the manufacturers have started sub-contracting obi (a part of Japanese traditional kimono dress) weaving 
to rural weavers who are willing to work for them for lower wages. 
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start buying my own thread from the market, he will refuse to provide me 
work in future [...] These days, getting work is very difficult. Since I have a large 
family to support, I do not want to lose this source of income.  
 
The shawl workers explained that like the poiywans, manufacturers have resorted to 
several practices of reducing their wages and exploiting them. The most common 
practice is to find defects in their products and deduct their wages. For example, the 
manufacturers or their agents pass needles through the woven shawls to assess the 
quality of weaving. If the needle does not pass through the holes, the quality of weaving 
is assessed to be good but if it passes through, they either ask the poor weavers to pay 
for the whole shawl or deduct their wages. Similarly, the manufacturers and poiywans 
have made another excuse for paying low wages to the spinners by checking the length 
of the thread spun. The spinners argued that the short length is primarily due to the low 
quality and adulterated wool which cuts frequently because the wool today is mainly 
machine-carded and not manually dehaired. Even though this wool is provided by the 
manufacturers and their agents, they put the blame on these poor women and pay them 
lower wages in return. If they are unable to find any defects, the poiywans make profits 
by selling these spinners raw pashmina at higher prices. Since they cannot refuse to buy 
raw wool from the same poiywan or manufacturer for fear of losing work, the 
exploitation of these poor workers continues. 
 
The payments made by the manufacturers and poiywans to their employed workers are 
irregular and can be subject to monthly or annual delays. The shawl workers understand 
this as a way of establishing control over them so that they do not start working for other 
employers.
110
 They argue that the practice of irregular payments for their labour has 
increased manifold after the ban on shahtoosh. Some shawl workers explained that even 
when they get shahtoosh, they are paid much less than they were before the ban on the 
excuse of its illegality. However, they argue that the manufacturers make profits and 
increase their incomes out of the same illegal production by selling the products at rates 
much higher than those before the ban.  
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 A similar example of silk weavers of Kyoto is discussed by Hareven (2002) who notes that as employees 
of capitalist manufacturers, Nishijin weavers have little control over the type of obi they produce, terms of 
employment, working conditions and pay rates. Even when they weave in their own households, they are 
neither independent artisans nor small entrepreneurs.   
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Since there is growing competition for jobs in the already saturated pashmina industry, 
this has increased the bargaining power of both manufacturers and poiywans. The 
poiywans, who act as agents of manufacturers, have increased their commission for 
providing work to poor artisans. I further demonstrate exploitation of poor shawl 
workers in the following two narratives: 
 
25 years ago, I embroidered the picture of Indira Gandhi [former Prime 
Minister] on a shawl. I designed it and stitched it. I sold it to the vasta in my 
locality. I was paid Rs. 90 for it. The piece was selected by the Handicrafts 
Department in Srinagar for an exhibition in Delhi where the vasta was awarded 
one lakh rupees for that master-piece. We neither get good wages nor 
recognition for our skill. After the ban, the exploitation of the vastas and 
poiywans has further increased as they have adopted several new ways to 
exploit us. They count the number of flowers embroidered and pay only Rs. 40-
50 for each but when they sell it to the traders or exporters, this count does 
not matter. They sell the designs produced by us at much higher prices [...] 
Two months back, a poiywan asked me to work on a shawl for which the vasta 
will pay Rs. 6500. He said that out of this amount, Rs. 1500 will be his 
commission for providing me work. Although I knew that he would earn this 
money for nothing, since I wanted work, I agreed to it. Such is the fate of 
craftsmen in this industry whose products are famous worldwide [...] When a 
ragbar [embroiderer] dies, his children inherit nothing but his spectacles, 
neut
111
, needle and a debt of some thousands he borrowed from the vasta to 
meet his household expenses. 
                                                
                                 Abdul Rashid Rathore (age 72), embroiderer, Syedpora, Srinagar 
 
My vasta has not paid me anything for the last year. Whenever I go to him for 
my wages, he says that he will pay me next month. The poiywans exploit us 
even more. Earlier, my vasta used to pay Rs. 60 for darning a shawl, but now I 
am paid only Rs. 50 because Rs. 10 is the commission of the poiywan for 
providing me work. Since it has become very difficult to get work, I cannot 
refuse to do it even at these low wages for the fear of being replaced by others 
in the locality.                                                                                                                                
                                                    
                                                   Syed Mohd. Yusuf (age 75), darner, Narwara, Srinagar 
 
As we observed, the workers do not refuse to work for low wages because of increased 
competition in getting work after the ban. These poor shawl workers also argued that the 
other reason for not leaving their old employers is that they are the ones whom they 
depend on for borrowing money in times of need. In return for the help offered to these 
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 An iron or steel ring worn on the upper part of the forefinger by embroiderers in Kashmir to avoid 
getting hurt by the needle while stitching the shawl. 
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shawl workers, the manufacturers make profits by exploiting their skills and labour in the 
following years and thereby controlling them.
112
 Thus, their poor economic conditions 
and indebtedness results in amplified exploitation by their employers.  
 
I have mentioned in chapter three that some of the weavers in the 1980s started taking 
up trading jobs and small-scale manufacturing. After the ban, more weavers ventured 
into the business of selling pashmina shawls outside the state to supplement their 
declining incomes. However, due to inadequate marketing skills, illiteracy and lack of 
exposure to outside world, very few of them could succeed in selling shawls directly to 
customers and fashion outlets outside J&K.
113
 The weavers informed me that the 
manufacturers always discourage them from taking up trading functions, explaining that 
this involves huge risks.
114
 Due to their poor access to the market, some of the weavers 
argued that if somehow they manage to produce a shawl and go to the manufacturer 
directly (bypassing the poiywans) to sell it, he never pays the full price. Most of the time, 
he pays them half of the price in cash and for the rest, he provides raw wool. This way, 
the manufacturer is able to maintain his market position as well as establish control over 
his subordinate workers. As Bashir Ahmed (age 40), a weaver of Narwara, Srinagar 
explained:  
 
I produce some shawls but it is not profitable because I do not have links to the 
shopping outlets and big businessmen outside the state. Since we are poor, the 
traders and customers outside do not trust us. Moreover, owing to the 
militancy in the state, our Kashmiri Muslim identity becomes another barrier to 
explore trading opportunities outside J&K. So, even if we produce shawls, we 
are left with no choice but to sell them to the vasta [...] He is shrewd, never 
pays us cash but provides raw material in exchange for our products. 
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 In the context of mat weavers in Tamil Nadu, Venkatesan (2009) explains that traders give loans and 
advances to the weavers in times of need, and control their production. As one of her respondent weavers 
remarks, ‘they trap us like fish in a net. They strew money [for bait]’ (ibid.: 154). 
113
 This points to the Simmel’s (1950) argument that in trade, intelligence always finds expansions and new 
territories, an achievement which is very difficult to achieve for the original producer with his lesser 
mobility (cited in Venkatesan, 2009: 143). 
114
 By discouraging new entrants in manufacturing and trading activities, the powerful actors seek to 
maintain their privileged position. Jha and Misra (2006: 40), in the case of the silk weavers of Bhagalpur, 
Bihar, note that the monopoly of big businessmen threatens the very existence of the ‘smaller fry within 
the community in the same way as the big fish devours the small one’, a process which can also be noted in 
the example of shahtoosh. 
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The shawl workers also reported that there have been fluctuations and increases in the 
prices of raw pashmina and shahtoosh in the last three decades. This could possibly be 
due to the fact that earlier there were only a few raw wool traders in Srinagar. Owing to 
the profits associated with wool trading, many manufacturers have taken up trading 
functions resulting in increased competition and fluctuating wool prices.
115
 The 
respondents revealed that most of the time, an artificial shortage of wool is created by 
Ladakhi wool suppliers and local traders to create demand in order to sell the wool at 
higher rates. Although increasing wool and shawl prices have benefited the already rich 
bhotias and local wool traders, it has proved detrimental to spinners and weavers 
because unlike the case of shahtoosh, the raw pashmina needs to be purchased from 
manufacturers or poiywans.
116
 Explaining this, Saleema Rashid (age 60), a spinner of 
Syedpora, Srinagar narrated: 
 
In the last ten years, the price of shahtoosh and pashmina wool has increased 
rapidly. I used to buy 60 grams of pashmina for Rs. 30 but now I get 10 grams 
for Rs. 60. The traders sell shahtoosh illegally for more than 40,000 per 
kilogram. Though the prices of wool and shawls are increasing and benefiting 
the rich, our incomes are on constant decline. 
 
The discussion above suggests that on the one hand, the ban has resulted in plummeting 
incomes for the poor artisans, while on the other, it has motivated the powerful actors 
such as traders, manufacturers and poiywans to maintain their market position by 
creating artificial wool shortages, adulteration, increased use of machines, exploitation of 
poor shawl workers and indulging in illegal shahtoosh trading. The fact that ‘illegality’ 
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 In the 1980s, one kilogram of raw pashm was sold for Rs. 400, which rose to Rs. 1100 in the 1990s. In 
2006, raw pashm was sold for Rs. 1600 and machine-carded for Rs. 6000. This rise of price was even 
sharper in the case of shahtoosh which increased from Rs. 7000 per kilogram in the 1980s to Rs. 16,000-
18,000 in the early 1990s and Rs. 30,000 in 1998. According to the local spinners and weavers, in 2006, one 
kilogram of shahtoosh was being sold for 38,000 per kilogram in Srinagar. This sudden rise in the price of 
shahtoosh from Rs. 16,000 to Rs. 38,000 was because of the shortage of wool in the market due to the ban 
on the shahtoosh trade. Similarly, the rates for shawls also increased. In 1996, one plain pashmina shawl 
was sold for Rs. 3000 but by 2006, the price rose to Rs. 5000-6000. In the same way, the price of one plain 
shahtoosh shawl rose from Rs. 15,000 in 1996 to as high as Rs. 60,000, in 2006, owing to the ‘illegality’ 
involved. This shows that in a period of ten years, the price of a pashmina shawl has doubled but the price 
of a shahtoosh shawl has increased four times. 
116
 This is comparable to the case of silk manufacturing in Bhagalpur, Bihar, as noted by Jha and Misra 
(2006). The ownership of the finished product remains with the supplier of silk yarn i.e. traders and 
manufacturers. As such, the poor weavers are ‘forced to live a life of destitute masterminded by exporters 
and dealers through the process of manoeuvrings’ such as controlling the supply and price of silk yarn 
(ibid.: 67). 
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increases prices, justifies the risk the powerful traders and manufacturers take in 
breaking the ban by forming alliances and bribing the law enforcement officials. 
Arguably, a blanket ban rather than helping in conservation, may lead to overexploitation 
of resources (Ramnath, 2002).
117
 
 
MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000: 5), in the context of Congo, suggest that 
traders ‘transgress and contest the boundaries of the law’ through various mechanisms 
including their ‘second economy’ activities. We observe that after failing to resist the ban 
through open protests and negotiations, the powerful traders showed their non-
compliance to international conservation regulations by indulging in the illegal shahtoosh 
trade. In chapter four, I highlighted that the traders and manufacturers protested against 
the ban by proclaiming that it is inimical to the interests of J&K and thus morally 
unjustifiable. However, it is important to note that the ‘moralistic construction’ (Singh, 
2008: 13) of manufacturers and traders that the ban is against the shahtoosh worker 
community may also obscure their exploitative practices and huge profits made out of 
illegal trade which excludes the majority of the affected population but benefit these 
powerful groups.
118
  
 
The privileged groups, often, are provided institutional security in harnessing state 
resources and capitalising on environmental opportunities for private gain, resulting in 
divergent vulnerability profiles for various sections of the affected populations (Collins, 
2008). Although the J&K state did not provide any institutional security to wool traders 
and manufacturers, it did help the manufacturers and traders to secure their interests 
through a weak implementation of the ban. Indeed, the illegality of trade has resulted in 
increased vulnerability of the poorer shahtoosh workers who had remained exploited 
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 In the context of northeast India, Ramnath (2002) notes that blanket ban on timber felling and the laws 
to promote conservation have accelerated deforestation. For the poorer people dependent on these forest 
resources for sustenance, the ban and its continuing operation has generated untold miseries but it is to 
the advantage of rich and powerful landowners. 
118
 Singh (2008) argues that illegal and unregulated trade in wildlife has been characterised by conservation 
groups as a great risk for the remaining wildlife populations in Laos. While conservation organisations 
construct an image of regulation through CITES as a global necessity, their assumed morality provokes 
counter accusations by the affected groups about the immorality of impositions by western 
conservationists. However, both the competing representations focus the gaze outwards without 
considering the uncertainties and divisions that occur within concerning the increasing vulnerability of the 
poor populations and benefits acquired by the elite through the continued high value trade in wildlife. 
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and marginalised even before the trade became illegal. Under such circumstances, the 
poor who can least afford to bear the costs of environmental conservation may also 
ignore or ‘deliberately contravene environmental policy measures to defend their 
livelihoods’ (Wiggins et al., 2004: 1940).  
 
Scholars such as Chatterjee (2004) argue that in most of the world, poorer people 
transgress the strict lines of legality in struggling to live and work. Likewise, Leon (1994) 
suggests that due to lack of any alternatives, the natural resource dependent populations 
adopt ‘avoidance strategies’ by indulging in illegal activities as the only viable possibility 
to sustain themselves. Bloomer (2009: 63) refers to such activities as ‘coping strategies’ 
as opposed to being seen as ‘criminal opportunism’. Peluso (1993) suggests that the 
Maasai in Kenya started illegal wildlife hunting for sustenance when their principal 
livelihood of livestock grazing was restricted by reserve authorities (see also Brown and 
Marks, 2007). While lack of alternative livelihoods and poverty could be the reason for 
the illegal poaching of chirus by Tibetan herdsmen, the arguments presented by these 
scholars provide only partial explanations to the involvement of poor workers in the 
illegal shahtoosh production. For the poor shahtoosh workers, the question of 
sustenance is undeniably significant. Yet, their poor economic conditions and lack of 
alternative employment opportunities are not the only determining factors in their 
continuing involvement in shahtoosh production. Because the workers do not own either 
the yarn or the finished products, their transgressing behaviour and involvement in illegal 
production is rather controlled and determined by the manufacturers and poiywans who 
employ these workers to make huge profits. I refer to this process as delegated illegality, 
wherein the powerful actors delegate and assign illegal tasks to their entrusted 
subordinate workers. For the poor shahtoosh workers, the question is not to choose 
between legality and illegality i.e. processing pashmina or shahtoosh, rather it is the 
matter of compliance to the orders given by their employers for whom they have been 
working for generations. 
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1.5 Declining social prestige and cultural heritage 
 
The shahtoosh workers argued that the ban has not only resulted in the loss of their jobs 
and affected their incomes adversely, it has also resulted in the loss of traditional skills 
and cultural heritage of spanning 600 years. They noted that besides being a large source 
of revenue for the state and livelihoods for its population, the shahtoosh shawl industry 
has given recognition to Kashmiri handicrafts worldwide. The shawl workers argued that 
there is no substitute for this ancient art and, therefore, the industry should be 
preserved. 
 
Since the majority of the shawl workers had shahtoosh as their family occupation, they 
attached great cultural value to it. Moreover, the fact that shahtoosh weaving and 
production of shawls was a lucrative profession, these workers argued that people in 
Kashmir have, at times, preferred the shahtoosh production and trade to other jobs.  
They believe that there are greater chances of class mobility working with shahtoosh 
than any other craft. Hence, those who were engaged with shahtoosh considered 
themselves privileged and enjoyed high social status amongst other artisans in Kashmir. 
 
According to the shahtoosh workers, the decline in their incomes after the ban has 
resulted in their low standard of living in several ways. They opt for buying cheaper food 
products now, struggling to save their incomes for their daily household expenses. They 
complained about not being able to provide better education for their children and a lack 
of proper health facilities due to their poor economic conditions. In order to cope with 
the loss of jobs or sudden decline in their wages, these shawl workers informed me that 
they had to do distress selling of their land, property and jewellery items.
119
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 Although the poor weavers had to sell their properties to meet the daily expenses after the ban, the big 
manufacturers have started investing their savings in purchasing land and other non-movable assets to 
compensate for the present and anticipated decline in their incomes. I also observed that manufacturers 
owned some of the best houses in the city. 
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The decline in their wages has also resulted in the loss of prestige they enjoyed earlier, 
working with shahtoosh. They have experienced a strong sense of deprivation since the 
ban as they are ranked lower with regard to social status. They observed that the young 
weavers cannot afford to get married since they are not sure how they will feed their 
families. Moreover, they even argued that no one wants his daughter to get married to a 
pashmina weaver nowadays. Nisar Ahmed Baba (age 33), a weaver of Rathpora, Srinagar 
remarked:  
 
Before the ban, I was respected in my locality. People used to greet me as 
salaam sahib owing to my prosperity but after the ban, we are struggling even 
to bear the daily household expenses. The other name for our life now is 
compromise as we practically experience it at every step [...] These days, even 
a wage-labourer earns more than we do. 
 
 
Both the male and female workers argued that after the ban, they have avoided going to 
any community gatherings, marriage ceremonies or making social visits since they need 
to work double the number of hours with pashmina (in comparison to shahtoosh) in 
order to feed their families. The female spinners explained that they enjoyed more space 
and independence in the family before the ban. Most of them used to keep a record of 
their wages with the poiywans and withdraw money at the time of their daughter’s 
weddings to buy jewellery and other articles. Since the ban, they have not been able to 
make such long-term savings as it is difficult to bear the expenses of the household with 
the sole incomes of their husbands. 
 
Before the ban, the young girls in the family used to spin and save their incomes for their 
marriage expenses and also contributed to the household expenditures. Since pashmina 
production is not as profitable, many of these young spinners have left their jobs, 
aspiring to join other occupations. Some young spinners, however, explained that since 
their family members consider working outside their homes as a cultural loss, it restricts 
their mobility and choice of occupation. As non-earning members, their position within 
the household becomes weakened. Female separators who have lost their jobs since the 
ban are now financially dependent on their parents or spouses for their personal 
expenses. The use of machines has also had an impact. They argued that the loss of their 
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jobs has negatively affected the relationship with their spouses. Their personal expenses 
have been restricted and space for decision-making has been limited. Habla Begum (age 
44), a female embroiderer of village Ganderbal explains, in the following words, the 
problems she has been facing after the ban due to the increased exploitation by the 
manufacturer: 
 
After the ban, the vasta have become even more exploitative. Nine months 
ago, I finished embroidering a pashmina shawl after six months of hard work. 
The vasta refused to pay me anything for my labour saying that my work was 
not satisfactory. Since I am a woman, I could not fight for my wages. My in-
laws abused me and demanded the money for the work I did for six months. 
They refuse to accept that I had not been paid even a single penny, and 
believed that I was making excuses to keep the money for my personal 
expenses. I was humiliated to the extent that they threatened to expel me 
from the house unless I gave them the due amount. As I was unable to pay 
them the money, I have had to come to my father’s house and I have been 
staying here for the last five months with the hope that one day the vasta will 
pay for my labour and I will go back to my husband [...] I am completely 
depressed now.  
 
 
The above discussion suggests that the differential impact of ban is not only based on 
economic inequalities but also gender relations. It is important to note that female 
workers are not only exploited by their employers but, in addition to this, also by their 
own family members. Harriss-White (2003) suggests that the Indian workforce in the 
unorganised sector is fragmented across various lines of social differentiation including 
gender. Gender differences are systematically exploited by the merchant capital to 
segment the labour force and to resolve issues of labour control as female labour is often 
considered more docile and easy to discipline (ibid.). In the shahtoosh case, the 
manufacturers and poiywans have followed similar strategies by employing the female 
spinners and embroiderers in rural areas, and paying lower wages to women artisans for 
reducing the production cost, as well as minimising the threat of workers mobilisation. 
Although women constitute a major chunk of the workforce in the shahtoosh industry, 
they are least paid for their skills. Undoubtedly, after the ban, women shahtoosh 
workers, especially separators and spinners have been the worst affected. The situation 
of women shahtoosh workers is comparable to other women weavers and spinners in 
India and abroad (see for example, Venkatesan, 2009; Ramaswamy, 2006; Mohamad, 
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1996).
120
 It is to be noted that while male shahtoosh workers have witnessed a decline in 
social status and hierarchy, female workers, in addition, have experienced a decline in 
their position within the family in terms of decision-making power, respect and 
recognition.
121
  
 
Section Two 
 
      2. Rehabilitation and alternative livelihoods: accountability of whom? 
 
Although no substantial efforts have been made by the state or non-state agencies to 
rehabilitate and compensate the poor shahtoosh workers, some discrete initiatives have 
been taken by the WTI and J&K state with little success. Below, I critically examine these 
initiatives and argue that poor people affected by nature conservation policies, especially 
in developing countries, are left on their own to cope with new circumstances wherein 
their modes of sustenance and occupations are suddenly shifted from the domain of 
legality to illegality.  
 
In 2005, the WTI started a project titled, ‘A Livelihoods Initiative for Traditional 
Shahtoosh Workers in Kashmir valley’ to support the ban-affected spinners and weavers 
in Srinagar. The project aimed to reinstate Kashmir hand-made pashmina as a viable 
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 In the context of Malay silk weavers, Mohamad (1996: 189) highlights the exploitation of women 
weavers by Chinese middlemen who pay them ‘virtually nothing’ for their finished sarongs (kilt or skirts). 
The majority of the labour force in the industry, whether in the past or present, consists of women. 
Although they are real producers or actual weavers, they do not control the production process and the 
finished product. As home based workers they have no official identity and they are subjected to extremely 
low and unregulated wages (ibid.: 195). Unlike the case of the shahtoosh weavers, Venkatesan (2009) 
explains that the Labbai Muslim mat weavers in Tamil Nadu, own the final product. However, since they 
are dependent on traders to sell their products, they are exploited by these traders who find fault on the 
pretext of colour specifications, fineness of texture etc. Very often, in such cases, the traders either refuse 
to buy the product or pay them less. 
121
 Hill (2010) proposes that membership based organisations (such as the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association in India) can promote the social foundations of recognition and respect that are critical to 
identity and agency as well as provide workers with real opportunities to develop alternative non-
exploitative economic institutions that may deliver improved wages and social security. In the case of 
shahtoosh weaving in particular or the shawl industry in J&K in general, we see an absence of such 
women’s organisations, possibly because of a combination of factors such as strong nexus between 
traders, manufacturers and bureaucrats, dependence of artisans on their employers for loans and 
advances, and the ongoing militancy and political instability in the state. 
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alternative to shahtoosh by providing the Geographical Indication (GI)
122
 craft mark to 
the pashmina shawls of Kashmir so as to create their credibility and demand in 
international markets. The representatives of the WTI explained that although their 
campaigns to ban shahtoosh were primarily funded by the IFAW, they were not able to 
receive any funds from other international agencies or donors to support the livelihoods 
project for shahtoosh workers. It was only after the WTI received a small grant from the 
British High Commission, New Delhi for a period of three years that the project was 
initiated. A WTI official in Srinagar, on the condition of anonymity, also informed me that 
even within the organisation there was little enthusiasm in sustaining the project as 
many of its members felt that it was not directly related to wildlife conservation and did 
not fit into the main objective of a conservation organisation. 
 
According to the WTI, because the project started three years after the ban on 
shahtoosh, they have faced several problems in convincing the shawl workers to 
participate in their activities. In 2006, the WTI formed a trust called the ‘Charitable Trust 
for Promotion of Handmade Pashmina in Kashmir’ to eliminate the role of the 
middlemen (poiywans) by providing raw pashmina at lower rates directly to spinners and 
weavers, and buying back yarn and fabric at a slightly higher price than the market rate. 
The spinners were paid Rs. 1.20 per knot as compared to Rs. 1 paid by their vasta or 
poiywan. Yet, very few prospective ‘beneficiaries’ came forward to participate in the WTI 
project. The reason was not just the mistrust for an organisation that has campaigned for 
the implementation of the ban but also the uncertainty involved in the short life period 
of such projects. As one couple, Hanifa Begum (age 39) and Mushtaq Ahmed (age 43) of 
Syedpora, Srinagar explained: 
 
The WTI project workers offered us better rates for spinning and weaving raw 
pashmina. But they said that they would provide the wool for six months and 
did not give any long-term commitment. These projects come and go but if we 
do not remain loyal to our vasta and poiywan, we will not get any work in 
future. 
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 A geographical indication (GI) is a name or sign used on certain products which corresponds to a specific 
geographical location or origin (e.g. a town, region, or country). The use of a GI may act as a certification 
that the product possesses certain qualities or reputation, due to its geographical origin. 
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The Board of Trustees of the aforesaid trust mainly comprised manufacturers which the 
WTI has been able to enroll by giving the incentive of publicity to hand-made pashmina 
shawls with the GI tag in national and international trade fairs, exhibitions and sales 
outlets. I also attended a meeting held by WTI officials with the Board of Trustees. The 
meeting covered a variety of issues. An exhibition was to be organised by the WTI in 
collaboration with the trust in the famous handicraft market Dilli Haat in New Delhi in 
2006. In the meeting, two manufacturers were selected to display their pashmina 
products along with spinning and weaving processes to prospective customers. Another 
important issue discussed in the meeting was the problem being faced by the WTI to 
involve spinners and weavers in the ‘alternative livelihoods’ project. It emerged in the 
discussions that the workers can only be motivated by increasing their wages, and 
lowering the cost of raw pashmina. Some manufacturers contended that the increase in 
wages of the weavers and spinners will be against their interests since it would increase 
the production costs while others referred to it as a much needed sacrifice to be made to 
earn the profits which can be made later with the rise in demand for pure hand-made 
pashmina products if the GI tag is able to open new market opportunities abroad. 
 
A WTI official, on the condition of anonymity, informed me that during the initial 
interactions of the WTI with the manufacturers, some manufacturers even proposed that 
the best way of utilising project funds was to hand over the money to the Manufacturers’ 
Association, the members of which would then distribute the money to the artisans 
working under them so as to compensate their loss of incomes due to the ban.
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However, when the WTI declined the suggestion on the basis that the grant is for 
providing alternative livelihoods to the affected spinners and weavers, these 
manufacturers ridiculed the organisation, stating that the WTI project will fail just as 
hundreds of government schemes have in the past. The WTI official also recalled that in 
2005, the WTI team organised a workshop titled, ‘Threats and Challenges to Pashmina 
Craft and Stakeholders Role’ at Srinagar. The discussion was mostly dominated by 
manufacturers, traders, exporters and poiywans but artisans remained silent. When 
asked to speak their views, these artisans were hesitant to share them. The official 
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 Interview in Srinagar, 20 November, 2006. 
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informed me that the WTI team came to know later that manufacturers and traders had 
asked the artisans to keep quiet and let the manufacturers deal with the WTI officials 
because a pro-ban organisation could not be trusted, and they need to be careful in their 
engagement with the organisation. This suggests that the manufacturers and traders, 
using their privileged position, tried to hijack the proposed project of the WTI, again 
marginalising the interests of the skilled workers. 
 
While the WTI’s initiative can be considered as tokenism, the efforts made by various 
governmental agencies and departments (Handlooms Department, Handicrafts 
Department, Weavers Service Centre, School of Designs and Craft Development Institute) 
failed to address the primary concerns of the ban-affected workers by means of 
providing any monetary compensation or creating alternative livelihood opportunities. 
These agencies are mainly involved in technological upgradation, loans and credit 
facilities and providing training to spinners, weavers, dyers, designers and embroiderers 
to improve their skills. The shawl workers argued that they did not require any training in 
the art which they have been doing for generations.
124
 Instead, their main concerns 
relate to the loss of jobs due to the ban, increasing redundancy due to the use of 
machines by manufacturers, problems of adulteration, increasing exploitation, low wages 
and lack of access to markets.  
 
While no funds were made available by the state and central governments specifically for 
ban-affected shahtoosh workers, some state agencies such as the Handlooms 
Department and the J&K Small-Scale Industries Corporation have been providing low 
interest loans and credit to shawl workers in general. Yet, very few weavers or spinners 
are able to access these funds due to lack of information, highly cumbersome paper-work 
and other formalities involved in the process. According to poor shawl workers, it is 
mainly the manufacturers and some influential senior weavers who are able to avail 
these opportunities as they are well-connected and well aware of the tactics to attract 
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 The futility of the state programmes for artisans can also be seen in examples discussed by other 
scholars. For example, Venkatesan (2009) notes that mat weavers in Tamil Nadu do not see any relevance 
of training programmes or workshops started by the government nor do they agree that the provision of 
new improved looms and natural dyes is able to help them in real sense. The weavers participate in such 
training programmes and workshops just to avail the stipend provided for training by government 
departments and NGOs. 
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these funds.
125
 Reflecting on his experience with the Handlooms Department, Gulam 
Hasan (age 44), a weaver of Rathpora, Srinagar explained: 
 
            I have been registered with the Handlooms Department since 1992. In 2004, I 
came to know about a scheme of loans for up to one lakh rupees for shawl 
workers. I applied for it. The officer asked me the names of the instruments 
used in weaving and tested my weaving skills. He then asked for a bribe of 
10,000 rupees and an undertaking by a government officer in support of my 
application for a loan. I did not know any government official and dropped the 
idea […] but it is very easy for vastas to get loans from government 
departments as well as banks. Last year, my vasta asked me and some other 
subordinate weavers and spinners to come to his house and work together to 
show that he runs a karkhana. We all gathered on the fixed day, two officers 
came and took pictures. A few months later, I came to know that the vasta has 
got a loan of ten lakhs for the karkhana that exists only in pictures.
126
 
 
Imtyaz Ahmed Sofi (age 42), a weaver of Eidgah, Srinagar explained his disappointment 
with the state initiative to promote Kashmiri shawls in craft fairs outside J&K: 
 
The Department of Handicrafts started a programme in 2000 under which 17 
craftsmen from Srinagar are sent to Delhi every year for two weeks to sell their 
products in craft fairs and exhibitions. The selection is supposed to be made on 
the basis of a lottery system. I applied twice but did not succeed. The people 
who get selected for such programmes are the sons or relatives of the 
manufacturers and politicians. Even if some weavers get selected, they do not 
have enough stock of shawls to exhibit and sell [...] they sell their seats to 
vastas.
127
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 Referring to the difficulties the poor face in accessing government aids, Jha and Misra (2006) present 
the case of the silk weavers of Bhagalpur, Bihar, who benefited little from the provision of bank loans 
started by the state and central governments after the communal riots in 1989 to compensate their loss of 
handlooms and livelihoods. Corruption on the part of government officials and middlemen were the main 
reasons for the failure of these rehabilitation and compensation schemes. As a result, the majority of 
weavers ended up working as labourers. 
126
 A similar observation is made by Venkatesan (2009: 139) that the mat weavers of Tamil Nadu may 
profess a commitment to the weaving industry, whether they weave or not, so that they can benefit from 
craft development schemes. As a result, non-weavers often access governmental funds normally meant to 
support weavers. If those who actually weave are able to receive such funds, they rarely invest the money 
into weaving. Rather, in most cases, these funds are used to meet other requirements of the household. 
127
 For handloom weavers in Varanasi, Showeb (1994) explains that even when a weaver knows the art of 
weaving quite well, he is often not able to rise economically because he fails to get financial backing for 
launching his own enterprise independent of the control of traders. Moreover, because of his low 
economic status he has poor connections in the raw material market as well as in the selling market of silk 
fabrics. Likewise, Jha and Misra (2006) observe that the lack of capital and monopoly of big businessmen 
are the biggest constraints faced by the silk weavers of Bhagalpur, Bihar and primary reasons for their 
abject economic conditions. 
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Mohd. Maqbool Mir (age 75) of Hamchi, Srinagar is an embroiderer who explained his 
lack of interest in a training programme by the School of Designs in the following words:  
 
I have heard that the School is providing training to the shawl embroiderers 
these days. These programmes are futile as we know better designs than the 
young experts in the schools. The government needs to plan programmes 
which can help us overcome the real problems we face — low wages and 
exploitation.  
 
 
The discussion suggests that the state did not show any serious concerns towards 
rehabilitating shahtoosh workers either by initiating targeted programmes or providing 
compensation to the affected populations. However, it has served the powerful actors 
such as manufacturers and traders. They are able to bribe the state officials and adopt 
tactics to demonstrate their direct association with the production process in order to 
avail the opportunities or provisions in the form of loans and participation in craft fairs 
and exhibitions meant for artisans. I have argued that there is lack of confidence and 
interest amongst the shawl workers in the government schemes due to the inadequacy 
of programmes in addressing their primary concerns, the weak possibilities they see in 
receiving government aid and their inability to bribe the authorities concerned. This 
shows that neither the state nor any non-state agencies have assumed the accountability 
to recompense the losses incurred to the poor artisans in the wake of wildlife 
conservation. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
From this chapter, I draw three main conclusions. First, the shahtoosh worker community 
is highly heterogeneous wherein shawl manufacturers, traders and skilled workers have 
divergent interests and different powers. As a result, the ban has had differential impact 
on the various categories of shawl workers who have showed differential abilities to 
challenge, contravene and manipulate the new regulations of resource use. We observed 
that the ban has resulted in the loss of jobs for the separators and those working with 
shahtoosh exclusively, and a sharp decline in the incomes of the poor artisans such as 
spinners, weavers, embroiderers etc. who perform the most arduous jobs in the 
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production process. These poor shawl workers fail to set up new businesses or enter into 
new trades due to a lack of financial capital and access to market opportunities. The rich 
and powerful categories of manufacturers, poiywans and wool traders have also 
experienced loss in their incomes but they have been able to devise new strategies and 
tactics to maintain their monopoly and control over the production process. The 
manufacturers have increased the use of machines and have adopted several 
adulteration practices to reduce the production costs. They have also been exploiting the 
skilled workers by deducting their wages and paying them irregularly. The new strategy 
adopted by the poiywans concerning the distribution of wool to rural artisans has further 
marginalised the spinners, weavers and embroiderers of Srinagar who are already hit 
hard by the ban. Similarly, the wool traders have been creating artificial wool shortages 
and increasing the price of wool. The impact of the ban can also be observed through the 
changing gender relations and loss of social status or prestige enjoyed by the shahtoosh 
shawl workers before the ban.  
 
The second conclusion is that the international conservation community has failed to 
change both the existing belief systems of the local shawl workers and their behaviours 
to conform to the international regulations. There is widespread ignorance about the 
origin of shahtoosh and the unpopularity of the ban in the Valley. Not only do the shawl 
workers subscribe to the age old myths, but some of them even see a positive 
relationship between the increased supply of shahtoosh and the population of chirus. We 
have observed that the behaviour of the shawl workers is actually governed by the 
rationality of their employers who supply pashmina and shahtoosh wool to them. Since 
the ban creates demand and illegality increases prices, it motivates the powerful actors 
to violate the ban and accrue profits. While the manufacturers, poiywans and wool 
traders showed their non-compliance by indulging in the illegal shahtoosh trade for profit 
making, the involvement of poor artisans in illegal production is primarily determined by 
the will and interests of their employers, a process which I referred to as delegated 
illegality. Further, by involving the subordinate workers in illegal production and creating 
‘moralistic construction’ by protesting against the ban, I have argued that these powerful 
actors are able to cover both their exploitative practices and strategies adopted to 
compensate their loss of incomes. 
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The third conclusion is that in the absence of any alternative employment opportunities, 
the poor shawl workers are more or less locked into the system with little chance of 
escape. The alternative livelihood project initiated by the WTI has created little incentives 
for the shawl workers to cooperate since they see pashmina as a less attractive option. 
The lack of long-term assurance in the WTI project and the dependency of artisans on 
their manufacturers for loans and advances in times of need discourage these artisans 
from participating in the project. The increased competition and saturation of the 
pashmina industry has, in turn, increased the bargaining capacities of the powerful 
categories resulting in further exploitation of shawl workers. Moreover, there have been 
no initiatives taken by the state to recompense the loss of livelihoods of the shahtoosh 
workers. The few initiatives taken by the Handlooms Department to support shawl 
workers in general have mainly served the already powerful. The fact that the shahtoosh 
workers are concentrated in one geographical region, Srinagar, means that a well 
designed and targeted strategy for providing alternative livelihoods by the government 
or international agencies at the time of the ban could have substantially reduced the 
miseries of these workers.  
 
The discussion presented in this chapter motivates us to look beyond the dichotomous 
positions of global control versus local resistance in the context of nature conservation, 
and analyse how international conservation interventions seep into the existing relations 
of domination and subordination at ground level. It also signals the need to analyse how 
environment and politics are intertwined and differentially articulated in particular 
localities. It is demonstrated that the nature conservation regulations and interventions, 
instead of determining the local realities become refracted and reshaped through various 
forms of microlevel politics and practices. It can be, thus, argued that power rather than 
being concentrated at a particular site, is dispersed and fluid, and that power relations 
among various actors play decisive role in influencing the outcome of nature 
conservation policies. 
 
Overall, the case study of shahtoosh has provided insights into the history, growth and 
decline of shahtoosh shawl production in J&K. It has also examined the power and 
agenda of international wildlife conservation, the paradoxical relationship between the 
159 
 
centre and the state, the split role of the J&K state and the limited space for protest by 
the citizens. It has highlighted the exploitative relationships within the shawl industry and 
the nexus between powerful actors such as government officials, politicians and big 
manufacturers or traders that works against the interests of artisans. Indeed the ban on 
shahtoosh has coincided with the historical attempts of powerful actors to dominate and 
exploit poor shawl workers along with extending the coercive and violent powers of the 
state to control its dissenting populations. Arguably, the global concern of chiru 
conservation is proven to be incompatible with the livelihoods of shahtoosh workers, 
despite the fact that these workers are not involved in the killing of the antelope. 
Although there are valid ethical arguments in favour of wildlife conservation, it is the 
poor and powerless who bear the burden of nature conservation costs.  
 
While there are overtly conflicting interests of diverse actors involved in the controversy 
over the ban on the shahtoosh trade, not all nature conservation interventions are 
characterised by such evident conflicts. Therefore, it is worthwhile to assess how the 
nature conservation agenda unfolds itself in the situations where there is an apparent 
convergence of the interests of different stakeholders. I address this question through 
the case-study of forest management programme involving local communities in J&K in 
the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Forests, State and People: a historical account of 
forest management and control in J&K 
 
The poor would eat in abundance from the forests, 
Animal, birds, and flowers alike. 
Then came the order that for hunting 
One needs a licence. 
How much will they loot, 
What will they answer to God? 
Our ruler is so greedy that  
Even Mulberry leaves have built him a treasure, 
Even then he is not satisfied.  
 
— Ali Shah Khoiyami (1904)128 
 
While being wary of historical determinism, it is pertinent to understand the various 
political and scientific influences in the past that have shaped the present discourse and 
practice on forest conservation and management. At each and every historical stage, 
forest management has been a ‘political process’ wherein resource access, control and 
use have been ‘bitterly contested’ (Bryant, 1997: 194). Moreover, forests are not only 
‘physical domains’, but also contested ‘social spaces’ in which different groups of people 
attach different meanings (Beinart and Hughes, 2007: 119). As Sivaramakrishnan (2003) 
suggests, there is a need to constantly question what is presented as ‘natural’ or 
‘inherently systematic’ and see it in the light of its historical production. A historical 
understanding of the issues of access, control and management of forests, thus, can 
provide useful insights for analysing the agenda, power and interests of various 
stakeholders involved in the contemporary politics around forest conservation and use in 
J&K.  
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 From Akhir Zamaan (The End of the World), an unpublished manuscript in Kashmiri. The English 
translation of the poem can be found in Zutshi (2004: 137). 
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In 1891, the Forest Department (FD) was established in the princely state of J&K which 
epitomised centralisation of power with regard to access and control of forest resources. 
Just over 100 years later, in 1992, a regulation for ‘Joint Forest Management’ was 
promulgated with the aim to conserve and use forest resources based on the principles 
of decentralised management and people’s participation. In this chapter, I present the 
story of forest management in J&K beginning from the practice of ‘communal’ 
management in the pre-colonial period to ‘custodial’ in the colonial era and, ultimately, 
to ‘social and participatory’ management in the late 1980s.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: I begin with a brief discussion on forest 
management in the early colonial period and argue that the state interest in forest 
control was limited only to the collection of forest dues from local communities and 
forest management had largely remained communal in nature. Following this, in section 
two, I analyse how, by the end of the 19
th
 century, the forest citizens had to cope with a 
new political and economic context when British intrusion in forest control and 
management went far beyond those of previous rulers. The principles of ‘scientific 
forestry’ determined forest resource utilisation with the aim of increasing the sustainable 
productivity of forests and various measures were taken to restrict the access of local 
communities. In section three, I explain that the colonial system of forest management 
perpetuated in the post-colonial period, and highlight the shift from ‘custodial’ to ‘social’ 
management of the forests in the state. The discussion presented in this chapter rests on 
the argument that ‘scientific forestry’ served to legitimise the role of forest bureaucracy 
in the control and use of forests. I argue that although the rationality of scientific 
management succeeded in curtailing the rights and access of local communities 
dependent on forest resources for sustenance, it proved subservient to the imperial, 
commercial and varying national interests in the colonial and post-colonial periods 
respectively. 
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Section One 
 
1. Forest management in early colonial period 
 
While rich and extensive accounts of forestry in pre-colonial and colonial periods are 
available for different provinces of British India (and some princely states), little is known 
about the history of forestry in J&K before the British influence, primarily due to a lack of 
any systematic records or studies. As mentioned in chapter two, the princely state of J&K 
came into existence in 1846 when Maharaja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu 
accepted British suzerainty. The forest management in the state during the second half of 
the 19
th
 century can be partially understood on the basis of reports of British forest 
officials in the service of J&K princely state. These are, however, mainly annual 
assessment reports without any reference to the previous systems of forest 
management.
129
 Some inferential description on the previous system of forest control 
and administration in the state is provided in the forest reports and working plans made 
by the state forest officials after independence. The understanding of the history of 
forestry in the state during the early colonial period, therefore, remains sketchy. 
 
Historically speaking, the forests of the state were controlled by the princely rulers and 
jagirdars, the chiefs to whom lands were granted by the rulers in recognition for their 
services and loyalty to the state.
130
 Prior to the establishment of a fully fledged Forest 
Department (FD) in J&K in 1891, the administration of forests was under the control of 
civil authorities of Revenue Department.
131
 The Wazir-i-Wazarat was in charge of the 
district while Tehsildars under him managed the affairs of the tehsils or sub-districts. 
Girdawars worked under Tehsildars and, in turn, were assisted by rakhas at village level. 
The girdawars used to collect the forest dues or rasums on the various forest products 
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 It may be argued that the denial of existence of any previous systems of forest management could be a 
deliberate strategy on the part of British colonial officers to establish the supremacy of ‘scientific 
management’. 
130
 Jagirdars had the power to govern the forest areas that fell within their territories and earned part of 
their incomes from taxes imposed on the local communities for forest use.  
131
 Working Plan for Jammu Forest Division 1998-99 to 2007-08 (p.36), prepared by the Conservator of 
Forests, Manoj Pant (2008). 
163 
 
consumed by the villagers.
132
 Due to scarce records available on forest management 
before the formation of J&K princely state, it is not clear whether such an administration 
existed before the 19
th
 century. Some forest reports of the post-independence period 
suggest that the practice of collecting forest revenue gained momentum under the reign 
of Maharaja Gulab Singh (1846-1857), the first ruler of the state of J&K. The existence of 
formal administration of forests by the state, therefore, can be inferred to have started 
gaining roots during this time. Since the forests were available in abundance (owing to 
small population size and a limited set of uses), the administration of forests only 
involved the collection of revenue and the protection of forests was not a significant 
concern to the princely state.
133
  
 
A recent study on participatory forest management in J&K state by the FD suggests that 
an informal community system for forest management known as bradari existed in all the 
big villages and hamlets in the mid 19
th
 century (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.).
134
 The bradari 
consisted of all the village residents with an informal body of senior members to take 
decisions on local disputes over forest use. The village residents were obliged to meet 
requirements of fodder, fuelwood and minor forest produce from the village forests 
without interfering with those of other villages. Any disputes regarding access to forest 
resources were, most of the time, resolved by the community locally. It is reported that 
under the bradari system, the community members showed concerns towards protecting 
and managing forests effectively. There was a common practice of growing trees around 
places of worship known as banis (sacred groves) as well as near boalies (water 
springs).
135
 The village communities attached religious value to the forests and were 
aware of their significance in meeting the everyday requirements of fuel, fodder and 
small timber. There are no records of forest destruction and its adverse consequences for 
village communities in the pre-colonial period, nor is there evidence for serious conflicts 
over control for forest resources. It is claimed that even with limited state intervention, 
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 While there were no clearly defined arrangements for the collection of rasums, it is reported that they 
were collected from individuals in some cases and collectively from the village communities in others 
(ibid.). 
133
 Ibid. 
134
 This report, titled ‘Study on Participatory Forest Management in J&K State’ is authored by P. Patnaik, 
Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and S. Singh, Chief Conservator of Forests. 
135
 Working Plan for Doda Forest Division, 1978-79 to 1987-88 (GoJ&K, 1988). 
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local communities were able to protect forests effectively (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.: 53). I 
may mention that such claims regarding communal management are based on the 
interpretations of present day state forest officials rather than any authentic historical 
evidence. 
 
As in other parts of India, the state management of forests did exist in the pre-colonial 
period, but ‘it was restricted in scale and application’ (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 52). In the 
context of Burma, Bryant (1997: 194) argues that in comparison to the previous systems 
of forest regulation, the British forest management was new in terms of ‘the method and 
scale of the attempt’ as also in the extent of ‘coercive and administrative powers’ 
exercised by the colonial state. Since the late 19
th
 century, forest users in J&K witnessed 
a drastic change in their access to resources as the British intrusion in terms of control, 
management and exploitation of forests went far beyond those of previous rulers. In the 
following discussion, I critically examine the new system of forest management during 
the British rule in J&K. 
 
Section Two 
 
2. Local access versus commercial interests: the politics of scientific forestry in the late 
colonial period 
 
As stated earlier, the forests were managed by the Revenue Department of the J&K 
princely state (under British suzerainty) until 1891. Since the prime concern of the 
colonial administration during that time was the expansion of agriculture, the 
department transferred vast areas of previously uncultivated land to the local 
communities for agricultural purposes. There was limited demand of timber in the state 
and, therefore, the contractors were invited from outside J&K for commercial extraction 
of timber. These contractors were granted pattas or written permits which allowed them 
to select forest patches for felling according to convenience (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.: 49). 
However, the management of forests by the Revenue Department was considered 
165 
 
‘haphazard and destructive’ by the forest authorities.
136
 As H.F. Cleghorn (1861: 5), a 
colonial forest official (also known as the ‘father of scientific forestry’ in India) noted: 
 
It is only of late years, that attention has been drawn to the importance of 
conserving tropical forests […] The matter of complaint was that throughout 
the Indian empire, large and valuable forest tracts were exposed to the 
careless rapacity of the native population, and especially unscrupulous 
contractors and traders, who cut and cleared them without reference to 
ultimate results, and who did so, moreover, without being in any way under 
the control or regulation of authority.  
 
The government of British India realised that more systematic surveys of forest resources 
and management of timber harvest would be essential if the increasing requirements of 
timber for railway constructions in India and ship-building in Britain were to be met 
(Tucker, 1982).
137
 Therefore, at the behest of the British Resident in J&K, the first step 
towards forming a separate forest administration was taken in 1857 when Mahal 
Nawara, a forest section was created within the Revenue Department of the princely 
state (Kawosa, 2001: 36). The idea behind creating this section was to generate more 
revenue from forest resources. Under the system of forest working in vogue then, the 
contractors were allowed to work in any way that suited them but with the condition 
that half of the produce extracted is handed over to the Revenue Department as state’s 
share (Negi, 1994: 48). This system continued until 1883 when Ain-i-Jangalat, a 
preliminary regulation for controlling forest working was introduced and the mode of 
collection of the state’s share was changed from kind to cash (ibid.). 
 
In British India, during this period, there were growing concerns within bureaucratic 
circles over the management of forests by an autonomous organisation, independent of 
Revenue Department. The British colonialists felt that the state ought to pursue active 
interventionist policies based on the principles of scientific forestry. It was held that 
there was a need for systematic management of forests by classifying the forest areas 
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 Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1893-94, prepared by the Conservator of Forests, 
J.C. McDonell (1894). 
137
 Most North Indian rail lines were built with deodar (Cedrus deodara), growing in the high mountains of 
Himachal and J&K (see Tucker, 1982: 116). 
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according to their use.
138
 Dietrich Brandis, the first Inspector General of Forests in India, 
explained the strategy of systematic management as ‘a separation of forest domain of 
the state from the large mass hitherto more or less open to the public’ (cited in Pathak, 
2002: 90). The implication was that there existed a conflict between the people and the 
forests and that the conflict had to be managed (Khator, 1989). For this, the new 
silvicultural systems were inaugurated, and science based laws and regulations for the 
utilisation of forests launched. The main reason suggested for such a shift was that 
forests had a long gestation period and therefore could not be left to private agencies. It 
was also believed that a systematic management system based on scientific approaches 
would yield rich economic dividends and satisfy the timber demands. As Khator (ibid.: 13) 
argues, for the first time, the British declared forests as ‘valuable good’ – goods which 
needed protection and proper distribution. The deployment of science for the pursuit of 
systematic management of forests, thus, seems to coincide with the commercial and 
imperial interests. 
 
The government support for scientific forestry began in the mid 19
th
 century in a modest 
way with the appointment of mainly medical surgeons trained in natural history to the 
posts of Conservator of Forests in various provinces of India. Experts were being 
deployed as ‘scientific soldiers’ and new agencies to manage forests were established 
(Rajan, 2006: 11). Initially, the forest officials were charged with three main tasks: to 
satisfy the complaints and demands of the lessees of the forests, to assure the 
government the provision of its full timber demands for the dockyards, gun-carriage 
factories and public works, and to restrict practices such as shifting cultivation (Stebbing, 
1926).  
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 The British government in India passed the first Forest Act in 1865. The Act empowered the government 
by declaring any land covered with trees, brushwood, or jungle as government forest, provided that such 
notification should not abridge or affect any existing rights of individuals or communities (Khator, 1989: 
13). Subsequently, a more comprehensive Act was passed in 1878 which classified forests into three 
categories: a) reserved forests, b) protected forests, and c) village forests. The distinction between these 
forests was based on the people’s rights over forest produce. The reserved forests, as the name implies, 
were to be totally controlled by the government, and the people were denied any access to them. The 
protected forests could be accessed by the people but restrictions applied as to what could be taken away 
from the forests. The village forests served as community forests providing daily subsistence to the people. 
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Within the state of J&K, the forest authorities were pressing for the creation of forest 
reserves and enactment of legislation for declaring forests under their exclusive control 
(Pathak, 2002).
139
 Subsequently, along the lines of other provinces of British India and 
some princely states, a FD was established in J&K in 1891 with the stated goal of 
systematic forest management based on the principles of ‘scientific forestry’. J.C. 
McDonnell of Indian Forest Service (IFS) was appointed as the first Conservator of Forests 
in the princely state of J&K. The Annual Report of the J&K Forest Department (1893) 
suggests the persistence of conflict between the Revenue and Forest Departments in the 
initial years of its formation. For example, it stated that the management of minor forest 
products and medicinal plants, such as kuth (Sassurea lappa), kaur (Picorrhiza kurroa) 
and rasaunt (Berberis lyceum) which continued under the Revenue Department ought to 
be credited to the FD. It further stressed that the authority to grant permission for 
grazing cattle, which remained with revenue authorities, need to be brought under the 
FD. The report suggested not only that the expenditure for the present grazing 
establishment could be saved, but that the FD would be better able to manage these 
affairs. Although the entire management of grazing and control of minor forest produce 
continued to be administered by the Revenue Department, the FD was allowed to close 
one-fifth of the total forest area in the state in the following years.
140
 
 
During the initial years of its formation, the main objectives of the department were 
demarcating forest areas and preparing working plans.
141
 The forests were divided into 
beats, compartments, ranges, divisions and circles, and were to be managed by forest 
guard, forester, range officer, divisional forest officer and conservator of forests at 
respective levels.
142
 Under the working plans, the number of trees to be felled and the 
period allowed for their removal was specified. It was ensured that only the mature trees 
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 The scientific management of forests created tensions within bureaucracy over the question of control 
of forest resources, and, thus, assertion of forest control in mid 19
th
 century India was marked with inter-
departmental disputes (see Bryant, 1997). 
140
 Progress Report of Forest Administration in the J&K State 1910-11, prepared by the Conservator of 
Forests, R.C. Milward (1911). 
141
 The Annual Report of the J&K Forest Department (1894: 2) mentioned the significance and need of 
scientific management stating that in Jammu, there are enormous areas of forests, the best and extensive 
ones lying in the Nowshera and Kotli tehsils. As soon as the trained officers are available, they should be 
demarcated and rough plans made for working. 
142
 Each compartment comprised four to five beats. Such five compartments formed a range, five ranges 
made a division and five divisions comprised a circle. 
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(with the prescribed diameter trunk for each timber species) were felled which could be 
replaced by the growing stock of young trees.
143
 The FD engaged its own contractors for 
timber extraction and the rates of the work were fixed by auction or tender. Some 
training programmes were started to educate the subordinate forest staff in scientific 
forestry and silvicultural practices. Furthermore, the working plans promoted the 
establishment of nurseries and new plantations with the aim of increasing the supply of 
timber and revenue generation. It was held that any expansion of governmental forests 
could be paid for by the revenue collected within a year of their management (Barton, 
2002: 67). The forest officials maintained that the money thus raised would become 
available to build access roads and canals for floating timber, simultaneously serving the 
purpose of building up the communications in India for the maintenance of colonial rule 
as well as for the stimulation of industry (ibid.). Subsequently, the construction of roads 
that opened to the forests were undertaken in J&K along with the building of railways, 
with the aim of making transportation of timber and other forest products easier.  
 
The process of demarcation and the preparation of working plans were also accompanied 
by the task of enclosing demarcated areas in order to restrict the access available to the 
villagers and livestock previously (see Bryant, 1997).
144
 The FD, however, had to face a 
great deal of opposition, first, from the jagirdars who defended their previous rights of 
felling the forests within their territories, and second, from the villagers who had been 
accustomed to using forest areas for fulfilling their daily requirements of firewood, 
fodder and timber.
145
 Although denying the ownership rights to the jagirdars, the 
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 For the purpose of timber felling, three main types of methods were adopted depending upon the 
condition and status of forests. For the better stocked forests, ‘selection felling’ was practised, for poor 
quality forests, ‘improvement felling’ was prescribed and for the forests not yet under working plans, 
‘unregulated felling’ system was adopted (Progress Report on Forest Administration in the J&K State 1910-
11). 
144
 The scientific forestry, as Bryant (1997: 215) suggests, had adverse effects on the peasantry in British 
India since access to common forests was reduced and forest officials made no provision for the long-term 
production of ‘minor’ forest products. 
145
 This has been noted in the Annual Forest Report of the J&K State 1893-94. Similar conflicts between the 
Forest Department and villagers can also be seen in other parts of British India. For example, in the context 
of Kumaon hills, the Indian Forest Law (1878) brought to light a deep-seated conflict between the 
subsistence patterns of traditional village life and the colonial system’s methods of timber management. 
When the law was introduced into the districts, villagers evaded en masse the fee payment system that 
regulated their use of government forests (Tucker, 1982: 117). Forests guards hired by the department 
functioned as little else but rural police, often in competition with officers of the Revenue Department 
(ibid.: 118).  
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resistance by villagers was dealt with by assuring them that their needs would be met by 
keeping some grazing grounds open for their cattle and providing them with free grants 
of timber.
146
 In the case of jagirdars, it was held that timber and firewood could be 
provided to them as a temporary concession at the free will of the State government.
147
 
While the various forest reports indicate grants of free timber to the villagers in the initial 
years, the practice soon changed into ‘privileges’ or ‘concessions’.
148
 In addition, the FD 
maintained that the privileges or concessions in the case of forest produce or access to 
pastures could be suspended for the offender or even for the whole village in situations 
when trees in the demarcated forests are felled without permission from the forest 
officials, and when fire is caused wilfully or due to negligence of villagers.
149
  
 
In 1901, another significant shift can be noted when the practice of free grants was 
discouraged and timber started being sold to the villagers.
150
 The Annual Report of the 
Forest Department, J&K (1901-02: 14) stated that ‘initially, there was outcry but people 
soon became accustomed to the rule and began purchasing trees’. It further stated that 
the selling of trees was becoming a good source of revenue to the Department and was 
bound to increase in the future. Moreover, the forest authorities held that the practice of 
granting free timber had resulted in overexploitation of the forests in the previous years, 
and therefore, needed to be checked.
151
 Explaining the need and significance of shifts 
from ‘privileges’ and ‘concessions’ to the ‘sale’ of timber and forest products to the 
villagers, J.C. McDonell, the Conservator of Forests, J&K, in the Annual Report of the 
Forest Department (1901-02) stated:   
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 Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1893-94. 
147
 Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1902-1903, prepared by the Conservator of Forests, 
J.C. McDonell (1903). 
148
 See Progress Report of the Forest Administration, J&K 1909-10. It is important to note that ‘concessions’ 
and ‘privileges’ are distinct from ‘free grants’ as under the former system, timber is granted to the villagers 
after the payment of small fraction of its value. 
149
 The Jammu and Kashmir Forest Act 1930, Chapter II, Clause 7. 
150
 According to the Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1901-02, prepared by J.C. McDonell 
(1902), for the first time, 111 blue pine and 40 silver fir were sold to the villagers in Kamraj division of J&K 
while in Kashmir, 624 pine and fir trees were sold to the village people for house construction (ibid.: 14). 
151
 The Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1901-02 noted that many free grants were 
made by the Tehsildars in the past even to people who had no rights on forest produce. Such a ‘misuse’ of 
free grants has also been reported in the Annual Forest Report, J&K State 1893-94. Due to floods in 
Srinagar in 1893, forests were open to the villagers for two months for supplying free timber to repair the 
damages to their houses (ibid.: 16). According to the report, the experiment was not successful from the 
forest point of view as it not only resulted in the people taking advantage to cut timber as much as they 
could but also drew villagers from neighbouring villages who were not affected by floods. 
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There is a need to be careful as the provision of giving forest produce to the 
villagers at a nominal rate can result in manifest loss to the state when, after 
all, they have no right to such a concession (p.26). The practice of selling 
timber to the local communities is no hardship on the people as they are ten 
times more well-off than they were in the past owing to their general rise in 
wages paid by the Forest Department for construction activities as well as due 
to higher value of their farm produce [...] It is fair for the state to reap some 
benefits from the general prosperity of which it is the cause. Villagers have also 
begun to be economical in timber. They have started using bricks for walls 
instead of all timber, which is far more suited to a cold winter than the old 
wasteful log huts (p.14). 
 
Analysing the colonial forest policy, Khator (1989: 14) observes that it primarily 
emphasised the commercial value of forests, as a result of which, the ‘economic elite 
entered the scene and used forests as means of participation in the growing and 
modernizing economy’. At the same time, the local people who were forest owners by 
tradition were transformed into labourers. Forests thus provided a rich ground for the 
extension of capitalism and imperialism (ibid.). This can be further observed in the 
commoditisation of firewood and the establishment of various firewood depots in 
Kashmir by the end of the 19
th
 century. Certain areas were set apart and leased to the 
contractors for felling trees for firewood in return for royalty levied by the FD.
152
 This 
new arrangement resulted in serious problems in the supply of firewood to the people in 
the state. Often, the contractors created artificial supply shortages in the market in order 
to get the highest rates possible. An initiative to check such shortages of firewood was, 
however, taken in 1918 by the FD when it was decided that all firewood coupes will work 
under the supervision of the Department and fixed rates would be determined.
153
  
 
Another important concern of the forest authorities was getting suitable land free of all 
concessions for timber or claims for grazing to undertake plantation activities prescribed 
in the new working plans.
154
 In response, forest regulations such as The Closure Rule 
(1909) and Rules for Closure of Deodar Forest to Nomad Goat (1912) were formulated 
and major parts of forest areas were closed to grazing. Nevertheless, the FD maintained 
that the continued grazing by the goats of bakarwals and gujjars (pastoralists) in the 
forest areas kept open (for grazing) was posing threat to the natural regeneration of 
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 The Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State, 1901-02. 
153
 Progress Report of Forest Administration, J&K State, 1918-19, p.23-24. 
154
 Progress Report of Forest Administration, J&K State, 1909-10. 
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forests.
155
 It was argued that the heavy grazing by these goats and the cutting of all 
herbaceous growth for fodder by the local villagers was making it impossible for any 
seedlings to grow. The FD attributed the problem of ‘overgrazing’ to the fact that 
regulation of grazing still remained under the Revenue Department and, hence, it was 
impossible for the FD to exercise any form of exclusive control.
156
 
 
The restrictions on the villagers with regard to the access to forests, grazing and felling 
trees under the new system led to various forms of resistance. As Tucker (1982: 117) 
suggests, whenever an area was declared as reserved, the transition to the new 
management system was a ‘time of very delicate tensions between villagers and 
foresters’. In the context of J&K, an increase in the number of forest fires caused by the 
graziers was reported in the initial years of enclosing forest areas.
157
 The villagers also 
expressed their opposition to the new regulations by refusing to provide any assistance 
to the forest staff in putting out forest fires.
158
 Some reports suggest cases of illicit felling 
of deodar, spruce and fir by local villagers for want of firewood and timber.
159
 Ironically, 
the drive to maintain high levels of timber production by the state restricted the felling 
for the locals but led to a continuous rise in commercial felling in the colonial period.
160
  
 
The initial enthusiasm for the systematic management of forests declined in the later 
years, owing to the outbreak of the First World War (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.: 59). In the 
late 1920s, the forests of the state came under a new management system known as 
‘uniform felling’, which means growing plantations of same age and preferably of single 
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 Progress Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1918-19. 
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 Progress Report on Forest Administration, J&K State 1924-25. 
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 Annual Report of the Forest Department, J&K State 1893-94. 
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 It is reported that the DFOs had filed legal cases against villagers for such refusals (see Progress Report 
of Forest Administration, J&K State 1909-10, Progress Report of Forest Department, J&K State 1910-11). 
159
 Various divisional forest reports indicate such cases stressing the need for more staff especially forest 
guards and foresters to control illegal felling (see Annual Forest Report, J&K State 1893-94; Progress Report 
of Forest Department, J&K State 1910-11). Under the plea of cutting firewood, the Duabgah hanjis 
(boatsmen) were also reported to fell deodars illegally for making boat planks (Annual Forest Report, J&K 
State 1893-94: 14). 
160
 The revenue from the FD contributed nearly one-third of the total state revenue in the early part of the 
20
th
 century. In 1891, the annual net surplus was about three lakh rupees and by 1913, it rose to 21 lakhs. 
From then, the progress was rapid and the surplus reached 56 lakhs in 1928. For the next eight years, there 
was a slump and the surplus averaged 30 lakhs, but it reached nearly 50 lakhs by 1940. This figure rose to 
63 lakhs in 1942 followed by 86.5 lakhs and 76.3 lakhs in 1945 and 1946 respectively (Champion and 
Osmaston, 1962: 420).  
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species so that the entire patch could be harvested at the same time. Under this new 
system, the most accessible forests bearing commercially important species were 
brought under concentrated felling without any efforts to augment natural regeneration 
(IFRI, 1961: 6, see also Kawosa, 2001). Although the previous working plans were based 
on the principles of scientific forestry, the demands of the War led to heavy removals 
ignoring even the most basic principles of scientific management. Between the two world 
wars, the demand of timber increased significantly and forests, including those of blue 
pine, spruce and fir, were extensively exploited. As in other parts of India, massive 
wartime demands for timber products brought the danger of permanent damage to both 
government and private forests (Tucker, 1982). This process continued in the following 
years as during the Second World War (1939-1945), extensive felling was carried out in 
total disregard of the working plan prescriptions (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.: 59). The gun 
factory established in Baramulla during the inter-war period for the manufacture of rifles 
was supplied with abundant timber from the walnut forests, which led to massive 
depletion of forest cover in the district.
161
 After the war, however, the working plans 
were revised and emphasis was laid again on ‘scientific management’ by way of stock 
mapping and collection of statistical data on growth and yield of the forests.  
 
Although the main objectives of the FD can be understood as timber extraction and 
revenue generation, some concern for forest conservation was also shown by the senior 
authorities.
162
 As Sivaramakrishnan observes, by the third quarter of the 19
th
 century, 
‘scientific forestry was also deeply challenged by responsibility for environmental health, 
the preservation of nature, and thus with conservation’ (1999: 279). However, the very 
possibility of an emergence of the ideology of forest conservation in the 1850s was in the 
context of pressing timber shortages (Pathak, 2002). For example, a close connection 
between the shortage of timber and initiatives for conservation was evident in Punjab in 
the wake of British conquest (Rangarajan, 1996: 26). Punjab was conquered in 1849, and 
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 Progress Report on Forest Administration, J&K State, 1920-21. 
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 The Progress Report of the Forest Department, J&K State (1909-10) notes that although the timber 
extraction and free grants are assuming great significance, it is worthy to understand that adequate steps 
to ensure reproduction be taken in order to maintain the timber supplies. It further stated that although 
the senior officials recognised the importance of forests and the necessity of young growth, this concern 
needed to be brought to the attention of junior revenue officials who saw forests as inexhaustible (ibid.: 
17). 
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after the denudation of the plains, logs were brought from Kashmir under license from 
the Dogra ruler. It was feared that there would be an acute shortage of wood in the 
Rawalpindi hills due to massive requirements for the building of the Muree cantonment. 
The Forest authorities in Punjab, therefore, began to regulate access to selected forests, 
especially those of deodar (ibid.: 27). Emphasising the significance of conservation, 
Stebbing (1926: 12), suggests that ‘surplus revenue from the FD was the necessary 
consequence of conservancy management’. This idea of conservation was addressed to 
and received by various layers of the administration differently (Pathak, 2002). Broader 
issues such as the climatic effects of deforestation and the importance of forest 
conservation for the interests of ‘humankind’ were more influential at the higher levels 
of administration. At the microlevel, more specific and functional issues dominated. 
These mainly included revenue generation, timber supplies and appeasing the 
landholders (ibid.: 87).  
 
Sivaramakrishnan notes that although scientific forestry is primarily concerned with 
revenue and regeneration, it is ‘obliged to deal in extenso with questions of rights and 
property’ (1999: 279). Apart from conservation concerns, the need to involve local 
communities in protecting degraded forests also figured in some forest policies of the 
state during the British period. The Kashmir Forest Notice (1912) and Jammu Forest 
Notice (1912) were the two main regulations which outlined the role of village 
communities in forest protection. Under these regulations, concessions were granted to 
the village community in lieu of protecting the surrounding forests by helping the forest 
and police officials in preventing forest offences. Owing to the growing resistance by the 
villagers to the establishment of closures (fencing of pasture lands and degraded forest 
areas), the FD in 1930 proposed to form ‘village forests’ and involve local communities in 
conservation measures.
163
 These village forests were to be formed in each forest range 
assigning the responsibility of protecting and afforesting wastelands in the village. The 
panchayats or village committees were to be empowered to enforce the rules for the 
protection of the area and regulate both grazing and concessions on forest products as 
sanctioned by the FD. This policy, however, could not be implemented effectively since 
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this was the period when the independence movement was going on in the state (as in 
other provinces of India) and the people were reluctant to cooperate with the 
government. Yet, this policy can be considered a major initiative in the history of FD, 
laying the foundation for joint management of forests by state and local communities in 
the years to come.  
 
To summarise, three main points can be drawn from the discussion presented in this 
section. First, apart from forming the basis for demarcating forest areas and timber 
extraction, ‘science’ found its application in legitimising the role of professional 
community of foresters for the use and control of forest resources. We have observed 
that in the process of demarcating forests, claims of ownership by jagirdars declined and 
the rights of local villagers with regard to access to forest resources were curtailed. The 
‘communal management’ of forests changed into a system of ‘free grants’ of timber to 
the local forest users at the will of the state. On the pretext of overexploitation of forest 
resources by the local populations, this system of ‘free grants’ was further altered to that 
of ‘concessions and privileges’ and later into the practice of ‘selling’ timber and firewood 
to the local communities.  
 
Second, the rationality of ‘science’, which stood supreme in restricting the rights of local 
communities to forest resources ultimately surrendered to imperial and commercial 
interests. We noted that due to the rise in demands for timber during the world wars, the 
state forests were exploited in complete violation of the rules and principles prescribed 
in the working plans. Bryant rightly suggests that scientific forestry may have been 
compatible with the development of a rational state but in the pursuit ‘to make financial 
ends meet, short-term expediency often proved the more powerful policy influence’ 
(1997: 204). In other words, we can argue that while scientific rationality is powerful 
enough to limit the local people’s access to their forest resources, it often proves 
subservient to the interests of powerful actors or administrators.  
 
Third, to consider the colonial forest policy as based on mere exploitation of forest 
resources would be a partial depiction of the complex interplay between ideologies and 
practices of the state. As Sivaramakrishnan argues, scientific forestry was a ‘complex, 
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multi-layered discourse formation that was historically and contingently produced’ 
(1999: 280). Besides revenue generation, we also witnessed some concerns of the 
colonial state for conservation and local community involvement in forest protection 
which, to a certain extent, helped in accommodating the dissent shown by the affected 
communities in response to the restrictions imposed and possibly also served as 
justifications for the interventions by the forest bureaucracy in affairs which were earlier 
the domain of rulers and village communities. I shall now turn to discuss the 
perpetuation of the colonial forest policy in the post-colonial period, and analyse the 
important shifts in ideologies and practices concerning forest management until the late 
1980s. 
 
Section Three 
 
3. National interests versus local needs: the politics of forest management in the post-
colonial period 
 
After independence in 1947, the FD of J&K was reorganised under the new conditions 
caused by the partition of the country and subsequent integration of the state with the 
Indian Union. The problems which resulted from the partition of India caused serious 
challenges to the management of forests in the J&K state. Some parts of the erstwhile 
princely state were now under Pakistani rule, which disrupted forestry operations in the 
state. The timber sale depots at Jhelum and Wazirabad fell in Pakistani territory and the 
rivers Jhelum and Chenab lost their usefulness for floating and transporting timber in J&K 
(IFRI, 1961: 6). The disturbed conditions that prevailed at the time of partition caused a 
temporary cessation of forestry works in the state. In the subsequent years, however, 
land transport was developed and a new timber depot at Pathankot (in Punjab) was 
established (ibid.). The timber trade, which had suffered immensely after partition 
revived and forest working, was resumed with greater vigour by the early 1950s to realise 
the agenda of nation-building. The rapidly increasing demand from all over the country 
for industrial wood facilitated the timber extraction activities of the FD in the state. The 
main demand for Kashmir timber in India was for producing sleepers for the railways. 
While major demand was for deodar timber (due to its resistance to termites), willows, 
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walnuts and other conifers were also extracted for construction purposes and the 
manufacturing of rifles, furniture and sports goods.  
 
              
 
                                                      
                                  Map 2: Forest cover of Jammu & Kashmir (FSI, 1999) 
 
Although the initial years of independence laid emphasis on raising plantations and 
increasing the productivity of forests, the concern was more for meeting industrial 
requirements than conservation per se. For example, the main objective of the National 
Forest Policy (1952) formulated by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, which laid the 
basis for most forest regulations in independent India, was the realisation of maximum 
revenue. The policy clearly pointed out that local interests and priorities should be 
subservient to the broader national interests. It stated:  
 
Village communities in the neighbourhood of a forest will naturally make a 
greater use of its products for the satisfaction of their domestic and 
agricultural needs. Such use, however, should in no event be permitted at the 
cost of national interest. 
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The forest policies and regulations of the Indian government were not extended to J&K in 
the initial years of its accession (owing to its special constitutional status). Yet, a 
convergence of interests emerged between those of central and state governments 
concerning timber extraction and revenue generation. As such, the system of ‘uniform 
felling’ which started in the 1920s under colonial rule continued until the late 1970s.
164
 
The forests with deodar, kail, and fir were felled unabatedly without any conscious 
efforts to regenerate them. Interestingly, the basic premise of such working in the Forest 
Department was that most of the mature trees would be removed from the forest areas 
to allow the younger generation of crops to grow in the following years (Kawosa, 2001: 
37). The regeneration and maturing of the left over crops after the harvesting operations, 
however, did not keep pace with the felling of the trees. Moreover, the younger crops 
were under constant pressure from local communities who were dependent on the 
forests to meet requirements of fuelwood, housing timber and other forest resources for 
sustenance (ibid.).  
 
The FD continued to lease the forest areas to the private contractors for timber 
extraction in lieu of the royalty levied. Owing to their strong links in the bureaucratic 
circles, the forest lessees often managed to hold the lease for longer periods than 
originally granted to them and caused relentless destruction to the state forests (Kawosa, 
2001: 38).
165
 Furthermore, due to heavy snowfall in 1979-80, the forests of the state 
were damaged considerably. The FD, in response, initiated a ‘hygienic operation’ and the 
tasks of additional markings and cleaning the fallen materials in the forest compartments 
were granted to the lessees on nominal rates (ibid.). Since contractors were already 
employed for timber extraction purposes, this operation, in actual practice, worked in 
the interests of timber contractors who started felling even the green trees in these 
forests under the guise of hygienic clearance (ibid.). The unabated timber felling by 
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 With the increasing demand for timber, firewood and other minor forest products, the forests were 
exploited at a rapid rate. The outturn of timber in 1947 was 28.00 (000 cubic metre) which reached up to 
451.43 in 1960 and 609.21 in 1980. The outturn for the other major forest products such as firewood was 
70.10 (000 cubic metres) in 1950 which reached to 162.48 in 1960. There was a decline in the extraction of 
firewood in the next few years due to the availability of alternative sources of fuel and energy and the 
figure dropped to 82.30 in 1975 (GoJ&K, 2005: 24). 
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 M.A. Kawosa is the ex-Director, Environment and Ecology, J&K Government who played a key role in 
formulating the Forest Policy of J&K, 1990.  
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contractors (in connivance with forest officials) for over thirty years after independence, 
generated high revenues but also resulted in the fast depletion of the forest cover.
166
 
 
By the late 1970s, the central government, following the policy of liquidating the 
autonomy of the J&K state, also started intervening directly in the matters of forest 
working, which so far, had been the monopoly of the state government. At the national 
level around this time, the need to dovetail forest conservation with timber extraction 
was felt by the policy makers and planners. For example, the National Commission on 
Agriculture in 1976 proposed that for meeting conservation goals as well as maximising 
timber production for developing industries, there was a need for extending the forestry 
activity outside the existing forest area through the creation of large-scale man-made 
forests. Notably, as in the colonial period, the provision of ‘free grants’ and ‘concessions’ 
to local forest users was seen as incompatible with the goals of forest management, and 
rural populations continued to be regarded as destructors of forests. As the 
Commission’s report, published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (1977) 
stated:  
 
Free supply of forest produce to the rural population has dilapidated forests. It 
is necessary to reverse the process. The rural people have not contributed 
towards the maintenance of regeneration of forests. Having overexploited the 
resources, they cannot in all fairness expect that somebody else would take 
the trouble of providing them forest produce free of charge. 
 
The Commission also proposed nationalisation of timber extraction and the setting up of 
a network of State Forest Corporations (SFCs) in the country. In response, the 
Government of J&K in 1978 established the State Forest Corporation which was 
entrusted with the responsibility of extraction and development of forest resources. 
Rather than leasing the forests to private contractors or agencies, the FD now leased 
forest compartments to the SFC after reaching an agreement on the payment of a fixed 
amount of royalty. This system, to a large extent helped to eliminate private contractors 
who had not only monopolised the forest trade but also indulged in ‘unscientific and 
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 After independence, the revenue from the state forests was on constant rise. There was a sharp decline 
in the net surplus from 76.3 lakhs in 1946-47 to 8.70 lakhs in 1947-48 due to turbulent conditions at the 
time of independence. It gradually picked up and reached 65.25 lakhs by 1955-56. The net revenue 
touched as high as 1536.43 lakhs by 1979-80 (GoJ&K, 2001b: 172). 
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uncontrolled operations in the forests’ (Kawosa, 2001: 39). However, the SFC continued 
to make as much harm to the forests of the state as the private contractors did in the 
past (ibid.). Forests continued to be exploited at an average annual yield of 10-15 million 
cubic feet of timber without corresponding investments in their regeneration (ibid.). It is 
estimated that forests of the state shrunk from about 21,000 square kilometres in 1930 
to 13,000 square kilometres by 1990 (ibid.: 42). 
 
It is important to note that by the early 1980s, the narratives of ‘deforestation’ and ‘soil 
erosion’ started influencing international development discourse. Various development 
and donor agencies drew upon international scientific debates of the 1970s and early 
1980s particularly with regard to forest influences on climate, hydrological regimes and 
soil erosion. Furthermore, the rise of ‘alternative development’ thinking (e.g. Chambers, 
1983/1987; Schumacher, 1973) and contributions of studies on the problems of 
environmental degradation from political economy perspective (see for example, Blaikie, 
1985; Shiva, 1991) led to a significant change in the perception of the role of local 
communities in problems related to natural resources. The local forest users, who were 
previously considered as part of the problem of environmental degradation and 
deforestation now came to be seen as part of the solution by means of their active 
involvement in forest regeneration and improvement of wastelands. As such, 
international agencies such as the World Bank, the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) started promoting 
afforestation programmes in India through community involvement, with the ultimate 
aim of increasing tropical forest cover. By the late 1980s, the notion of ‘sustainable 
development’ also became an integral part of the mainstream conservation thinking and 
seeped into various natural resource development policies and programmes across the 
developing world. This brought to the fore the idea of fulfilling subsistence requirements 
of forest dependent populations along with meeting the goals of environmental 
sustainability in various conservation interventions in the following years. 
 
The period of the 1980s also saw a corresponding shift in ‘national interest’ from revenue 
generation (that had prevailed since the colonial period) to forest protection and 
conservation for maintaining environmental sustainability. Moreover, grassroots 
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environmental action fed into this change in thinking about management and use of 
forest resources. In 1981, a well known environmentalist, Sunder Lal Bahuguna (of 
Chipko fame), visited the state and started a movement known as ‘Kashmir-Kohima 
Padhyatra’ for protecting Himalayan forests and generating awareness against 
commercial felling. His idea of forest protection infused public opinion with criticism for 
unabated exploitation of forests for revenue generation in the state. The then Chief 
Minister, Sheikh Abdullah also gave a boost to the movement by declaring in one of his 
cabinet meetings: ‘we will not earn money by selling our trees’ (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.: 
16).  
 
In the previous section, I mentioned that some attempts to involve local communities in 
forest protection and regeneration had been made by the forest authorities in J&K since 
the 1930s, although with little success. A serious concern for local participation in 
conserving forests, however, figured more prominently in 1982-83 under the ‘Social 
Forestry’ programme proposed by the National Commission on Agriculture and 
sponsored by the World Bank in J&K. The main objective of the programme was to raise 
plantations along roadsides, regenerate degraded lands and village common areas, and 
meet the requirements of fuelwood, fodder and small timber for the local 
communities.
167
 There was a provision in an agreement between the FD and village 
panchayats for undertaking tree plantation activities under the project. Although serious 
attention was given to meet the physical targets in the Social Forestry project, the 
concept of involving local people in the forest activities could not be fully realised as the 
forest officials were reluctant to shift their roles from ‘implementers’ to mere 
‘facilitators’ of the programme.
168
 Owing to the historical animosity between forest 
officials and villagers with regard to access to forest resources, the local communities 
were even more reluctant to cooperate in the project. A general apprehension among 
the villagers was that the FD would take over common lands that people had been using 
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 The programme had three major components: a) Farm Forestry – encouraging farmers to plant trees on 
their own farms by distributing free or subsidised seedlings, b) Woodlots – planted by the forest 
departments to meet the needs of the local populations. The woodlots were to be maintained by the 
people under the supervision of forest officers, and c) Community woodlots – planted by the communities 
themselves on common lands (Khator, 1989: 57-58).  
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 Interview with Lal Chand, Director of Soil Conservation Department, Jammu (20 February, 2007). 
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for meeting their daily requirements of fodder and fuelwood.
169
 As with Social Forestry 
programmes in other parts of India, the control over funds remained with forest officials 
who, in most cases, worked in alliance with the local elites and misappropriated project 
funds (Khator, 1989). Moreover, the procedure for the involvement of panchayats and 
the role played by them was not clearly defined (Patnaik and Singh, n.d.: 17). In 1984, the 
panchayats were dissolved in J&K and no elections of local bodies took place until the 
end of 1990s owing to the turbulent political conditions in the state. Since the only link 
between the FD and village community was broken after the dissolution of panchayats, 
the functionaries of the Department decided to form Village Forest Committees (VFCs) to 
protect degraded forest lands (ibid.). It is important to note that unlike panchayats, these 
VFCs were not democratically elected bodies and, in most cases, had no effective powers. 
 
The National Forest Policy of 1988 reviewed the strategy of forest management in the 
country and again laid an emphasis on the need for forest conservation along with 
meeting the basic requirements of forest dependent communities. Unlike the previous 
forest policies and regulations, it was held that rights and concessions of the rural people 
living within and around forests needed to be fully protected, and their domestic 
requirements of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce and timber should be 
maintained as a priority. The policy set a national goal to have a minimum of one-third of 
the total land area of the country under forest or tree cover. Notably, the forest policies 
of India (1952 and 1988) were not formally extended to the J&K state owing to its special 
constitutional status. Nevertheless, there were hardly any conflicts between the forest 
regulations of the centre and the state and all major forest management programmes 
initiated by the central government (such as the Social Forestry or creation of the SFCs) 
were also implemented in J&K.
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 The J&K state had no Forest Policy of its own until 1990 
and its forests were regulated through various acts and legislative orders of the state 
from time to time.  
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A turning point in the forest management of J&K came with the formulation of the first 
Forest Policy in 1990 when the state realised that the regeneration of forests was not 
keeping pace with the timber extraction. Under this policy, the felling of trees was 
banned in 18 catchments and timber extraction was limited to only five million cubic feet 
annually (Kawosa, 2001: 45). While the policy aimed to exploit forests sustainably and 
conserve village forests through community participation, it also resulted in the 
curtailment of concessions and grazing rights available to pastoralists and local villagers 
(ibid.). In order to realise the Forest Policy of 1990, the state enacted the J&K Forest 
(Conservation) Act of 1990, which totally banned the export of timber in unfinished or 
semi-finished form from the state, and also specified that no forest land could be 
diverted to non-forestry use. As the new policy was beginning to take roots, the state 
was hit by militancy and terrorism. Large areas of forests were burnt and the roadside 
plantations were cleared during the anti-insurgency and combing operations. The 
damage to the forests became a common affair and about four million cubic feet of SFC 
timber was torched by militants. Many forest officers were killed by terrorists and 
forestry operations came to a virtual standstill (Kawosa, 2001). After the heavy 
deployment of military and para-military forces in the state due to militancy, it is 
estimated that between 1990-1999, on an average, 30% of the firewood was supplied to 
the army (GoJ&K, 2001b). This, in turn, reduced the availability of forest produce for the 
village poor.  
 
To summarise, in the post-colonial period, we observed changing interpretations of 
‘national interest’ with regard to the management and use of forest resources. In the first 
three decades after independence, the Indian state promoted maximum timber 
extraction and revenue generation following the agenda of nation-building and 
industrialisation. The state forest authorities adopted the colonial model of scientific 
forestry and continued giving primacy to commercial exploitation over subsistence use of 
forests. The state interventions were justified following the colonial discourse about 
‘ecological irresponsibility of local people and the attendant need for professional 
scientific management by trained forest officials’ (Bryant, 1997: 217). We observed that 
in J&K, in actual practice, the silvicultural principles with regard to forest management 
were often violated and forests were felled unabatedly under ‘uniform felling’ system 
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until the 1970s. Although there were concerns for regenerating forests but more to 
realise commercial interests rather than meeting either conservation goals or the daily 
requirements of fuelwood, fodder and minor forest produce for local communities. In 
fact, there was not any significant change in the relationship between forest officials and 
local communities, and the locals continued to be seen as ‘forest destroyers’. In J&K, 
similar to other parts of India, conflict between the state and local communities 
‘persisted and continued to be contested though now under new political and economic 
circumstances’ (Bryant, 1997: 225).  
 
I also noted that by the early 1980s, the agenda of ‘forest conservation’ became 
dominant, again under the label of ‘national interest’. This emerging concern for forest 
conservation, however, brought two major shifts in the forest management of J&K. First, 
the nationalisation of timber extraction took place and control passed from private 
lessees to the SFC. A second and more important shift was that local communities who 
were earlier referred as ‘forest destroyers’ started being seen as potentially ‘active 
protectors’ who ought to be involved in the conservation programmes. This shift in 
thinking within policy circles from ‘custodial’ to ‘social’ management of forests was 
influenced and shaped substantially by the concerns and interests of international 
conservation community. As Mayers and Bass (2004: 3) argue, ‘efforts were made to 
identify common goals, much of them geared to pinning down the components of 
sustainable forest management’. The scientific knowledge, apart from legitimising state 
intrusion in systematically managing forests and enhancing forest yield to meet 
commercial requirements, found another application for articulating the goals of ‘forest 
conservation’ and ‘sustainable development’ in the following years.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I demonstrated that forest bureaucracy used the language of ‘scientific 
management’ and ‘strict regulation’ for maintaining control over forest resources both in 
the colonial and post-colonial periods. We saw that ‘scientific forestry’ proved 
subservient, first to imperial and commercial interests of the colonial state and then to 
the varying national interests of the independent state in the post-colonial period. In 
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both cases, I have argued that it played a crucial role in legitimising the interventions of 
forest bureaucracy and, at the same time, curtailing the rights and access of poor local 
communities dependent on forest resources for their sustenance. Until the 1970s, the 
local communities were regarded as ‘illegitimate’ appropriators or forest destroyers 
whose free access to forest resources needs to be regulated for meeting commercial as 
well as conservation goals. However, a subsequent shift in the national and state forest 
policies took place in the following years due to the changes in international conservation 
and development thinking emphasising the role of local communities in forest 
regeneration, coupled with the rising influence of grassroots environmental action 
demanding local control of forest resources. Consequently, the new policies now focused 
less on revenue generation and more on the need to protect village forests through the 
active involvement of local communities and giving primacy to their subsistence 
requirements.  
 
The shift in the potential role of local communities in forest conservation and use figured 
more clearly in the central government sponsored programme of ‘Joint Forest 
Management’ which was initiated in J&K in 1992. In the following two chapters, I 
demonstrate how power relations determine access to and control over forest resources 
in the state. I assess the joint management of forests by involving village communities, 
analyse the split role of the state in the implementation of the programme and highlight 
the complex relationship between law, science and politics in forest conservation. I 
illustrate the diverse ways in which law and science set the stage for various forms of 
politics from the macro- to the microlevel over issues of ‘participation’, ‘decentralisation’ 
and ‘sustainable development’ in the context of forest management in J&K.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Joint Management of Forests and Split Role of the State: 
the politics of forest conservation in J&K 
 
Participatory forest management became an integral part of international discussions on 
environment and development from the 1970s onwards (e.g. the World Forestry 
Conference in Jakarta, 1976). By the late 1980s, international and national forest 
conservation policies started emphasising the significance of ‘local participation’, ‘joint 
management’ and ‘decentralisation’ in the successful implementation of programmes. 
Such policies rest on the idea that forest dependent communities are to be empowered 
through their involvement in decision-making (by forming forest user committees), and 
benefited by both wage employment opportunities (e.g. tree-plantations, fencing and 
other developmental activities) and increased availability of biomass for their subsistence 
needs. The policy makers also started to acknowledge that local communities have 
‘indigenous’ knowledge of the forests, which can be brought to planning for the provision 
of their own needs. The policies based on these ideas aimed at forest protection and 
regeneration of degraded forest lands surrounding villages with the help of village 
residents. Sceptics argue that participatory forest management interventions, although 
significant in their own right, have inadequately addressed the issues of resource access 
and control, crucial in both forest conservation and community empowerment. A study 
of agenda, interests and power relations of various players involved in forest 
management is, therefore, necessary to understand the factors that actually influence 
access to and control over resources (e.g. forest produce and project funds) and, in turn, 
determine the outcome of forest conservation policies.   
 
In this chapter, I aim to understand the politics of the National Afforestation Programme 
(NAP) and examine the interplay between the central Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF), the J&K Forest Department (FD), the State Forest Corporation (SFC), local 
NGOs and forest field-staff. The following questions are addressed in this chapter: what is 
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the agenda of the NAP and how do various players associated with it interact with each 
other? What potential does the programme have for sustainable management of forest 
resources through local participation and partnership? How can the local state be 
understood in its divided role of both implementing the programme, and contravening 
the forest laws and regulations? Overall, I examine the relations of power among players 
involved in forest management and highlight diverse forms of politics from national to 
local level. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section one, I introduce the JFM programme 
started in J&K in 1992 for achieving sustainable management of forests through local 
participation and partnership. Following this, I discuss the objectives of the NAP initiated 
in 2002 for the effective implementation of the previous programme of ‘joint forest 
management’ through decentralisation. I point out that the broad range of objectives of 
the NAP could lead to serious problems of implementation since the project 
implementing agencies may fail to appropriately operationalise the various different 
objectives in relation to each other. This may result in different actors prioritising 
objectives as per their own interests and manipulating regulations according to their 
capacities. In section two, I highlight the interplay between the MoEF, the J&K FD and the 
SFC. I argue that, in actual practice, both central government and the State Forest 
Department are reluctant to devolve effective powers, often resulting in repeated re-
centralisation with regard to authority, control and access to resources. Following this, in 
section three, I highlight two forms of micropolitics at village level. I discuss the dilemmas 
of the forest field-staff and examine their split role in meeting conservation needs by 
restricting the access of villagers to local resources and, at the same time, transgressing 
the forest regulations to cater to the demands of local populations. I also examine the 
issues of conflict between the SFC and local contractors, and point out the fact that 
although the state and market actors are able to make profits by relentlessly exploiting 
rich forest resources, the poor struggle even to meet their subsistence needs from local 
forests.  
 
My main argument in this chapter is that the ‘joint forest management’ under the NAP 
fails to effectively facilitate access for the poor to local forest resources but provides a 
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new ground for legitimising the power and intrusion of forest bureaucracy and 
conservation community with regard to control over resources. However, these 
interventions do not go unchallenged and are reconfigured through various forms of 
micropolitics. The ways in which the intrusion of forest managers and their control over 
local resources is understood, negotiated and resisted by the village communities is the 
topic that I leave for the next chapter. 
 
Section One 
 
1.1 Joint management of forests: new arenas of ‘partnership’ and ‘participation’ 
 
In the last two decades, the mainstream conservation community has widely 
acknowledged the fact that forest conservation cannot be undertaken without the 
support and participation of local people, and that livelihood concerns and future 
development goals need to be at the centre of any viable conservation strategy that 
involves people (see Sunderland and Campbell, 2008; Barnett et al., 2005; Arnold, 2002; 
Hulme and Murphree, 2001; McShane, 2003; Pimbert and Pretty, 1995). Optimists 
maintain that the institutional governance, with wide acceptability among resource 
appropriators, promotes people’s involvement in resource conservation, inculcates 
mutual sharing of responsibility and accountability, and lessens conflicts (see Vira, 1999; 
Gadgil, 1998; Zuhair, 1998; Sarin, 1996). Furthermore, stress is laid on the need to create 
‘sustainable livelihoods’ in conservation programmes and on bridging the gap between 
state objective of forest conservation and interests of local populations (see for example, 
Ellis, 2000; Bebbington, 1999; Scoones, 1998; Carney, 1998; Chambers and Conway, 
1992). 
 
Sceptics, on the other hand, have warned against the optimism associated with the idea 
of local community involvement. For example, Lele (1991) cautions against the tendency 
to believe that local participation and social equity automatically ensure environmental 
sustainability (see also Scott 2006; Gray and Moseley, 2005). It is argued that local 
appropriators may not always enjoy full freedom to have the institutional governance of 
their choice (see Baland and Platteau, 1996; Karlsson, 1999; Reardon and Vosti, 1995). 
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Supporting this, Mabee and Hoberg (2006) suggest that, in practice, equality in decision-
making is constrained primarily by the structure of statutory authority, leaving little 
scope for those who are poor and marginalised. Noting the claims and cautions of various 
scholars on sustainability and participation, I will now turn to explain and analyse the 
rationale, objective and policy guidelines of the Joint Forest Management Programme 
(JFM) in J&K. 
 
As discussed in chapter six, few attempts for managing forests jointly with the local 
communities were made by the FD during colonial and postcolonial periods. By the late 
1980s, international forest conservation policies started to advocate decentralisation and 
joint management of forest resources to achieve the goals of sustainability. This global 
discourse of participatory management of forests found its way in the national policies 
on forest conservation. In 1990, the concept of local participation in forest conservation 
found a firm basis under the JFM when the MoEF, Government of India circulated its 
guidelines for the protection and development of degraded forest areas. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, after the dissolution of panchayats in 1984, Village Forest 
Committees (VFCs) were formed to protect degraded forest lands to maintain the link 
between the Social Forestry Department and local communities. By the time of the JFM, 
121 local forest committees had already been constituted in J&K under the Social 
Forestry programme.
171
 However, until the promulgation of the JFM, there were no clear 
guidelines for the constitution of the VFCs, their roles or responsibilities. 
 
In 1992, the J&K state notification on JFM entitled ‘Rehabilitation of Degraded Forests 
and Village Plantation Rules’ was issued and the procedure of constitution and 
functioning of the VFCs became formalised, hence attaining legal status. This new policy 
stressed primarily the management of forests for conservation and meeting local needs, 
and regarded commercial exploitation of forests and revenue generation as secondary 
objectives. It was held that active participation of local people is vital for regeneration, 
maintenance and protection of plantations for the afforestation and rehabilitation of 
degraded forests and wastelands (GoJ&K, 1992). Although the JFM programme involved 
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participation in the management and protection of natural forests, it has been applied 
only to the degraded forests and plantations raised on community lands thus far.
172
 This 
severely limits the scope of enhancing effective local access and control of forest 
resources through the JFM. 
 
Under the JFM, the FD and village community enter into an agreement to jointly protect 
and manage forest lands around villages by sharing responsibilities and benefits. The JFM 
is based on the principle that through local participation, the villagers would get better 
access to a number of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and a share in timber revenue 
in return for their increased responsibility for forest protection. The central MoEF is the 
funding agency for the various activities under the JFM programme in J&K and the state 
FD is the main project implementing body. Apart from ensuring the active participation of 
different sets of actors involved, the FD is also responsible for solving disputes arising out 
of the management of village forest land.  
 
Under this programme, a Village Forest Committee (VFC) was to be constituted in each 
forest range for protecting and managing degraded forest lands.
173
 Among the various 
functions, its major roles include assisting the forest staff in rehabilitating the degraded 
forests, protecting the plantations and preventing any timber thefts, encroachments, 
grazing in enclosed area, forest fires or any other damage caused to the plantations by 
local communities or outsiders. In return, the committee, after approval of the 
Forester/Range Officer and Divisional Forest Officer, is allowed to collect grass, fodder, 
dry and fallen wood from the plantation site free of royalty in ‘a manner which ensures 
sustainable yields of such produce from the area’ (GoJ&K, 1992). Under this programme, 
the village community was entitled to 25% of the final harvest of the produce of 
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 By 2006, around 40,000 hectares of forest land was being managed jointly by Forest Department and 
4,861 VFCs in J&K (Pai and Datta, 2006). 
173
 An adult male or female member of each household residing around degraded forests has a right to 
become a member of the VFC. It has an executive committee comprising 11 members, including two 
women and two representatives from Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Backward Classes, elected 
annually by the General Village (Rehabilitation of Degraded Forests) Committee which constitutes all adult 
village residents. The Executive Committee selects one of its members as president and forester/forest 
guard acts as secretary. The member-secretary is required to organise at least four meetings of the 
Executive Committee and two meetings of the General Body in a year, and has also to coordinate various 
joint forest management activities under the programme (GoJ&K, 1992).  
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plantation in kind or sale after deducting the costs incurred by the FD to raise 
plantations. However, it is important to note that the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) or 
Range Officer (RO) is authorised to take strong action including termination of the 
membership against any member who has failed or neglected to perform his function 
under the mentioned rules. 
 
NGOs may serve as facilitating agencies between the local communities and the FD, and 
are mainly involved in activities such as disseminating information, organising awareness 
programmes, providing training for income generation activities and forming local self-
help groups.
174
 Thus, central and state governments, and NGO actors seem to converge 
around a position that supports forest conservation and management through the 
involvement of local communities. This is also a position shared widely by bi- and 
multilateral agencies, as well as think tanks and consultants. 
 
The initial JFM notification of 1992 was amended in 1999 to make the programme more 
practical and people-oriented (GoJ&K, 1999). Under the revised guidelines, the village 
was made the basic unit for constituting a VFC instead of the forest range. Also, the 
number of members in the Executive Committee was raised from 11 to 15, including at 
least two women, three members from Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Backward 
Caste, a representative of nomads and two members from each village falling under the 
jurisdiction of panchayat, to be nominated by sarpanch (panchayat president). The VFC 
elections were now to be held every three years as per the revised notification. In order 
to provide a greater incentive to these communities for their involvement in forest 
conservation programmes, the benefits for the village communities were raised to 50% in 
the case of degraded forests and 75% in the case of wastelands. The state officials 
claimed that the village committee was now made an ‘equal partner’ of the FD in 
discharging the various functions as compared to their ‘assisting’ role in the previous 
regulation.
175
  
                                                 
174
 In other states of India, foreign donors have also been active supporters of the programme, most 
notably the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID). These agencies 
have adopted the JFM as part of their overall agenda of good governance, decentralisation, poverty 
alleviation, sustainable development, environmental protection etc. 
175
 Interview with Lal Chand, Director of Soil Conservation Department, Jammu (20 February, 2007). 
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By the late 1990s, the central government also began to encourage decentralisation 
policies with the aim of devolving natural resource management to local institutions. The 
key rationale behind this shift in management practice was that devolution would 
increase access of the rural poor to their surrounding forests, enhance the decision-
making power of local communities, and also result in an increased responsibility of 
villagers to manage natural resources sustainably. Optimists (for example, D’Silva and 
Nagnath, 2002; Guha, 2000; Saigal, 2000; Corbridge and Jewitt, 1997; Lynch and Talbot, 
1995) suggest that although devolution policies fail to deliver on many of our hopes, they 
are a better alternative than the centralised management of forests. Sceptics (such as 
Blaikie, 2006; Upreti, 2001; Bazaara, 2003; Campbell et al., 2001) argue that devolution 
policies have transferred little or no authority to local forest users and, thus, have had no 
significant positive impacts on the livelihoods of the poor. It is argued that local 
institutions set up under devolution have often been accountable to forest departments 
and other government offices rather than to local people (Ribot, 1998) and the 
possibilities for genuine comanagement have been quite limited (Baland and Platteau, 
1996). Below, I explain the NAP initiated by the MoEF to further strengthen the JFM by 
means of devolution of funds to the local forest committees called Joint Forest 
Management Committees. 
 
National Afforestation Programme: facilitating JFM through ‘decentralisation’ 
In 2000, taking stock of previous JFM projects, the MoEF recognised that for the effective 
implementation of the JFM and the active participation of local people, there is a need to 
reduce bottlenecks in the flow of funds from the centre to the JFMCs. Subsequently, in 
2002-03, the MoEF formulated a scheme called the ‘National Afforestation Programme’ 
with the aim of facilitating JFM programmes in the country. This scheme was to be 
implemented through a two-tier decentralised mechanism of Forest Development 
Agencies or FDAs (at the forest division level) and Joint Forest Management Committees 
or JFMCs (at the village level) (see Figure 5 below). The FDAs were required to strengthen 
the existing JFMCs and create new ones in villages where these committees did not 
already exist. Notably, in contrast to previous JFM projects, under the NAP, the funds for 
JFM activities are given directly by the MoEF to the FDAs headed by territorial 
conservator of forests, bypassing state FD headquarters (especially the offices of the 
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Principal Conservator and the Chief Conservator of Forests). The funds are then released 
by the FDAs to individual JFMCs. I explain the structure and composition of FDAs and 
JFMCs later in the section. 
FDA (Executive  Committee)
Centre (Funding)
Ministry of Environment and Forests
Government of India
J&K Forest Department
State Actors
(Implementation)
NGO Actors
(Training Activities)
Market Actors
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          Figure 5: Actors in Forest Administration and Management, J&K 
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The J&K FD started implementing the NAP in 2003.
176
 The objectives of the NAP can be 
broadly classified into four main categories.
177
 First, the programme emphasises the 
‘need for protecting and conserving natural resources’ by regeneration of degraded 
forests, and checking land degradation and deforestation. It is held that the first step 
towards this is securing ‘people’s participation’ in planning and regeneration efforts by 
forming village level committees so as to ‘ensure both sustainability and equitable 
distribution of forest products’.  
 
Second, an emphasis is laid on ‘increasing the availability of fuelwood, fodder and grass’ 
from regenerated areas. It is held that there is a need for ‘promotion of fuel saving 
devices’ to encourage efficient use of fuelwood, ‘reduce the drudgery of rural women in 
collecting wood’ and protecting the environment. The programme also emphasises 
‘conservation and improvement of non-timber forest produce’ (such as bamboo, cane 
and medicinal plants) and ‘production of other non-timber products’ (e.g. wax, honey, 
fruits and nuts) from regenerated areas.  
 
Third, the programme specifies taking measures to ‘improve the quality of life’ and ‘self-
sustenance of people’ living in and around forest areas. It proposes to ‘undertake skill 
enhancement programmes’ and ‘improve the employment opportunities of the rural 
people’ especially the disadvantaged sections such as scheduled castes, scheduled tribes 
and landless rural labourers. Fourth, ‘development and extension of improved 
technologies’ (such as clonal propagation, use of root trainers for raising seedlings, 
mycorrhizal inoculation) is aimed for increasing productive value of the forests. In 
addition to this, the programme also aims to ‘develop agro-forestry’, ‘common property 
resources’ and ‘water resources’ through plantation and water harvesting programmes.  
 
                                                 
176
 In 2003, the J&K State Forest Department got approval for initiating FDA projects in 27 divisions. An 
amount of 20.44 crore was released against the total cost of 73.76 crore (GoJ&K, 2006). By 2005, 31 FDAs, 
1070 JFMCs and 47,839 hectares of the state forest area had been covered under the FDA (ibid.). 
Specifically, the FDA Udhampur was sanctioned 341.91 lakhs to treat 2,250 hectares under this scheme 
from 2002-03 to 2006-07 (ibid.). 
177
 I have categorised the objectives into four themes. The full list of short-term and long-term objectives 
can be found in the ‘Operational Guidelines for National Afforestation Programme’ published by the J&K 
Forest Department, Jammu (n.d.). 
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The FDAs are registered as Federation of all JFMCs within forest divisions (territorial) 
under the Societies Registration Act.
178
 The main functions of the FDAs include 
implementation of centrally sponsored afforestation schemes as well as beneficiary 
oriented activities such as agro-forestry and avenue plantations. The FDAs are also 
assigned tasks of ‘planning financial outlays’ for various activities under the programme, 
‘assisting JFMCs for microplanning’ and ‘deciding entry point activities’
179
, ‘formulating 
guidelines for utilisation or sharing of usufructs’ and monitoring the activities of local 
NGOs. These agencies are also entrusted to take initiatives for ‘marketing the local 
products’, ‘creating environmental awareness’ and encouraging active participation of 
local villagers in the protection of forests against illicit felling of timber or forest fires. The 
JFMCs, on the other hand, are registered with the territorial Conservator of Forests.
180
 
Assisting the various forest activities, the major roles of the JFMCs include ‘preparation of 
microplans’, ‘choice of species to be planted’, ‘proposing physical and financial targets’, 
‘suggesting entry point activities’, ‘developing usufruct sharing mechanisms’ and 
‘awareness programmes’ and ‘fund raising activities’.  
 
The JFM guidelines and objectives presented above indicate three key analytical issues. 
First, as noted in the previous chapter, there was a shift in forest policies from a focus on 
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 The FDAs comprise a general body and an executive body. The conservator of forests is the chairperson 
of the general body. Its members include presidents of JFMC general bodies, not more than 50 out of 
which 20 should be female representatives. One non-official representative is nominated by the 
panchayat. Other members include range forest officers and DFOs. The executive body also has the 
conservator of forests as the chairperson, and the DFO as the member secretary. Its members include ex-
officio members, District Development Officer, District level officers of Agriculture, Rural Development, 
Animal Husbandry, Soil Conservation, Tribal Welfare, Industries, Public Health & Engineering and Education 
Department, one non-official representative nominated by panchayat and fifteen nominees from the 
JFMCs including a minimum of seven women. The general body is required to meet at least once a year and 
the executive body once every three months.  
179
 Entry point activities include creation of community assets such as checking dams for irrigation, digging 
of wells for drinking water requirements, construction of sheds for schools and community use, installing 
energy saving or energy alternative devices etc. 
180
 The general body of the JFMC includes all adult members of the village according to their willingness to 
participate. The meetings of the general body are chaired by the president of the committee who is elected 
after the voting process and holds the position for one year. According to the guidelines, a female member 
is to be elected as president at least once every three years. The member secretary of the executive body is 
the ex-officio member of the general body. The president of the general body also functions as president of 
the Executive body and forester as member secretary. A treasurer is appointed from the members of the 
JFMC by the member secretary in consultation with the president. The bank accounts are managed by the 
treasurer and the member secretary. One member representing the panchayat of the area is nominated by 
the member secretary. There are six other members drawn from the General body who would be 
nominated by the member secretary in consultation with the president of whom three are to be women. 
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‘timber extraction and revenue generation’ (until the late 1970s) to ‘forest conservation 
and participation’ (by the late 1980s). Above, we saw a new shift in forest management 
strategies based on ‘partnership’ with the formulation of the JFM in 1992 and 
‘decentralisation’ with the introduction of the NAP in 2002.
181
 Pointing to the risks 
involved in continuous policy experimentation, Mayers and Bass (2004: 136) note the 
emergence of conflicting signals and uncertainty, and argue that these may not help 
policy improvement unless the experiments are reviewed in the light of locally agreed 
sustainable development indicators. Sundar et al. (2001), in the context of the JFM in 
other parts of India, also observe that changes in the law and in official policy statements 
may be necessary, but they are by no means sufficient for real changes to take place. 
Indicating the uncertainties in which such policy changes can result, Menzies (1993), in 
the context of rural policies in Yunnan (China), argues that the frequent changes led to a 
belief amongst local communities that governmental policies may change again, taking 
away or further limiting the terms under which they manage forested land. The 
constantly changing guidelines and their practical implications (with regard to changes in 
structure and composition of the JFMCs, flow of funds, execution) create ambiguities for 
both agents and recipients of development concerning what they will achieve and how. 
 
Second, from the JFM objectives (under the NAP), it can be observed that the stated 
goals range from ‘protection of natural resources’ to ‘production of non-timber forest 
produce’, or even ‘initiating agro-forestry’ and ‘introduction of improved technologies’. 
Based on the range of activities to be covered under the programme, there is a wide 
range of responsibilities entrusted with the FD, most of which overlap with those of the 
JFMCs, thereby leaving scope for the FD to put the blame on village communities for the 
failure of projects. Although the JFM implies new partnerships and the NAP aims to form 
new mechanisms of decentralised control of forests, they fail to provide a focused set of 
objectives. As Sundar et al. (2001) note, the JFM objectives, while laudable, raise several 
difficulties for those who might wish to implement them because it is not clear how these 
can be understood in relation to each other. Furthermore, comanagement programmes, 
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 Recently, in 2010, the MoEF has again changed the JFM implementation policy by transferring project 
implementation powers to the panchayats in place of the JFMCs. The analysis of this policy shift is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
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if poorly designed, enable a variety of actors and institutions to promote and advance 
their individual interests (Bene et al., 2009). Hence, there is a need to prioritise whether 
the primary goal of the programme is forest conservation, availability of biomass for local 
communities, devolution of power, local participation or introduction of income 
generation activities, without which different actors may prioritise the objectives of the 
programme according to their own interests and assess its performance accordingly. And 
each objective, of course, is backed by different interests with varying forms and degrees 
of power. 
 
Third, it can be noted that benefits in terms of access to non-timber forest products are 
promised to the local communities in return for their shared responsibility in protecting 
the forests. However, to avail these benefits, the villagers require a prior approval of 
both field-staff and the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) which is to be granted on the basis 
of satisfactory performance of tasks assigned to them. Furthermore, it is observed that 
the field-staff and the DFO can terminate the JFMC membership of a person whose 
performance is found ‘unsatisfactory’ (see also Poffenberger and Singh, 1996). This 
revealed that, despite claims of ‘equal partnership’ and ‘decentralisation of authority’ in 
the programme, the forest bureaucracy retains ways for maintaining control over local 
communities and their access to resources. This observation corroborates Dean’s (1999: 
209) argument that ‘rights to resources are made conditional on the basis of 
performance’ and that very often, governmental strategies go against the interests of 
their target population. Supporting this view, Sundar (2001) observes how under the 
JFM, ‘gifts’ and ‘subsidies’ are constructed as though state control of forest resources 
were a timeless social fact. Similarly, Rathore (1996) suggest that conservationists and 
forest officials, instead of granting resource-use ‘rights’, prefer ‘concessions’ since 
government agencies can easily exercise control over concession grants and withdraw 
them at will. This reflects that under the guise of decentralisation, there is a strong 
coercive element in the project outlines concerning forest management.  
 
To summarise, in this section, I have indicated factors that can possibly determine the 
effective implementation of the programme. The broad scope of  the NAP, a lack of focus 
in the objectives, multiple and overlapping roles for the parties, constant shifts and 
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amendments in policies, contradictory imperatives, and avenues for centralised control 
within decentralised structures can all play a decisive role in the weak implementation of 
the programme. In some cases these factors can result in ambiguities concerning the 
responsibilities and rights of the parties involved, lack of interest among the village 
communities and misuse of power by implementing agencies or actors in the name of 
‘partnership’, ‘decentralisation’ and ‘sustainable use’ of forest resources. I provide 
evidence for the possibilities indicated here in the rest of this chapter and also while 
presenting the narratives of local communities in the next chapter. Below, I note how the 
programme is perceived differently by the various actors and in what ways their 
understandings of the NAP lead to the opening up of new spaces of cooperation as well 
as conflict.  
 
Section Two 
 
2. Setting the scene: interplay between centre, state and non-state actors 
 
The contemporary global conservation thinking gives an impulse to sustainable forest 
management by stimulating multi-scale and multi-stakeholder partnerships for 
conservation and sustainable management. These changes are raising new questions 
about the linkages between actors at multiple scales (Ros-Tonen et al., 2005), warrant a 
‘rigorous analysis of stakeholders’ (Njogu, 2005: 293), and require an understanding of 
how to achieve a consensus between stakeholders with diverging interests in forest 
management and planning (see Berg and Biesbrouck, 2005). Li (2007) argues that 
community forest management is an ‘assemblage’ that has been created due to struggles 
between villagers and forest bureaucracies over the access to village forests. One of the 
greatest challenges facing conservation, therefore, is to be able to engage with a broader 
set of stakeholders and civil society at various levels (Kumar, 2006). As Greenberg and 
Park (1994) argue, it is not enough to focus on local cultural dynamics but rather the 
relationship between policy and politics in the context of environment needs to be 
explicitly addressed to understand relative powers at many levels of environmental and 
ecological analysis. Supporting this, Leach et al. (1999) maintain that just as power 
relations pervade the institutional dynamics of everyday resource use, they pervade any 
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negotiation process and, therefore, different social actors have very different capacities 
to voice and stake their claims. It is, hence, important to examine how different actors 
set stages for politics according to their hierarchical powers, varied perceptions and 
conflicting interests. 
 
In this section, I discuss the power and interests of central, provincial and non-state 
actors involved in forest conservation and exploitation in J&K, and examine the interplay 
between them. First, I present the perceptions of forest officials with regard to the JFM 
and the NAP, and examine how the FD is redefining its role under the premise of ‘equal 
partnership’ with the JFMCs. I, then, present the role of the SFC and its association with 
the FD. Following this, I highlight the concerns of the central MoEF regarding the 
implementation of the NAP and its relationship with J&K FD. I also briefly outline issues 
of conflict between the FD and a local NGO called Almi Khudai Khidmatgar Association 
(AKKA) working in the field of community forest management in the Jammu region. 
 
FD and JFMCs 
Since the early 1990s, various working plans and reports of the FD have emphasised the 
significance of forest conservation both for maintaining ecological balance in the state 
and providing sustainable livelihoods to forest dependent communities. The agenda of 
the FD, therefore, has largely coincided with that of international conservation 
community in preserving natural resources by involving local populations. The various 
senior forest officials such as the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF), the Chief 
Conservator of Forests (CCF), the Conservator of Forests (CF) and the Divisional Forest 
Officer (DFO) held the view that since the economy of the state is primarily based on 
agriculture and forest related activities, the forests serve as an important source of 
livelihoods for the majority of its people.
182
 According to these officials, the management 
of forests in the state should rest on the principle of ‘sustainability’ despite several 
challenges, including constantly rising human and livestock population, their increasing 
dependence on natural resources for sustenance and high demand of fuelwood and 
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 The information presented in the following discussion is based on my interviews with various senior 
forest officials in Jammu from February to April, 2007. Some of the points presented here were common to 
the interviews with different officials and, therefore, I do not provide specific references while noting 
them.  
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timber in the state, owing to harsh winter conditions. Therefore, they maintained that 
the state is looking for ways to conserve its forests as well as providing livelihoods to its 
people through various forest programmes. Explaining the significance of local 
participation, the CF, Jammu stated: 
 
The agenda of forest conservation cannot be realised without the active 
involvement of the communities. Although afforestation schemes in the state 
since independence also emphasised the role of people’s involvement in 
forestry programmes, after the 1980s, various central government initiated 
projects such as the Social Forestry, the Joint Forest Management and the 
National Afforestation Programme have made the involvement of local 
communities mandatory [...] We are trying to reach out to the communities for 
the successful implementation of the NAP by forming the JFMCs and initiating 
various developmental activities in the villages.
183
 
 
On the NAP, the latest programme for decentralised forest conservation, the forest 
officials I interviewed maintained that the local communities have been empowered by 
means of devolution of funds. They argued that the structure of the FDA ensures ‘equal 
partnership’ and ‘participation’ of forest staff and local communities at various stages of 
the programme. For example, the FDAs are supposed to prepare a project plan specifying 
the financial outlay, area to be covered and range of activities to be undertaken. These 
plans are then sent to the National Afforestation and Eco-Development Board (NAEB) of 
the MoEF for the release of funds. After the project is approved by the MoEF, the CF as 
chairperson of the FDA receives the first grant from the MoEF for enabling the FDAs to 
undertake microplanning in consultation with the JFMCs and local communities. The aim 
of microplanning is to link the objectives of the programme with local needs. The 
villagers are meant to propose entry point activities and participate in rehabilitation plan 
of the forests by indicating areas most suitable for various land uses, for example, 
afforestation, fuelwood and fodder plantations, horticulture, and development of 
pasture lands. According to the NAP guidelines, the next instalment of funds is linked to 
the satisfactory implementation of the work programme and utilisation of previous 
funds. The funds released by the MoEF for the implementation of the work programme 
are transferred to the account of the JFMCs (jointly managed by the JFMC chairperson 
and forester) after receiving receipt from the FDA about the previous utilisation of funds. 
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 Interview with Manoj Pant, CF, East Circle, Jammu (22 March, 2007). 
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A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is signed by the FDAs with the JFMCs which 
outlines the mutual obligations and rights of both the partners. The MoU grants right to 
the FDAs to withdraw funding from a JFMC if its performance is found to be 
unsatisfactory. It may be mentioned that under this scheme, contractors or any 
intermediate agencies are not permitted to be engaged for execution of any of its works 
so that the full benefit of wages goes to the village residents. The FD maintains that the 
programme, besides addressing conservation concerns, also empowers local 
communities by generating employment and building capacities. 
 
The forest officials maintain that the JFM programme has been institutionalised 
successfully in J&K despite the initial challenges to its implementation in the 1990s due to 
terrorism in the state. In Jammu region, the programme is claimed by the forest officials 
to be most successful in Udhampur and Nowshera forest divisions.
184
 The officials 
associate high dependence of local people on the surrounding forests with the active 
‘participation’ of the villagers in the programmes. ‘Local participation’ (although difficult 
to measure and quantify) is considered as the key criteria for the success of the 
programme by the officials.
185
 It is important to note that their understanding of ‘success’ 
was based on the level of ‘local participation’. For example, the DFO explained to me that 
when a training camp was organised at Udhampur to demonstrate various income 
generation activities, most of the participants who attended the camp were from Laati 
and Chapparh villages.  
 
On the basis of my interviews with senior forest officials, below I note some of the claims 
made by them suggesting the successful implementation of the programme. According to 
the PCCF,
186
 there is an increase in the forest cover since the JFM programme although 
the state has experienced a fall in forest revenue in the last two decades due to 
restrictions on timber extraction and trade.
187
 He observed that although the programme 
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 Interviews with the PCCF, J&K, Jammu (12 February, 2007) and the DFO, Udhampur (3 February, 2007). 
185
 As stated in chapter two, due to the problem of militancy in Nowshera, I chose to examine the 
functioning of the NAP in Udhampur. I selected Laati and Chapparh villages (under FDA Udhampur) for my 
study because in these villages, the programme was considered most successful by the DFO. 
186
 Interview with I.A. Khan, PCCF, Jammu (12 February, 2007). 
187
 In 1980-81, the total forest area of J&K was 20,174 sq. kms, which increased to 20,230 sq. kms., by 2005 
(GoJ&K, 2005: 29). In 1980-81, the J&K FD generated a net surplus of 2,221.97 lakh rupees which reduced 
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has not successfully met the timber needs of the local communities, the availability of 
biomass, especially firewood and fodder, has certainly increased over the years due to 
establishment of closures (fencing of pasture lands and degraded forest areas). The 
villagers are allowed to collect grass and fuelwood from open forests and are supplied 
timber at concessional rates. According to him, the FD is now more open to incorporating 
the suggestions of local communities with regard to access to resources. For example, 
the PCCF informed me that on the demand of the local communities, they were allowed 
free access to non-timber forest produce such as anardana (Punica granatum)
188
 which 
was earlier collected only by the contractors after the issuance of permits by the FD. 
 
The forest officials view that the NAP has resulted in cordial relations between the staff 
and the villagers. As the CF argued, ‘the forest administration approach has changed 
from pure policing to people friendly’.
189
 He further added that the villagers are 
consulted in various planning issues such as the choice of species to be planted for 
regeneration, choice of area for entry point activities, and distribution of benefits and 
responsibilities. The officials maintained that the programme has helped in controlling 
the illegal timber trade significantly, which was earlier posing a big threat to the state 
forests. They also claimed that owing to the cordial relations between staff and local 
communities, villagers now complain to the forest authorities immediately whenever any 
damage to forest crops occurs due to illegal felling by timber smugglers or by the 
residents of neighbouring villages. It is pertinent to mention that these are the claims 
made by the senior forest officials. I briefly scrutinise some of these claims in section 
three of this chapter and more fully in the next chapter, based primarily on the 
experiences and narratives of the village communities. 
 
While recognising the importance of community involvement in forest protection and 
management, the FD also sees the forest citizens as the main destructors of state forests. 
Illicit tree felling by local residents, lopping and overgrazing by pastoralists (such as 
bakerwals and gujjars), forest fires, and encroachments on forest lands by villagers in 
                                                                                                                                                        
to 226.59 lakh rupees by 1991-92. By 2004-05, the FD was generating a net loss of 6,901.34 lakh rupees 
which means that the gross revenue was much less than the total expenditure (ibid.: 200) 
188
 Wild pomegranate seeds used as spice in Indian cuisines. 
189
 Interview with Manoj Pant, CF, East Circle, Jammu (22 March, 2007). 
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connivance with the revenue officials are some of the issues that the FD considers as 
major challenges to forest regeneration. The forest officials stressed the need of pucca 
(concrete) boundary pillars for demarcating forest lands in order to prevent 
encroachments by the local village residents (after bribing the local revenue officials). 
The FD maintained that there is tremendous pressure on forests for meeting the 
demands of fuelwood and fodder, and that the nominal grazing fee or kahcharai provides 
incentives for overexploitation of forest resources by pastoralists and other village 
residents (GoJ&K, 1993). I shall return to these claims while presenting the contradictory 
narratives of village residents and pastoralists in the next chapter. 
 
On being questioned about the effectiveness of the NAP, the DFO, Udhampur responded 
that the FD takes into account the local needs while planning entry point activities.
190
 She 
further stressed that the interests of weaker sections such as scheduled castes, 
scheduled tribes and women are represented in the formation of the JFMCs. She claimed 
that JFMC meetings are organised by foresters regularly in which the local concerns for 
forest protection and development are addressed.
191
 By means of various training 
programmes and workshops, the villagers are demonstrated the ways to develop 
alternative sources of income generation (such as mushroom cultivation, bee-keeping or 
fruit preservation) in order to reduce their dependence on forests.  
 
These senior forest officials held the view that the NAP is at the infancy stage and issues 
such as employment generation for local villagers or creating markets for their local 
products are yet to be tested. They maintained that although some self-help groups have 
been formed in the villages as an attempt to make village communities self-sufficient, 
these committees require time to become strengthened and institutionalised. To what 
extent the creation of self-help groups, alternative income generation activities, local 
participation and other developmental activities have benefited the villagers will be 
assessed in the following chapter. Suffice here is to say that the FD officials subscribe to 
the mainstream conservation discourse that supplicates technocratic and apolitical 
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 Interview with Roop Kaur, DFO, Udhampur (3 February, 2007). 
191
 The DFO informed me that there are supposed to be two meetings of the JFMCs in a year. Other senior 
officials were, however, not sure of the frequency of JFMC meetings in a year. It appeared to me that they 
had confined themselves to the administrative tasks in the head-offices and rarely made field visits.  
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solutions (such as creation of user committees and self-help groups) to deeply political 
problems of access and control of local forest resources and their multiple uses. 
 
Recall the point made above by the senior forest officials regarding cordial relations 
between the FD and village communities under the NAP. However, they also provided a 
contradictory narrative while arguing that the implementation of the programme is 
challenging because ‘it is very difficult to change the mindset of the field-staff and local 
villagers’.
192
 They pointed out that on the one hand, the field-staff is unwilling to shed its 
power and develop friendly relations with the local communities and on the other, the 
local people are reluctant to trust them owing to their previous experiences with forest 
administration based on policing and curtailment of local access to forest resources. The 
CF argued that the field-staff lack motivation as well as adequate training to implement 
these policies which are meant to be participatory in nature.
193
 The Conservator also 
explained that the FD is understaffed, particularly at field level, which results in 
unnecessary delays in project implementation. According to him, foresters and guards 
should preferably be local residents of the area so that a good rapport could be 
established between the staff and local villagers. He also suggested that there are very 
few NGOs or grassroots organisations in J&K to support community mobilisation 
activities and self-help group formation. Although NGOs such as the AKKA are working 
with the FD, their primary job is to train the officials and local people in income 
generation activities. I shall return to this point while discussing the relationship of NGOs 
and FD later in this section. 
 
According to the DFO Udhampur, the villagers are less interested in forest conservation 
per se and they see the programme as just another development project. The entry point 
activities under the programme do provide scope for undertaking development activities 
(such as construction of sheds for schools, check dams for soil and water conservation, 
digging of wells for drinking water), but only 10% of the total project funds could be 
spent on such activities. This prevents villagers from feeling motivated and actively 
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 Interview with Abhay Kumar, CCF, Jammu (4 March, 2007). 
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 Interview with Manoj Pant, CF, East Circle, Jammu (22 March, 2007). 
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participating in the programme. Another problem in project implementation, according 
to the DFO, is that of political rivalries at the village level. If the chairperson of the JFMC 
and the sarpanch of village panchayat are affiliated to different political parties, the 
project is likely to face problems due to intra-village conflicts and rifts. Apart from this, 
explaining some bureaucratic complexities in the project implementation, the DFO 
further informed me: 
 
We are completely dependent on the central government and the SFC for 
funds and revenue. The delay in the release of money by the Ministry is a 
major hindrance for project implementation in the state. When I joined the 
Department, I applied for funds to the Conservator of Forests for organising 
training camps for the villagers in my division. I was asked to produce 
utilisation certificate of the funds from the previous year. The earlier funds 
were not spent by the former DFO and hence lapsed. I could not produce the 
utilisation certificate and was unable to obtain the next instalment on time. As 
soon as I got the money, I arranged a three day camp in Udhampur which 
should have been organised months before [...] My tenure here is just for 
three years. Until the time I understand the challenges in the project 
implementation, I will get transferred.
194
 
 
 
SFC and FD 
As noted in the previous chapter, since 1978, the responsibility of extraction of timber 
has been entrusted with the SFC, in return for the royalty paid to the FD. This royalty is 
one of the main sources of revenue for the FD. A significant change occurred in the 1990s 
because of the restriction on green felling in the state. The Supreme Court of India in 
1996 ordered the J&K state to impose a complete ban on green felling and restrict the 
annual timber extraction to a maximum of 80 lakh cubic feet (cft.) in selected 
compartments.
195
 This has substantially reduced the quantity of timber extraction. For 
instance, in 1989-90, the SFC extracted 113.57 lakh cft. of timber which got reduced to 
76.67 lakh cft. in 1998-99 and merely 27.16 lakh cft. in 2004-05 (GoJ&K, 2005). The SFC 
was now allowed only to access dry, fallen and diseased timber in the state forests. Also, 
during the early 1990s when terrorism was at its peak, the timber extraction activities got 
hampered and militancy related fire incidents resulted in low returns for the investments 
made by the SFC.  
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 Interview with Roop Kaur, DFO, Udhampur (3 February, 2007). 
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 Honourable Supreme Court Judgement in Writ Petition Number 202/95. 
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The list of compartments from which timber can be extracted is made by the FD and the 
SFC jointly and is sent to higher authorities, the CCF of FD and the Managing Director, SFC 
for approval. After permission is granted by these authorities, marking is done by the FD 
following which the SFC contractor, the DFO and field-staff go to the area and supervise 
the labour for activities until the logs are carried to roads and transported to sales depots 
within the state.  
 
The SFC claims that apart from transacting timber business in the state, the corporation 
has benefited the government largely by paying royalty which, in turn, is used for various 
forest development activities. The SFC has been supplying logs free of charge to the FD 
both for providing timber to the villagers at concessional rates and for meeting their 
firewood requirements. Moreover, the SFC maintains that they provide employment to 
the local villagers under their various timber extraction activities.
196
 The SFC carries out 
timber extraction activities through selected contractors who, in turn, employ local 
contractors and villagers. The SFC claims that the organisation has been contributing to 
conserving and developing forests of the state by removing and disposing the diseased 
and fallen logs in the compartments, thus maintaining the forest hygiene. The SFC also 
maintains a Forest Development Fund which finances development projects in the 
forestry sector and has also contributed to funding FD programmes in the state. I explain 
the activities and functioning of the SFC at the ground level later in this chapter (section 
three) but for now, it is important to note the areas of conflict between the FD and the 
SFC. The SFC argues that although the Supreme Court had restricted the annual timber 
extraction to 80 lakh cft., the FD, in order to meet conservation needs, allows it to extract 
much less than the prescribed limit. For example, in 2007-08, the SFC has been allowed 
to extract only 35 lakh cft. by the FD. Moreover, the SFC officials claimed that they have 
to face constant interference of the FD concerning selection of species to be extracted, 
quality of stocks, techniques for timber felling etc. They argued that, for all practical 
purposes, the SFC working remains under the check of the FD leaving little autonomy for 
the corporation to carry out its business. Contrary to the claims of the SFC, the DFO, 
Udhampur narrated: 
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 Interview with Sheikh Shokat Ali, Deputy Financial Advisor, SFC, Jammu (28 March, 2007). 
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For the last three years, the SFC is making a loss and has failed to pay the due 
royalties to the FD. The establishment of the SFC has created unnecessary 
problems with regard to timber extraction and sale, for example, difficulties in 
inter-organisational coordination, duplication of work, delays in operations etc. 
[...] Until 1978, the FD used to sell timber and other minor timber forest 
products at subsidised rates but the SFC has kept their rates very high for its 
own profits.
197
 
 
MoEF and FD 
The central MoEF is the main sponsoring agency for the JFM projects under the NAP in 
J&K.
198
 Explaining the status of the JFM in the country, the Deputy Inspector General of 
Forests (DIG), MoEF argued that the relationship between the FDs and local communities 
has improved to some extent after the JFM.
199
 However, she emphasised that more time 
is needed to develop the capacities of the JFMCs before giving complete control to the 
villagers to manage forests surrounding their villages. Owing to the previous experience 
of lack of financial powers to the village forest committees in earlier JFM projects, she 
argued that the MoEF in 2002 initiated the NAP for further decentralising forest 
management activities by directly transferring funds to the FDAs and eventually to the 
JFMCs, thus aiming to reduce the bottlenecks created by the state forest departments. 
The major constraint faced by the MoEF in implementing FDA projects is the lack of 
follow up action by the J&K FD which is supposed to submit regular evaluation reports to 
the MoEF. As the DIG, MoEF stated: 
 
It is generally experienced that the FDAs do not submit progress reports in time 
but request for the release of funds. In J&K, less than 30% of FDAs applied for 
release of funds in 2003-04 and no evaluation report has been submitted by the 
FD thus far. It is difficult for us to release grants without receiving progress 
reports for the previous activities [...] The problem is not with availability of funds 
for the project but until the J&K FD shows its serious concern, the Ministry cannot 
ensure effective implementation of the programme.  
 
There is another area of tension between the central government and J&K state with 
regard to the issue of power and control within the state FD. The Indian Forest Service 
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 Interview with Roop Kaur, DFO, Udhampur (3 February, 2007). 
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 In some other states of India (e.g. Rajasthan, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana), international 
development agencies such as the World Bank and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation are the 
main sponsoring agencies for the JFM. 
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 Interview with Rekha Pai, DIG, MoEF, New Delhi (15 January, 2007). 
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(IFS) officials of J&K cadre, who are not domiciles of the state, experience marginalisation 
within the FD, owing to the antagonistic relations between the Indian government and 
the state of J&K since independence.
200
 The effective power is generally held by officials 
of the J&K State Forest Service, even though these officials are junior in terms of 
departmental hierarchy. Requesting anonymity, a senior IFS officer informed me: 
 
In J&K, there is an intense rift between the local officials and outsiders within the 
FD. Owing to the special status of J&K, most officers of central government, in real 
practice, have only de jure powers while junior forest officials from J&K who are 
well-connected to the politicians in Kashmir valley hold de facto powers. It is they 
who actually control the functioning of the FD. 
 
NGOs and FD 
Unlike other states of India, the presence of non-governmental development 
organisations is very limited in J&K, possibly due to the political instability, militancy, and 
cross-border conflicts in the state since independence. Currently, a local NGO called 
AKKA based in Jammu has marginal presence in the area of community forest 
management and conservation programmes. Specifically, the AKKA in association with 
the FD has organised training camps for the villagers on various income generation 
activities and creation of self-help groups in Udhampur.
201
 While a member of the AKKA 
stated that the organisation’s function is to train local communities in alternative income 
generation activities (such as mushroom cultivation, production of jams, pickles and 
dried fruits), it is beyond their capacities to assist them in marketing these products.
202
 
Arguably, lack of market opportunities renders such training activities futile and useless 
for meeting the livelihood needs of the villagers.  
 
On the question of their experience of working with the FD, the members of the AKKA 
argued that the collaboration has not been encouraging thus far. In any joint project, the 
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 Recall that at the time of the merger of J&K princely state with the Indian Union in 1947, the J&K state 
was to enjoy full autonomy except in the fields of defence, foreign affairs and communications. Over the 
years, the autonomy promised liquidated and the central government started to intervene in all areas of 
governance including forests. As such, the forest officials of J&K have, often, adopted a hostile attitude 
towards their superior colleagues coming from the Indian Forest Service. 
201
 I attended one such camp organised by the AKKA for income generation activities in village Chapparh. I 
present my observations on it in the next chapter. 
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 Interview with Rakesh Verma, member of the AKKA, Jammu (6 February, 2007). 
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FD takes all the credit for the work done and the NGO faces unnecessary delays in 
receiving funds from the FD. They explained the uncertainty involved in working with the 
FD since, in many cases, the official gets transferred before the programme is completed, 
and hence, the project is left mid-way through.  
 
Noting problems of collaboration between the FDs and NGOs in other parts of India, 
Sundar et al. (2001) argue that an important reason why it is hard for FDs to work with 
NGOs is that both organisations have very different overall agendas i.e. NGOs more 
interested in local community mobilisation and empowerment, and FDs primarily 
concerned with forest conservation (see also Levine, 2002; Mahanty, 2002 and Mencher, 
1999). Further, Sen (1999) argues that in India, there have been several instances of 
delays in funding by the state and stoppages of development projects due to whims of 
bureaucrats. As Farrington and Bebbington (1993) observe, depending on their histories 
working with the FD, some NGOs will be more while others less reluctant to enter into 
partnerships with government. It is yet to be seen how the NGO sector in J&K will expand 
in the years to come. 
 
On the basis of discussion in this section, it can be argued that although various actors 
involved in forest conservation seem to converge around the common goals of the 
‘sustainable use’ of forests, ‘local participation’ and ‘decentralisation of authority’, there 
are areas of tension between them with regard to organisational autonomy, power and 
control of funds. Scholars such as Blaikie (2006); Oyono (2004); Bazaara (2003); 
Muhereza (2003); Ribot (2002); Campbell et al. (2001) and Fomete (2001), in different 
country contexts, argue that the main impediment to decentralised forest management 
is that the governments rarely devolve actual powers which, often, result in repeated re-
centralisation in relation to power, authority and control over decision-making and 
access to local resources. In the narratives above, although the MoEF maintained that the 
objective of decentralisation is being realised through new NAP guidelines, we witnessed 
that there is still centralised control over funds. The middle rank officers such as the DFO 
also struggle to secure funds on time from the FD headquarters due to red-tapism, so 
typical of Indian bureaucracy. We also noted that while the state officials claimed that 
they ensure ‘equal partnership’ of local communities in the implementation of 
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programme and devolution of funds to the JFMCs, there is scope for withdrawal of funds 
by the FD if the performance of committees is found unsatisfactory, again indicating the 
presence of centralised control within apparently decentralised structures.  
 
We also witnessed the issues of conflict between the FD and the SFC over autonomous 
functioning. Apart from this, the rift between central and state forest officials in terms of 
de facto powers could also be seen as a significant factor in the implementation of the 
programme. While claiming that the programme has resulted in cordial relations 
between staff and local communities, we observed contradictory narrative when the 
senior forest officials argued that the field-staff lacks motivation to shed power and make 
the programme more participatory. It is also pertinent to examine the attitude of the 
field-staff towards senior forest officials, a point which I illustrate in the next section. 
  
Section Three 
 
So far, we have observed that NAP policy regulations and laws can set the stage for 
politics between the various players involved. I have noted mechanisms of centralised 
control at different levels from the MoEF to the FD headquarters to the divisional level. 
How these policies unfold at field level, creating new avenues for cooperation and 
conflict, is the main focus of the discussion that follows in the rest of this chapter and the 
next. Below, I examine the micropolitics of resource access and control in the villages 
Laati and Chapparh, acclaimed by the DFO (Udhampur) for being the most successful 
example of JFM under the NAP. Specifically, I explain the functioning of contractors 
involved in timber extraction and the relationship between the forest guard and villagers 
with regard to access to local forests. 
 
3.1 Laati and Chapparh: a brief introduction 
 
Laati and Chapparh, the twin villages, are located in the Udhampur district of the Jammu 
region. These villages are quite remote, the district headquarters being approximately 90 
210 
 
kilometres away.
203
 The villages fall under the Laati-Dudu forest range of the Udhampur 
forest division (see footnote 24 for demographic composition of the two villages). 
 
Before the land reforms in 1971 (discussed in chapter two), major landholdings belonged 
to Thakurs and Brahmins who used to employ Gaddis, poor Muslims and lower castes for 
tilling their lands but after 1971, lands were redistributed to the actual tillers. As such, 
Gaddis, Scheduled Castes and Muslims have been the major beneficiaries of the land 
reforms in these villages, although the upper castes have continued to maintain their 
privileged position in terms of status hierarchy and also by diversifying their sources of 
income, with the exception of agriculture (e.g. government jobs, shop-keeping, 
construction etc.). The literacy rate is very low in these two villages i.e. 29.3% in Laati and 
22.9% in Chapparh.  
 
Agriculture is the primary occupation of the majority of the population. Paddy, maize and 
mustard are the major crops grown here. The people of these villages are also engaged in 
some handloom and handicraft activities such as blanket weaving and basket making. 
Some others work as pastoralists, labourers, carpenters, potters, shopkeepers, timber 
contractors etc. Firewood is the main source of fuel for most of the villagers. Some 
women are engaged in collecting and selling firewood in the village while others collect 
non-timber forest products and herbs such as vanafsha (Viola odorata), guchchi 
(Morchella esculenta), doop (Jurinea macrocephala), kaur (Picorrhiza kurroa), patis 
(Aconitum heterophyllum), kasrorh (Diplazium frondosum), kundian (Mushroom rhizo) 
and anardana (Punica granatum), which are either used for self-consumption or sold in 
the local market for additional incomes. Major trees found in the forests surrounding 
these villages include deodar (Cedres deodara), banj (Quercus incana), keekar (Acacia 
eburnea), champ (Alnus nitida), maru (Quercus dilatada), akhrot (Juglans regia), kathi 
(Indigofera heterantha) and kaimbal (Lannaea grandis). Due to harsh winter conditions in 
the region, the inhabitants of these villages are heavily dependent on the surrounding 
forests for timber and fuelwood apart from fodder and other NTFPs. 
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 It takes about seven to eight hours by road to reach Laati and Chapparh from Udhampur due to 
mountainous track and poor condition of road. 
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After independence, the first panchayat elections in Laati were held in 1978. Due to 
terrorism in the state from the late 1980s onwards, panchayats were suspended and 
revived only in 2001 when the political climate in the state began to change. Laati and 
Chapparh villages were considered to be one for revenue purposes until 2000, but after 
the elections in 2001, two separate panchayats of Laati and Chapparh were formed. Both 
Laati and Chapparh fall under the FDA Udhampur, and had a common JFMC from 2003 to 
2007. As indicated above, the forests of Laati and Chapparh, apart from generating 
revenue for the state are also very crucial for meeting subsistence needs of the villagers. 
But who actually controls the forest resources, especially timber, and regulates its access 
is what I explain below. 
 
3.2 Our forests, their timber: the politics of resource control 
 
In the previous section, I pointed to some issues of conflict between the SFC and the FD 
with regard to organisational autonomy, payment of royalties, selection of 
compartments, timber pricing etc. In the following discussion, I highlight the politics 
between the SFC and local contractors in relation to control of forest resources and their 
exploitation.  
 
For the purpose of timber extraction, an agreement is made between the FD and the SFC, 
permits are granted and compartments for timber extraction are assigned to the SFC 
contractors. These SFC contractors are mainly based in urban areas, Jammu and 
Udhampur. The first job of the SFC contractor is to employ a local contractor (known as a 
munshi) from a neighbouring village who, in turn, employs labourers for various timber 
extraction tasks such as felling trees (or gharan), sawing (or charan) and carrying logs to 
roads to be finally transported to the sales depots.  
 
Contrary to the claims of the senior forest officials that the illegal timber trade is largely 
under control, my interviews with SFC contractors, local contractors and villagers in Laati 
and Chapparh suggested that it is very much prevalent, a point also covered in the 
212 
 
international media.
204
 The SFC contractors blamed local contractors for engaging in 
illegal activities and the destruction of forests in connivance with the field-staff.
205
 These 
contractors argued that they work within a transparent system based on tenders and 
auctions, and extract timber as per regulations laid by the SFC, but it was the local 
contractors who were the main culprits in violating forest laws and regulations. For 
instance, in the 1980s, the government allowed village residents (by issuing permits) to 
transfer logs from their old houses to the places where they had built new constructions. 
This policy made vigilance of timber transportation very challenging as it became difficult 
to ascertain where the timber was coming from and going to. Amidst this change in 
government policy which was basically meant to help villagers, local contractors started 
purchasing timber logs from villagers and selling them in the black market, making high 
profits. Misusing the permits to transport timber, they also started felling deodar wood 
illegally from neighbouring forests and selling it to timber traders in towns. Due to such 
illegal activities, the government again imposed strict regulations and stopped issuing 
permits to the local residents for timber transportation. Following this, the timber 
extraction and transportation was brought completely under the supervision of the SFC 
contractors who held exclusive rights for this purpose.  
 
Ramesh Chander is an SFC contractor who currently resides in Udhampur town. He was 
the sarpanch of Dudu village in 2001 and, interestingly, has also served as the JFMC 
chairperson in the past. He has been engaged in the timber extraction business for the 
last ten years. Supporting the point made above with regard to the role of local 
contractors in illegal activities, he narrated: 
 
The local contractors adopt various strategies to exploit forest resources 
illegally. The local contractors make an agreement with individual landowners 
for tree felling and selling. Generally, the landowner bribes the field-staff and 
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 Newspaper reports suggest that the illegal timber trade has flourished in the last decade or so due to a 
boom in construction activities in the state. For example, a report in a leading British daily, The Guardian 
(2010), suggests that corruption hinders moves to halt the illegal trade fuelled by the construction boom 
and notes, ‘the insurgency that has wracked the region for two decades is at a low ebb and an economic 
boom, in part fuelled by cash poured in by central government to win hearts and minds, has meant a 
voracious appetite for wood for new homes, hotels and other construction’. 
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 Interviews with Krishan Lal, Jammu (22 November, 2008) and Ramesh Chander, Udhampur (20 March, 
2007). 
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gets his permission to cut more trees than he actually has. The local contractor 
then cuts the trees from his land and few others from the nearby forest land in 
collaboration with the field-staff. The timber is then sold in the black market 
and the profits shared by the contractor, landowner and field-staff.  
 
Om Prakash is a local contractor in Laati and has been associated with timber extraction 
activities since 1975. He explained that SFC contractors visit the field occasionally and, 
hence, the responsibility of carrying out various timber extraction activities remains with 
the local contractors who work under the supervision of the FD and SFC field-staff. He 
informed me that although he had tried to gain a direct association with the SFC, he was 
unsuccessful since it was difficult to get SFC contracts without good financial backing. He 
mentioned that the SFC sanctions timber extraction permits only to those contractors 
who own some property, have substantial bank savings and can deposit a fixed amount 
as security to the SFC (generally 2% of the project cost). Most village residents are not so 
affluent and, therefore, unable to become SFC contractors. They are bound to work 
under SFC contractors from outside villages.  
 
Contrary to the argument presented by the SFC contractor above, Om Prakash argued 
that it is actually the SFC in connivance with their contractors which is destroying the 
forests. For their convenience (and also reducing transportation costs), the SFC 
contractors bribe the forest officials and cut the green trees in the forests surrounding 
villages rather than those which have been marked by the FD in distant forest 
compartments. He maintained that due to snowfall, trees in the upper reaches suffer 
damage and need to be cleared for the growth of young plants. Whilst the task of 
removal of fallen wood is entrusted to the SFC, the SFC officials hardly make an effort to 
engage in these activities in distant regions or upper reaches.
206
 Not only can the fallen 
logs fulfil the demands of timber for villagers in Laati and Chapparh, but these can also be 
used for making coal, furniture or firewood. In the absence of any efforts to maintain 
forest hygiene, these potentially valuable woods get wasted because they are eventually 
burnt by pastoralists who go up the mountains during the summer to graze their cattle. 
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 The main species in the upper reaches include deodar (Cedres deodara), spruce (Picea morinda), tos 
(Also picea), kail (Pinus exelsea), kheeru (Acacia catechu), deri (Toona serrata), kharari (Celtus australis), 
samel (Bambax ceiba), madrala (Sorbaria tomentosa) and padar (Pavetta indica). 
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He argued that if the task of forest hygiene is assigned to local contractors, it can prove 
to be beneficial both for the maintenance of forests as well as meeting subsistence needs 
of the villagers. Highlighting the indifference of SFC and FD field-staff in dealing with the 
problems of poor villagers, he commented: 
 
These are our forests, yet they [SFC] own the timber. The irony is that even if 
kail or any other tree is damaged in the surrounding forests due to snowfall, 
the field-staff let it spoil but do not allow it to be taken away by the poor for 
meeting their subsistence requirements. They say that it cannot be supplied to 
anyone because it is government property. So, most of the time, this fallen 
wood is neither used by the government nor the people [...] Such fallen trees 
even kill the small plants. This is how the rich forests of the state, which could 
be used for local sustenance, livelihoods and revenue generation, get 
destroyed due to the carelessness of forest authorities and the SFC. 
  
3.3 Split role of the field-staff: forest regulations vis-a-vis local needs 
 
Long and Van der Ploeg (1989) suggest that it is important to focus upon intervention 
practices as they evolve and are shaped by the struggles between various participants 
rather than simply on intervention models (see also Bardach, 2000; Liddle, 1992).
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Lipsky (1980) argues that implementers or ‘street-level bureaucrats’ face an ongoing 
duality between being responsive to their clients’ needs and ensuring policies are 
properly implemented. The forest field-staff, as a street-level bureaucrat, is an important 
link between the FD and local villagers and plays a key role in the implementation of 
forest programmes. Although extensions of a hierarchical chain of command, they can 
also act as independent agents with their decisions reflecting their own personal 
circumstances (Vira, 1999). The discretionary power that forest guards exert in recording 
forest offences, deciding the amount of fines and recommending applications for timber 
concessions, provides them with a significant amount of power and authority over forest 
dependent villagers (Vasan, 2006). Emphasising the need to analyse the roles and 
experiences of lower level government workers, Corbridge et al. (2005: 7) argue that the 
ways ‘technologies of rule’ actually work at local levels depends on the manner in which 
‘they are interpreted by field officials and seized upon, understood, reworked and 
possibly contested’ by differently placed social groups. Moreover, these officials are 
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often local residents and are involved in complex relations of sociality and reciprocity 
(Agrawal, 2005). Since the separation between private and professional relationships of 
field-level staff fails in Indian rural society, their identity is shaped by both their 
professional role as implementers of forest policy and also by their role as villagers in 
rural social networks (Corbridge et al., 2005). This presents a dilemma concerning the 
social roles and identities that a forest guard negotiates. Such a dilemma is well 
expressed by a forest official in Karnataka in the following words: ‘I think it is too hard to 
do both policing which requires terrorising villagers, and eco-development projects which 
requires being friendly’ (Mahanty, 2002: 3761). Below, I note the dilemmas of the field-
staff in Laati and Chapparh villages and highlight the split role of the Forester and Forest 
Guard in the protection and conservation of forests. 
 
The Forester and Forest Guard in Laati stressed the need of conserving forests for 
maintaining ecological balance as well as meeting the biomass requirements of the local 
people. They argued that fuelwood and fodder security would motivate the people to 
participate in various forest development activities under the NAP, and maintained that 
the formation of decentralised bodies such as the JFMCs and devolution of funds under 
the FDA has positively contributed to bridging their gap with the local communities.
208
  
 
On the question of plantation activities under the NAP, they argued that the FD has 
established nurseries and planted trees such as deodar, keekar, akhrot, maru and banj on 
the degraded forest lands. According to them, the choice of the species is made in 
consultation with the JFMC considering the needs of the local people. For example, the 
Forester argued that deodar is very useful to melt snow and its timber is durable for 
construction purposes, keekar prevents soil erosion and also provides firewood and 
fodder, and maru and banj are both used for the supply of fuelwood. I deal with the 
issues of people’s participation in selecting species and their access to local forests in the 
next chapter. In this section, I confine to presenting the perspective of the field-staff.  
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 It is pertinent to note that the Forester along with the JFMC Chairperson effectively control the project 
funds at the village level. 
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According to the Forest Guard, he is under constant pressure from senior authorities to 
check illegal felling. Being native to Laati, it is difficult to cater to the local needs of 
timber and fuelwood and, at the same time, adhere to the forest regulations that restrict 
local people’s access to forest resources. In the following narrative, the Forest Guard, 
Rafiq, explained the dilemmas he faces with regard to the demand of timber and 
firewood in the village: 
 
The forest laws are not in consonance with the needs of villagers. In winter, 
people come to me every day with their demands for timber to repair their 
houses. They also demand fuelwood at the times of marriages, community 
feasts and funerals. Their needs are very genuine and I give them the best 
possible help even going against law. 
 
While maintaining that forest conservation is important, the Forest Guard argued that it 
should not be at the cost of local requirements. He argued that while restricting access to 
resources (e.g. creation of enclosures to check open grazing), there should be proper 
provision for compensation to the affected populations. He added that although few 
entry point activities have been undertaken such as construction of ponds, bridges and 
roads, they are not sufficient in motivating the local communities to support the forest 
conservation programmes. The villagers still see the FD as ‘encroacher’ of their local 
resources. He stressed the fact that being local to Laati, he understands the local 
problems, but often other field officials are indifferent to the subsistence needs of the 
villagers. For instance, they even put restrictions on the collection of dry fuelwood unless 
they are bribed by the local residents. Explaining the challenges he faces in being 
accountable to both villagers and senior forest officials, the Forest Guard narrated his 
split role: 
 
I have to consider many things while helping the local people. Before letting a 
person collect timber or firewood from the forests, I make sure he can employ 
labourers to carry the log of wood or twigs as soon as possible else he might be 
caught by the Forester or police in the village. If caught, he may be fined 
heavily and I will be questioned by the higher officials [...] At times, I take the 
risk by allowing them to collect damaged timber when I know that their 
demands are genuine [...] Sometimes, I am afraid of villagers for scolding me 
for not helping them and at other times, I fear senior officials for helping 
villagers against law. I have to consider forest laws as well as local needs but 
senior officials take only the law into consideration. Since I am local to this 
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place, I have to walk hand-in-hand with the people of this village as well as 
secure my job. 
 
The Forest Guard explained that although the local villagers are entitled to timber at 
concessional rates, they need to apply for permits. Once the application is made by the 
villagers to the DFO, he does the necessary paper work including preparation of a report 
on the availability of damaged timber in the village forests, checking applicants’ records 
regarding illegal tree felling, reporting their last consumption of timber etc. If the 
applicant has cordial relations with the forest staff and has participated in fencing or 
other forest protection activities, then he is eligible to get permits and can avail timber at 
concessional rates.  
 
Apart from the highly cumbersome process, there are three main problems villagers face 
with regard to permits as explained by the Forest Guard. First, many villagers are too 
poor to pay the cost of permits, which is Rs. 350. Second, only 10-15 permits are issued in 
a year and applications are accepted only for nine months to restrict the demands for 
timber. Also, if a villager is granted timber, he can avail it again only after a period of 
three years. Third, they are not supplied deodar (for its high market value) but only kail 
which is less durable. Also, the amount of timber granted is quite low when compared to 
their needs for constructing or repairing houses.
209
 The Forest Guard explained:  
 
The construction of one house in a colder region requires a minimum of five 
trees. To meet this requirement, there is no other option than allowing the 
villagers to collect timber against forest laws. 
 
The discussion above suggests the split role of the field-staff in simultaneously catering to 
the demands of local residents and senior authorities. In spite of the overly optimistic 
claims about ‘people’s participation’ and ‘sustainability’, we can see the incompatibility 
between the archaic forest regulations and local requirements. The poor are denied 
access to good quality timber for subsistence needs and have to cope with poor quality 
housing, a point also raised by Sundar et al. (2001) in their study of the JFM in other parts 
of India. We also noted that the forest authorities maintain exclusive control over local 
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 For each permit, the applicant is entitled to receive one log of wood and 20% of the market value of the 
log is charged to the villagers after they obtain permits.  
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resources in the form of permits and concessions. Menzies (1993), in the context of rural 
China, argues that the foresters retain substantial control over forest management by 
issuing or denying permits to the local populations. We saw that given the cumbersome 
legal process of getting permits for timber and restrictions imposed on open grazing and 
collection of fuelwood, the poor can hardly see any incentives to strictly abide by the 
forest laws and regulations. They may often find it more practical to negotiate with the 
field-staff in order to meet their basic needs, a process in which both the forest guard 
and village poor transgress the lines of legality. It remains to be seen which other 
incentives, apart from helping the poor, can motivate the field-staff to transgress forest 
laws. I shall return to this point while discussing illegal timber trade and rent seeking in 
the next chapter. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
From this chapter, I draw three main conclusions. First, policy regulations and guidelines 
set the initial stage for politics with regard to control of funds and the activities to be 
undertaken as part of project implementation. This politics is shaped by factors such as 
the broad scope of the NAP, lack of focussed objectives, frequent amendments to 
regulations concerning project execution and flow of funds. I pointed to the ambiguities 
or uncertainties such factors can result in for the various actors in terms of their 
responsibilities and rights. I have argued that concessions granted to villagers in return 
for the responsibilities of forest conservation and regeneration are conditional upon their 
performance as forest protectors and law abiding forest citizens. Also, the local users 
need the approval of both the field-staff and senior forest officials before accessing any 
benefits or concessions, and their membership in the JFMCs could be terminated by the 
forest staff in the case of their performance being found unsatisfactory. It signals to the 
presence of a coercive element in the NAP, as opposed to the claims of being ‘people-
friendly’. 
 
Second, although the senior forest officials claim that the NAP is based on the premise of 
‘participation’ and ‘decentralisation’, I found that the forest bureaucracy rarely devolves 
effective powers onto lower levels, resulting in repeated re-centralisation with reference 
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to power, authority and control over decision-making and access to local resources. 
Despite efforts to reduce the bottlenecks in the transfer of funds from the centre to the 
JFMCs, the funds suffer delays or lapses due to failures on the part of forest officials in 
producing progress reports, utilisation certificates or conducting evaluation exercises. 
This indicates the presence of centralised control within apparently decentralised 
structures of the joint forest management.  
 
Third, while the FD and the SFC exclusively control local forest resources and exploit 
them for commercial purposes, it is the local populations who are expected to limit their 
dependence on forests and perform the task of forest conservation and regeneration of 
degraded forest lands. The SFC contractors and the FD make profits out of valuable forest 
resources but the local populations are devoid of accessing resources even for meeting 
subsistence needs. I have also highlighted the split role and dilemmas of the field-staff in 
catering to the demands of village residents for access to forest produce as well as those 
of senior authorities concerning forest conservation and enforcement of forest 
regulations.  
 
In closing, I presented in this chapter the arguments of optimists who maintain that 
participation and decentralisation lead to the sustainable management of forests along 
with meeting local needs. I also noted the viewpoints of sceptics who maintain that there 
is a strong coercive element in the forest policies and that, in actual practice, there is re-
centralisation of power and resources rather than effective decentralisation. What is 
evidenced in my study of the NAP in J&K is that the claims of sceptics are not unfounded, 
especially in the analysis of the functioning of forest bureaucracy. Yet, at the village level, 
these policies do not always result in fixed and determined outcomes as the sceptics 
would want us to believe. In the next chapter, I shall demonstrate that the intrusion of 
forest bureaucracy and the conservation ideas that it brings are negotiated and 
reconfigured according to the differential power and abilities of local actors. As such, 
forest conservation interventions do not go uncontested − they are experienced and 
accepted differently by various social groups within the village community, leading to 
multiple forms of micropolitics of forest use and management. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
The Micropolitics of Forest Use and Control: new spaces 
for cooperation and conflict 
 
The supporters as well as critics of participatory forest management programmes have 
conventionally understood these interventions in relation to issues of cooperation and 
conflict between forest bureaucracies and village communities. Recently, some scholars 
have pointed to the importance of local power relations and the role of field-staff in 
ultimately shaping the outcome of conservation policies (e.g. Springate-Baginski and 
Blaikie, 2007; Vasan, 2006; Li, 2005; Sarin et al., 2003). The forest edge, as Li (2007) 
suggests, is a site of struggle but it is difficult to control merely by coercive mechanisms. 
Other commentators have warned against the unbridled faith in ‘decentralisation’, and 
argue that it may ‘risk strengthening ties of patronage and further entrenching local 
elites’ (Francis and James, 2003: 327). Depending on their respective bargaining power 
and differential abilities, village residents devise various strategies to secure their 
interests amidst the opportunities and challenges created by interventions like the NAP. 
It is, thus, important to examine the roles and agendas of different players at the 
microlevel and understand how local power relations could be crucial in defining the gap 
between forest management policies and on-the-ground realities. 
 
In the previous chapter, I analysed the micropolitics of forest use and control by 
explaining the split role of the field-staff, and areas of tension between the SFC and local 
timber contractors. This chapter extends the discussion on micropolitics further by 
revealing new spaces of cooperation, conflict and contestations that have emerged under 
the NAP in Laati and Chapparh. The following questions are addressed in this chapter: a) 
How effective has the NAP been in enhancing people’s participation through 
decentralised management of forest resources? b) To what extent has the programme 
solved the problem of access to timber, fuelwood and fodder for village residents? c) In 
what ways do local power relations determine the access of villagers to forest resources? 
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d) How do the differential capacities of various forest users determine their behaviours in 
transgressing forest regulations and indulging in illegal timber harvesting? Overall, in this 
chapter, I present the experiences of the village community with the forest field-staff to 
assess how far the agenda of partnership between the FD and the village community has 
been realised in actual practice.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, I present the interplay between 
the JFMC, field-staff and panchayat, and highlight the areas of tension between these 
agencies. I focus on various forms of micropolitics concerning bottlenecks created by the 
FD in the devolution of funds, the domination of field-staff in decision-making, emerging 
hostility between the JFMC and other village residents, information asymmetries 
between the field officials and the JFMC members, and conflicting powers and functions 
of panchayat and the JFMC. In section two, I analyse the differential impact of forest laws 
and regulations on village residents. I argue that while the relatively affluent and 
powerful villagers are able to negotiate with the field-staff to facilitate their access by 
means of bribery, it is the poor who suffer the most from the increased restrictions on 
access to fuelwood, fodder and timber. I also illustrate how the field-staff creates 
opportunities for rent seeking by maintaining ambiguities between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ 
access to forest resources. Following this, in section three, I present the local 
understandings of the players involved in illegal timber harvesting. I maintain that 
although the poor, at times, indulge in illegal felling, it is merely to meet their subsistence 
needs. However, it is a powerful stream of actors including security forces and foresters 
themselves, who are involved in the relentless exploitation of forests for private gains. 
The principal argument in this chapter is that conservation programmes such as the NAP 
permeate existing relations of domination and subordination, and are reshaped by local 
power dynamics, resulting in differential impacts on various categories of forest users. 
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Section One  
 
1.1 From centralisation to decentralisation: do blockages disappear? 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the JFMC is considered as a potential link between 
the village community and state for forest conservation and management. The various 
developmental and conservationist functions, previously performed exclusively by the FD 
are now to be comanaged with the JFMCs. I have shown that an important shift with 
regard to the flow of funds was brought under the NAP in 2002 to facilitate the effective 
functioning of the JFM. The stated aim was that the new programme would devolve 
power and authority to the JFMCs for forest protection and reduce bottlenecks created 
by the state forest departments in the release of funds to the JFMCs.  In other words, this 
meant a change in the roles and powers of state and local actors with regard to control 
over funds as well as access to forest resources.  In the following discussion, I examine 
the degree to which the NAP has brought a shift in the powers of the forest officials vis-a-
vis local communities in Laati and Chapparh villages in relation to partnership in forest 
management, participation in decision-making and devolution of funds. I also highlight 
the symmetries (or asymmetries) with regard to information shared by the field officials 
with the local residents and demonstrate how the new laws and regulations can set the 
stage for politics between various players involved. 
 
In 2003, a common JFMC was constituted for Laati and Chapparh villages to implement 
the JFM project (under the NAP) funded by the central government. At the time of my 
fieldwork (2006-07), the same JFMC was functioning as no elections took place in the 
years following its initial formation.
210
 According to the JFMC members, the then Forester 
organised a meeting of villagers from Laati and Chapparh in order to form a village forest 
committee. In the meeting, he explained that under a new project of the FD, various 
developmental and forest regeneration activities would be undertaken jointly by the 
forest staff and the committee members. Out of a total of 50-60 villagers present in that 
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 It is to be noted that the NAP guidelines suggest that the elections for the JFMCs should take place every 
year. However, in the villages of my study, the next round of elections took place only after four years. A 
new JFMC was constituted in November, 2007.  
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meeting, the Forester asked the participants to nominate members for the proposed 
committee. A JFMC member from Chapparh, however, informed me that while three to 
four villagers had expressed their willingness to become members, the rest were simply 
nominated by the Forester, including Chairperson Rattan Chand (age 58), a thakur by 
caste who also happened to be the Forester’s friend.
211
 A list of ten names was then sent 
by the Forester to the FD for approval, which comprised of two thakurs, one Scheduled 
Tribe, three Scheduled Castes and four Muslims. Out of these ten members, two were 
women, one belonging to a Scheduled Caste and the other a Muslim. In this sense, the 
composition of the JFMC was representative of the various different social groups in the 
two villages but there was disproportionate representation in terms of residence as eight 
members belonged to Laati and only two to Chapparh village.
212
 It is pertinent to note 
that out of the ten committee members, eight were illiterate, the Chairperson being one 
of them. Having explained the formation and composition of the JFMC, I now turn to 
present the perspectives and experiences of the members in terms of the actual 
functioning of the JFMC.
213
  
 
In my initial conversations, the committee members emphasised the importance of 
community participation, and argued that the villagers recognise the significance of 
conserving forests and their sustainable use because they are completely dependent on 
the surrounding forests for meeting their basic needs of timber, firewood, grass, local 
medicinal plants etc. They argued that village residents can protect and manage the 
surrounding forests better than the forest field-staff who are often not local to the village 
and, hence, not committed to performing their duties properly. Being unfamiliar to the 
issues concerning local requirements and use of forest resources, they merely restrict 
their job to policing the forests. Most committee members were largely unaware of the 
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 It is important to note that thakur is traditionally a dominant caste group consisting mainly of landlords. 
Rattan Chand is an agriculturalist and a resident of Laati village.  
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 Sansar Chand (age 42), the JFMC member from Chapparh also informed me that the disproportionate 
representation of the JFMC in terms of residence was mainly because the Chairperson belonged to Laati 
and he, along with the Forester, selected other members known to them from the same village. Some 
issues of inter-village conflict between Laati and Chapparh will find mention in the narratives of sarpanch 
(who belongs to Chapparh) later in this section. 
213
 In order to understand the issues of cooperation and conflict between the JFMC and the FD, it was 
important to have repeated interactions with the members of the committee and hence the information 
provided below is based on several conversations with them.  
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rationale behind the formation of the JFMC, a point that would become clearer in the 
following discussion. On the need for a village forest committee, the Chairperson, Rattan 
Chand, commented:  
 
I think the main reason for forming a village committee is that it is difficult for 
forest guards to take care of the whole forest beat. I also feel that the 
responsibility of the department to protect forests from illegal felling is now 
over and has become ours.  
 
According to the Chairperson, the functions of the JFMC include village development, 
forest conservation and distribution of benefits and responsibilities among villagers. Soon 
after the formation of the JFMC, the members were asked by the Forester to prepare a 
microplan in consultation with the villagers, specifying the various developmental and 
conservation activities needed in the villages. Initially, the local villagers lacked 
awareness of the objectives of the programme and were apprehensive of the various 
forest related activities owing to their experiences of curtailment of rights to use forest 
resources imposed by the FD in the past (as discussed in chapter six). They were 
suspicious of losing further access to the forests and, hence, showed their reluctance to 
participate in any joint activities with the Department. The microplan was thus made 
mainly by the Forester with some suggestions on entry point activities (e.g. site for the 
construction of bridges, ponds etc.) by the JFMC members. Explaining the various 
developmental and conservation activities undertaken in the last three years, the 
Chairperson informed me: 
 
                   We have constructed two bridges, one in Laati Musral and the second in Laati 
Gharat. We also made four bowlis in Chapparh and three in Laati for securing 
water. For forest regeneration, we have made four closures, two in Chapparh 
and two in Laati. We have established two plant nurseries, one in Dhoona and 
other in Sira Morh. There is a watchman in both the nurseries and the 
committee members visit there every four days. Also, keeping in view the local 
demands for fodder, we allow people to cut grass from closures every three 
months in return for the help they offer in fencing the closures [...] We pay 
attention to the requirements of all the village residents as proposed by the 
committee members from both Laati and Chapparh villages. We also hold 
meetings when the Forester visits the village and take decisions collectively. 
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Although what the Chairperson narrated indicates the functioning of the JFMC in 
accordance with the prescribed guidelines, the actual picture came out more clearly in 
the later interactions with him, other committee members and villagers. For example, 
Sansar Chand, a JFMC member from Chapparh, provided a contradictory narrative with 
regard to the functioning of the committee in terms of decision-making powers and 
participation. According to him, the JFMC organised two meetings in the first few months 
of its formation for the preparation of microplan. The issues discussed in the meetings 
were related to the selection of sites for establishing closures, entry point activities and 
measures for preventing illegal tree felling. He informed me that after these initial 
meetings, the decisions were mainly taken by the Forester and Chairperson without 
consulting JFMC members.  
 
Other members of the committee argued that local residents being largely unaware of 
the aims and objectives of the project, give the credit to the forest staff for the entry 
point activities undertaken and the committee members do not get due recognition for 
their work. They also insisted that in the absence of field visits by senior officials, they are 
unable to communicate to the FD their concerns over the selection of entry point 
activities in the village. Moreover, in the absence of any awareness building exercises for 
the JFMC members with regard to the overall objectives of the programme and their 
rights and responsibilities, they rely solely on the field officials for the purpose of 
information. Owing to this, they argued that the field officials are able to exploit both 
committee members and local villagers to serve their own interests. 
 
After a few interactions with the Chairperson in Laati, some issues of conflict between 
the JFMC, field-staff and villagers also emerged on the question of control over funds, 
decision-making powers and roles and responsibilities of the committee. According to the 
Chairperson, the FD is not sensitive to the biomass requirements of the villagers and 
makes inappropriate choices of species to be planted for forest regeneration. For 
example, he mentioned that in 2006, the field officials provided keekar to the JFMC for 
plantation in the surrounding forests without any consultation with the committee 
members. The members argued that keekar yields very little fuelwood and serves no 
other purpose than increasing forest cover due to its fast growth. They proposed other 
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species such as akhrot, maru and banj which are more useful for the purposes of fruits, 
fuelwood, fodder as well as timber. Yet, the FD did not supply these trees as they take 
more time to mature when compared to keekar. Also, for the purpose of tree plantation 
on private lands, there is reluctance on the part of field-staff in involving the committee 
for distribution of plants to the villagers. As the Chairperson explained, a few months 
previously, the FD had provided some fruit bearing trees to be distributed among poor 
villagers. The Forest Guard and Forester distributed the trees according to their own 
discretion without consulting the JFMC regarding potential beneficiaries.  
 
The JFMC members argued that at the time of the formation of the committee, the 
Forester told the members that under the programme, the committee was empowered 
to take decisions on its own (in consultation with the field-staff) regarding provision of 
timber and fuelwood to the villagers in view of their genuine needs. However, the 
members explained that they were never given authority to take decisions in these cases. 
As such, the villagers continue to approach the Forest Guard and Forester for their 
demands of timber and firewood. They argued that for them, the programme has been 
more about responsibilities than any real benefits. As the Chairperson stated:  
 
I go and check the closures every four days. I even fight with people in the 
village for the illegal collection of damaged timber from the forests. I get no 
rewards for it. But I have to do this, otherwise if anybody damaged a closure, 
the staff would put the blame on me.                                                                                                               
 
Apart from decision-making, participation and responsibilities, the JFMC members also 
raised the issue of their control over project funds and maintained that they are hardly 
aware of the total funds granted by the FD for each activity. They blamed the field-staff 
for not discussing with them project expenses and estimates of costs for labour, 
transportation etc. The Chairperson complained of a delay in the approval of bills by the 
FD and the consequent payments to be made to the labour employed. For example, he 
recalled that in 2006, the committee was assigned the job of establishing a closure in 
Laati for which they were only provided the fencing wire but no advance payment. The 
committee was expected to employ the labour which was paid only after the completion 
of the project since the bills for labour costs were to be approved by the DFO and the 
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entire process took more than three months. Explaining his lack of actual power in terms 
of control over funds, he stated:  
 
I was told by the Forester that the two of us will jointly manage all project 
funds. But I have no say in the utilisation of funds. It is the Forester who 
controls the money [...] He even kept my rubber stamp for months saying that 
he needs it to do all the formalities required for maintaining the records of the 
JFMC. 
 
Sansar Chand, a JFMC member, reflected on his experiences with regard to benefits and 
associated responsibilities under the programme. Also, highlighting the problem of 
uncertainties regarding project costs and release of money, he narrated:  
 
I have not been benefited in any way other than that I am now more aware of 
the forest activities than the local villagers are. In fact, I had to spend from my 
own pocket to construct a bowli as an entry point activity in my ward. Neither 
was the amount to be spent on its construction made clear to me nor was I 
paid anything in advance by the Forester. So, I contacted the villagers known 
to me for providing labour and promised them to pay at the rate of Rs. 70 per 
day upon the completion of the work. The total money spent was Rs. 17,000. 
But, the Forester refused to pay the total amount, telling me that the Forest 
Department had sanctioned only Rs. 15,000 for the bowli [...] I came to know 
later from the Forest Guard that the actual money sanctioned was Rs. 25,000. 
So where are the benefits?                           
 
The JFMC members suggested that for effective project implementation, the government 
should give the power of utilising funds directly to the committee rather than to the DFO 
or field-staff. Although under the NAP, the money is transferred directly to the account of 
the JFMCs from the FDA, we noted that, in actual practice, it cannot be utilised unless 
approved by the DFO and the Forester. The funds remain under the effective control of 
the forest staff with the possibility of delays, misappropriation and leakages. Hence, the 
stated objective of devolution of funds to the JFMCs for effective implementation of the 
project seems to remain unfulfilled because of the blockages created both at the field 
and divisional levels. 
 
While the devolution of funds has not resulted in reducing bottlenecks, the idea of 
forming local partnerships in bringing the FD closer to village communities has also been 
only partially realised. The JFMC members argued that instead of bridging the gap 
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between the villagers and the FD, the programme has actually created a divide within the 
village community. They maintained that since the formation of the committee, fellow 
village residents have become hostile to them and see the committee members siding 
with the FD in curtailing their access to the forests. For example, if there is any case of 
illegal felling, a JFMC member has to accompany the field-staff to the place where the 
tree has been felled in order to witness the offence. However, they argued that if the 
offender is poor, he is punished but if he is relatively affluent, the field-staff accept bribes 
and allow the offender to take the timber away. 
 
The members argued that most of the time the staff invites them to witness the offence 
only when they are sure that the culprit cannot pay the bribe owing to poor economic 
conditions. When a villager is fined, the hostility of the local villagers is directed towards 
the committee members instead of the field officials. Due to such cases, the villagers do 
not identify themselves with the committee members and blame the members for being 
indifferent to their genuine requirements and acting against them. The members also 
complained that although the Forest Guard and the Forester benefit from bribes and 
salaries for doing their jobs, the committee members merely get a bad reputation from 
fellow residents for assisting the field-staff in witnessing forest offences.  
 
The JFMC members also pointed out that at the time of the formation of the committee, 
they were misinformed by the Forester with regard to the benefits that they would be 
entitled to. For example, a female member of the committee recalled that she was 
promised to be paid Rs. 500 per month for becoming a member of the committee.
214
 She 
expressed her disappointment when no such payment was made to her.
215
 The Forester 
also promised to pay Rs. 500 per month to the watchmen employed by the JFMC for 
protecting enclosures. Yet, no salary was paid to them for their services. Under the NAP 
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 In my conversations with the two female members of the JFMC, I found that they were not aware of the 
reasons for the formation of the committee, various project activities under the NAP or their 
responsibilities in forest protection. It appeared that although the reserved places for women in the JFMC 
were filled nominally, they hardly played any role in actual decision-making. The negligible role of female 
members in decision-making in forest programmes has also been highlighted by other scholars such as 
Springate-Baginski and Blaikie (2007), Agrawal (2005) and Sarin (1998). 
215
 Making a similar observation, Kawosa (2001) notes that the village committee members usually consider 
their membership as an opportunity or stepping stone for future appointments in the Forest Department 
which when not achieved disappoints the members. 
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guidelines, however, there is no provision for cash payment to the JFMC members for 
their shared responsibility with the field-staff. This infers that at the time of constituting 
the JFMC, the Forester had misguided the villagers with such false promises in order to 
enrol female membership and put the burden of policing forests on the villagers. 
 
Despite the presence of the JFMC in the village, the FD had entrusted some of the 
activities under the programme with the ex-sarpanch of Chapparh owing to her good 
relations with the DFO.
216
 The JFMC Chairperson complained that the training camp for 
income generation activities organised in Chapparh in 2007 was under the supervision of 
ex-sarpanch rather than the JFMC. Explaining his marginalisation, he argued that rather 
than consulting him on the demands brought forward by the villagers for timber and 
firewood, the DFO approved the cases recommended by the ex-sarpanch. He also added 
that he was also not involved in the formation of self-help groups initiated by the ex-
sarpanch in consultation with the DFO under the NAP. Suggesting that since the JFMC is 
the partner of the FD for all forest related activities, any collaboration with a third party 
such as the panchayat cannot be justified. I further elaborate on the issues of conflict 
between democratically elected panchayats and the FD promoted JFMC in the following 
discussion. 
 
1.2 Panchayat and JFMC: conflicting powers and functions 
 
My interview with Beant Gupta (age 65), the ex-sarpanch of Chapparh, revealed some 
inside facts concerning the formation of the JFMC and its functioning, disparities 
between the developmental activities in Laati and Chapparh and tensions between the 
JFMC and the panchayat.
217
 Although her tenure finished in 2006 after serving as 
sarpanch for five years, she still holds considerable power and authority in the two 
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 This point has also been raised by Sundar et al. (2001: 206) in their study of the JFM in other states of 
India. They note that ‘the creation of autonomous forest protection committees at village level is 
potentially in conflict with the national pressure to revitalise the panchayat’. 
217
 It is to be mentioned that Beant Gupta is Mahajan by caste and the majority of the villagers in Chapparh 
are Gaddis. She succeeded in winning the panchayat elections in 2001 against five Gaddi candidates which 
shows her popularity in the village. 
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villages.
218
 She compared the functioning of panchayat with the JFMC and argued that 
unlike the forest committee, her panchayat had always considered the interests of the 
villagers by holding regular meetings for developmental activities. Also blaming the JFMC 
for concentrating the developmental work only in a few wards of Laati, she stated:  
 
Out of the grants my panchayat received, I constructed the panchayat office 
building, water tanks, roads, playground etc. for the villagers. I have done 
development in all the eight wards of Chapparh unlike the JFMC which 
concentrated their developmental work in only a few wards of Laati, to which 
most of its members belong. I assigned the construction jobs to the residents 
of the respective wards to ensure that the work done was of the best quality. 
The members of the panchayat visited the construction sites regularly to check 
the progress. This way, I shared power of panchayat with local residents. 
 
She claimed that since the senior authorities approve the developmental plans without 
visiting the sites themselves, the community programmes, often fail to meet the actual 
needs of the villagers. She argued that there should be two separate JFMCs for Laati and 
Chapparh respectively to represent the interests of both the villages, a matter she had 
been pursuing actively with the DFO.
219
 Also, contrary to what the JFMC members 
suggested, she maintained that the JFMC can work better in collaboration with the 
panchayat. She complained that the present JFMC never sought her advice on any of the 
developmental or conservation matters, and argued that if they had done, she would 
have advised them on other developmental activities needed in the village. Further, 
commenting on the arbitrary process of the formation of the JFMC, she noted: 
 
The JFMC was formed by the Forester in 2003 without any elections [...] It 
lacked equal representation of the people from Laati and Chapparh. The result 
was that the developmental activities by the JFMC were concentrated only in 
Laati [...] I know that the JFMC Chairperson and other members are friends of 
the Forester – all illiterate and drunkards. 
 
According to the ex-sarpanch, neither the FD nor the JFMC has taken any initiatives to 
create awareness about the NAP in the villages. She claimed that the JFMC Chairperson 
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 It is to be noted that no panchayat elections have taken place in J&K since 2006. Beant Gupta is a nurse 
by training and the first point of contact for the villagers to get any medical treatment. As such, she was 
held in recognition by the villagers even before being elected as sarpanch.  
219
 After her tenure was over in 2006, she succeeded in pursuing the DFO to elect the new JFMC in 2007. 
However, the committee had not undertaken any projects until I conducted the second field trip to the 
village in November, 2008. The actual functioning of the new JFMC is beyond the scope of this study. 
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has no standing and is incapable of organising even a workshop or a training camp for the 
benefit of the village community. Owing to this, the DFO asked her to organise a one-day 
training camp for income generation activities at Chapparh in 2007.
220
 As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, an expert from an NGO named AKKA was invited by the FD to train 
the local people in various forest related income generation activities such as mushroom 
cultivation, drying fruits, bee-keeping and honey production (see Figure 6 below).
221
 This 
training camp did not prove beneficial, according to the ex-sarpanch, because the JFMC 
failed to take any follow-up action such as the formation of self-help groups for these 
income generation activities. Moreover, she thought that in the absence of marketing 
opportunities for their products, merely a one-day training camp could not succeed in 
motivating the villagers to start such income generation activities.  Also, according to her, 
different departments such as rural development, horticulture, agriculture, social 
forestry etc. have in the past approached villagers with community based projects which 
have showed little tangible benefits and visible effects. This has confused the villagers 
and resulted in the loss of their faith and enthusiasm to participate in the governmental 
projects. She informed me that following the directives of the DFO, she has now formed 
three self-help groups in the village, two made up of females and one of males, and 
argued that the members of these groups have agreed to contribute money for the 
functioning of the group merely because of her reputation in the village.
222
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 I noted that the JFMC Chairperson was not present in the training camp and only two JFMC members 
attended it. This suggests that by the time of my fieldwork (2006-07), the JFMC was surpassed by the ex-
sarpanch and the DFO was dealing with her for all practical purposes. Effectively, the ex-sarpanch started 
dominating in all matters of the FD and villagers in Laati and Chapparh even before formally taking up the 
position of the JFMC Chairperson of Chapparh in 2007. 
221
 In the picture, it is the ex-sarpanch, Beant Gupta (left), the DFO, Roop Kaur (centre) and the expert from 
the AKKA, Rakesh Verma (right), sitting at the front facing the villagers. The JFMC Chairperson, however, 
was not present in the camp. It is also notable that the DFO, in spite of her privileged position, tried to 
bridge the gap with the villagers by sitting on the ground with them and not in the chairs arranged by the 
FD field-staff. This clearly shows that, when compared to the past, the attitude of some senior forest 
officials has changed, especially in dealing with the village communities for they are now more courteous 
and respectful to them. Yet, I observed that the forest field-staff is not so forthcoming in changing its 
attitude, and maintains a hierarchical relationship with the villagers in their day-to-day interactions. 
However, the change in attitude on the part of senior officials (or even field-staff) in being more courteous 
while interacting with villagers, although welcoming, does not discount the fact that it is the FD and not the 
JFMC which determines access to forest resources as well as project funds.  
222
 A self help group is formed by collecting a specified amount from each member of the group every 
month. Once the groups are six months old, they can apply for loans and start any income-generation 
activity.   
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                      Figure 6: A training camp at Chapparh organised by FDA Udhampur 
 
To conclude, in this section, I have argued that although there is construction of local 
institutions and change in the structure of flow of funds under the NAP, there is 
reluctance on the part of the FD to hand over effective power to the JFMC. Whilst the 
JFMC is representative of various social groups in the village, the members were primarily 
selected by the Forester. The microplan was prepared without consulting the villagers 
and entry point activities were decided mainly by the Forester and the JFMC Chairperson. 
We witnessed the domination of field-staff in the choice of tree species for regenerating 
forests, their distribution, and selection of sites for establishing closures. Moreover, the 
blockages in the transfer of money both at divisional and field levels indicate strong 
centralised control over funds as opposed to the decentralised management aimed 
under the programme. As observed, it is only after the project activity is completed and 
expenditure bills approved by the DFO that the money is released to the JFMC. At the 
field level, the effective control over funds also remains with the Forester (Secretary of 
the JFMC), who misappropriates them by providing wrong information to the JFMC 
members. This is evidenced from the lack of transparency between the Forester, the 
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Chairperson and members of the JFMC with regard to the allocated funds for the 
construction works undertaken as entry point activities in the villages.  
 
The above findings corroborate the results of some recent studies on participatory forest 
management in other states of India. For example, Springate-Baginski and Blaikie (2007), 
in their study of the JFM programme in Orissa, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh argue 
that in practice, local people have very little influence on forest management plans and it 
is actually the FD who sets the agenda for the activities to be undertaken. Likewise, 
Sundar (2004) illustrates the failure of devolution of power to the participatory 
committees in the villages of Madhya Pradesh and argues that the committees are tightly 
controlled by government staff and rarely represent the actual users of the forests. Sinha 
(2006) maintains that the ‘ruler-ruled attitude’ is quite apparent among the FD officials in 
Jharkhand, especially the Range and the Beat officers with little participation of the 
villagers.  Dhanagare (2000) argues that the notion of ‘joint’ remains only on paper as the 
forest department in Uttar Pradesh still perpetuate its conventional view of forestry of 
working for the people than with the people. Ballabh et al. (2002) in the case of 
Uttaranchal and West Bengal note that the FD’s control over microplans and the disposal 
of forest produce leave little room for ‘people’s participation’, thus, hampering the 
successful implementation of the JFM projects. Referring to the functioning of the JFM 
under the NAP in Orissa, Sarap and Sanrangi (2009) argue that although some 
developmental works have been undertaken in the villages at the entry point phase, 
transparency has not been maintained in the use of funds and also the choice of the 
activities to be undertaken were decided mainly by the forester and the chairperson of 
the committee. Thus, on the basis of my findings from J&K and similar observations made 
by scholars in other states of India, I argue that empowering villagers through 
‘participation’ (by forming village committees) and ‘decentralisation’ of control (by 
transfer of funds to the committees) does not automatically result in the altering of 
power relations between the FD and the villagers. Instead the diverse interests and 
priorities of players involved may create spaces for conflict under the cover of 
cooperation or comanagement of forests.  
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Apart from lacking power in decision-making and control over funds, we also noticed that 
the JFMC members experience hostility from fellow village residents due to their 
association with the field-staff in witnessing forest offences. While the committee 
members face antagonism for complaining against local villagers, we saw that such 
offences may also open up rent seeking opportunities for the field-staff. Thus, by making 
the JFMC a representative of local population and a ‘legitimate’ body responsible for 
forest protection, the FD is able to shed its responsibility of forest conservation by using 
the committee as a vehicle to re-orient interactions of villagers with forests. At the same 
time, it diverts the hostility of the villagers towards the committee instead of the FD.  
 
The JFMC members in Laati and Chapparh argued that even for the construction works 
undertaken as ‘entry point activities’, the villagers give the credit to the field-staff for 
bringing in money for development and do not give due recognition to the responsibility 
shared by the committee members. Referring to this paradoxical situation, Sundar et al. 
(2001: 14) argue that where the JFM fails, the FDs deflect blame towards villagers for 
mismanagement of already degraded commons but where it succeeds, they claim joint 
credit for reversing deforestation and simultaneously providing for the livelihood needs 
of the poor. Bhattacharya et al. (2004: 25) caution against the ‘regressive effect of formal 
structures’ (like forest committees) on community based collective action and argue that 
the introduction of formal structures of governance may also cause a ‘schism’ within 
social groups. In line with the above arguments, we noted in the narratives of the JFMC 
members that contrary to bridging the gap between villagers and the FD, the local 
institutions have entrenched already existing disparities and power relations within the 
village community.  
 
I have also highlighted the areas of tension between the panchayat and the JFMC in Laati 
and Chapparh which suggest that local power realities are complex and, hence, even well 
meaning policies of decentralisation and participation unravel differently than intended 
by the policy makers. In reality, these policies are rarely able to secure fixed and 
determined outcomes; rather they become refracted and reshaped by power relations at 
the microlevel. We saw the conflict between the ex-sarpanch and the JFMC on the one 
hand, and emerging cooperation between the DFO and the ex-sarpanch, on the other. 
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While the DFO was interested in the training workshop and formation of self-help groups 
to demonstrate the effective functioning of the NAP, the ex-sarpanch, after the end of 
her tenure, was trying to reconsolidate her position and power in the village by 
cooperating with the DFO in implementing these activities. However, the forest 
committee and supposed village ‘beneficiaries’ for whom such activities were actually 
targeted remained as mere spectators or passive participants in the programmes. 
 
The issues of knowledge creation, dissemination and information are central to the 
effective functioning of community based natural resource management programmes. In 
the study of the NAP in J&K, I have shown that the lack of knowledge regarding the roles 
and responsibilities of different stakeholders, funds available for various activities under 
the programme, and lack of easy access to the senior forest officials were major sources 
of discontent to the committee members. Observing issues concerning lack of awareness 
in participatory forestry programmes, scholars reveal a remarkable lack of information 
among village committees about the legal framework for decentralisation (Larson, 2004). 
Mahanty (2002) notes that in the case of forest protection in Karnataka, due to poor 
communication and information links with the implementing agencies, information 
transmission was largely informal, through personal accounts, stories and rumours. 
Kothari et al. (1997) argue that a basic problem in India’s protected areas seems to be the 
absence of any form of dialogue between the government authorities and local 
communities resulting in misinformation about the positions, justifications and 
circumstances of each other. Similarly, Das (1997) notes that the interaction of villagers 
with the senior officials is near negligible as they visit only the forest areas and very 
rarely the villages. Springate-Baginski and Blaikie (2007) also report the universal 
tendency of the DFOs and the rangers to pay a quick visit to village leaders, organise a 
poorly advertised meeting and then attempt to enforce the plan. Such short visits by the 
government officials to the field have been referred by Chambers (1987) as ‘rural 
development tourism’. I have explained that since the senior forest officials in J&K rarely 
visit the field, and the laws are, often, interpreted by the field officials according to their 
own understandings and vested interests. In Laati and Chapparh, the committee 
members did not only lack information about their rights and responsibilities, they were 
misinformed regarding the incentives to join the JFMC. For example, the female 
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members in the villages were misguided about the honorarium that they would be 
getting by becoming the JFMC members. The committee members were also 
misinformed about the funds available for the construction activities under the 
programme.  
 
The information asymmetries between villagers, the JFMC members and forest officials 
provide opportunities to the field-staff for imposing restrictions on the village residents 
for rent seeking. I elaborate on this point in the next section where I focus on the 
interactions between villagers and the field-staff. I demonstrate that even after four 
years of project implementation, the majority of the villagers lacked awareness of the 
aims and objectives of the NAP. I also discuss specific problems faced by ordinary 
villagers in terms of access to timber, fuelwood and fodder, and the differential abilities 
of village residents to secure their respective needs.  
 
Section Two 
 
2. Increased biomass, reduced access 
 
In order to gain a nuanced understanding of ‘community’, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) 
propose to examine how the diverse interests of stakeholders can affect processes 
around conservation and determine their differential access. More recently, scholars 
such as Dressler et al. (2010), Saito-Jensen and Jensen (2010), Shackleton et al. (2010) 
and Springate-Baginski and Blaikie (2007) suggest that although well intentioned 
community forestry policies do result in collective afforestation, they may also run the 
risk of emboldening local elites politically and economically. Likewise, Ros-Tonen et al. 
(2005: 12) argue that the resource management practices are marked by power conflicts 
and ‘exclusion from access rights are still commonplace’. Gupta (1998: 320) cautions 
against ‘exclusions and repressions in a community’ and Vasan (2006: 233) notes that 
diverse groups within local communities organise differently in order to contest, 
negotiate or even override state dictates. Pointing to the role of micropolitics in shaping 
the outcomes of community programmes, Saberwal (1999) argues that the local access 
to and use of natural resources is influenced to a far greater extent by local power 
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relations than by the policy debates of a hegemonic state. Sundar (2001) maintains that 
community involvement in conservation and management does not represent a shift 
away from state control; rather it is a shift to more micro-disciplinary forms of power 
(see also Neumann, 2001). Noting the observations and cautions of these scholars, I now 
turn to examine the relationship between villagers and field-staff in Laati and Chapparh, 
and explain how forest laws and regulations have been experienced differently by village 
residents owing to their differential power and abilities. 
 
My interviews with the village residents suggest that the majority of them lacked 
awareness about the objectives of the NAP and even the existence of the JFMC in the 
villages. Most of them had never participated in any of the meetings of the JFMC held in 
the initial months of its formation. Those few who had the knowledge of the committee 
stressed the fact that it was formed by the Forester without consulting the villagers. They 
also mentioned that a general apprehension amongst the villagers for forest 
conservation activities was that the FD would take away their land to establish closures. 
Some others even felt that if they became members of the committee, the FD staff would 
ask them to complain against villagers involved in illegal felling, failing which they could 
be punished by the forest officials. Most villagers, hence, saw the state more as a 
malevolent outsider than a provider for their subsistence needs, and showed little 
interest in participating in forest regeneration programmes of the FD. There were a few 
others who were aware of the JFM programme and strongly emphasised local control of 
forests for protection and use. For example, Majid Ahmed (age 74), a resident of 
Chapparh stated:  
 
The forest is like a mother to us. For everything, we have to go to the forests. 
They only help us, they never bring us harm. I believe that the forests should 
be protected by the local people and the department jointly [...] Forest officials 
get transferred and lose interest in the programmes but villagers are always 
here to take care of the forests. If the local people are involved by the 
department, they can protect the forests just as their own property. 
 
In terms of the change in forest cover in the surrounding areas, I received mixed 
responses from the villagers. While some held the view that compared to 15 years ago, 
there is now an increase in forest cover and availability of grass and fuelwood, others 
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considered that the forests are continuously depleting. Yet, all of them stressed that their 
own access to forest resources has decreased because of increasing restrictions imposed 
by the FD. Acknowledging the increase in pressure on the local forests due to the 
increasing population, they observed that the depletion of forests has been mainly due 
to commercial exploitation of timber and other forest produce. Moreover, they also 
argued that the FD is not doing enough to protect the natural loss of forests due to heavy 
snowfall by removing damaged timber. Instead, it has put restrictions on local 
populations to access forest resources even for fulfilling their basic requirements. An 
elderly resident of Laati, Kastoori Lal (age 78) on the issue of forest depletion due to 
commercial exploitation, remarked: 
 
When I was young, I feared thinking that if the forests continue growing this 
way, what will happen? Now I feel the opposite. Previously, the forests were 
dense and inhabited by wild animals. The presence of these wild animals 
prevented the local villagers from destroying the forests. But the exploitation 
of the forests by the Department and contractors to meet market demands 
has changed everything [...] In the next 50 years, there will be no forests left 
for the future generation. 
 
The villagers held the view that even when the FD takes initiatives for tree plantation and 
forest regeneration, it is not for the benefit of local people. They explained that the FD 
mainly grows timber species and encloses the area for regeneration. This creates a 
reduced supply of fodder and fuelwood. They argued that villagers are mainly dependent 
on maru for fodder and firewood. Maru trees are declining due to the increasing 
fuelwood and fodder demands in the village and need to be replaced by fast growing 
species to meet the local needs. Reiterating the point made by the JFMC Chairperson (in 
the previous section), they argued that the FD is growing keekar which is a very fast 
growing species but does not yield much fuelwood. They suggested other species such as 
banj, champ, kaimbal and kathi which grow faster, and can also provide both firewood 
and fodder.
223
 They suggested that walnut can also provide fuelwood as well as timber to 
the local villagers and can be grown both on private and forest lands. However, they are 
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 Poor villagers have little faith in the FD concerning the choice of species to be planted. In the past, the 
FDs across India have attracted public anger for the plantation of eucalyptus under the Social Forestry and 
Eco-development projects. Kumar (2002) notes that by planting fast growing species, the JFM could 
succeed in halting forest degradation but the objectives of poverty reduction and meeting biomass 
requirements of the villagers are sidelined.   
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never consulted over the choice of species or sites to be chosen for regeneration despite 
their knowledge and understanding of the various uses of local plant species. 
 
When asked about the change in the attitude or behaviour of the forest staff, the poorer 
villagers maintained that their relationship has not changed with the field officials who 
continue to threaten and exploit them. Some poorer residents held the view that 
although the officials are inflexible in dealing with their requirements of timber and 
firewood, the relatively well-off residents are treated differently because they can afford 
to bribe the forest officials. Emphasising the problem of timber in the village, the villagers 
explained that in times of heavy snowfall, the field officials, instead of being responsive 
to their genuine demands of timber, expect them to apply for timber permits which, 
according to them, is a long, expensive and cumbersome process.
224
 Moreover, the wood 
that is provided to them is of kail which is of lower quality in terms of its durability as 
compared to that of deodar which the villagers had been traditionally using for 
constructing houses. They pointed out that the forest staff provides timber to those who 
offer them bribes but impose all regulations and restrictions on the poor. The villagers 
cannot approach the DFO directly with their demands of timber because if they do so, 
the field-staff gets angry with them and does not recommend their case for timber 
concession to the DFO. In the narratives below, I illustrate that the forest officials, 
instead of being sensitive to the needs of the poor are actually re-enforcing the already 
existing disparities. 
There is no change in the relationship of forest staff with us. I have many 
complaints against them. The roof of my house collapsed last week and I have 
no choice but to sleep in my cattle shed. I am trying to get some timber to 
repair my roof but the Forester does not pay attention to my request. He tells 
me that I need a permit to get timber and the process would take a minimum 
of four months. Neither can I wait for four months nor can I fell any tree from 
the forests [...] My husband died last year, I have three little kids. I do not 
know whom to approach to solve my problem. 
                                                                                                       Kaushalaya Devi (age 36), Laati                         
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 It is to be noted that the actual fee for a permit is Rs. 350 but the local villagers are charged ten times 
more by the field officials due to their lack of awareness. We will observe this in the narratives of the 
villagers provided below. Those who could afford to pay Rs. 3000-3500 to the Forest Guard for a permit do 
so because the market value of timber is much higher, and beyond the affordability of most village 
residents. For example, the current market value of kail (10 cubic feet) is Rs. 14, 940 and chir (10 cubic feet) 
is Rs. 6,260. 
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Three years back, I needed timber for my house. I approached the Guard and 
he asked me to apply for permit. I told him that I could not go to the forest 
office at Udhampur. He asked me to pay him Rs. 3000 and after I made the 
payment, I got the permit at home next week. So, I have no complaints against 
the Department.                                                         
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                 Zakeya Begum (age 48), Chapparh 
 
There is no change in the attitude of the forest staff towards the local people. I 
just need one log to repair my roof but the Guard does not provide me timber 
[...] All forest employees are friends of the affluent. The rich get even deodar 
for firewood but the poor like me cannot get it even for constructing a house. 
Laws are only for the poor.                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                           Rekha Kumari (age 44), Laati 
 
Yes, the relationship between the forest staff and the villagers has improved in 
the sense that they talk courteously with us now. But they never discuss their 
forest activity plans with us and make late payments for the labour we provide 
in the construction activities. What is worse is that the permit fee is only Rs. 
350 but they charge us Rs. 3000. They say that it is their commission.                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                      
                                                                                   Rehmat Ullah (age 64), ex-sarpanch, Laati 
 
The Forest Department has not done anything for us. We face many problems 
with getting timber from the Department [...] Two years back, due to snowfall, 
many houses including mine were damaged. I requested the Guard many times 
but he told me that I needed to get a permit first. I could not apply because it 
was a long process and the fee was Rs. 3500 which I was not able to afford. 
Then, a few weeks later while crossing the river, I found a damaged log of 
wood which I carried and brought to my house without informing the Guard. 
Although I have used it to repair the roof of my house, the condition of my hut 
is still very dangerous as it can fall anytime.                
                                                                                                              
                                                                                                            Mool Raj (age 40), Chapparh 
 
Referring to the strict regulations of the FD, the villagers mentioned that, often, the field 
officials threaten them even for collecting dry twigs from open forest areas. The women 
who collect firewood and sell it in the villages for modest incomes complained that they 
are harassed by the field-staff on the pretext of ‘illegality’. Some of them informed me 
that when they offer bribes, the Forest Guard even allows them to cut green branches to 
be used as firewood.
225
 On the contrary, the Forest Guard argued that he has put 
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 In the feudal times, there was a practice of rast, a form of informal dues paid by the local villagers for 
the maintenance of forests. But even now the Forest Guard collects rast from the villagers. It may include 
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restrictions on the collection of dry wood because some villagers had started supplying 
firewood to wood sellers outside of the villages, which is obviously not used for local 
consumption. The villagers exclaimed that being unclear of what is ‘legal’ and what is 
‘illegal’, they are bound to succumb to the restrictions imposed by the field-staff on their 
access. As a result, most of them are compelled to bribe the field-staff for collecting 
fuelwood from the surrounding forests.  
 
Besides the problems of timber and firewood in the village, another challenge faced by 
the local residents is the reduced access to fodder after the establishment of closures 
under various forest programmes in the villages.
226
 It is mainly women and children who 
are involved in the task of collecting fodder and firewood for the daily consumption in 
the household.
227
 My female respondents explained that they have to travel long 
distances in order to collect fodder and firewood because of the enclosures established 
in the surrounding forest areas. They recalled that travelling to distant forests in the time 
of heightened militancy involved high risks as the field-staff imposed restrictions on open 
grazing in the surrounding forests. They informed me that since the establishment of 
closures, the FD has never opened them for villagers to collect grass.
228
  
 
According to the pastoralists such as gujjars and bakarwals
229
, pastoralism is no more a 
profitable occupation due to the growing shortage of fodder since open forests are being 
enclosed by the FD for forest regeneration. They argued that the livestock population in 
the village is declining as they have started selling their livestock and looking for 
                                                                                                                                                        
items for consumption such as ghee (clarified butter), maize, grains, pulses, kidney beans or even cash. 
According to the villagers, the Forest Guard argues that this is for the firewood he provides them. If one 
does not give rast, the Guard does not allow them to collect firewood or fodder from the forests. 
226
 In the context of the JFM programmes in Andhra Pradesh, Saito-Jensen and Jensen (2010) suggest that 
prior to the JFM, although the forest boundaries were drawn between state-owned forests and those of 
villagers, they had de facto access to forest resources. The villagers used to enter the forests to collect 
various forest produce by avoiding the timing and locations of patrols of forest guards. However, the JFM 
has led to a significant redefinition of these forest boundaries by establishing closures and assigning the 
task of vigilance to the JFMCs. This has reduced local people’s access to resources as we also see in Laati 
and Chapparh. 
227
 As mentioned earlier, the women and children collect medicinal herbs such as vanaksha, guchhi, doop, 
kaur and patis from the forests and sell these to local shopkeepers for additional incomes. 
228
 A few of the respondents recalled that five years previously, the Guard charged them a Rs. 150 fee to 
collect fodder from the closures. Since the FD claims to provide fodder to the villagers for free, it can be 
inferred that the Guard charged the villagers illegally. 
229
 The gujjars and bakerwals are traditional nomadic graziers who trade in livestock and its products. 
Generally, bakerwals rear sheep and goat for wool and meat while gujjars rear buffaloes for milk. 
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alternative livelihoods. Recall the argument of senior forest officials (in the previous 
chapter) that an increase in livestock and human population is putting pressure on the 
forest resources. They blamed villagers and pastoralists for destroying the forests by 
overgrazing. Contrary to this, the pastoralists in Laati informed me that the livestock 
population has actually decreased in the last ten years due to restrictions imposed by the 
FD on their access to forests.
230
 Many of them have taken up agriculture to support their 
incomes. Others who are still engaged in livestock rearing have to buy fodder from the 
local residents and from the neighbouring villagers during the winter, and move to 
mountain tops during the summer to graze their cattle.
231
 The following two narratives 
explain the ways in which the pastoralists are coping with the shortage of fodder in the 
village: 
 
While I manage agriculture in Laati, my brother takes the sheep to a 
neighbouring village in the winter and stays there for four months. He has 
made an arrangement for grazing with a cultivator in that village who has got 
several maru trees on his land [...] We are charged Rs. 1500 by him for each 
maru tree. For providing fodder to our cattle during these months, we spend 
Rs. 3000. It is an expensive affair now. 
                                                                                                                    Tirth Ram (age 70), Laati 
 
From May to September, I go to the upper reaches of Seoi Daar because there 
is not enough grass in the village. We have to pay Rs. 2,000 to the Forest Guard 
for going there.
232
 In October, we move to the plains. I have some contacts 
with landowners in the villages of the Kathua district. They lend us their land to 
graze our cattle. We have to pay Rs. 5,000 for 150 sheep but there is no other 
choice. 
                                                                                                  Mohammed Aslam (age 62), Laati 
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 Sundar et al. (2001) make a similar observation in other states of India where the villagers informed 
them that livestock numbers had decreased since the early 1990s, corresponding to a decrease in 
availability of fodder. They note that this assessment by the villagers themselves contrasts with the 
perceptions among foresters that livestock numbers are increasing. 
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 Pastoralists in other parts of India also adopt different strategies to compensate for reduced availability 
of fodder in their villages. For example, Saberwal (1999: 41) mentions various methods adopted by the 
herders in Himachal Pradesh to cope with the shortage of fodder through local level negotiations within 
the herding community as well as between herding and cultivating communities. He notes that a herder 
may draw upon family labour to ‘pay’ for access to grazing. Alternatively, a herder may choose to pay for 
such access through a monetary transaction, or through reciprocal sharing of winter and summer grazing 
grounds. Similarly, Agrawal (1999) in his study of a migrant pastoral community in Rajasthan argues that 
shepherds negotiate with the neighbouring landowners in the villages and with state officials in order to 
get access to fodder from both private and common lands. Axelby (2007) also notes similar processes of 
negotiations in the context of Gaddi shepherds in Himachal Pradesh. 
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 While there is no grazing fee for cows, and up to six horses, the fee is Rs. 1.15, Rs. 0.20 and Rs. 0.40 for a 
buffalo, sheep and goat respectively. My respondent, however, informed that the pastoralists have to pay 
much higher than the official fee for grazing. 
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Another important point of contention between the FD and villagers in Laati and 
Chapparh relates to encroachments on forest lands.
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 The practice of demarcating 
private lands and government lands goes far back, and some of my respondents could 
recall that in the pre-independence period, bhurjis were made to demarcate the forest 
lands from the private lands in Laati and Chapparh.
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 This practice continues until the 
present day. The forest guard measures the forest land and patwari (local revenue 
official) keeps records of the village private lands. Some senior villagers argued that the 
practice of encroachment on the forest lands has increased after independence because 
the field-staff is corrupt and it is easy for villagers to alter the boundaries after offering 
them bribes.
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 According to my respondents, the practice of encroachment is done more 
by the relatively affluent people who can bribe the field officials.
236
 These encroachers 
sometimes involve the poorer residents (living on the nearby lands) in their 
encroachment activities to ensure that they do not complain to the senior authorities.
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The poorer households are co-opted by the affluent in encroachment of forest lands by 
providing incentives for sharing a small portion of the total land encroached by them. 
Munshi (age 70), a senior resident of Chapparh and member of the JFMC explained: 
 
There are many examples of encroachments of the forest lands around Laati 
and Chapparh, but these cases are never reported. Last year, I went to 
complain about such encroachments to the Range Officer in Chenani. He said 
that they do not have employees to check this, so I should take the case to 
patwari. I did not pursue this nor did they bother to look into it [...] Due to 
such insensitivity of the officers and the people, the result is that the forest 
land is diminishing and private land is increasing.
238    
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 The FDs throughout India consider encroachment, by way of expansion of agricultural activities, as the 
biggest threat to the forest areas. For example, Das (1997: 57) notes that the forest officials hold the view 
that ‘notwithstanding the people’s allegations and denials’, encroachment of forest land for agriculture is 
‘frequent and rampant’.  
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 Bhurjis or boundaries are conventionally made of stone and mud though the FD is now proposing to 
make cemented bhurjis in the villages to discourage the practice of encroachments. 
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 Das (1997), in the context of Rajasthan, notes that the forest guards and other field-staff generally take 
cash, or are bribed with milk and milk products, in exchange for which they allow the villagers to encroach 
on the forest land for cultivation, entry into the enclosures, and felling trees. 
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 This corroborates the findings of Sundar et al. (2001: 186) that although encroachments are a desperate 
response by marginalised people for subsistence, the richer households are mainly involved in this practice 
because ‘bribing the forest staff and ploughing freshly cut forest land is expensive’. 
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 Robbins (2000) makes a similar note in the context of rural Rajasthan and argues that corruption is 
structurally perpetuated by co-opting the poor. The caste and class elites offer minor concessions to the 
poor who, in turn, surrender the ability to complain and remain complicit. 
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 I went to see encroachments with him in a forest named baskar. He showed me the land of a Muslim 
cultivator who had encroached nearly 30 kanals of forest land about 20 years ago by bribing the forester. 
The second case was of another Muslim agriculturalist who had encroached 40 kanals of forest land. 
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Below I briefly note the experiences of the villagers in the construction activities 
sponsored by the FD under the NAP and also in the previous projects. Although the NAP 
emphasises income generation activities and employment provision for the villagers in 
return for their shared responsibility of protecting the forests, it has failed to invoke any 
motivation among local villagers to participate in such activities of the FD. According to 
the villagers, while the FD has undertaken a few construction activities such as the 
building of bridges, water sprouts and the fencing of forest patches for regeneration, 
these activities have generated little income for them as the construction works lasted 
for only 10-15 days in each case. Those who are employed in tree plantation (by the FD), 
tree felling (by timber contractors) or construction works (by the JFMC) are paid lower 
wages, between Rs. 50-70 per day when compared to the prescribed wages of Rs. 100 (as 
per the forest guidelines). The villagers, therefore, do not see these forest activities as 
opportunities for enhancing their incomes nor for increasing the availability of biomass. A 
few also indicated the reasons for their lack of faith and willingness to participate in 
government projects. For example, in an earlier programme of watershed development 
in the village, the respondents informed me that under that project, activities such as the 
establishment of closures and tree plantation took place for a period of five years. But 
after the project was over, the closures were damaged by the villagers in order to meet 
their demands for firewood and open grazing. Mohammad Ashraf (age 42), a resident of 
Laati explained his lack of interest in governmental projects and narrated his experience 
of working as wage-labourer in the watershed project:  
 
I appreciate the work the watershed project did for forest regeneration and 
checking water and soil erosion but we labourers suffered a lot working on this 
project. We were not paid for 23 months [...] What was worse was that we 
were not even told that the project was over. We continued waiting for our 
wages as we thought we would be paid after six to eight months for our labour 
as had always been the case. Finally, we wrote an application to the DFO to 
grant our wages but we were told that the project was over, so nothing could 
be done [...] Five years is a short period for any project to mature. As soon as 
the old project begins to show its effect, it ends and a new project starts. I 
think that the programmes should be continued for a longer period to bring 
effective results for the development of the village. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Although the FD has, on paper, reclaimed the area from him, he has constructed his house on the 
encroached land and is still living there. He explained that this land included around 500 deri trees, which 
are of even better timber quality than deodar.  
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To summarise thus far, the discussion presented in this section raises four main issues 
concerning the functioning of the NAP. First, it can be noted that while there has been an 
increase in forest cover in the last two decades, as some respondents have suggested, 
the villagers’ access to forest resources such as timber, fuelwood and fodder has 
certainly been reduced. The FD has imposed several restrictions on village residents 
through various mechanisms such as permits for timber concessions, providing low 
quality wood for housing, enclosing forest areas for regeneration, restricting open 
grazing, and even prohibiting the villagers to collect dry wood from the open forest lands. 
This is done in the name of increasing forest cover as well as the availability of biomass 
for local forest users. Yet, the incentives such as timber concessions or employment 
generation have failed to attract villagers’ interest in working with the FD. Menzies and 
Peluso (1991), in the case of China, note that incentives to protect forests are more 
effective than controls on access, but they are themselves stifled by bureaucratic 
procedures and may turn into another set of de facto controls imposed by the state. 
Edmunds and Wollenberg (2003), in the context of the JFM in India, argue that foresters 
retain substantial control over forest management, issuing or denying permits for a wide 
array of management activities. Other scholars (e.g. Peluso, 2003; Peluso and 
Vandergeest 2001; Barber, 1989) suggest that state agencies control both resources and 
the activities of their subjects seeking access to those resources by mapping, 
demarcating, reserving forest areas and administering rural territories. In J&K, we noted 
that the process of obtaining timber concessions remains long and complicated; villagers 
need to wait for several months or pay bribes to the field-staff to shorten the process. 
Also, contrary to the claims of senior officials (discussed in the previous chapter) that the 
forests are depleting as a result of an increase in the livestock population, the narratives 
of pastoralists and villagers in Laati and Chapparh suggest that the livestock population 
has, actually, decreased in the recent past and they have started selling their livestock 
and taking up alternative livelihoods. Due to the shortage of the availability of fodder and 
restrictions imposed by the FD on grazing, some of them have started purchasing fodder 
from the landowners within the village or from cultivators in other villages. Likewise, the 
access to fuelwood for the poor has declined in spite of the regeneration of surrounding 
forests under various projects, the NAP being the most recent.  
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Second, in contrast to the NAP programme guidelines, we saw that the decision-making 
process is mainly controlled by the FD with little or no participation of the local forest 
users. For instance, the selection of species is mainly done at the district level with the 
objective of time-bound increase in forest cover without assessing the actual needs and 
priorities of the villagers. This finding resonates the observations of other commentators 
on decentralised forest management. For example, Njogu (2005) argues that despite 
being recognised as critical stakeholders in conservation and development projects, in 
practice, communities often lack the power to become definitive stakeholders. Sarin et 
al. (2003) suggest that instead of revitalising the indigenous knowledge of local users, the 
joint management system developed for supporting livelihoods and maintaining 
ecological services, is actually reinforcing the FD’s claim to be the monopoly holder of 
technical forestry knowledge. Randeria (2007) notes that the new regulatory regimes of 
forest control are based on claims to scientific knowledge while disregarding local 
knowledge, norms and practices in practical terms. In Laati and Chapparh, we see that 
the lack of opportunities to exercise choice by villagers results in their reluctance to 
cooperate with the FD in spite of their willingness to regenerate and protect the 
surrounding forests.  
 
Third, the forest laws and regulations are experienced differently by village residents 
owing to their differential abilities to negotiate with the field-staff. In my conversations 
with the villagers, I noted several references to myriad practices of rent seeking by the 
field-staff, signalling that corruption at the lowermost level of the FD plays a determining 
role in the unfair distribution of benefits. Referring to unequal access to forest resources 
and their distribution, Springate-Baginski and Blaikie (2007) argue that although the 
wealthy use the forests less for subsistence purposes than marginal farmers and the 
landless, they are often in a position to gain more from the new opportunities which 
participatory forest management offers. Likewise, Sarin et al. (2003) note that instead of 
enhancing multidimensional space for local forest management, the JFM interventions 
empower the FD, often in alliance with village elites, to reassert its control over local land 
and forest resources. Collins (2008) argues that the powerful groups receive facilitation 
by the field officials for private gain in return for providing security to exploit 
environmental opportunities but the poor experience marginalisation. Platteau (2009: 
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60) states that in situations of ‘power asymmetries’ within communities, there is a 
considerable risk of local elites distorting information in a strategic manner and 
‘opportunistically capturing’ a substantial portion of benefits. Owing to such unequal or 
clientelist conditions, the local elites are able to capture the local state, a process 
referred by Veron et al. (2006) as ‘decentralised corruption’. In Laati and Chapparh, we 
noted that while the poor face problems in accessing timber and fodder despite their 
genuine requirements, the relatively affluent village residents benefit easily from both 
timber concessions and fuelwood. They also benefit extensively by encroaching forest 
lands but the ability of the poor to do the same is severely restricted due to their weak 
bargaining capacities vis-à-vis forest officials. 
 
Fourth, information asymmetries between the FD and villagers provide an opportunity 
for the field-staff to bolster their authority over forest resources as well as manipulate 
forest laws for private gains. We noted that the villagers were largely unaware of the 
programme as well as the actual rules and regulations governing their access, due to 
which they were often harassed by the field-staff for their supposed ‘illegal’ access to 
forest resources. They were also paid less and irregularly due to their lack of information 
regarding minimum wages for construction activities. Wardell and Lund (2006) observe 
that people’s ignorance of their rights provides scope for local authorities to define 
current practices as illegal. In the narratives of the villagers, I have demonstated that, on 
the one hand, the forest staff compromises with forest laws and regulations to meet the 
requirements of relatively affluent and on the other, it uses them against the poor even 
for collecting dry wood under the false charges of ‘illegality’. This suggests that, in 
practice, forest laws and policies are often bent to serve the powerful actors but work 
against the interests of the poor. Arguably, rather than forest laws and regulations 
defining the outcome of conservation policies, it is the local power dynamics which 
actually shape the conforming and transgressing behaviors of various forest users, 
thereby, determining the success or failure of conservation programmes. This again 
suggests that power is dispersed and fluid, and that forest conservation outcomes are 
shaped by complex processes of negotiations and contestations at the ground level 
rather than simply determined by the rationality from the ‘above’.  
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Section Three 
 
3. Illegal timber felling: what if fence eats the grass? 
 
In the previous chapter, I noted that the senior forest officials believe that the illegal 
felling and timber trade has been controlled significantly since the initiation of the 
programme. The local villagers, as they argued, are more willing to cooperate in forest 
protection because of the efforts made by the FD to enhance community participation. It 
was also claimed that the JFMCs, now recognised by the FD as comanagers, assist the 
field-staff by complaining immediately if any damage to forests (such as illegal felling, 
forest fires and encroachments) has occurred in the village. I also discussed the 
involvement of the SFC and local contractors in illegal timber extraction, and the role of 
the field-staff in transgressing forest regulations while dealing with the timber and 
firewood needs of local villagers. In this section, I extend the discussion on these points 
further by presenting local understandings and the experiences of village residents (and 
field-staff) to assess the actual situation regarding illegal timber felling and trade in Laati 
and Chapparh, and the various players involved therein.  
 
Although initially the field-staff, including the Forester and the Forest Guard, shared the 
viewpoint of senior officers that illegal timber extraction has been under complete 
control for the last few years, it was after a few meetings that they narrated the inside 
story of illegal felling and the timber trade, and their own limitations in controlling these 
activities. The Forester in Laati pointed out that militancy and turbulent political 
conditions in the 1990s had proved beneficial for timber smugglers across the state as 
forest patrolling became difficult.
239
 He further explained that while the local poor also 
resort to illegal felling in times of crises such as damage to their houses due to snowfall 
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 Even recently, newspaper reports suggest that the unrest in Kashmir during the summer of 2010 has 
immensely benefitted timber smugglers in the state. As noted by a press agency, ‘timber smugglers have 
largely benefitted from the restricted movement of forest guards and other officials during the course of 
unrest in Kashmir. The illegal felling of trees has shown an upward trend and has become so widespread 
that during the last three months alone, forest officials have seized more than 5000 cubic feet of timber 
from smugglers in different parts of the Valley’ (Ganae, 2010). 
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or at the time of communal feasts for want of firewood; it is the Border Security Forces 
(BSF) and police, deployed since the early 1990s to curb militancy, that have actually 
damaged the forests extensively. These agencies are involved in illegal felling and 
smuggling out logs of wood using their official conveyances. In other instances, they even 
make furniture from deodar wood in the local furniture shops of Laati and transport it to 
their houses outside the state. The Forester stressed that the local villagers cannot 
indulge in this business because there are some 20 check-posts of the FD and the police 
on the way from Laati to Udhampur. Explaining this paradoxical situation, he argued that 
the local people complain to the field-staff about imposing restrictions on their access 
while turning a blind eye to the ‘illegal’ activities of paramilitary and security forces. 
Although he reported such cases to the senior officials of the FD, they have been 
reluctant to take any disciplinary actions against the illegal practices of security forces. 
Moreover, to register a court case for illegal felling, a witness is needed. No villager, he 
explained, would come forward to complain against the BSF for fear of receiving threats 
from them. Explaining the dilemma faced by the field-staff in taking action against the 
BSF, the Forest Guard of Laati, Rafiq added:  
 
In Mantalai, a few months back, BSF personnel felled 15 deodar trees. The 
Forest Guard of Mantalai complained about this to the DFO. The DFO sent a 
letter to the Deputy Inspector General, BSF complaining about the illegal felling 
by the BSF personnel in the region. After this, the Guard started receiving 
threats until he apologised and presented ten kilograms of ghee [clarified 
butter] to the BSF personnel in the village [...] In my forest range also, they 
illegally fell firewood and timber [...] I am afraid of the BSF because it will start 
snowing next month and they will clear a forest patch, and I will have to face 
antagonism from the local villagers. 
 
The Forest Guard and Forester in Laati argued that they are considerate about the needs 
of the local people when their requirements are genuine and allow them to collect fallen 
wood from the nearby forests. Yet, they blamed the local police who have been extorting 
money from the village residents until recently in forest related offences. They argued 
that, in the past, the police officials used to harass the villagers by accusing them with 
false charges of tree felling. The police would ask for bribes even from the people who 
were given permits for timber concessions by the FD. However, in the recent years, due 
to changes in regulations related to forest offences, if the police confiscate logs from a 
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villager, they have to take the case to the DFO and the charges can be ascertained only 
after the DFO’s consent. This change in procedure, according to them, has saved the 
innocent from the hands of corrupt police.   
 
Some JFMC members held the view that the illegal timber trade has certainly fallen in the 
last ten years or so but has not been stopped completely. Apart from the BSF, the 
members indicted the forest field-staff for facilitating the continued green felling in the 
area. As mentioned in section one, the JFMC is required to assist the field-staff in 
witnessing such offences but, often, the field officials accept bribes from the offenders 
and let them go free. Moreover, members argued that the staff also violates the forest 
rules by charging nearly ten times more than the actual fee for providing permits for 
timber concessions. The members argued that, in many cases, the forest guards get the 
application sanctioned from the DFO for one log but allow the applicants to cut and carry 
more. While the payment of the sanctioned timber is made to the Forest Department, 
the field-staff benefits from the payments made to them by the applicants for the 
additional trees cut. 
 
Interestingly, the JFMC members informed me that the field-staff themselves have 
devised several strategies for green felling. For example, they do this by peeling the trunk 
in ring form or burning the bottom part of the trunk, causing the trees to fall naturally in 
the next few months (see Figures 7 and 8 below). The field officials make informal 
agreements with the village residents and local contractors, and apply these felling 
techniques mainly to the enclosed areas and conceal their malpractices. The field-staff 
then justifies such premature felling on the pretext of forest fires or high wind velocity. 
The JFMC members believe that by doing this, the field-staff is able to earn money as well 
as maintain cordial relations with the public. 
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Figure 7:  A ring peeled pine in the closure of          Figure 8: A burnt deodar trunk in the closure of 
Laati                                                                                     Chapparh 
 
As indicated earlier, the village poor have also adopted strategies to meet their 
requirements for fuelwood and timber by either illegal felling of trees or collecting the 
damaged and fallen timber after bribing the field-staff. According to a senior resident of 
Chapparh, in response to the strict regulations, poor villagers sometimes collect the 
damaged wood from the forests without informing the field-staff, and hide the stolen 
logs (underground) in their houses to be used in times of need. Obviously, they do so 
because the forest laws and regulations work against their subsistence needs. Below, I 
present some narratives pointing out the viewpoints of village residents on the various 
different players involved in illegal felling: 
Most of our forests are being destroyed by the security forces [...] The BSF gets 
funds from the Indian government to buy coal and kerosene oil. They pocket 
this money and, instead, cut the trees from the surrounding forests for 
firewood, taking our share away.                           
                                                                                                                                               
                                                                                                 Mohammed Ashraf (age 55), Laati  
        
I believe that the SFC has caused much harm to the surrounding forests. The 
contractors do not cut the trees marked in the compartments which are 
difficult to access but fell green ones in the areas nearby for their convenience. 
Though they are allowed only to cut champ by the Department, at times they 
even cut maru, banj and deodar and intermix the wood logs [...] Some local 
villagers also indulge in green felling and sell the logs to the local contractors 
for making money.  
                                                                                                                        
                                                                           Rehmat Ullah (age 62), ex-sarpanch, Chapparh 
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These days, there is a big problem of getting fuelwood and timber even for our 
basic needs. Previously, we used to collect dry wood from the surrounding 
forests but now we are told by the Guard that it is illegal because the forest is 
no longer open for free access. Since we need fuelwood, there is no other way 
than to bribe the Guard or buy firewood from local woodsellers. 
         
                                                                                                  Mohammed Aslam (age 40), Laati 
                                                                                                                    
To summarise, in this section, I have demonstrated that there are multiple actors 
involved in the illegal felling of trees, including the BSF, forest staff, police, timber 
contractors and village residents. While indulging in illegal practices, we observed that it 
is the already powerful actors who largely succeed in forest exploitation and destruction. 
For example, I have argued that the paramilitary force, the BSF is able to transgress the 
forest laws due to their position of privilege and power. The field-staff experience 
dilemmas in fulfilling their expected duties of forest protection amidst militarisation of 
J&K. It also feels helpless in checking illegal activities for ‘fear of physical danger’ (Vasan, 
2006). We witnessed that the Forest Guard himself suggest various strategies of green 
felling to village residents who, in turn, bribe them for the illegal harvesting of timber. 
Referring to very similar tactics adopted by log traders in Thailand, Dheeraprasart (2005) 
highlights the role of the Forest Industry Organisation in illegal timber felling and explains 
that the timber traders employ the villagers to inflict a premature death of the trees by 
cutting a thin ring around the narks and sometimes applying chemicals in a large quantity 
on selected trees. In the context of South East Asia, Dauvergne (1997) also report that in 
exchange for gifts, money or security, implementers, often ignore or even assist illegal 
harvesters and timber smugglers. 
  
The poor village residents also resort to illegal practices mainly to meet their daily 
requirements of fuelwood or timber in the times of emergency, although with greater 
probability of being harassed by the enforcement officials. Rossi (2004) cautions that 
although the policies are strategically reworked by various actors, according to their own 
powers and interests, those in weaker bargaining positions are unlikely to prevail their 
interests over the actors dominantly placed. Scholars such as Bloomer (2009), Chatterjee 
(2004) and Peluso (1993), in different contexts, have argued that poverty and lack of 
alternatives are the main reasons for the indulgence of poor in illegal activities. Wiggins 
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et al. (2004) suggest that resource dependent communities may ignore or deliberately 
contravene policy regulations to defend their interests or livelihoods. In J&K, I have 
argued that it is the poor who are considered to be the major destructors of forest 
resources by the FD. Rather than acting against the powerful players who commit the 
most serious violations of forest laws, the field as well as the senior officials remain 
complacent and put the burden of forest conservation and regeneration on the poor by 
imposing restrictions on their access.  
 
I have shown that timber concessions ‘through proper channels’ are difficult to avail for 
the poorer residents but easily available for those who can afford to bribe the field-staff. 
Robbins (2000: 428) aptly notes, where existing patterns of social power are strong, 
‘state-defined common property rules, founded on principles of equity, are fashioned 
into inequitable de facto rules, cemented in local social capital and trust’. In the absence 
of effective formal mechanisms for delivering services to the poor, MacGaffey and 
Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) argue that people rely either on the trust of personal 
relationships or create their own system of values by operating in the ‘second economy’. 
Likewise, Nordstrom (2004) suggests that ‘shadow economies’ function through 
negotiated rules, laws and mutual trust among the participants. Brown and Ekoko (2001) 
maintain that unlike conventional polarisation of local villagers versus external loggers, 
there are multiple actors who regulate the use, protection and exploitation of forests and 
determine the outcome of forest management policies. I have demonstrated that forest 
conservation and protection in J&K is not simply a matter of conflict or cooperation 
between village residents and the FD but an issue of power relations between multiple 
actors including timber contractors, paramilitary forces and police. Ironically, the actors 
who are meant to either fence the forests or provide security and protection are the key 
players in transgressing forest laws and regulations. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
From this chapter, I draw three conclusions. First, while the NAP promises a rich array of 
benefits for local populations, from representative decision-making to increased 
availability of biomass, it has not resulted in bringing any effective change in the 
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relationship of villagers with the FD in terms of control or access to local forest resources. 
I have shown the dominant position of the field-staff in selecting the members of the 
committee, preparation of microplans, selection of entry point activities, choice of 
species for forest regeneration, and control over funds for various activities under the 
programme. I have also argued that despite the claim of devolution of funds to local 
communities for facilitating the NAP, the release of money is strictly controlled by the 
forest bureaucracy at both divisional and field levels. In practice, the FD, in the guise of 
decentralisation and people’s participation, is still able to retain centralised control of 
forest use and management. 
 
Second, there are emerging areas of conflict, cooperation and contestations between the 
FD, JFMC members, panchayat and the villagers. Contrary to the claims of forest officials 
that the programme is successfully bridging the gap between the villagers and the FD, we 
saw that it is actually creating a divide between the committee members and other 
villagers, and between democratically elected rural local bodies and the FD sponsored 
JFMCs. By making the JFMC a representative of the local population in forest protection, 
the field-staff tries to shed its responsibility of forest conservation on to the JFMC and 
also divert the hostility of the villagers towards the committee. I have noted that the DFO 
and the ex-sarpanch collaborate with each other to pursue their respective agendas 
while sidelining the existing JFMC which was entrusted with the implementation of the 
various project activities. Owing to these new spaces of cooperation, conflict and 
contestations, I argue that conservation interventions like the NAP, often get refracted 
and reshaped by power relations at the microlevel. 
 
Third, the majority of the respondents suggested that there has been an increase in the 
forest cover in the last ten or so years but their own access to forest resources such as 
timber, fuelwood and fodder has reduced. Since the forest regulations are incompatible 
with the subsistence needs of village residents, we saw that the villagers have no choice 
but to bribe the field-staff or resort to ‘illegal’ practices for accessing forest resources. 
The village residents have differential abilities to negotiate with the field-staff owing to 
their status determined by various factors including wealth and power. While the 
relatively affluent succeed in obtaining timber concessions and fuelwood easily or even in 
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encroaching forest land, the poor are harassed for the collection of dry twigs or damaged 
timber. Moreover, the blame of forest destruction is put on the poorer residents and 
pastoralists but the powerful actors such as the BSF, police and timber contractors who 
indulge in extensive forest exploitation ‘illegally’, go scot-free.  
 
It can be argued that both law and science are being used as a means to legitimise the 
control of forest bureaucracy, serve the interests of the powerful and affluent, and at the 
same time, to restrict the access of poorer residents to forest resources. A general 
response from the villagers was that they are confused regarding what is ‘legal’ and what 
is not. The forest laws and regulations keep changing and villagers are, often, not 
informed about the rights which affect their access to resources. Since the senior forest 
officials in J&K rarely visit the field, the villagers are dependent on the field officials to 
understand the new regulations. The forest laws are, often, interpreted by the field 
officials according to their own understandings and vested interests for creating rent 
seeking opportunities.  Furthermore, we observe that scientific knowledge is privileged 
over indigenous or local understandings of forest use and management even under the 
NAP. Apart from reinforcing the expert authority of the FD by means of selection of 
species to increase forest cover, we also see that the field-staff themselves disseminate 
strategies for causing the the premature death of trees.  
 
Overall, the case study of forest use and control in J&K explained the shift in 
management strategies from ‘communal’ to ‘custodial’ to ‘joint’. Beginning from the 
colonial period to post-colonial times, we saw a continuous decline in the power of local 
forest users to control local resources. While the scientific rationality succeeded in 
limiting the access of local users to forest resources, it proved subservient first to 
imperial and then to varying national interests of forest exploitation and conservation. In 
the last two decades, the science of ‘sustainability’ has changed the focus of forest use 
from commercial exploitation to forest regeneration through local participation and 
decentralisation, based on the assumption of convergence of interests of forest 
managers, the conservation community and forest dependent populations. I have 
demonstrated that the broad objectives of the NAP, the split role of the state in forest 
protection and exploitation, information asymmetries between the FD and villagers, lack 
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of actual devolution of power and funds to forest citizens, differential abilities of village 
residents to access forest resources and extensive destruction by both timber contractors 
and security forces, result in various forms of politics from macro- to microlevels. I argue 
that owing to the differential power and diverse interests of players involved in forest 
use and control, the forest conservation policies are negotiated, manipulated and 
reworked in very different ways than originally envisaged by policy makers. While the FD 
bureaucracy, timber contractors, security forces and local elites are all able to secure 
their respective interests, it is the poor who are compelled to limit their forest use and 
bear the cost of forest conservation and regeneration.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
On Conservation Politics: cooperation, conflicts and 
contestations 
 
This thesis has discussed the politics of wildlife and forest conservation by exploring two 
recent interventions in J&K. Following an integrative multi-level and multi-actor 
framework, the study has examined the process of the banning of shahtoosh trade and 
the implementation of the NAP, and analysed the power, agendas and interests of the 
various stakeholders involved. The first part of the thesis (chapters one and two) 
introduced the research questions and approach, research setting and various 
methodological tools used for the collection of data. The second part of the thesis 
focused on the case-study of the ban on shahtoosh trade in three subsequent chapters 
(three, four and five). Apart from discussing the myths, legends and realities concerning 
the origin of shahtoosh, shawl production process as well as the growth and 
development of the shawl industry, I highlighted the areas of conflict and tension 
between conservationist groups, central government and the J&K state in banning the 
trade of shahtoosh. I also analysed the various forms of micropolitics that emerged in 
response to the imposition of the ban in the state. The third part of the thesis (chapters 
six, seven and eight) dealt with the study of forest conservation and management. 
Tracing the systems of management and control of forests in J&K from early colonial 
times, the study presented the interplay between various state and non-state actors 
associated with the implementation of joint forest management under the NAP. I also 
highlighted the areas of cooperation, conflict and contestations at the village level with 
regard to managing, controlling and accessing forest resources. 
 
The analysis of the two case-studies began with examining how the historical factors and 
circumstances influenced both the shaping of the conservation policies and the 
determining of their outcomes. The study then examined how law, science and politics 
played a central role in defining access to and control over resources. By taking into 
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account the agenda and priorities of the global conservation community, internal 
divisions and complexities within the state, and the differentiated concerns of social 
groups within the affected communities, the research has illustrated the various forms of 
contestations that take place when global conservation policies are transmitted to the 
local worlds. The narratives of the local communities were presented in the thesis to 
demonstrate how various historical, political, scientific, legal and social forces interact 
with each other, and how they are challenged, compromised and reconfigured.  
 
In this thesis, I engaged with diverse viewpoints on nature conservation in understanding 
how conservation policies meet local realities. The mainstream literature advocates 
global control over local natural resources for their sustainable use and management. I 
considered arguments in this literature ranging from the urgent need for global natural 
resource management (e.g. IUCN, 1980; WCED, 1987), to realising the goals of 
sustainable management of natural resources along with the sustainable livelihoods of 
dependent populations (e.g. Bebbington, 1999; Scoones, 1998; Chambers and Conway, 
1992), to natural resource management through local community involvement (e.g. 
Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Gadgil, 1998; Shepherd, 1998; Adams, 1996) and devising 
effective mechanisms for participation through local partnerships and decentralisation 
(e.g. D’Silva and Nagnath, 2002; Saigal, 2000; Lynch and Talbot, 1995). In contrast, the 
alternative viewpoint shows scepticism towards the global conservation agenda and 
considers global management of local resources as a new form of imperialism (Calvert 
and Calvert, 1999; Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997), often with coercive and violent force 
to control the local populations and their resources (see Peluso and Watts, 2001; 
Lohmann 1996; Peluso, 1993; Neumann, 1992). Some scholars even caution against the 
dangers of repeated centralisation of actual powers within decentralised natural 
resource management practices (see Sarap and Sanrangi, 2009; Sinha, 2006; Sundar, 
2004; Ballabh et al., 2002; Poffenberger and Singh, 1996). My observations during the 
fieldwork revealed that the deterministic interpretations of conservation interventions 
fail to provide convincing accounts of the complex and diverse processes through which 
the policies meet the local realities. My analysis, thus, goes beyond the claims of both 
‘sustainable resource management’ and ‘coercive conservation’ schools. I have argued 
that power relations are at the heart of sustainable resource management and use, and 
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that while the global conservation agenda can be seen as coercive in nature, it does not 
always result in straightforward compliance by the state and local actors to the imposed 
laws and regulations. My findings, therefore, resonate with the arguments of scholars 
(such as Gupta, 2009; Singh, 2008; Li, 2007; Rossi, 2004; Leach et al., 1999) who have 
emphasised that global interventions rather than transforming the local realities, in 
positive or negative ways, are resisted, reinterpreted and reshaped in the process of 
implementation, resulting in such interventions taking very different forms than intended 
in the policy rhetoric. This thesis suggests that rather than the conservation policies 
shaping the local realities, or the ‘state’ dictating the ‘community’, it is the powerful 
stream of actors located at multiple sites which actually determines the outcomes of 
nature conservation interventions by undergoing through the processes of contestations 
and negotiations.  
 
In the following discussion, I revisit the case-studies and reflect on the broad conclusions 
of this research. I begin by analysing the nature of power in conservation interventions. 
Following this, I highlight the spaces of cooperation, conflict and contestations between 
different actors in terms of: a) relationship between law, science and politics, b) 
partnerships and collaborations, c) split role of the state, d) different impacts and 
differential abilities, e) rationality of rule, f) illegal trade and g) limited space for protest. I 
raise the issue of accountability and outline the main implications of the study for policy-
making in the areas of wildlife and forest conservation in general, and specifically in the 
context of the conflict-ridden state of J&K. 
 
1. Power as dispersed and fluid 
 
I have demonstrated that power rather than located at one site is dispersed and fluid, 
and that when conservation policies meet local realities, differently placed actors engage 
in contestations at multiple sites to secure their respective interests. This means that the 
sole capacity of conservation interventions to change local realities can be questioned. 
There is no doubt that in recent times, the influence of transnational actors has 
considerably increased in defining the relationship of nation-states and local populations 
with their resources (Gupta, 1998), and that the global conservation community has 
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adopted a coercive attitude in addressing the nature conservation issues (Peluso, 1993). 
It is argued that the transnational conservation organisations, using moralistic 
constructions, present nature conservation as global necessity (Singh, 2008). I have 
shown that despite the initial resistance of the J&K state to the banning of shahtoosh, the 
will of the international community prevailed in making the trade ‘illegal’. Also, the issue 
was dealt largely along conservation lines with little consideration to the livelihood 
concerns of the local populations. Similarly, the global conservation thinking on 
sustainable use of forests through local participation and decentralisation became a 
guiding force to govern forest resources in J&K.  
 
The other side of the narrative, hitherto less addressed in the literature, is that the state 
and local populations rather than acting as passive recipients are consistently engaged in 
resisting, negotiating and reshaping these conservation interventions (Gupta and Sinha, 
2008; Rossi, 2004; Moore, 2000; Li, 1999). I argue that although the conservation policies 
from ‘above’ certainly play a significant role in defining the access of these actors to their 
resources, the conforming and transgressing behaviours of the local state and affected 
populations is actually determined and shaped more by the local power relations and 
circumstances. It is argued that when the recipients of policies and interventions are 
faced with discourses external to their language, culture and society, the relative distance 
from the sources of rationality increases the room for manoeuvre available to them 
(Rossi, 2004: 26). Referring to the dispersed and fluid nature of power, I have maintained 
that the affected communities, located at distance from the centres of policy 
formulation, exercise their power by finding ways to transgress regulations imposed from 
‘above’. However, I have also demonstrated that it is primarily the relatively powerful 
actors within the affected communities who are able to manipulate policies to suit their 
requirements, priorities and interests.  
 
2. Between cooperation and conflict: spaces for contestation 
 
When power rather than being located at one site is dispersed and fluid, it is likely to 
move beyond cooperation and conflict into the domain of contestation and negotiation. 
In practice, resource governance can be seen as a matter of ‘fragile relays, contested 
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locales and fissiparous affiliations’ (Rose, 1999: 51). Salskov-Iverson et al. (2000) maintain 
that the ‘local’ is a site where transnational discourses are challenged, translated, 
negotiated and internalised into numerous political re-positionings. Resistance to nature 
conservation, Li (2005: 391) suggests, involves not simply rejection but the creation of 
something new, finding allies and repositioning in relation to the various powers 
confronted. Moreover, global interventions can also be seen to articulate with deeper 
histories of government attempts to regulate and discipline landscapes and livelihoods, 
and generate politics of contingency and contestation (Moore, 2000). Therefore, as 
Gupta and Sinha (2008: 290) argue, there is a need to approach local development 
contexts as spaces of negotiation in which the power of globally dominant discourses is 
received, accepted, amended and rejected, leading to more diverse outcomes than the 
deterministic interpretations allow. Below, I discuss the spaces of cooperation, conflict 
and contestations through which the two conservation interventions unfolded in J&K.  
 
Science, law and politics 
In this thesis, I have argued that science and law played a crucial role in setting the stages 
for politics between various actors involved in wildlife and forest conservation efforts. 
While both science and law served in legitimising the rationality of the conservationist 
community and its intrusion in controlling local resources in J&K, we found that they also 
played a significant role in serving the interests of powerful actors both within the state 
and resource dependent populations. As discussed in chapter four, science and scientists 
were enrolled in legitimising the imposition of the ban with the view of urgent need for 
protecting the Tibetan antelopes and reversing the declining trend of its population size. 
Yet, little efforts were made to explore the possibility of chiru farming. In chapter six, I 
explained how scientific forestry played a crucial role in legitimising the intrusion of the 
forest bureaucracy in J&K for the systematic management of forests. However, the 
scientific management principles were compromised in favour of war-time needs and 
serving the commercial interests of the colonial as well as post-colonial state. In the years 
to come, a new application of science was propagated by the international conservation 
community under the label of ‘sustainable management’ of forests. Chapter eight argued 
that the scientific expertise, apart from legitimising the control of the professional 
community in protecting the forest resources, was also used by the forest bureaucracy to 
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maintain its dominant position in terms of selection of species for forest regeneration. I 
have demonstrated that while science played an authoritarian role in controlling local 
resources (Saberwal and Rangrajan, 2003; Greenough and Tsing, 2003; Yearley, 1996) 
and maintaining its superior position in decision-making (Blaikie, 2006; Saberwal, 2003; 
Agrawal, 1995), it surrendered to the will of powerful actors who manipulate its 
application and use it to suit their own priorities and interests. Such application of 
science and its subservience to commercial and vested interests results in shaping the 
outcomes of conservation interventions very different from the claims made by the 
global conservation community with regard to sustainable management and use of 
natural resources.  
 
Apart from science, the law served as another platform for the contending parties in both 
imposing the regulations and violating them. I have shown the paradoxical relationship 
between the centre and the state owing to the special constitutional status of J&K, 
posing a situation of direct conflict between the conservationists, central government 
and the J&K state. As discussed in chapter four, separate central and state wildlife laws, 
ambiguities with regard to the understandings of chiru hair and wool, as well as the origin 
of shahtoosh wool became significant points of contestation for the parties involved. This 
resulted in the reluctance on the part of the state agencies to respond to the pressures of 
the international conservation groups and central government, and to delay the 
imposition of the ban in J&K. In the case of the NAP, I have argued that the broad 
objectives of the programme, and policy incoherence provide ample space for politics 
between the forest managers and local populations over the sharing of responsibilities, 
distribution of forest produce, and evaluating the success or performance of programmes 
according to their own priorities (cf. Bene et al., 2009; Sundar et al., 2001). I have 
maintained that although the forest bureaucracy placed an emphasis on decentralised 
management, there are avenues for centralised control over resources (Poffenberger and 
Singh, 1996; Menzies, 1993). For example, the FD retained the power to terminate the 
JFMC membership in case the members fail to perform their responsibilities. Moreover, it 
was noted that the DFO and the field-staff retain the authority in terms of timber 
concession grants to the villagers, depending on the applicant’s performance in abiding 
by the forest regulations and assisting the field-staff in forest conservation. There is also 
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a need for prior approvals by the local communities for availing benefits under the 
programme, determined mainly by the field-staff or the DFO. Irrespective of the legal 
rights available to the forest citizens, the boundaries between legality and illegality are 
often (mis)interpreted by the field-staff for rent seeking opportunities. The misuse of the 
law is also observed when the field-staff curtails the rights of the poorer villagers in the 
name of illegality but transgresses the regulations to benefit the relatively affluent village 
residents.  
 
Uneasy partnerships and collaborations 
Mainstream conservation and development policies often assume cooperation as the 
underlying feature of sustainability but overlook issues of conflicts and contestations in 
natural resource governance. While the NAP envisages an unproblematic relationship 
based on cooperation between the JFMC and the FD, in actual practice, we see problems 
of control over funds and decision-making between the MoEF, the CF, the DFO, field-staff 
and the JFMC Chairperson. As discussed in chapters seven and eight, there are 
bottlenecks in the release of funds to the state FD by the MoEF, to the DFO by the CF and 
to the JFMC by the forester. I have presented contradictory imperatives and claims of the 
senior officials and the field-staff in terms of problems of effective implementation of the 
projects, and between the SFC and the FD in terms of timber harvesting and revenues. In 
Laati and Chapparh, I have shown conflicts between the JFMC and the panchayat on the 
one hand, and emerging cooperation between the DFO and ex-sarpanch as well as 
between the forest field-staff and local elites. Although it is claimed that the JFMC is a 
representative of villagers, we witnessed the emerging hostility between JFMC members 
and ordinary villagers over issues of forest policing and protection.  
 
In the case of shahtoosh, I have discussed the exploitative relationship between 
manufacturers and artisans (chapter three) and the reluctance on the part of 
manufacturers to respond to the demands of workers’ associations for increase in wages 
(chapter four). However, we witnessed that a cooperative relationship started taking 
shape, although for a brief period, between manufacturers and other categories of 
shahtoosh workers, with manufacturers joining the previously formed associations of the 
weavers and motivating their subordinate workers to cooperate in order to challenge 
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and resist the ban. We saw different tactics adopted by the manufacturers to resist the 
ban such as the false promises made by them to increase the wages and abandon the use 
of machines, the display of spinning wheels in demonstrations to publicise the loss of 
traditional occupations, and later corrupting the politicians and enforcement officials in 
order to continue both the use of machines for dehairing and spinning as well as the 
illegal trade of shahtoosh. I argue that by collaborating with each other and engaging in a 
protest movement with subordinate workers against the ban, the manufacturers could 
both publicly obscure their exploitative relations with their employees and also succeed 
in continuing to use machines and the illegal production of shawls.  
 
Split role of the state 
My research findings also substantiate the argument that the ‘state’ rather than being a 
unified entity is heterogeneous in nature and marked with internal complexities and 
divisions (cf. Corbridge et al., 2005; Vira, 1999; Gupta, 1995). While giving an appearance 
of the unity of command, I have explained that the various state actors pursue their own 
agendas and interests, contributing to the politics of contingency in natural resource 
management. The internal divisions within the state may result in unanticipated 
consequences of conservation interventions. Taking into account the heterogeneity of 
the state, I suggest that state actors create situations where there is neither effective 
implementation of conservation regulations nor complete disregard to the laws 
concerning these regulations. This, in turn, lead to perverse incentives such as rent 
seeking opportunities for the local officials (Wardell and Lund, 2006) and formation of 
nexus between political actors, enforcement agencies and the local elites (Bloomer, 
2009; Veron et al., 2006). Corroborating these arguments, this research has 
demonstrated that the state, in practice, has performed a dual role in enforcing forest 
and wildlife regulations as well as contravening them. I have referred to such dual 
performances of the state and its constituents as split role, critical in understanding the 
incongruence between the stated objectives and actual results of nature conservation 
interventions. It is also argued that by weak enforcement of the banning of shahtoosh, 
the J&K state is able to show resistance to the imposition of global agendas and 
interventions. In the case of the NAP, various layers of state actors contravene the stated 
aim of the new policy and resist effective devolution of power. Furthermore, the 
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enforcement officials in both cases perform a divided role of law enforcement along with 
allowing, ignoring or even participating in ‘illegal’ trade in natural resources (cf. 
Dauvergne, 1997). In line with the arguments of scholars (such as Vasan, 2006; Corbridge 
et al., 2005; Mahanty, 2002; Vira, 1999) in relation to local state performances in 
different parts of India, my study shows that the field-staff in J&K faces a challenging 
situation of acting as forest police as well as maintaining friendly relations with the fellow 
village residents.  
 
I have discussed in chapter four that the J&K state continued to delay the imposition of 
the ban on shahtoosh but, having lost the legal battle (and succumbing to international 
pressures), ultimately submitted to the international will. I have also shown that the 
imposition of the ban in 2002 resulted in party politics with the ruling party, NC (National 
Conference), having little leverage after the decision of the J&K High Court. The main 
opposition party, the PDP (People’s Democratic Party) demanded the lifting up of the ban 
and criticised the party in power for its inability to resist the will of the central 
government and for neglecting the issues of livelihoods as well as cultural heritage. 
However, when the PDP came to power in 2003, it did not take the issues of alternative 
livelihoods and rehabilitation seriously but instead resorted to weak enforcement of the 
ban which mainly helped the manufacturers and traders. While the ban had a direct 
bearing on the livelihoods of poor skilled workers whose voice and concerns were rarely 
addressed in the legal battle, I have explained that the strong nexus between politicians, 
manufacturers and traders succeeded not only in persuading the state to delay the 
imposition of the ban but also in allowing illegal trade to continue. The enforcement 
officials as well as politicians saw this as another opportunity for rent seeking in the 
already corrupt system of governance in J&K. 
 
In the case of implementation of the NAP, I have argued that the state FD, while 
welcoming project funds coming from the centre, has been reluctant in devolving actual 
powers to the local communities. At the field level, as explained in chapter seven and 
illustrated in chapter eight, the forest field-staff plays a crucial role in determining the 
access of various actors in the village to the forest resources, including timber, fuelwood 
and fodder. While there are strict regulations in relation to forest use and management 
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to restrict the access of villagers, the field-staff could be seen transgressing the law in 
various ways: by misappropriating the project funds for NAP activities; by allowing the 
village residents to collect forest resources ‘illegally’ in the times of need; by charging 
higher fees for timber concession permits; by suggesting tactics for illegal timber 
harvesting in lieu of bribery; by allowing relatively powerful villagers to encroach forest 
lands; and by turning a blind eye to the destruction of forests by para-military forces. I 
have argued that the state appears to align with the rationality of the conservation 
community in terms of promoting participation, partnership and decentralisation in 
forest management but various state actors, especially the field-staff, are able to secure 
their respective interests amidst changing discourses and policies coming from ‘above’.  
 
I have maintained that the power of the conservation community is confronted with the 
power of both the local state actors and differently positioned social groups within 
resource dependent populations that, in turn, shape the outcome of nature conservation 
policies. The split role of the state is decisive in the complex process of transmission of 
conservation policies to the local worlds. The state actors in the process of policy 
implementation create avenues whereby resource dependent populations cooperate, 
negotiate and contest for access to and use of resources. In the case of J&K, I have shown 
that these state practices generated the politics of contingency in relation to natural 
resource management, again suggesting the dispersed and fluid nature of power. 
 
Differential impact, differential abilities 
Since communities are not homogenous, the impact of conservation interventions is 
likely to be differential on different social groups within the affected communities. The 
differential impact of nature conservation policies also leads to different kinds of 
conforming and resisting behaviours of differently positioned shahtoosh workers and 
village residents. While it is important not to characterise less powerful actors as passive, 
Rossi (2004: 26) argues that there is a difference between framing the terms of reference 
and being able to manipulate dominant orders of discourse subversively. Indeed, the lack 
of access to resources results less from people’s lack of formally defined rights, but their 
incapacity to make claims ‘stick’ against those of more powerful actors (Leach et al., 
1999: 241, see also Ramirez, 1999). These policies even run the risk of emboldening local 
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elites who capture the substantial portion of benefits as well as being able to access 
forest produce illegally (Dressler et al., 2010; Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007; 
Collins, 2007). 
 
I have argued that the ban has affected poor artisans more severely in comparison to the 
manufacturers, traders and agents. As observed in chapter five, various strategies are 
adopted by the manufacturers and their agents to exploit the poor artisans: by deducting 
wages; by supplying work to rural artisans to minimise production costs; and by supplying 
wool instead of cash to control labour. I also explained that raw wool traders created 
artificial shortages to increase the price of raw wool, and using dehairing and spinning 
machines to reduce labour costs. I have argued that while the powerful actors have 
devised various ways to compensate for the losses after the ban, the poor skilled workers 
have been unsuccessful in securing their interests. They either work for their 
manufacturers to produce shahtoosh illegally for reduced wages or if they try to 
compensate for the losses by resorting to tactics, such as adulteration of wool, they do 
not succeed because their employers are able to detect the adulterated threads. I have 
also explained that while males have suffered from their loss of incomes and social 
status, females have additionally experienced a decline in their decision-making power 
and recognition in the family.  
 
In the case of the NAP, as discussed in chapter eight, although the forest cover has 
increased (as claimed by forest officials and villagers) in the last few years, the villagers’ 
access to forest produce has reduced. However, again we saw differential access of 
villagers to forest resources and differential abilities to transgress the laws in connivance 
with the forest officials. While the relatively affluent are able to access timber and 
fuelwood easily by bribing the field-staff, it is the poorer who suffer the most from the 
increased restrictions on forest use. Based on these observations, I have argued that the 
new conservation interventions, in fact, have seeped into the existing relations of 
domination and subordination within the local communities along with entrenching the 
gap between enforcement officials and the poorer citizens in J&K. In both cases, I have 
demonstrated that the state has served the interests of the powerful actors and local 
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elites rather than the poor and marginalised, who are left to bear the cost of nature 
conservation and protection. 
 
Rationality of rule 
This thesis has maintained that while conservation policies create an appearance of 
agreement about environmental management, they do not necessarily change the belief 
systems of the affected populations (cf. Singh, 2008). The research has pointed to the 
limitations of the power of conservation community by demonstrating that it is actually 
the rationality of the powerful stream at the microlevel which determines the behaviour 
of the local communities. As I illustrated in the case of shahtoosh ban, the knowledge of 
the unsavoury origin of shahtoosh wool is limited to the powerful players. The 
unpopularity of the ban and the persistence of myths relating to the origin of shahtoosh 
even after the imposition of the ban suggest that the global rationality is understood, 
accepted and shaped by the local actors according to their own interests. We saw that 
the shahtoosh workers challenge the genuineness of the premise on which the ban is 
based. It is the perception of powerful manufacturers and traders which dominate the 
local belief systems and govern their behaviours in conforming or transgressing the 
boundaries of legality.  
 
In the case of the NAP, I also demonstrated that there is a lack of awareness among the 
villagers about the objectives of the programme, and the role and functioning of the 
JFMC. Here, the behaviour of the people related to access of forest resources is largely 
determined by the field-staff. I have noted several information asymmetries among the 
JFMC members and villagers with regard to what is ‘legal’ and what is ‘illegal’. By 
maintaining such uncertainties, I have argued, the field-staff is able to exploit the poor 
for rent seeking. Moreover, the JFMC members who are claimed to be equal partners 
under the NAP know little about the funds available for project activities. In fact, they 
have been misguided by the field-staff both on the funds available for the entry point 
activities as well as the incentives to join the programme. This suggests that conservation 
discourses can ‘project an appearance of unified potency even while being effectively 
divided and weak in practice’ (Singh, 2008: 14). From both cases, we can conclude that it 
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is the rationality of local powerful actors which largely rules rather than the legal and 
scientific rationality of the conservation community. 
 
On illegality 
All negotiation processes reflect prevailing power relations and it could be argued that if 
powerful groups do not achieve their desired outcome through open negotiation, they 
are likely to achieve their ends through other means (Leach et al., 1999: 241). In this 
research, I have argued that the ban has officially been imposed on the state but the 
production and trade of shahtoosh still continues (although in lesser volume), owing to a 
strong nexus between manufacturers, politicians and enforcement officials. The poor 
also resort to illegal production of shahtoosh, however, I argue that their indulgence 
cannot be explained only as a result of poor economic conditions (Chatterjee, 2004), 
absence of alternative livelihoods (Brown and Marks, 2007; Wiggins et al., 2004; Peluso, 
1993) or a ‘coping strategy’ (Bloomer, 2009). Non-compliance decisions, as Leon (1994) 
suggests, have elements of both self and collective interests, and the relationship 
between the two varies according to the type of illegal behaviour. Factors such as 
poverty and loss of livelihoods certainly play a significant role in the transgression of law 
by the poor artisans but I suggest that their indulgence in illegality is primarily 
determined by the manufacturers who control the production of shahtoosh and delegate 
the now illegal tasks of processing to their entrusted subordinate workers. I have termed 
this process as delegated illegality. Although I do not suggest that the poor skilled 
workers are compelled by their employers to undertake these jobs, their participation 
could be seen as an obligation on their part to take the orders of their employers for 
whom they have been working for generations. In the case of forest conservation, I have 
explained that while the poor villagers resort to illegal timber felling, it is more to meet 
their subsistence needs. Apart from the local village residents, I have argued that it is the 
powerful stream including the forest field-staff, police, military forces and timber 
contractors who carry out illegal timber harvesting for profit making. I have also noted 
that on some occasions, the forest field-staff has assisted the relatively affluent village 
residents to access timber illegally. Oddly enough, those who are authorised to protect 
forest citizens and their resources are the ones who are playing a significant role in forest 
destruction. 
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Limited space for protest 
While I have maintained that nature conservation interventions in J&K cannot be 
understood simply as environmental imperialism or a new form of colonialism pursued 
through coercion, the conservation initiatives can certainly serve as means for the central 
as well as provincial states to assert their authority over environment and resource 
dependent populations. The environmental conservation is rarely seen by states as a goal 
in itself, but rather as means to achieve political as well as economic ends (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997). The conservation interventions can also serve as moral justifications to 
strengthen state military capacity (Peluso, 1993) and legitimise state violence against 
dissenting groups (Neumann 2001; Kothari et al., 1995; Ghimire, 1994). As I explained in 
chapter four, the ongoing militant separatist movement in J&K limited the space of 
association and protest for shahtoosh workers, with the state using its violent powers to 
crush the demonstrations against the ban on the pretext of ‘anti-national’ activity. My 
research has suggested that in regions affected by violence, nature conservation policies 
collide with the ongoing political struggles between the state, militant groups and the 
wider civil society over legitimacy to rule. I have argued that the shrunken space for 
protest in Kashmir was crucial to sidelining the issues of the alternative livelihoods of the 
affected populations. Moreover, the Kashmiri shawl hawkers often face harassment from 
police agencies outside the state where they are seen as suspected terrorists. This 
suggests that the political climate of the state largely shapes the manner in which nature 
conservation interventions are experienced by the affected communities as well as the 
way in which the state responds to the local resistance. 
 
3. Who is accountable? 
 
This research has demonstrated that there are valid ethical arguments in favour of nature 
conservation but it is the poor who bear the burden of conservation costs. While issues 
of environmental protection are top of the agenda for international conservation 
agencies, neither the state nor any other agency is accountable for addressing the 
grievances of the affected populations. In chapter four, I have argued that while the issue 
of chiru conservation was addressed at length in the legal battle, the poorer shawl 
workers remained almost voiceless. Apart from meetings and discussions of the expert 
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committee constituted to explore the prospects of chiru breeding, and observations 
made by the J&K High Court concerning adequate compensation to the artisans in 
Kashmir, no practical efforts were made to provide alternative livelihoods, or 
compensate the artisans. While no substantial efforts were made to experiment with 
chiru breeding, the logistic problems of getting the consent of all signatories of the CITES 
in domesticating chirus for commercial purposes became an impediment in the possible 
collaborative efforts required for the purpose. The Chinese authorities maintained that 
exploring the prospects of chiru breeding for commercial purposes is beyond their 
control (due to the international ban) even if the habitat of chiru falls within the Chinese 
territory. I explained in chapter five that the only initiative for the rehabilitation of 
shahtoosh workers has been taken by the animal rights group, WTI. This programme can 
be seen at best as tokenism owing to its limited coverage and scope. While the 
international agencies did not take the responsibility of adequately addressing the issue 
of rehabilitation of affected communities, the central government passed on the task of 
rehabilitating the shawl workers to the state government. As I have argued, the state 
government remained complacent in providing alternative livelihoods to the shawl 
workers. In addition to this, the state initiatives to promote the shawl industry and to 
help artisans proved futile due to a mismatch between the actual requirements of the 
artisans and the mandates of the various state agencies. 
 
In the case of forest conservation, I have discussed that while there is an apparent 
consensus in the policy rhetoric on the issues of forest conservation through local 
participation and decentralisation, little attention has been paid to the subsistence needs 
of the poorer forest citizens. I have explained that both the colonial and post-colonial 
state considered the local communities as forest destroyers and curtailed their rights to 
access forest produce. In recent times, the local communities have been left on their own 
to cope with the reduced access, either bearing the costs of forest conservation or, at 
best, transgressing the law to meet their subsistence requirements. I argue that unless a 
joint effort on the part of international conservation agencies and national and provincial 
governments is made to undertake the issues of rehabilitation, and unless the 
subsistence needs of the poor are adequately met, the nature conservation policies are 
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unlikely to realise the goals of sustainable resource management or sustainable 
livelihoods. 
 
4. Policy implications 
 
Whilst the research did not aim to generate a list of recommendations for policy-making, 
my findings nonetheless point towards a number of practical implications. I argue that a 
blanket ban not only results in the loss of the livelihoods of affected populations, it may 
also become difficult to overturn it when the population of the endangered species 
begins to rise. Therefore, strategic time bound restrictions can result in sustaining the 
species as well as the livelihoods of the dependent populations. I maintain that there is a 
need to run a simultaneous programme for rehabilitation when conservation measures 
are imposed. This can be done by a collaborative effort on the part of international 
agencies, the central government, provincial state and NGOs to compensate for the 
losses or through the formation of a support body which could take adequate steps in 
this regard. The frontier location of the state, the incidence of the militancy as well as the 
high rate of unemployment necessitate special efforts to address the issues of livelihoods 
if we are to prevent nature conservation interventions fuelling terrorism in the Valley. I 
argue that since the shahtoosh workers were concentrated in one region i.e. Srinagar, a 
timely effort to rehabilitate artisans could have saved the affected population from the 
miseries resulting from the ban. 
 
As discussed in chapter seven, the broad objectives of the NAP create ambiguities 
regarding what is to be achieved through the programme. While conservation of natural 
resources, income generation for the poor, fulfillment of subsistence requirements of the 
villagers, introduction of scientific technologies for forest regeneration and increase in 
biomass can be equally important, there is a need to prioritise and limit the targets to 
make the policy work practically given the limited time period of the projects. The short 
duration of the projects and constant shifts in policies may result in a lack of motivation 
among the villagers to participate in the programmes. The lack of awareness regarding 
the project activities as well as forest regulations and inaccessibility of senior officials 
increase the chances of their exploitation at the hands of field-staff. As argued earlier, 
273 
 
the forest officials not only legitimise their control over the forest resources on the 
pretext of scientific rationality, they use and abuse the law to secure their own interests. 
The choice of species for forest regeneration are often not the ones required by the 
forest dependent communities and the ambiguities in terms of what is ‘legal’ and what is 
not increase their vulnerability to harassment by the enforcement officials. I suggest that 
science and law, rather than serving the interests of the forest bureaucracy, police and 
local elites, should be used in the service of the poor and marginalised communities in 
order to realise sustainable ecological practices. Moreover, the overlap of roles and 
functions of the JFMC and the forest field-staff in forest protection and development 
activities results in blame games. Effective forest conservation policies should be based 
on the idea of increasing the access of the poor to the forest resources rather than 
putting the costs of regeneration of the degraded forest lands on them, especially when 
the reasons for forest degradation are very different from the presumed linkages 
between poverty and environmental destruction as claimed in mainstream literature. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have demonstrated that power is not concentrated in a single site but is 
dispersed and fluid, and that nature conservation interventions rather than resulting in 
fixed and determined outcomes are accepted, resisted and reconfigured by various 
actors at multiple levels. I have argued that although there are valid arguments in favour 
of conserving both chirus and forests, it is the poor that bear the brunt of nature 
conservation costs. While the relatively powerful actors are able to manipulate the laws 
and regulations depending on their differential power and abilities, the poor suffer from 
the loss of traditional occupations or reduced access to forest resources. In the case of 
conflict regions like J&K, I argue that these conservation interventions may also coincide 
with the ongoing struggles between the state and citizens on the question of legitimacy 
to rule as well as with the attempts of the historically powerful actors to dominate the 
poor and marginalised. Although much intellectual energy has been spent on advocating 
or challenging global control over local resources, little effort has been made to 
emphasise the need of wider responsibility for recompensing the losses of the resource 
dependent populations. If the demands for saving chirus from extinction or regenerating 
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degraded forest areas are pressing, equally pressing, I insist, are the issues of the 
livelihoods of the poor artisans and the subsistence requirements of the forest 
dependent populations who are somehow trying to survive in the already fragile 
economy of J&K. There is no reason to deny the need and significance of global concern 
for conserving forest and wildlife resources; however, I suggest, global resource control 
without matching accountability to the affected communities is unlikely to meet the 
goals of sustainable resource management. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
             
Map of chiru habitat (Schaller, 1997) 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
          
Picture 1: Raw shahtoosh wool 
 
 
        
Picture 2: Dehairing machine in Srinagar 
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Picture 3: Perkumgor strengthening the spun thread using pritz 
 
 
    
Picture 4: Penkumgors stretching the threads using iron rods 
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Picture 5: Barangor couple combing threads and making warp 
 
                 
 
Picture 6: Vovers in a karkhana, Srinagar 
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Picture 7: Washed shawls along the banks of the Jhelum river, Srinagar 
 
 
         
Picture 8: Raffugar mending holes in a shawl 
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Picture 9: Rangrez dyeing a pashmina shawl 
 
 
       
 Picture 10: The coloured samples for dyeing spun threads 
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Picture 11: Chappawal using a wooden block to print a pashmina shawl 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 12: Ragbars in Khanmulla village 
316 
 
 
       
 Picture 13: Ragbar working on an intricately embroidered shawl using golden silk thread 
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 Picture 14: Steam ironing and finishing of a shawl 
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APPENDIX III 
 
    
 
              
Picture 1: A view from Chapparh 
 
 
             
Picture 2: Forest closure in Chapparh village 
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Picture 3: Munshi, an agriculturalist, Chapparh with grandchildren 
 
 
                
Picture 4: Seebu, a Gujjar pastoralist, Laati, with daughter-in-law and grandchildren  
320 
 
 
            
Picture 5: Mohammed Aslam and Tirth Ram, pastoralists, Laati 
 
 
 
Picture 6: Dry fodder for cattle, Laati 
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Picture 7: Shankari Devi, a ‘Below Poverty Line’ resident, Chapparh 
 
 
      
 Picture 8: Women collecting dry twigs and firewood, Baskar Forest, Chapparh 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
List of shahtoosh seizures (IFAW and WTI, 2001) 
 
S.No. Date of Seizure 
 
Place of Seizure Goods Seized Qty/No. 
1 1992 Arjinshan Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 168 No.s 
2 1992 Italy Shahtoosh Wool 500 Kg. 
3 1992 Near Arjinshan Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 1300 No.s 
4 April 1992 Germu, China Chiru Hides 21 No.s 
5 April 1993 Arjinshan Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 1200 No.s 
6 June 1993 Raxaul, Indo-Nepal border Shahtoosh Wool 100 Kg 
7 May, 1993 Germu, China Chiru Hides 369 No.s 
8 18.01.1994 IGI Airport, Delhi Shahtoosh Wool 107 Kg 
9 18.01.1994 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 1600 No.s 
10 28.01.1994 Lawrence Road, Delhi Shahtoosh Wool 400 + Kg 
11 19.02.1994 East MotiBagh, Delhi Shahtoosh Wool .05 Kg 
12 25.02.1994 Calcutta Airport Shahtoosh Shawl 7 No.s 
13 11.05.1994 MajnooKaTila, Delhi Shahtoosh Wool - 
14 15.07.1994 Karol Bagh, Delhi Shahtoosh Wool 16 Kg 
15 5.12 1994 Darjeeling, West Bengal Shahtoosh Wool 185 Kg 
16 1994 Shops in France Shahtoosh Shawl 283 No.s 
17 1994 Shops in France Shahtoosh Shawl 121 No.s 
18 1994 Shops in France Shahtoosh Shawl 213 No.s 
19 December, 1994 Indo-Nepal Border, Nepal Shahtoosh Wool 33 kg 
20 1995 Pashupati Nagar, Nepal Raw Wool 190 kg 
21 1995 Tatopani Custom, Nepal Raw Wool 115 kg 
22 1994/1995 Belgium Shahtoosh Shawl 31 No.s 
23 1994/1995 UK Shahtoosh Shawl 34 No.s 
24 1994/95 Hongkong Shahtoosh Shawl 100 No.s 
25 February, 1995 Milan, Italy Shahtoosh Shawl 42 No.s 
26 23.12.1995 Lajpat Nagar, Delhi Shahtoosh Shawl 172 No.s 
27 January – April, 1996 Arjinshan Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 1100 No.s 
28 01.05.1996 MangAi, China Chiru Hides 400 No.s 
29 May 1996 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 100 No.s 
30 07.07.1996 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 540 No.s 
31 08.11.1996 Oberoi Hotel, Delhi Shahtoosh Shawl 10 No.s 
32 12.11.1996 IGI Airport, Delhi Shahtoosh Shawl 12 No.s 
33 15.11.1996 DilliHaat, Delhi Shahtoosh Shawl 5 No.s 
34 15.11.1996 J&K Govt. Emporium, Calcutta Shahtoosh Shawl 3 No.s 
35 21.02.1997 London, UK Shahtoosh Shawl 138 No.s 
36 Summer 1997 Ali Custom Post, Tibet Raw Wool 684.5 kg  
37 July 1997 Tibet, China Shahtoosh Wool 400 kg  
38 July – August 1997 Arjinshan Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 300 No.s 
39 29.11.1997 Kekexili Nature Reserve,China Chiru Hides 469 No.s 
40 18.12.1997 Furama Hotel, Hongkong Shahtoosh Shawl 186 No.s 
41 1998 Tatopani customs, Nepal Raw Wool 218 kg 
42 11.2.1998 Bangalore, Karnataka, India Shahtoosh Shawl 4 No.s 
43 21.2.1998 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 44 No.s 
44 April 1998 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 100 No.s 
45 27.4.1998 IGI Airport, New Delhi Shawls 7 
46 29.5.1998 HauzKhas, New Delhi Shawls 46 
47 June 1998 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 259 No.s 
48 29.7.1998 Santushti Shopping Complex,  
New Delhi 
Shawls 17 
49 13.12.1998 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 273 No.s 
50 1999 Tatopani customs, Nepal Raw Wool 20 kg 
51 1999 Unknown location on Tibet-Nepal  Raw Wool 150 kg 
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Border 
52 26.2.1999 IGI Airport, New Delhi Shawls 9 
53 6.3.1999 ChandniChowk, New Delhi Shawls 159 
54 14.3.1999 IGI Airport, New Delhi Shawls 13 
55 17.3.1999 ChandiniChowk, New Delhi Shawls 96 
56 17.3.1999 Greater Kailash I , New Delhi Shawls 13 
57 April 1999 Near Arjinshan Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 426 No.s 
58 10.4.1999 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 105 No.s 
59 19.4.1999 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 44 No.s 
60 June-July 1999 Arjinshan Nature eserve, China Chiru Hides 956 No.s 
61 June-July 1999 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 320 No.s 
62 13.8.1999 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 1061 No.s 
63 31.10.1999 South Delhi Shawls 10 
64 28.11.1999 South Delhi Border of antique 
shawl 
1 
65 23.12.1999 Delingha, China Chiru Hides 110 No.s 
66 30.12.1999 Germu, China Chiru Hides 341 No.s 
67 5.1.2000 Gonghe, China Chiru Hides 155 No.s 
68 11.1.2000 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 99 No.s 
69 4.2.2000 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 73 No.s 
70 19.2.2000 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 828 No.s 
71 23.3.2000 Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi Shawls 7 
72 27.3.2000 Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi Shawls 7 
73 16.5.2000 Kekexili Nature Reserve, China Chiru Hides 544 No.s 
74 November 2000 Minfeng County XAR, China Chiru Hides 105 No.s 
75 26.12.2000 Hualong, Qinghai, China Chiru Hides 941 No.s 
76 6.2.2001 South Extn, New Delhi Shawls 65 
77 27.3.2001 Tibet-Nepal border, Nepal Raw wool 39 kg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
